JUDGMENT Ajit K. Sengupta, J.: These two appeals have been preferred from a common judgment and order dated 21st December, 1990 whereby the learned trial Judge has in effect dismissed the writ petitions filed by the appellants on the finding that they had become infructuous. In both the writ petitions the appellants/writ petitioners challenged the Constitutional validity of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989 and the Calcutta Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as "the 1990 Amendment Act") which replaced that Ordinance. 2. The 1990 Amendment Act inserted a new Section in the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, namely s. 398A, as a result of which, for a period of one year from 18th December, 1989 (i.e. the date on which the 1990 Amendment Act came into force), there was a total embargo on any person applying for sanction of any plan to erect a building exceeding 13½ metres in height. The constitutional challenge is basically directed against this embargo. 3. The learned trial Judge heard the writ petitions at length. Since the embargo was for a period of one year from 18th December, 1989, the learned trial Judge in his judgment and order dated 21st December, 1990 held that the writ petitions had become infructuous. The learned Judge observed: "As the said amendment has ceased to have any effect then the constitutional validity of an Act which is no longer in force cannot be entertainable." There were certain other observations made by the learned Judge to which reference would be made later as and when necessary. 4. After the commencement of the hearing of this appeal, and having regard to the submissions made on behalf of the appellants on the short questions' as to whether the learned Judge was right in arriving at the conclusion that the writ petitions had become infructuous, the Court enquired as to whether it would be advisable to hear the parties on the merits as well, since, if the Court found that the learned Judge had erred in his conclusion that the writ petitions had become infructuous that would necessarily involve an examination on merits and such examination would normally be done on remand by the learned trial Judge. All the parties, however, agreed that they would prefer the question on merits to be decided by the Appeal Court so that the entire controversy should be laid at rest at least as far as the High Court stage is concerned. Since the Court was prima facie of the view that the submissions made on behalf of the appellants that the writ petitions could not have become infructuous, as held by the learned Judge, could not be brushed aside, it was decided to hear the parties on merits as well and to decide the issues comprehensively. Since the parties agreed to this course, we proceeded to adopt this course to shorten the litigation process. 5. Although the facts leading to the filing of the two writ petitions are not much in dispute it is necessary to refer to them to the extent required. 6. In Matter No. 1149 of 1990 (which has given rise to Appeal No. 21 of 1991), the writ petitioner no. 1 is a Private Ltd. Company known as Terra Firma Investment and Trading Private Ltd. (hereinafter referred as "Terra Firma") and the writ petitioner No 2 to 7 are the Shareholders of Terra Firma. Terra Firma is engaged in the business, inter alia, of developing real property, including promoting and constructing buildings. On 8th December, 1988 Terra Firma purchased a plot of land at premises No. 104, Ultadanga Main Road, which is now known as Bidhan Nagar Road. According to Terra Firma, it decided to buy the Ultadanga property on the basis that it would be able to construct a building having a covered area of at least 5,66,836.8 Sq ft. This again was based on the then available Floor Area Ratio (FAR) calculated at the statutory rates then prevailing under the relevant Building Rules Terra Firma submitted an application for sanction of a building plan which was accepted by the Corporation on 24th March. 1989. Various Departmental sanctions/clearances were also given in relation to this plan by the Corporation/different Departments of the Corporation, and according to Terra Firma they complied with all requisitions made from time to time by the Building Department. (a) In paragraph 17 of the writ petition Terra Firma stated as follows :- "The proposed building as per the submitted plan would have a total plinth area covering 42% of the land area. (a) In paragraph 17 of the writ petition Terra Firma stated as follows :- "The proposed building as per the submitted plan would have a total plinth area covering 42% of the land area. The remaining 58% of the plot of land would remain vacant partly used as lawn, children's play-ground and for providing other amenities to the inmates of the proposed building." It is further stated by Terra Firma that it had made huge investment in purchasing the property and for its development including Rs. 2,00,000/- approximately plaid to the Architect. Although the building plan for sanction was submitted on 9th January, 1989 and was accepted by the Corporation after appropriate scrutiny and verification and the Departmental sanctions/clearances had been granted on 24th March, 1989, the Corporation for undisclosed reasons delayed the granting of the sanction. (b) On 18th December, 1989 the West Bengal Government promulgated the Amendment Ordinance which resulted in the embargo and the rejections of the plan. Terra Firma challenged the constitutional validity of the Amendment Ordinance in an application under Article 32 of the Constitution of India in the Supreme Court. During the pendency of the Matter before the Supreme Court, the 1990, Amendment Act was passed which replaced the Amendment Ordinance. In view of the passing of the Amendment Act, the Supreme Court by its order of 9th April, 1990 permitted Terra Firma to withdraw the petition under Article 32 of the Constitution with liberty to move the High Court. Terra Firma then tiled the writ petition (out of which this appeal arises). 7. In Matter no. 477 of 1990 (giving rise to Appeal no. 10 of 1591), the writ petitioners submitted an application for sanction of a plan for construction of a 6-stroried building situate at 56, Park Street, Calcutta. This application was submitted on 6th March, 1988. On different dates between 9th March, 1987 and 31st August, 1987 "No Objection Certificates" were obtained from various authorities of the Corporation as well as the Director of Fire Services, Government of West Bengal, and the Deputy Commissioner (Traffic) Calcutta Police. The petitioners have alleged that after two years of total inaction the Deputy Municipal Commissioner (Building) made an order directing the Department to refer the case to the Municipal Building Committee. The petitioners have alleged that after two years of total inaction the Deputy Municipal Commissioner (Building) made an order directing the Department to refer the case to the Municipal Building Committee. The Municipal Building Committee recommended the plan for sanction imposing certain conditions and this recommendation was communicated to the petitioners after 3 months, namely 11h August, 1989. On 20th September, 1989 the petitioners requested the Corporation to inform them as to whether there could be any ocher objection to the sanctioning of the plan. To this the District Building Surveyor by his communication dated 11th November, 1989 wanted the petitioners to show the provisions for accommodation of existing tenants. The petitioners by their letter dated 12th December, 1989 requested the District Building Surveyor to inform them as to under what provisions of law the requisition contained in the District Building Surveyor's letter dated 11th November, 1989 had been made. Six days' later the Amendment Ordinance was promulgated resulting in the statutory rejection of the application for sanction submitted on 6th March, 1987. 