R. DAYAL, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner having passed MBBS Examination, was appointed as Medical Officer under the Government of Sikkim, on 3-12-1982. She was promoted and posted as Acting District Medical Officer, West District, Geysing vide order dated 16-8-1991, which post she joined on 30-10-1991. Under an agreement dated 12-3-1992, which the Government of Sikkim, the Manipal Education and Medical Group, Manipal Karnataka, a registered trust, agreed to provide certain post-graduate seats in Kasturba Medical College, Manipal (KMC) to the students nominated by the Sikkim Government. KMC was supposed to provide 2 seats in preclinical, 2 seats in paraclinical and 2 seats in clinical post-graduate studies. The petitioner applied for post-graduate course in certain studies giving first preference in general medicine. A selection Committee constituted by the Government selected 12 candidates for the 6 seats including 4 candidates for general medicine falling in clinical group. The name of the petitioner appears at Sl. No. 3 amongst these four candidates. The petitioner and others were directed to go to KMC for interview. Accordingly, the petitioner and others went to Manipal, but no interview held, and the candidates were merely required to fill up certain forms and submit their marksheets. Though KMC was supposed to provide two seats in clinical studies, yet vide letter dated 30/06/1992, they offered to provide two more seats in preclinical in place of two seats in clinical studies. Vide letter dated 27-7-1992, the Government insisted for two seats in clinical, as a result of which the college authorities agreed to provide the already agreed two seats in clinical (general medicine) studies. However, instead of the petitioner, respondents Nos. 2 and 3, viz. Dr. Padam Maya Chettri and Dr. Sarkey Bhuttia were nominated by the State Government for the general medicine seats. This was done because of the policy decision taken by the government on 7-8-1992 for not sending senior doctors like C. M. Os. , D. M. Os. , D. T. Os. , etc. , for post-graduate training so that hospital and district administration and programme implementation might not suffer. The policy statement runs as under:"selection OF CANDIDATES FOR P. G. COURSE after discussin with H. C. M. , it has been decided that a comprehensive policy guidelines for selection of inservice P. G. Training be formulated for the future. It has also now been decided not to send Sr. Doctors like C. M. Os. The policy statement runs as under:"selection OF CANDIDATES FOR P. G. COURSE after discussin with H. C. M. , it has been decided that a comprehensive policy guidelines for selection of inservice P. G. Training be formulated for the future. It has also now been decided not to send Sr. Doctors like C. M. Os. , D. M. Os. , D. T. Os. , etc. for P. G. Training as Hospital and District Administration and Programme Implementation is bound to suffer. While formulating the policy guidelines, this point may also be incorporated. " ( 2 ) THE petitioner challenges her non-nomination and nomination of respondents Nos. 2 and 3. She contends that though she has been posted as Acting District Medical Officer, she has not received emoluments as District Medical Officer and is drawing her salary in the scale of the Medical Officer. She submits that respondent No. 3 who has been selected is entrusted with very responsible job of immunisation of people in two districts and is holding the rank of District Medical Officer, and he was selected even though the Selection Committee did not select him and it was doubtful whether he had even made an application for nomination. According to her, once the Selection Committee was constituted, respondent No. 1. could not supersede the decision of such committee and could not change its previous policy to the detriment of the petitioner and others. Further, she has contended that it was on the direction of the government based on selection by the Selection Committee that the petitioner took strenuous and ardous journey for about ten days and spent a large amount of money and the travelling allowance would not commensurate with the troubles taken by her, and so the State is bound by the principle of promissory estoppel. Further, her contention is that there is no reasonable ground why senior and experienced doctors should not undergo post-graduate courses in preference to junior and less experienced once, and the action of respondent No. 1 in sending respondents No. 2 and 3 for post-graduate studies is not based on any policy, and is arbitrary, mala fide, unreasonable and violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 3 ) THE State has averred in its counter-affidavit that there posts of District Medical Officers are lying vacant and they have to be filled up by promotion on the recommendation of the Departmental Promotion Committee. For this purpose, the proposal for appointment of DMOs through promotion has to be sent to the Sikkim Public Service Commission and the process of promotion takes a considerable time. Therefore, in view of the urgent requirement of the services of DMOs, the government decided to fill these vacancies by promotion of General Duty Medical Officers as District Medical Officers on acting capacity and, accordingly, the petitioner joined as Acting District Medical Officer on 30-10-1991. It is denied that respondent No. 3 did not make any application. Copies of the applications made by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have been enclosed as Annexure R2 and R3 to the counter-affidavit. It is also denied that respondent No. 3 was appointed District Medical Child Health or District Immunisation Officer of South and West Districts, and it is said that he was temporarily entrusted with the work of DMCH and DIO which he was discharging in addition to his usual work. As regards policy, the stand of the government is that this being the first batch of government doctors being sent for post graduate courses to KMC, under an agreement, the government had not formulated any policy or guidelines earlier. However, the government was compelled to formulate policy guidelines for selection of candidates for in-service post-graduate training on 7-8-92 due to the difficulties felt in hospital administration and national health programme implementation when 12 doctors were sent to KMC for interview. In reply to the plea of promissory estoppel, it is pleaded that the government had simply selected 12 doctors against 6 MD seats in various disciplines in KMC, Manipal leaving the final selection to KMC Management and so the petitioner could not have been certain about her selection by KMC for undergoing the course. To repeal the charge of arbitrariness, it is alleged that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were nominated as per order of merit, seniority and subject preference of medical officers who had applied for undergoing the course and who had not been disqualified under the new policy. It is denied that respondents No. 3 is in the rank of District Medical Officer. 