JUDGMENT S.K. Dubey, J -- 1. This is an appeal against the conviction of the appellant/accused under section 161, Indian Penal Code, and section 5 (1) (d) and (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short, the' Act), and sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000;- and, in default, to further undergo six months' imprisonment, recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Sheopur Kalan, District Morena, in Special Criminal Case No. 3/1985, decided on 2.4.1987. 2. Brief facts leading to the case are thus; The appellant was an Assistant District Inspector of Schools (for short, 'ADI') and was posted at Karahal; private students were allowed to appear in examinations of Class Vth through Informal Institutions; PW.2 Moharsingh and PW 3 Harendrasingh Chouhan were respectively Assistant Teacher and Teacher of Semalda Haveli and Mayapur. Informal Institutions, who used to get from Government Rs. 50/- as an incentive per private student, it was necessary for the private student to declare his date of birth as also the fact that he is not a regular student and appearing as a private candidate. Therefore, to get the amount of incentive PW.2 Moharsingh and PW 3. Harendrasingh used to take interest to see that the forms or such students are cleared and they are allowed to appear in the examination. PW.2 and PW.3 sent the forms of the private candidates of their institutions in February 1984; on scrutiny some were rejected by the appellant. Hence, the two teachers approached the District Education Officer, a superior officer of the ADI, who granted special permission on 5.4.1984 for appearing such students in the examinations which were going to begin from 11.4.1984. 3. The prosecution alleged that for allowing the students the appellant demanded Rs. 200/- as bribe from PW.2and PW.3 on 9.4.1984; P.W. 2and P.W.3 gave Rs. 100/- at the residence of Jag dish Kumar, the Head Master of the school (the co-accused who was acquitted by the trial Court) and agreed to pay the balance amount on the next day at the residence of PW. 2. Thereafter, PW.2 and P.W.3 filed a written complaint (Ext. 100/- at the residence of Jag dish Kumar, the Head Master of the school (the co-accused who was acquitted by the trial Court) and agreed to pay the balance amount on the next day at the residence of PW. 2. Thereafter, PW.2 and P.W.3 filed a written complaint (Ext. P/3) to the Additional Collector, Pukhraj Maru (PW.5) of demand of bribe by the appellant stating therein that the permission granted by the District Educaiton Officer is not being recognised by the appellant and a threat has been given that the appellant will not allow the students, if the amount is not paid on 10.4.1984. 4. PW. 5 and PW. 9 laid a trap on 10.4.1984; for that PW. 5 and PW. 9 initiated two notes of Rs. 20/- and six notes of Rs. 10/- each (Articles A to H), but the appellant on 10.4.1984 did not reach the place to take the amount of gratification. The examination began on 11.4.1984 at 7.00 a.m., in which all the students including those who got the special permission from District Education Officer, appeared. It is alleged that the appellant threatened to with-hold the result; hence, the balance amount of Rs. 100/- was given by PW. 2 and PW. 3 near a flour mill of one Siddiqui Mohammad (PW. 1); there, on receipt, the notes were given by the appellant to co-accused Jagdish, who put them in his pocket. At this juncture, PW. 2 gave an indication by scratching his head, to PW. 9 Gayaprasad Mishra of the trap party, who was nearby, came and made a search of both the accused; from the pocket of co-accused Jugdish Rs. 540.30 p. including the notes (Articles A to H) were received a list of 24 students (Ext. P/8) was also recovered. In the presence of 'panchas' PW. 1 Siddique Mohammad and PW. 7 Jugraj, a seizure memo (Ext. P/8), seizing notes (Articles A to H) was prepared. Nothing was recovered from the appellant. A 'panchanama' was also prepared by PW. 5 and PW. 9 at the spot, P.W. 9 Gayaprasad Mishra lodged a first information report (Ext. P/13) at Police Station Sheopur, where a case at crime No. 78/1984 under S. 161, IPC, and S. 5 (1) (d) and (2) of the Act was registered against both the accused. After completing the investigation and obtaining sanction (Ext. 5 and PW. 9 at the spot, P.W. 9 Gayaprasad Mishra lodged a first information report (Ext. P/13) at Police Station Sheopur, where a case at crime No. 78/1984 under S. 161, IPC, and S. 5 (1) (d) and (2) of the Act was registered against both the accused. After completing the investigation and obtaining sanction (Ext. P/10), signed by Upendra Nath Sahane (not examined) to prosecute the appellant, 'challan' was filed against both the accused. 