8. In both the writ petitioners several grounds have been taken to sustain the attack on the constitutional validity of the Amendment Act. At the hearing the principal submissions, however, centered around the violation of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India. Affidavits-in-Opposition were filed by the State of West Bengal. In these Affidavits the State mainly relied on the Statement of Objects and Reasons contained in the relevant Bill as introduced in the Legislative Assembly which will be extracted a little later. Apart from this it was also alleged on behalf of the State in the Affidavit that since the new Building Rules could not be finalised and enforced under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1980, the provisions of the Building Rules as were obtaining under the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 were continuing to be in force by virtue of s. 635(2)(f) of the 1980 Act, and since the old Building Rules which were operating were considered to be thoroughly inadequate and not proper for controlling the risk of hazardous construction of multi-storied buildings in the city the State Government had to promulgate the Amendment Ordinance and thereafter the 1990 Amendment Act. In order to appreciate the implications of this allegation made in the Affidavit of the State it is necessary to note that in a writ petition filed in this Court namely Matter no. In order to appreciate the implications of this allegation made in the Affidavit of the State it is necessary to note that in a writ petition filed in this Court namely Matter no. 5757 of 1988 (Licensed Building Surveyors Association v. State of West Bengal) the State of West Bengal was restrained by an order of injunction from finalising and publishing certain proposed amendments to the Building Rules which were allegedly prepared in the light of the recommendations of an Expert Committee. By reason of that injunction the old Building Rules continued to be in force by reason of s. 635(2)(f) of the 1980 Act. 9. In the course of hearing and in answering comments made on behalf of the writ petitioners that the affidavit-in-opposition did not disclose any materials to support the stand taken by the State, the learned Advocate General submitted that Expert Committees had been constituted to make in depth study of the problems and the impugned legislation was enacted to give effect to those recommendations. We requested the learned Advocate General to produce the records of the Expert Committees on the basis of whose recommendations the restrictions were sought to be imposed since such records of recommendations were not disclosed in the affidavit. We also directed the State to file a list of total number of plans pending on 18th December, 1989 for sanctioning of buildings beyond 13.5 metres and a list of applications for sanctioning of plans submitted and sanctioned between 25th November, 1988 and 17th December, 1989. The State has furnished to the Court some records pertaining to the Expert Committee and also the two lists referred to above. 10. After the conclusion of the submissions the parties requested that they might be permitted to file written notes of their submissions for assisting the Court. Such leave was granted and Notes of Submissions have been filed on behalf of the appellants as well as the respondent State. 11. Before dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the State it is necessary to set out the provisions of the 1990 Amendment Act which is under challenge. It is not necessary to refer to the Amendment Ordinance inasmuch as it was replaced and repealed by the 1990 Amendment Act and since the 1990 Amendment Act came into force with retrospective effect from 18th December, 1989, i.e. the date of promulgation of the Amendment Ordinance. 12. It is not necessary to refer to the Amendment Ordinance inasmuch as it was replaced and repealed by the 1990 Amendment Act and since the 1990 Amendment Act came into force with retrospective effect from 18th December, 1989, i.e. the date of promulgation of the Amendment Ordinance. 12. The 1990 Amendment Act as published in the Calcutta Gazette of 23rd February, 1990 is extracted in its entirety: West Bengal Act I of 1990 -------------------------------- The Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1990 (Passed by the West Bengal Legislature) (Assent of the Governor was first published in Calcutta Gazette, Extraordinary, of the 23rd February, 1990) An Act to amend the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 Whereas it is expedient to amend, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, for the purpose and in the manner hereinafter appearing; It is hereby enacted in the Fortieth year of the Republic of India, by the Legislature of West Bengal, as follows:- 1. (1) This Act may be called the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1990. (2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 18th day of December, 1989. 2. In the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), after s. 398, the following section shall be inserted : 'Bar to construction 398A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act of building in certain or in any other law for the time being in force, with effect cases for a limited from the date of coming into force of the Calcutta period. Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said Act) and for a period of one year from such date (hereinafter referred to in this section as the said period), no person shall apply for sanction of any plan to erect a building exceeding thirteen and a half metres in height. (2) Any application for sanction of any plan to erect a building exceeding thirteen and a half metres in height, submitted by any person–– (a) before the coming into force of the said Act and lying pending for such sanction on the date of coming into force of the said Act, or (b) at any time during the said period shall stand rejected forthwith. (3) Any person, whose application for sanction of any plan to erect a building exceeding thirteen and a half metres in height stands rejected under sub-s. (2), may apply afresh for such sanction in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the rules made thereunder on the expiry of the said period. (4) Any fee paid by any person for sanction of any plan to erect a building exceeding thirteen and a half metres in height, the application for which stands rejected under sub-s. (2), shall at his option, be refunded to him or adjusted towards the fee payable by him for fresh application for such sanction under sub-s. (3). (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the State Government may, if it considers necessary or expedient so to do in the public interest, by notification, exempt any application for sanction of plan from the operation of the provisions of this section. 