2 and 3 were nominated as per order of merit, seniority and subject preference of medical officers who had applied for undergoing the course and who had not been disqualified under the new policy. It is denied that respondents No. 3 is in the rank of District Medical Officer. ( 4 ) THE petition involves the determination on three points- (I) Is the State bound by the principle of promissory estoppel to nominate the petitioner; (ii) whether in the facts and circumstances, the State could not lay down the policy which worked to the detriment of the petitioner; and (iii) whether non-nomination of the petitioner and the nomination of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 was arbitrary and in violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution. ( 5 ) AS to promissory estoppel, it is clear that the process of selection or nomination was not complete so as to hold out a promise or assurance to the petitioner that she would be nominated for the course when she was asked to go to Manipal for interview. For the six seats in total and two seats in general medicine, 12 and 4 candidates respectively were selected by the Selection Committee and final selection was left to be made by the K. M. C. Therefore, the fact that on the direction of the government all the candidates selected by the Selection Committee including the petitioner undertook journey to Manipal to appear in the interview, the expenses of which were admittedly borne by the government, did not amount to the petitioner acting on any representation of the government so as to make her alter her position. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that it is not necessary for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel that the promisee has suffered detriment or prejudice and has referred to Delhi C. and G. Mills Ltd. V. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 2414, in support of his contention. While this is so, it is clear from the same judgement that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted on the assurance given to him, must have relied on the representation made to him, which means that the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or representation. While this is so, it is clear from the same judgement that the party asserting the estoppel must have acted on the assurance given to him, must have relied on the representation made to him, which means that the party has changed or altered the position by relying on the assurance or representation. It is essential that the promisee must have acted on the promise made to him and having so acted, must have changed or altered his or her position. But, in the present case, the government did not make any promise that the petitioner would be finally selected so as to entitle her to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the Petitioner has also referred to Sheela Ashok Patwardhan v. V. M. Medical College, (1989) 3 SCC 362 : (AIR 1989 SC 382 ). There, the appellant had passed MBBS examination from a medical college situated in the State of Andhra Pradesh. After her marriage, she started living at Solapur with her husband and intended to prosecute her studies in post-graduate MD Medical College at Solapur. In order to be eligible for that course, it was essential for her to join Housepost in Obstetrics and Gynaecology. On an application made by her, the Government of Maharashtra created a Housepost in Obstetrics and Gynaecology specifically and categorically stating that the enable her to complete her post-graduate studies at the college at Solapur. The Dean of the College called upon the appellant to join the Housepost and not to quit the same before competing the term in as much as the Housepost was specially created to enable her to complete her post-graduate studies at the college at Solapur. She joined the Housepost and duly completed the same. Subsequently, the Dean of the College issued an advertisement inviting applications for the post graduate seats in various disciplines for January 1987 batch. The appellant made an application praying for the issuance of an application form for the MD course in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, but no such form was issued to her. The ground for refusal was the failure of reciprocity on the part of the State of Andhra Pradesh. The appellant made an application praying for the issuance of an application form for the MD course in Obstetrics and Gynaecology, but no such form was issued to her. The ground for refusal was the failure of reciprocity on the part of the State of Andhra Pradesh. It was held that the State of Maharashtra was entitled to refuse to admit any student passing the MBBS examination from any Medical College in the State of Andhra Pradesh, as that State had not reciprocated in the matter of admissions to post-graduate degree courses in Medical Colleges of that State. But, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the respondents were not at all justified in refusing to admit in the post-graduate degree course, when on the prayer of the appellant a supernumerary Housepost had been created, so as to enable her to become eligible for the post-graduate course, and they were aware of the fact that the appellant had passed her MBBS examination from a Medical College in the State of Andhra Pradesh and it was after considering all the facts and circumstances including high merit of the appellant, that the State of Maharashtra created a supernumerary Housepost for the appellant. It was further held that after creating a supernumerary Housepost specifically for the appellant, the respondents were not at all justified in refusing even an application form and in not considering her case for admission in the post-graduate degree course on the ground of failure of reciprocity by the Andhra Pradesh State. This authority has no application to the facts of the present case, as the respondents there had created a Housepost specially to enable the appellant to be eligible to post-graduate studies at the college at Solapur, who joined the Housepost and duly completed the same. It is clear from the judgment that even though there was no question of automatic admission in the post-graduate course, simply because one had completed the house job, the complaint of the appellant was that she was not even given an