5. During trial, the prosecution examined PW. 1 Siddique Mohammad, PW. 2 Moharsingh, PW. 3 Harendrasingh, PW. 4 Dilipsingh, PW. 5 Pukhraj Maru, the then Additional Collector, PW. 6 Kailash Narain, PW. 7 Jugraj, PW. 8 Tejbali Dubey and PW. 9 Gayaprasad Mishra, the then SDO (P). P-W. 1 and PW. 7 did not support the prosecution. The appellant denied the charges and raised of false implication because of enmity of the two teachers PW. 2 and PW. 3 as the appellant was discharging his functions honestly by scrutinising the forms, resulting in loss of Rs. 50/- per form to the teacher. A pica of 'alibi' was also raised by saying that at the time of trap, he was taking his meals in a hotel, from where he was called and his signatures were obtained; DW.1 Mahesh was examined to prove that in between 11.00 a.m. and 12 noon on 11.4.1984 the indentification parade (para 4) held by PW 12 Surajmal, Naib Tahsildar on 4.1.1984. He asserts in the Court that he was assaulted by Anand Singh with a Farsa (para 10). This was not said by him in his police statement marked Ex. D/5. PW-3 Shyamubai, however, says that PW-6 was assaulted by Jatalsingh. The medical report (Ex. P/32), however, does not confirm any injury by Farsa. Moreover, he did not state any marks of description on the basis of which, he may properly indentify the assailants (para 21). There is no explanation either with regard to delay of 15 days caused in holding the test indentification. In short. PW - 6 does not inspire confidence. 15. PW-l Balram and PW-5 Peera, both had an axe to grind and had positive animus to implicate falsely (para 11 of PW -5). On going through their statements, we find that they do not appear to be the witnesses of truth. In short. PW - 6 does not inspire confidence. 15. PW-l Balram and PW-5 Peera, both had an axe to grind and had positive animus to implicate falsely (para 11 of PW -5). On going through their statements, we find that they do not appear to be the witnesses of truth. Their versions, when subjected to close scrutiny, do not portrary rustic simplicity, but have an indelible stamp of pi aimed deceit and design. PW-2 Kamalabai and PW-3 Shyamubai are also found to be equally unreliable. The First Information Report does not show particularisation of weapons. PW-2 attempts to do so (para 1) only to be contradicted by PW -1 as also' by PW -3. If incident was witnessed, then where was the occasion to enquire from the deceased (para 2 of PW-1).? This means that the claim of being an eye-witness or a material witness for that matter is false. State v. Indoriya (1990 Weekly Note II-185). The deceased named only three. The witnesses foisted the case on twelve. We have carefully read the statements of all these witnesses ourselves. On this kind of evidence, we think, it is highly dangerous to sustain the conviction of as many as twelve persons when there are strong circumstances indicative of false implication. Then: is no way of separating the grain from the chaff inasmuch as even the overt act attributed to Anandsingh by PW -6 and Jatalsingh by PW -3 is falsified by the medical report (Ex. P/32). We do not find any serious effort on the part of the Court below to make even an attempt to shift the grain from the chaff and even if we were to assume that Court did make such an attempt then we can say that in so doing the Court has accepted the chaff and rejected the grain. We have, thus, no hesitation in rejecting the statements of these principal winesses as thoroughly unreliable and untrustworthy. 16. There is yet another circumstance. None is arrested before 20.12.83. The incident is of 18.12.83. The First Information Report is said to have been registered at 3.00 P.M. on 18.12.1983. The defence has seriously challenged the time of death as also criticised the delay in registration of the offence. In these circumstances, particularly it was obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove prompt compliance of section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The First Information Report is said to have been registered at 3.00 P.M. on 18.12.1983. The defence has seriously challenged the time of death as also criticised the delay in registration of the offence. In these circumstances, particularly it was obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove prompt compliance of section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This has admittedly been not done. This, therefore, leads to an inference that the First information Report is ante-timed and has been brought into existence after due deliberation about incorporation of the names of the appellants therein. How else can such a doubt be dispelled? It is pertinent to refer the case of Chakki reported in Chhakki v. State ( 1990 JLJ 772 ) which clearly laid down that the First Information Report becomes doubtful when compliance of provision of section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not shown. In these circumstances, considerable doubt about genuineness of the First Information Report is thus, appellant was taking his meals in his hotel. 6. The trial Court, after evaluating the evidence, convicted the appellant and acquitted co-accused Jagdish, holding that though the notes were recovered from his pocket, which were given by the appellants, no demand of bribe was made by Jagdish, nor he was authorised to grant permission to allow students in the examinations. 7. Shri B.L. Bhargava, counsel for the appellant, and Shri C.S. Dixit, Deputy Govt. Advocate for the State, were heard. Records perused. 