3. (1) The Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1919 is hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken under the Principal Act as amended by the said Ordinance shall be deemed to have been validly done or taken under the Principal Act as amended by this Act." 13. First of ail, we propose to examine the correctness of the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that the writ petitions have become infructuous, because the 1990 Amendment Act is no longer in force. Mr. Pal has submitted that the learned Judge was persuaded to arrive at this conclusion on the theory that the 1990 Amendment Act was a temporary Act or had a temporary effect in view of sub-s. (2) of s. 1 thereof which provided the commencement date as 18th December, 1989 and the provisions of sub-s. (1) of s. 398A which imposed the embargo for a period of one year from the date of commencement According to Mr. Pal, this conclusion of the learned trial Judge cannot be sustained. He contends that the 1990 Amendment Act is not a temporary Act. It is an Act to amend the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1980. It does not cease to be effective on the expiry of one year from the date of its commencement. Pal, this conclusion of the learned trial Judge cannot be sustained. He contends that the 1990 Amendment Act is not a temporary Act. It is an Act to amend the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1980. It does not cease to be effective on the expiry of one year from the date of its commencement. Merely because the restriction imposed by sub-s. (1) of s 398A is limited in point of time to a period of one year from the date of commencement of the 1990 Amendment Act, it cannot be said to be a temporary Act. Moreover, sub-s. (2) of s. 398A has the effect of permanent rejection of all applications for sanction of plans to erect buildings exceeding 13½ metres in height which had been submitted before 18th December, 1989, i.e., the date of commencement of the Act and which was lying pending for sanction on 18th December, 1989. The provisions relating to submission, of a fresh plan as envisaged in sub-s. (3), the refund or adjustment of the fees payable in relation to any application which stands rejected by reason of sub-s. (2), the power of exemption granted by sub-s. (5) of s. 398A, lead clearly to the conclusion that the Act is nor a temporary Act and in any event had certain permanent effect. 15. In this connection reliance is placed upon State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar, AIR 1962 SC 945 , & T. Venkata Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 SC 724 . In Bhupendra Kumar's case ( AIR 1962 SC 945 ) while dealing with the question as to the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act, Gajendragadkar, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed as follow:- "... ...In our opinion, what the effect of the explanation of a temporary Act would be must depend upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and upon their character, whether the said right and liability are enduring or not. ...In our opinion, what the effect of the explanation of a temporary Act would be must depend upon the nature of the right or obligation resulting from the provisions of the temporary Act and upon their character, whether the said right and liability are enduring or not. As observed by Parker, B. in the case of Steavenson v. Oliver (151 E.R. 1024, 1026-1027) 'there is a difference between temporary statutes and statutes which are repealed; the latter (except so far as they relate to transactions already completed under them) became as if they had never existed; but with respect to the former, the extent of the restrictions imposed, and the duration of the provisions, are matter of construction". In this connection, it would be useful and interesting to consider the decision in the case of Steavenson itself. That case related to 6th Geo. 4. c. 133, s. 4, which provided that every person who held a commission or warrant as surgeon or assistant surgeon in His Majesty's Navy or Army, should be entitled to practise as an apothecary without having passed the usual examination. Tile statute itself was temporary and it expired on August 1, 1826. It was argued that a person who was entitled to practise as an apothecary under the Act would lose his right after August 1, 1826, because there was no saving provision in the statute and its expiration would bring to an end all the rights and liabilities created by it. The Court rejected this contention and held that the person who had acquired a right to practise as an apothecary, without having passed the usual examination, by virtue of the provision of the temporary Act, would not be deprived of his right after its expiration. In dealing with the question about the effect of the expiration of the temporary statute, Lord Abinger, C.B. observed that 'it is by no means a consequence of an Act of Parliament's expiring, that rights acquired under it should likewise expire. Take the case of a penalty imposed by an Act of Parliament, would not a person who had been guilty of the offence upon which the legislature had imposed the penalty while the Act was in force, be liable to pay it after its expiration? The case of a right acquired under the Act is stronger. The 6 Geo. 4c. Take the case of a penalty imposed by an Act of Parliament, would not a person who had been guilty of the offence upon which the legislature had imposed the penalty while the Act was in force, be liable to pay it after its expiration? The case of a right acquired under the Act is stronger. The 6 Geo. 4c. 133, provides that parties who hold such warrants shall be entitled to practise as apothecaries; and we cannot engraft on the statute a new qualification, limiting that enactment'. It is in support of the same conclusion that Parker, B. made the observations which we have already cited. 'We must look at this Act', observed Parker, B., 'and see whether the restriction in the 11th clause, that the provisions of the statute are only to last for a limited time, is applicable to this privilege in question. It seems to me that the meaning of the Legislature was that all assistant surgeons, who were such before the 1st of August, 1826, should be entitled to the same privileges of practising as apothecaries, as if they had been in actual practice as such on the 1st of August, 1815, and that their privilege as such was of an executory nature, capable of being carried into effect after the 1st of August, 1826. Take the case of a penalty imposed by a temporary statute for offences created by it. If a person is tried and convicted under the relevant provisions of the temporary statute and sentenced to undergo imprisonment. could it be said that as the temporary statute expire by efflux of time, the detention of the offender in jail by virtue of the order of sentence imposed upon him would cease to be valid and legal? In our opinion, the answer to this question has to be in the negative. Therefore, in considering the effect of the expiration of a temporary statute, it would be unsafe to lay down any inflexible rule. If the right created by the statute is of an enduring character and has vested in the person that right cannot be taken away because the statute by which it was created has expired. If a penalty had been incurred under the statute and had been imposed upon a person, the imposition of the penalty would survive the expiration of the statute. If a penalty had been incurred under the statute and had been imposed upon a person, the imposition of the penalty would survive the expiration of the statute. That appears to be the true legal position in the matter." 