U. L. Bat, C. J.-A copy of the writ petition has been served on Shri S.A. Laskar, learned Senior Govt. Advocate, Assam appearing for respondents 1 to 3. In the nature of the order we propose to pass, we find it unnecessary to issue notice to respondents 4 to 6. Petitioner's case can be summarised as follows : He had been serving as Peon-cum-Chowkidar from 1982 till 1988 continuously in the office of the third respondent, Superintendent of Taxes, North Lakhimpur, though his appointments were against leave vacancies for all these years. He is a registered unemployed in the Employment Exchange at North Lakbimpur, registration No. being 1794/91. The third respondent sent a letter requesting District Employment Officer, North Lakhimpur (not a party to this petition) to sponsor names of suitable candidates for appointment to the post of Peon-cum-Chowkidar and the latter sent a panel of names to the third respondent. He did not sponsor the petitioner's name. Petitioner submitted an application to third respondent seeking appointment to the post and the third respondent forwarded his application to the District Employment Officer for being sponsored. The District Employment Officer, by Annexure 4 letter dated 23.1.91 declined to sponsor the petitioner's name. Among the candidates sponsored by the District Employment Officer, third respondent, selected respondents 4, 5 and 6 and they have been appointed on 15.2.91. Petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking a direction to third respondent to appoint him in the post of Peon-cum-Chowkidar. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Senior Govt. Advocate, Assam. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has been working continuously for 8 years in leave vacancies and he is entitled to be considered for appointment to the post, which is sought to be filled up regularly or temporarily and the petitioner's candidature cannot be ignored merely because the local Employment Exchange does not sponsor the petitioner's name. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner has been working continuously for 8 years in leave vacancies and he is entitled to be considered for appointment to the post, which is sought to be filled up regularly or temporarily and the petitioner's candidature cannot be ignored merely because the local Employment Exchange does not sponsor the petitioner's name. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Mehboob Rahman vs. State of Mizoram & others, 1991 (2) GLJ 170 and in particular the following observations in that judgment: "In view of the provision contained in sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Act in question sponsoring by the Employment Exchange is not compulsory for giving employment and on that ground the petitioner cannot be deprived from the post if he is otherwise qualified." Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 has been enacted to facilitate the working of the Employment Exchanges with a view to find job opportunities to unemployed youth. Section 4 requires, employers in every establishment in public sector to notify vacancies to the prescribed Employment Exchange for filling up any vacancies in their establishment. This Court in Mehbood Rahman's case has held that sponsoring by Employment Exchange is not compulsory. On a consideration of the facts of the case it appears that the observation quoted above that "the petitioner cannot be deprived from the. post if he is otherwise qualified" is an obiter dictam. The petitioner in that case was registered in the District Employment Exchange, Aizawl, which was later cancelled. He was appointed on a contract basis in the post of Assistant Engineer and the contract was going to expire on 24.7.91. To his representation he received a reply informing that unless his candidature was sponsored by the local Employment Exchange, it would be difficult to consider his case for regular appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer. The judgment does not indicate what were the reliefs claimed in the writ petition. To his representation he received a reply informing that unless his candidature was sponsored by the local Employment Exchange, it would be difficult to consider his case for regular appointment to the post of Assistant Engineer. The judgment does not indicate what were the reliefs claimed in the writ petition. The judgment however refers to the arguments on behalf of the petitioner in the following terms : "Cancellation of the registration in the Employment Exchange is bad in law inasmuch as no opportunity for showing cause was given to the petitioner and that apart in view of the Employment Exchange Manual the petitioner is entitled to get -himself registered as he possesses a residential certificate issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Aizawl." The answer of the learned Assistant Advocate General was that the petitioner was not registered as he was not a citizen of Aizawl, etc. It was this point which arose before the Court for consideration and the Court answered by saying that the cancellation of registration was bad in law and in violation of natural justice. Operative portion of the judgment reads thus: "In the result the petition is allowed and the rule is made absolute. We quash the order No. A 43011/1/86-1&E dated 10th July, 1989 issued by the Under Secretary, Govt. of Mizoram, Labour & Employment Depart­ment and direct the respondents to re-register the name of the petitioner in the District Employment Exchange at Aizawl ...." A reading of the judgment would indicate that the only relief claimed by the writ petitioner related to the cancellation of his registration and that relief was granted by the Court which directed registration of his name of the petitioner in the Employment Exchange. There was no prayer to direct the appointing authority to consider the petitioner for the post of Assistant Engineer without being sponsored by the Employment Exchange and there was no contention nor no decision that if the appointing authority desires to seek the assistance of Employment Exchange in order to select a suitable person for appointment, that would be bad in law. It is under these circumstances we indicated that the observation relied on by the learned counsel is an obiter dictam. So far as appointment to the post in question is concerned, it must be governed by some Rules. Rules are not placed before us. It is under these circumstances we indicated that the observation relied on by the learned counsel is an obiter dictam. So far as appointment to the post in question is concerned, it must be governed by some Rules. Rules are not placed before us. In the absence of any specific Rules indicating the source from which candidates are to be called to participate in the process of selection, there is nothing wrong either in principle or in practice in the appointing authority seeking assistance of the Employment Exchange concerned to sponsor candidates for selection. It appears to us that peeking the assistance of Employment Exchange has its own merit inasmuch as it reduces to the minimum arbitrariness in the process of selection and avoids manipulation in selection and appointment. Petitioner has not been able to produce before us any Rule or principle of law which entitles him to contend that recourse to Employment Exchange is illegal and that his application is bound to be considered even if not sponsored by the Employment Exchange. In Annexure 4 letter the District Employment Officer has given a valid reason for not sponsoring the petitioner namely, that he was registered only on 7.1.91. In other words, die petitioner must stand in queue along with others already registered in the Employment Exchange and when his turn comes naturally he can expect his name to be sponsored, if any requisition is made. He cannot jump the queue because he worked in the leave vacancies. We also find two statements in the writ petition contradictory. The first statement is that he served as Peon-cum-Chovwkidar from 982 till 1988 contiguously and the second statement that his appointment as Peon for all these years was against leave vacancies. Hie latter statement would indicate that he could not have been working continuously, but only intermittently. Further the petitioner seeks a writ of Mandamus directing his appointment and quashing the respondents of respondents 4 to 6, which have been made on 15.2.91. Writ petition has been filed only on 20.1.92. The petitioner did not give any explanation for the delay apart from stating that he received the copy of Annexure 3 order on 16.10.91. Annexure 3 order was passed on a representation given by him by the Commissioner of Taxes before the impugned appointments of respondents 4 to 6 were made. Writ petition has been filed only on 20.1.92. The petitioner did not give any explanation for the delay apart from stating that he received the copy of Annexure 3 order on 16.10.91. Annexure 3 order was passed on a representation given by him by the Commissioner of Taxes before the impugned appointments of respondents 4 to 6 were made. When he found that respondents 4 to 6 were appointed to vacancies to which he was seeking appointment, he should have taken recourse to law. Therefore, the delay in approaching Court remains unexplained. We decline to admit the writ petition and accordingly dismiss the same, but without cost.