8. The appellant's counsel placing reliance on Gokulchand Dwarkadas v. The King. AIR 1948 PC 82; Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1954 SC 637 ; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab. AIR 1958 SC 124 ; PC Joshi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1961 SC 387 , attacked on the validity or the sanction (Ext. P/10) to prosecute. It contended that the sanction was granted mechanically, which does not disclose the facts constituting the offence and the applicability of mind of the sanctioning authority. Though no particular form, or design or set of words has been prescribed for a valid sanction, the sanctioning authority is required to go through all relevant material placed before it to form an opinion that the fact are such which constitute the offence. Though no particular form, or design or set of words has been prescribed for a valid sanction, the sanctioning authority is required to go through all relevant material placed before it to form an opinion that the fact are such which constitute the offence. The sanction must reflect that there was a deliberate decision of the sanctioning authority for ordering prosecution, if it is not reflected from the order, the prosecution must prove the same by extraneous evidence. 9. The Act was intended to suppress bribery and corruption in public administration and it contains stringent provisions. Section 4 of the Act raises presumption, unless the contrary is proved by the accused in respect of offence punishable under S. 161 and 163, IPC, or all the offences referred to in clause (a) to clause (d) of sub-sec. (1) of S. 5 of the Act. Section 6 prescribes a condition precedent that the Court should not take cognizance of an offence without previous sanction of the competent authority, without which a public servant cannot be prosecuted for offences specified in the section. 10. In case of K. Veeraswami v. Union of India, (1991)3 SCC 655, the Apex Court in para 28 has observed that the competent authority has to examine independently and impartially the material on record to form his own opinion whether the offence alleged is frivolous or vexatious. The competent authority may refuse sanction for prosecution if the offence alleged has no material to support or it is frivolous or intended to harrase the honest officer. But he is duty bound to grant sanction if the material collected lends credence to the offence complained or. When a public servant is prosecuted for an offence, which challanges his honesty and integrity, the issue in such a case is not only between the prosecutor and the offender, but the State is also vitally concerned with it as affectes the morale of public servants and also the administrative interest of the State. The discretion to prosecute public servant is taken away from the prosecuting agency and is vested in the authority which is competent to remove the public servant. The discretion to prosecute public servant is taken away from the prosecuting agency and is vested in the authority which is competent to remove the public servant. The authority competent to remove the public servant would be in a better position than the prosecuting agency to assess the material collected in a dispassionate and reasonable manner and determine whether sanction for prosecution of a public servant deserves to be granted or not. 11. In case of P.C. Joshi v. State of U.P. (supra) the Apex Court ruled that mere production of a document which sets out the names of the persons to be prosecuted and the provisions of the statute alleged to be contravened and purporting to bear the signature of an officer competent to grant the sanction where such sanction is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction, does not invest the Court with jurisdiction to try the offence. If the facts which constitute 'the charge, do not appear on the face of the sanction, it must be established by extrane6us evidence that these facts were placed before the authority competent to grant sanction and that the authority applied his mind to those facts before giving sanction. 12. The prosecution has proved the sanction (Ext. P/10) signed by one Upendra Nath Sahane, who was not the sanctioning authority, by examining the sanctioning authority P W. 8 Tejbali Dubey, who also produced the note-sheet (Ext. P/9). Both the document are quoted verbatim :- Ext. 12. The prosecution has proved the sanction (Ext. P/10) signed by one Upendra Nath Sahane, who was not the sanctioning authority, by examining the sanctioning authority P W. 8 Tejbali Dubey, who also produced the note-sheet (Ext. P/9). Both the document are quoted verbatim :- Ext. P/9 **egksn;] Vkmu bUlisDVj ‘;ksiqjdyka dh vksj ls nhoku th ¼iqfyl½ dk;kZy; esa mifLFkr gq, FksA mUgsa Jh frokjh] fuyfEcr ,-Mh-vkbZ-,l- eqjSuk ds fo#) U;k;ky; esa pkyku is’k djus gsrq bl dk;kZy; dh vuqerh pkgh gSA lacaf/kr ,-Mh-vkbZ-,l- ds fu;qfDr drkZ vf/kdkjh laHkkxh; vf/kdkjh gSA vr% muds fo#) U;k;ky; eas pkyku izLrqr djus gsrq vuqerh nsus ds fy, ;g dk;kZy; l{ke gSA izdj.k vkns’kkFkZ izLrqr gSA mi- f’k-l vuqerh