16. This principle, was reiterated in T. Venkata Reddy's case AIR 1985 SC 724 . 17. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases cited above will apply with greater force in the instant case, as we have no hesitation in accepting the submission that the 1990 Amendment Act is not a temporary Act, and in any event it has definite permanent effect. This is clearly apparent from a plain reading of the 1990 Amendment Act. Even if the 1990 Amendment Act could be construed as a temporary Act the ratio of Bhupendra Kumar's case would squarely apply and as such it would not be correct to hold that the writ petitions had become infructuous. As such, the view expressed by the learned trial Judge cannot be sustained. Since the learned trial Judge dismissed the writ petitions only on this short ground without adverting to the merits, the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge, under appeal must be set aside and we do so. 18. We proceed to consider the merits of the controversy between as suggested and requested by the parties in the writ petitions themselves. 19. The main planks of the attack to the constitutional validity of the 1990 Amendment Act, as advanced by Mr. Ghosh and Mr. Pal, are as follows: (a) the provisions of s. 398A imposing a temporary embargo on a person applying for sanction of any plan to erect a building exceeding 13½ metres in height and the rejection of applications for sanction which were pending on the date of the commencement of the Act, i.e., 18th December, 1989 are arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. (b) The restriction imposed by sub-s. (1) of s. 398A inserted by the 1990 Amendment Act in the principal Act is an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carryon their occupation or trade or business and is therefore, violative of Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. (b) The restriction imposed by sub-s. (1) of s. 398A inserted by the 1990 Amendment Act in the principal Act is an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carryon their occupation or trade or business and is therefore, violative of Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India. (c) The 1990 Amendment Act is a glaring instance of colourable exercise of legislative power inasmuch as the real object of the Legislature in enacting this Act was to neutralise or circumvent the effect of an interim order made by this Court in the earlier writ petition filed by the Licensed Building Surveyors' Association by reason of which the authorities had been restrained from giving effect to certain proposed changes in the then existing building rules. 20. The Learned Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the State as well as the Calcutta Municipal Corporation has submitted that there is no constitutional infirmity in the 1990 Amendment Act and has advanced the following submissions and justifications:- (a) The Legislature enacted the 1990 Amendment Act in public interest, since it found that the existing building rules were anachronistic and not suitable to cope with the present-day problems of hazardous and indiscriminate growth of high-rise buildings without appropriate planning conducive to the city's urban land. (b) The object of s. 398A is not to temporarily prevent construction of high-rise buildings but to prevent further sanction for such construction in terms of the old building rules which were found to be unsuitable to the needs of situation. (c) The problems narrated in the "Objects and Reason" of the Amendment Bill were not to be removed by temporary moratorium on new sanction of high-rise construction but by compelling the new sanctions for such construction to be in accordance with the new building rules to be shortly enforced which was designed to cope with the problems narrated in the Objects and Reasons. (d) Since the restrictions imposed were reasonable and had nexus to the objects to be achieved by the 1990 Amendment Act, the challenge under Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution was misconceived. 21. The respective contentions were elaborated by the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and a number of authorities were cited in support of the respective contentions. We will refer to these elaborations, to the extent necessary in the course of our judgment. 22. 21. The respective contentions were elaborated by the Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and a number of authorities were cited in support of the respective contentions. We will refer to these elaborations, to the extent necessary in the course of our judgment. 22. For a proper appreciation of the respective contentions it is necessary to refer briefly to the statutory provisions relating to the regulation of construction of buildings in the Calcutta Municipal Area as well as the records produced by the State and the Municipal authorities before us. 23. The Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 contained various regulatory provisions relating to buildings including erection, alteration or additions to buildings. Schedule XVI to the 1951 Act contained the Rules regarding use of building sites and the execution of building works. These Rules provided for extensive regulation of various important aspects of building construction covering security, health considerations etc. They deal with leaving of open space, the criteria for heights, impact of buildings on public streets and a host of other related matters. The important thing to note is, that there was no absolute embargo in these rules, with regard to the height of a building. However, Rule 3 of the Rules contained provisions relating to heights of buildings generally and made such height dependent on a formula based on the criteria as to whether the building was situated at the side of a street, and also the width of the street concerned. 24. The Building Rules as originally contained in Schedule XVI of the 1951 Act were repealed and re-enacted in 1977 by the Calcutta Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1977. The Building Rules as amended in 1977 introduced various innovations, particularly taking into account the phenomenon of increasing high-rise constructions. The 1977 Amendment introduced the concept of Floor Area Ratio in Rule 21 which provided as follows :- "21. Floor area ratio––(1) Limitation of floor area and height of a building shall be achieved in terms of Floor Area Ratio (FAR). (2) Floor Area Ratio or FAR shall be the quotient obtained by dividing the total covered area of all the floors of the building by the area of the plot: Total covered area of all floors FA R---------------------------------------- Area of the plot (3) The maximum permissible FAR for the different classes of building on different width of streets shall be as given in the Table below :........." 