application form for the post-graduate degree course on the ground which was known to the respondents at the time of the creation of the supernumerary Housepost. In the instant case, the petitioner was never selected finally and she had not to complete any course, as the appellant did of Housepost in the authority cited. In the instant case, the petitioner was never selected finally and she had not to complete any course, as the appellant did of Housepost in the authority cited. ( 7 ) AS to policy, it is manifest that earlier there was no policy or guidelines as regards the selection for nomination for MD Course. As stated by the State in its counter-affidavit, the necessity for the policy was felt on account of the difficulties faced in the hospital administration and programme implementation when 12 doctors including the petitioner were sent to KMC for interview. It is an admitted fact that the entire expenses on the MD course are to be incurred by the State Government. In addition, the doctors in service are entitled to draw their salary. The government is, therefore, entitled to take a policy decision in the interest of proper administration in public interest. When such a decision is taken, it is in the very nature of things that some one or the other is bound to be adversely affected thereby. The test to judge the validity of such policy decision is not whether a person who has some reasonable expectation suffers in the realisation of the expectation, but, whether the decision could be said to be reasonable to achieve the purpose which it professed to achieve. In Mohan Kumar Singhania v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1, reference was made to the following observations in Birendra Kumar Nigam v. Union of India, 1964 SC (Notes) 70 - "139. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "if, as must be, it is conceded that the exigencies, convenience, or necessity of a particular department might justify the imposition of a total ban on the employees in that department from seeking employment in other departments, a partial ban which permits them to seek only certain posts in the same department cannot be characterised as illegal as being discriminatory. The mere fact therefore that under the rules officers in certain other departments are permitted to compete for a Class I post is no ground by itself for considering such a variation as an unreasonable discrimination, violative of Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution as not based on a classification having a rational and reasonable relation to the object to be attained. Of course, no rule imposes a ban on these employees resigning their posts and competing for posts in the open competition along with 'open market' candidates. "in A. S. Sanggwan v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1545, a select list had been prepared pursuant to a policy statement of 1964 way back in 1971 for promotion to the posts of brigadiers in the Directorate of Military Farms, who as brigadiers automatically expected to become Directors of Military Farms. The third respondent found the third place and the petitioner was left out. Those on the first and second places got their promotion in due course. When the turn of the third respondent came, a writ petition was filed to interdict the Central Government from proceeding to make any fresh selection in departure from the selection list of 1971 overlooking the claim of the third respondent. His contention was that since he was already in the selection list which was made pursuant to the policy statement of 1964, any further selection could not supersede his claim. The core of the contention was that once a policy had been made in exercise of the general executive power of the Union of India and made known and acted upon, it would be arbitrary to depart from it overnight by making a fresh selection and without an antecedent reformulation of policy and making that policy known to the concerned sector in the army. Repelling that contention it was held :-"4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A policy once formulated is not good for ever; it is perfectly within the competence of the Union of India to change it, rechange it, adjust it and readjust it according to the compulsions of circumstances and imperatives of national considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "it was further observed that Government may stick to the earlier policy or give it up. But one imperative of the Constitution implict in Art. 14 is that if it does change its policy, it must do so fairly and should not give the impression that it is acting by any ulterior criteria or arbitrarilly. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, earlier there was no policy. But one imperative of the Constitution implict in Art. 14 is that if it does change its policy, it must do so fairly and should not give the impression that it is acting by any ulterior criteria or arbitrarilly. ( 8 ) IN the instant case, earlier there was no policy. The policy was laid down for the first time on 7-8-1992, deciding not to send senior doctors like GMOs/dmos etc. , for post graduate training in the interest of proper administration. Once it is held that the policy could be formulated and it was not arbitrary, the plea that it is arbitrary to prefer junior doctors to senior and experienced ones for undergoing MD course, automatically falls to the ground. The contention that respondent No. 3 was similarly placed as the petitioner has also no merit. Order dated 30-7-1992 filed as Annexure P4 by the petitioner herself says that respondent No. 3 was simply entrusted with the work of DMCH/dio in addition to his own duties. His position was different from that of the petitioner who had been promoted and appointed as Acting District Medical Officer and whose case for regular promotion through Public Service Commission was under process. Besides, the State has filed a statement showing the biodata of the doctors who had applied for post-graduate course at KMC as Annexure R9 to the counter-affidavit. The names are said to be arranged in order of seniority. The first 8 names are of the persons holding the posts of DMOs, CMOs or DIOs etc. , and none of them was selected. Regarding the ninth name, the learned Advocate General submitted that he was not interested to get the nomination. The next names at serial Nos. 10 and 11 are Dr. Sarki Bhutia and Dr. Padam Maya Chettri who are respondents Nos. 3 and 2 respectively. It would thus appear that the nomination of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 could not be said to be arbitrary. ( 9 ) IN the result, the petition is dismissed. No costs. Petition dismissed. --- *** --- .