nh tkuk mfpr gksxkA gLrk- ¼vi-½ 8-8-85 ,Xt- ih- 10 **dk;kZy; la;qDr lapkyd yksd f’k{k.k Xokfy;j laHkkx ØekadA f’kdk;rA 84-70 909 Xok- fnukad 8-8-85 izfr] uxj fujh{kd iqfyl LVs’ku ‘;ksjiqjdyka ¼eqjSuk½ fo”k; Jh ch-,l- frokjh] ,-Mh-vkbZ-,l- ¼fuyfEcr½ ds fo#) U;k;ky; esa pkyku is’k djus dh vuqerh ckorA lUnHkZ && vkidk i=kad 1643@85 fnukad 5-8-85 ds Øe esaA mDr lanfHkZr i= ds Øe esa Jh ckyeqdqUn frokjh] lgk] ftyk ‘kk[kk fujh{kd ¼fuyfEcr½ ds fo#) U;k;ky; eas pkyku is’k djus gsrq vkids }kjk bl dk;kZy; ls vuqefr pkgh xbZ gSA tks bl dk;kZy; }kjk pkyku izLrqr djus dh vuqerh nh tkrh gSA gLrk- ¼vi-½ la;qDr lapkyd] —rs yksd f’k{k.k] Xokfy;j laHkkx izfrfyfi % & ftyk f’k{k.k vf/kdkjh] eqjSuk dh vksj muds i=kad 491 fnukad 6-8-85 ds lanHkZ esa lwpukFkZ izsf”krA gLrk- la;qDr lapkyd] —rs yksd f’k{k.k] Xokfy;j laHkkx A look to Ext. P/10 shows that it does not give any indication that Before grant of sanction the sanctioning authority applied it" mind. The authority granted sanction on mere asking by a Head Constable of Police; a note-sheet was then prepared which was approved by PW8, who deposed at the trial that a letter (Ext. P/8) dated 6.8.1985 from District Education Officer for grant of sanction and wireless message received from SDO (P). The Constable who came with the case diary, wanted that the sanction to prosecute he given; hence, on satisfying from the case Diary, sanction was given by him on the note-sheet (Ext. P/9). 13. Neither from the sanction nor from the note-sheet, it appears that before grant of sanction, PW8, had examined the facts and the material collected in the case diary. P/9). 13. Neither from the sanction nor from the note-sheet, it appears that before grant of sanction, PW8, had examined the facts and the material collected in the case diary. Even PW.8 has not stated that before approval of sanction he was satisfied prima facie that there was material for constituting the offence. The extraneous evidence produced docs not also disclose that the sanctioning authority was satisfied that the material collected lends credence to the offence complained of. 14. It is settled that grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise hut a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to Government servant against frivolous prosecution and must, therefore, he strictly applied with, before any prosecution can he launched against a public servant; therefore, from the sanction and extraneous evidence produced, it is not proved that the sanctioning authority was satisfied that the prosecution against the accused should he launched, because of the appellant receiving a bribe. In the circumstances, the prosecution launched was without valid sanction and, therefore, the cognizance taken by the Special Judge was completely without jurisdiction; hence, the prosecution has to he quashed. For that I place reliance on Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1979 SC677. The appeal is entitled to succeed on this point alone; hut I consider it proper to record my decision on merits of the case also. 15. On merits, in my opinion, the prosecution has failed to prove the case. Admittedly, against acquittal of Jagdish, co-accused from whom the notes were seized, the State has not preferred any appeal. Even assuming for argument's sake that the notes were given to the appellant by PW2. and PW.3 and the appellant, in turn, gave to co-accused Jagdish the question whether the appellant had any motive to take the bribe or whether there was any occasion for him to take bribe, has to he examined. The overall assessment of the matter discloses that the prosecution story was not true. The reason for giving bribe was for obtaining permission of the appellant to allow students to appear in the examination, which was refused by him. PW. 2 and PW. 3 on refusal to grant permission by the appellant, obtained special permission on 5.4.1984 from the superior officer. The student" appeared in the examinations. Therefore, the story which was not in the complaint (Ext. PW. 2 and PW. 3 on refusal to grant permission by the appellant, obtained special permission on 5.4.1984 from the superior officer. The student" appeared in the examinations. Therefore, the story which was not in the complaint (Ext. P/3), was developed during trial, that the appellant threatened to withhold the result. Besides, if the appellant had agreed to take bribe, he would have reached the agreed place, date and time, but he did not dl; so. As PW.2 and PW.3 wanted to any-how implicate the appellant, it is stand that after the examinations were over, while on way, the notes were given to appellant, who gave to co-accused Jagdish, who put the same in his packet. If the appellant received and handled the notes, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the fact by positive evidence by way of phenolphthalein that, which is the surest test to detect the handling of notes, as said by the Apex Court in case of Raghubir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1976 SC 91 = 1976 Cri. L.J. 172. "where a trap is laid for public servant, it is desirable that the market currency notes, which are used for the purpose of trap, are treated with phenolphthalein powder so that the handling of such marked currency notes by the public servant can be detected by chemical process and the Court does not have to depend on oral evidence which is sometimes of a dubious character for the purpose of deciding the fate of the public servant." 