25. It is not necessary to refer to the Table in detail. The net effect of the FAR concept is that the smaller the plot the smaller will be the building. The obvious purpose of introducing the FAR concept was to see that sufficient open spaces were left after the construction of a building on a particular site. The Amendment also introduced the mandatory requirement of keeping parking spaces for buildings exceeding a particular height. It further introduced in Rules 37, 38 and 39 rules of general and fundamental importance by providing that the structural planning and design, construction planning, design of installation of building and plumbing services of all buildings as well as loading and foundation shall be made in accordance with the National Building Code. Rule 41 provided that concrete, steel and prefabrication shall be as per the National Building Code. Rule 42 provided that materials should conform to the National Building Code. Rules 43, 44 and 45 provided that construction, building services (lighting, ventilation etc.) and plumbing services (water supply, drainage, gas etc.) shall be as per the National Building Code. 26. The new Rule 18 was substantially similar in terms to the old Rule 3, but was subject to the new Rule 3 which provided as follows :–– "3. Streets and heights of building––(1) No building exceeding ten metres in height shall be constructed on a street which is less than five metres in width (2) No building exceeding fifteen metres in height shall be constructed on a street which is less than seven and a half metres in width. (3) No building exceeding eighteen metres in height shall be constructed on a street which is less than ten metres in width. (4) No building exceeding thirty-six metres in height shall be constructed on a street which is less than eighteen metres in width. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (1), (2), (3) or (4), a stair-case room with a height not exceeding two and a half metres shall not be taken into account in calculating the height of the building." Again it is to be noted that there was no absolute embargo on construction of a building beyond 13.5 metres in height. 27. The Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 was repealed by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 which came into force with effect from January 4, 1984. 27. The Calcutta Municipal Act, 1951 was repealed by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 which came into force with effect from January 4, 1984. However, by reason of s. 635(2)(f) the provisions contained in Schedule XVI of the 1951 Act continued to remain in force. Therefore, even after the commencement of the 1980 Act, there was no absolute embargo on construction of buildings beyond 13.5 meters in height. 28. We will not refer to the records which have been produced before us. From the records relating to the Draft Building Rules which were prepared in 1986, it appears that these Draft Rules had been published id the Calcutta Gazette dated 30th January 1986 and certain objections and suggestions' were received by the Government to the promulgation of these Rules. The Government of West Bengal by its Resolution dated 25th March 1988 constituted a Committee for the purpose of scrutinising the suggestions and recommendations received. This Committee, along with its letter dated 25th November 1988, forwarded to the Government "two copies of the C.M.C. Building Rules, 1988, as prepared by the Committee, for taking necessary actions from your end." The enclosed Rules of 1988 contained XVIII Chapters covering various aspects of construction and maintenance of buildings. Chapter X of the enclosed Rules dealt with "Area and Height Limitations"––Rules 61 and 62 of this Chapter dealt with 'Floor Area Ratio' and 'Ground Coverage in respect of buildings' respectively. Rule 64 dealt with the height of buildings and as such the same is quoted below:- "64. Permissible, Height of Buildings––(1) The permissible height of buildings on means of access of different widths shall be as given below :- TABLE 5 Permissible Height of Buildings. Width of Means of Permissible Height Access in Metres. in Metres i) 1.2 to 3.5 7 ii) Above 3.5 to 7.00 10 iii) Above 7.00 to 10.00 13.5 iv) Above 10.00 to 15.00 18 v) Above 15.00 to 20.00 24 (2) For a building on a plot of land having means of access more than 20 metres in width, the maximum height of building shall not be more than 1.5 x (width of means of access + with of front open space)." Chapters XVII and XVIII dealt with 'Structural Design' and 'Building and Plumbing Services' respectively and broadly provided that they shall be as per the National Building Code and National 'Electrical Code. The records disclosed that the Committee held at least 34 meetings. The Minutes of these meetings have been disclosed. At the 23rd meeting held on 8th September 1988 Chapter X of the enclosed Rules dealing with 'Area and Height Limitation was discussed. The Minutes of this meeting are quoted below:–– 23rd Meeting Present 1. Sri T.C. Dutta 2. Sri S.K. Roy, 3. Sri A. Dev, 4. Sri S.K. Ghosh, 5. Sri M. K. Moitra, 6. Sri D. Banerjee. 7. Sri S. P. Gupta, 8. Sri A.K. Jana. 8th September, 1988 at 4:00 p.m. is the C.M.C. Guest House. At the outset, Chapter-X dealing with Area and Height Limitation and Chapter-XII dealing with existing buildings were taken up for discussion. These two Chapters were examined from different angles by (he members of the Committee as regards ground coverage, size of plot, nature of occupancy, width of means of access, car parking facilities and the relaxations that may be extended (in case of small plots/and existing buildings. It has been finally accepted the Chapters and the rules from 61 to 66 and Rule 72 with some corrections and modifications. Apart from this, some minor modifications in some rules discussed in earlier meetings were incorporated after discussion with Chairman. Chairman informed that he had discussions with Minister-in-Charge, L.G. & U.D, Deptt., and Mayor of Calcutta regarding publication of informations in newspapers/Municipal Gazette relating to sanctioning of multi-storied buildings in the city. This information will contain, premise, number. salient features, cubical content etc. as decided by Municipal Commissioner. Mayor and Minister also agreed to the views. This may be thought of by C.M.C. In this connection, Chairman of the opinion that C.M.C. should arrange for Micro-filming of the sanctioned plan, which in his opinion, is not difficult but also a demand of the present world for scientific preservation of records. 29. Therefore, it is clear that even on 25th November, 1988 there was no question of imposing an absolute embargo on buildings-exceeding 13.5 metres in height. 30. As already pointed out the Licensed Building Surveyors' Association filed a writ petition in this court on 23rd December, 1988 and obtained an order which had the effect of restraining the State from implementing the Rules of 1988 approved by the Committee. 30. As already pointed out the Licensed Building Surveyors' Association filed a writ petition in this court on 23rd December, 1988 and obtained an order which had the effect of restraining the State from implementing the Rules of 1988 approved by the Committee. On 13th July 1989 the Government of West Bengal passed a Resolution constituting a High Powered Committee to consider the problems mentioned in the recitals to the Resolution and advised the Government in the matter. The recitals of this Resolution were as follows :- "WHEREAS a large scale private development of private properties has taken place in Calcutta in recent years; AND WHEREAS the State Government considers it necessary to regulate such private development in public interest; The Terms of Reference in this Resolution so far as relevant for the present purpose included the following :- "(iv) Impact of high-rise constructions on the limited civic amenities created by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the State Government and resultant disequilibrium in the civic life-need for stricter restrictions on building activities. (v) The impact of high-rise constructions on social perspective, environmental safety and traffic facilities. (vi) Enforcement or fire safety requisitions in case of high-rise loopholes and remedies." 31. The Committee set up by the Resolution consisted of 10 members of which Shri T. C. Dutt, Chief Secretary, Government of West Bengal, was the Chairman. It may be mentioned that Shri T. C. Dutt was also the Chairman of the Committee which had been set up by the Resolution of 25th March 1988 to scrutinise the Draft Building Rules which had been published in the Calcutta Gazette on 30th January 1986. 32. The records of the Proceedings of this 1986 Committee have been produced before this Court. From these records it appears that the 1989 Committee held 6 meetings on 31st July 1989, 12th August, 1989, 20th August 1989, 2nd September 1989 (4th and 5th) and 9th September 1989. At the first meeting held on 31st July 1989 after certain preliminaries the Committee decided to ask the Calcutta Municipal Corporation to furnish certain Information including the following :- (a) An up-to-date list of high-rise buildings (13.5 metres and above) sanctioned by the C.M.C. since 1980. At the first meeting held on 31st July 1989 after certain preliminaries the Committee decided to ask the Calcutta Municipal Corporation to furnish certain Information including the following :- (a) An up-to-date list of high-rise buildings (13.5 metres and above) sanctioned by the C.M.C. since 1980. (b) An up-to-date list of applications for sanctioning plans of high-rise buildings (13.5 metres and above) under consideration of the C.M.C. (c) An up-to-date list of unauthorised high-rise buildings (13.5 metres and above)––action contemplated against each of them by the C.M.C. Paragraph 5 of the Minutes of the first meeting recorded as follows :- "5. Suitable amendment to the C.M.C. Act, 1980 should be initiated immediately to substitute the words 'six months' for the words 'sixty days' appearing in s. 398(1) in case of high-rise buildings (13.5 metres and above) in order to arrest spurt in unauthorised construction of high-rise buildings taking advantage of non-communication of refusal within a period of sixty days by the Municipal Commissioner. 33. At the 2nd meeting held on 12th August, 1989, amongst others, the following decision was taken:- "(e) Provision in the C.M.C. Act, 1980 or in the Rules made thereunder should be incorporated for certifying a building plan having the height of 13.5 metres or above from structural point of view by an outside agency duly empanelled and licensed by the C.M.C before the same is considered for sanction. C.M.C. should also have sufficient arrangement to scrutinise such plans by its own competent structural Engineers. (f) Since the new Building Rules under the C.M.C. Act, 1980 are more stringent in nature in so far as those relate to buildings with a height of 13.5 metres or above, the question of incorporating adequate Provision either in the Act or in the Rules for disclosure of plans for buildings of the above category already sanctioned under the existing Rules by the applicants within a period to be fixed by the C.M.C. immediately after the new Building Rules are finally published should be considered carefully." 34. But the more important decision appears at para 1.3(a) of the Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the committee held on 20th August 1989, which is as follows:- "1.3(a) The terms of reference of the Government Resolution are in respect of high-rise buildings only. It was recommended that the terms of reference should contain long-span buildings also in addition. But the more important decision appears at para 1.3(a) of the Minutes of the 3rd meeting of the committee held on 20th August 1989, which is as follows:- "1.3(a) The terms of reference of the Government Resolution are in respect of high-rise buildings only. It was recommended that the terms of reference should contain long-span buildings also in addition. Government should be moved accordingly." There is no further discussion on the high-rise aspect in the subsequent minutes of the meetings, i.e., 4th, 5th and 6th meetings. 35. From the records produced it appears that an interim report was prepared by the 1989 Committee, although the date does not appear from the report. Paragraphs 1.3, 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4 and 3.1 are quoted below:- "1.3. On the other hand, the Committee felt that there is urgent need for taking effective preventive action to stop further deterioration of the situation created by large-scale and ill-controlled construction of high-rise buildings. The Committee, therefore, decided to submit their Interim Report containing its considered recommendations about immediate action required in this field. 1.4. The Committee had so far 8 sittings commencing from the 31st July, 1989 till the 2nd October, 1989. The meetings were held at different places, namely Writer's Buildings, Office of the ILGUS, Office of the Housing Board and Indira Bhawan at Bidhannagar. 2.1. The Committee felt that the situation obtaining in, the Calcutta Municipal Area in respect of buildings with a height of 13.5 metres and above is indeed alarming. Some immediate steps are, therefore, considered essential to arrest the ill-controlled spurt in the, activities of the high-rise buildings on the part of the private developers so as to ensure public safety and security and specially because–– (a) the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Building Rules, 1988 could not be brought into force as yet; and (b) the infrastructure of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation including sewerage, drainage, water supply and transport system is under enormous pressure. 2.2. On the above understanding of the matter, the Committee unanimously decided to recommend; (a) regulating the construction, sale and transfer of flats by promoters in West Bengal, and (b) putting a general ban on fresh construction of high-rise building with a height of 13.5 metres and above for a limited period. 2.4. 2.2. On the above understanding of the matter, the Committee unanimously decided to recommend; (a) regulating the construction, sale and transfer of flats by promoters in West Bengal, and (b) putting a general ban on fresh construction of high-rise building with a height of 13.5 metres and above for a limited period. 