16. No doubt, there is a presumption under S. 4 of the Act which a person, accused of the offence under S. 5 of the Act, has to discharge. A public officer has no right to demand any bribe; but when he is hauled up before a Criminal Court to answer a charge of having taken illegal gratification, the question whether any motive for payment or acceptance of bribe at all existed, is certainly a relevant and a material fact for consideration. A public officer has no right to demand any bribe; but when he is hauled up before a Criminal Court to answer a charge of having taken illegal gratification, the question whether any motive for payment or acceptance of bribe at all existed, is certainly a relevant and a material fact for consideration. What has to be proved in an offence under S. 161, IPC, is the essence of obtaining or acceptance by a public servant, of a gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do an official act or for showing or forbearing to show any favour or dis-favour to any person or for rendering any service or disservice to him. (See Madan Mohan Singh's case. AIR 1954 SC (37)(supra). 17. In the present case, there is no proof of motive for payment or acceptance of bribe, as much earlier to the alleged demand of bribe by the appellant for granting the permission for appearing in the examination to those students, whose forms were rejected, special permission was already granted by the District Education Officer on 5.4.1984, and in pursuance of that, the students appeared in the examinations. Therefore, even if it is presumed that the amount was taken by the appellant and given to Jagdish, the co-accused, mere recovery of money, divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid, is not sufficient to hold the appellant guilty, as there was no occasion whatsoever for the appellant to demand or receive the amount as bribe. Such a presumption, even though the plea of 'alibi' taken by the appellant, of not being present at the place of trap, as he was taking meals in a hotel at the time of trap, is ignored, will not arise, because the evidence led by PW. 2 and PW.3 was of interested witnesses and discrepant to the complaint, which goes to the root of the matter and, if properly noticed, would lead in Court to discard the prosecution version, particularly in the absence of chemical process of the powder treatment. Even if it be accepted for argument's sake, that the burden to prove an issue lies upon the accused under S.4 (1) of the Act, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove h is case beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if it be accepted for argument's sake, that the burden to prove an issue lies upon the accused under S.4 (1) of the Act, he is not required to discharge that burden by leading evidence to prove h is case beyond a reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if the accused person succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case, as is one by a party in civil proceedings. It is not necessary that he should establish his case by the test of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. As soon as he succeeds in doing so, the burden is shifted to the prosecution, which still has to discharge its original onus that never shifts, i.e., that of establishing on the whole case of guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. (See V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P.), AIR 1966 SC 1762 Suraj Mal v. The State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1979 SC 1408 , and Mansingh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1979 SC 1455 ). 18. In the circumstances, ordinarily, in such type of cases powder treatment is made, but the prosecution has not explained or placed any material on record to show why such a process was not followed in the present case, though the trap is said to have been arranged by experienced people like Additional Collector and SDO (P). It does not appeal to reason that the officers were not aware of the powder treatment, which is in vogue in the country for about four decades. If such powder treatment had been made, the passing of the bribe and handling of the notes would not have been difficult to be proved. Therefore, the story about the place and the manner of taking bribe is opposed to natural human conduct. That is what has been said by the Apex Court in case of Khilli Ram. v. State of Rajasthan ( AIR 1985 SC 79 ). 19. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The conviction of the appellant under S. 161 IPC, and S. 5 (1) (d) and (i) of the Act and the sentences passed there under are set aside, and the appellant is acquitted. He is on bail. His bail bonds are discharged. The fine, if deposited, he refunded to the appellant.