2.4. As regards the second issue, it may be stated that till: (i) a thorough evaluation of the present capacity of civic infra-structure in C.M.C. area is made, (ii) public reaction in regard to the advantages/distributions of high-rise building activities is assessed by the Committee, and (iii) the new Calcutta Municipal Corporation Building Rules, 1988 are enforced, a temporary ban on construction of new buildings with a height of 13.5 metres or/and above should be seriously considered by the State Government. With this end in view, a draft Ordinance has been prepared and recommended by the Committee in its meeting held on the 2nd October, 1989, a copy of which is enclosed (Annex-C). 3.1. The Committee shall continue its work on various aspects of the terms of reference and prepare its final recommendations for submission to the Government in due courts." 36. On 18th November 1989 the Governor promulgated the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989, which was replaced by the 1990 Amendment Act. The Statements of Objects and Reasons of the Bill have been reproduced in the Affidavit-in-Opposition of the State, which reads as follows:- "Of late a great deal of concern has been caused to the State Government by the problems arising out of unplanned and indiscriminate construction of high-rise buildings in Calcutta inasmuch as such construction has resulted in : (1) increased load on sewerage and drainage system, (2) acute problems of traffic management, increased density of population, reduced availability of open space, increased problems relating to conservancy, etc. 2. As an interim step, before introduction of permanent measures to cope with the problems as aforesaid, the Stare Government decided to amend the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, in order to prevent construction of high-rise buildings in Calcutta for a period of one year for the present; 3. As the Legislative Assembly was not in session and it was necessary to take immediate action, an Ordinance, namely, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989 (West Bengal Ordinance No. (IX) of 1989) was promulgated. 4. As the Legislative Assembly was not in session and it was necessary to take immediate action, an Ordinance, namely, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation (Amendment) Ordinance, 1989 (West Bengal Ordinance No. (IX) of 1989) was promulgated. 4. The Bill seeks to continue the provisions of the said Ordinance." 37. The main thrust of the submissions made on behalf of the appellants centres around Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that the absolute embargo on height exceeding 13 5 metres is an unreasonable and arbitrary restriction. They have relied on a number of well known decisions of the Supreme Court, viz. E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1974 SC 555 ; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1978 SC 597 , Ramona Dayaram Shetti v. International Airport Authority of India, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 and Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, reported in AIR 1981 SC 487 . 38. Our attention has been drawn to the observations of Bhagwati J. in Ajay Hasia (supra) where the Supreme Court considered the decisions in Maneka Gandhi (supra) and International Airport Authority of India (supra). The observations are as follows :- "Now the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of Art. 14 : What is the content and reach of the great qualising principle enunciated in this article. There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning for, to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it, cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits......Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence, "This was again reiterated by this Court in International Airport Authority's case (1979) 3 SCR 1014 ) at p. 1942 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) (supra) of the Report. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence, "This was again reiterated by this Court in International Airport Authority's case (1979) 3 SCR 1014 ) at p. 1942 : ( AIR 1979 SC 1628 ) (supra) of the Report. It must therefore now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality, the doctrine of classification which is evolved by the Courts is not paraphrase of Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that Article. It is merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to above, the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would be breached. Wherever therefore there is arbitrariness in State action, whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an "authority" under Article 12, Art. 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the constitution." 39. In order to substantiate his contention that the absolute embargo on height exceeding 13.5 metres is unreasonable and arbitrary. Mr. Ghosh has advanced the following reasons :- (i) Firstly, it is pointed out that there is no embargo on construction of high-rise buildings as such and that it will be possible to make construction of buildings exceeding height of 13.5 metres even during the period of one year on the basis of plans which had been sanctioned prior to 18th December 1989 and which were still valid. Referring to Rule 62A of Schedule XVI it was also pointed one that ordinarily sanction of a plan remains valid for 5 years and can be renewed for another 5 years. Referring to Rule 62A of Schedule XVI it was also pointed one that ordinarily sanction of a plan remains valid for 5 years and can be renewed for another 5 years. It is, therefore, argued that during the period, in question a large number of high-rise buildings could be or would be constructed lawfully with the sanction of the Corporation and as such the object of the 1990 Amendment Act (i.e. to prevent construction of high-rise buildings for a period of one year) cannot obviously be achieved. (ii) Secondly, the 1990 Amendment Act creates two classes of persons who are interested in construction buildings, namely, those who have already obtained sanction of their plans before 18th December 1989 and those who have not and this classification has no nexus with the object to be achieved by the impugned legislation. (iii) Thirdly, the rejection of all applications for sanctioning plans beyond 13.5 meters in height is not based on any discernible principle particularly in the context that the embargo was for a temporary period. It was submitted that the permanent rejection of all such plans was a disproportionate consequence unrelated to the object sought to be achieved. (iv) Fourthly, the real object of the 1990 Amendment Act was to nullify the interim order made by this Court in the writ petition filed by the Licensed Builders' Association restraining the State from giving effect to the draft Rules of 1988 It was contended that the Government, instead of taking recourse to the bona fide course of having the interim order vacated or set aside by a judicial proceeding adopted this circuitous method demonstrating executive vendetta against the judiciary for obstructing the framing and implementation of new building rules. It was pointed out that in view of collapse of a few buildings although each of these buildings did not exceed 13.5. meters in height––which attracted severe criticism in the media regarding the efficacy of the supervisory role of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation in the matter of sanction of plans and overseeing construction, the State Government took recourse to its Ordinance-making power for issuing Ordinance which was incorporated in the 1990 Amendment Act as a palliative to offset the effect of such criricism. 40. Mr. Pal, appearing for Terra Firma; adopted the submissions made by Mr. Ghosh in relation to Article 14 of the Constitution. 40. Mr. Pal, appearing for Terra Firma; adopted the submissions made by Mr. Ghosh in relation to Article 14 of the Constitution. He however, added that the classification between those who had already obtained sanction of their plans before 18th December 1989 and those who had not is arbitrary inasmuch as it is based on the fortuitous event of obtaining a sanction. In other words, although both the persons applied for sanction much before 18.12.1989 the fortuitous event of obtaining of sanction by one year would permit him to construct above 13.5 metres whereas the other person would be prohibited from doing so. The adoption of an arbitrary criterion of obtaining sanction for differentiating between the two persons is, without anything more violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, By way of analogy reliance has been placed on the principle laid down in the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Pattawardhan v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1977 SC 2051 . 41. But the real emphasis of Mr. Pal was that the embargo on construction exceeding 13.5 meters in height was an unreasonable restriction on the right of Terra Firma to carryon trade and business and then fore violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. He has referred to the statement of Objects and Reasons and has pointed out that various reasons which are stated therein mainly appear to have nexus with the load of population on various civic facilities like drainage system, conservancy, traffic management etc. It is contended that when a challenge is thrown on the ground of violation of Art. 19 it was for the State to establish before this Court the reasonableness of the restrictions by cogent materials, The affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the State merely quotes the Statement of Objects and Reasons and the records produced by the State pursuant to the direction given by this Court do not disclose any relevant or duly considered approach for imposing such restrictions. It is also contended that the permanent rejection of all pending plans is a glaring instance of disproportionate and therefore, unreasonable restriction. In this connection learned Counsel has relied on Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1951 SC 118 ; Laxmi Khandsari v, State of U.P, reported in AIR 1981 SC 873 . 42. It is also contended that the permanent rejection of all pending plans is a glaring instance of disproportionate and therefore, unreasonable restriction. In this connection learned Counsel has relied on Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1951 SC 118 ; Laxmi Khandsari v, State of U.P, reported in AIR 1981 SC 873 . 42. We propose to consider the various contentions raised on behalf of the writ petitioners and the answers and the stand taken on behalf of the State. 43. It is not disputed by the learned Advocate General that even after 1990 Amendment Act came into force there was no ban on the actual construction of high-rise buildings i.e. buildings exceeding 13.5 meters. In other words, those persons whose plans had been sanctioned prior to 18.12.1989 were free to construct and many constructions, in fact, went on even after 18.12.1989. The State produced before us a list of plans which had been submitted and sanctioned during the period from 25.11.88 to 17.12.89. This list showed that a number of plans had been sanctioned prior to 18.12.1989. In the written submissions filed on behalf of the State it was stated that the object of s. 398(A) "is not to temporarily prevent construction of high-rise building". The mischief that was to be remedied by the 1990 Amendment Act was, according to its Statement of Objects and Reasons, to prevent or arrest any further increase on the load on sewerage and drainage system, minimise problems of traffic management, prevent the increase in density of population, stop reduction in availability of open space and arrest problems relating to load on the conservancy system. It is clear that ostensibly the entire object was to ensure that there was no further stress and load on the civic facilities, traffic management and ecology. Terra Firma in its petition has given a clear illustration of the impact of the embargo on the height on a given plot of land. This illustration demonstrates that since there was no bar on horizontal expansion, having regard to the available FAR, the built-up area would not be reduced by reason of the embargo and therefore, the number of persons occupying a building would not necessarily undergo any substantial diminution. It has been demonstrated and not disputed that the encouragement of horizontal expansion would result in lesser open space being available. It has been demonstrated and not disputed that the encouragement of horizontal expansion would result in lesser open space being available. This would not only be harmful for ecology particularly in a congested city like Calcutta, but would also create other problems of traffic management, accessibility of essential services like fire service etc. The petitioners point out that if the real intention of the State was to achieve any of the objects mentioned in Statement of Objects and Reasons then obviously there should have been a total restriction on the construction of buildings which would ensure that the number of occupants were limited. We were not shown any provision in the 1990 Amendment Act which could achieve this purpose. There is substance in these submissions of the petitioner. We directed the submission of a list of plan sanctioned, on and from 25th November 1988 because the learned Advocate General had submitted that an expert committee had recommended ban on building over 13.5 meters on that date. The list, however, shows that sanctions for building with height exceeding 13.5 meters were given in a number of cases after 25th November 1988. 44. Moreover, the legislative history of this aspect of the Municipal laws as well as the records of the Committee to which we have referred, do not also disclose any discernible reason for the embargo on the application for sanction. 45. The Building Rules contained in the 1951 Act and as amended in 1971, as already noted, did not contain any such embargo on construction of buildings beyond 13.5 meters in height. The draft Rules which were prepared in 1986 also did not contain any such embargo. The discussions at the 23rd meeting of the Committee constituted in 1988 for scrutinising the suggestions and recommendations on the 1986 draft Rules which have been extracted earlier clearly establish that there was not even any discussion regarding the imposition of any absolute embargo on receiving applications for sanction for buildings exceeding 13.5 meters in height. The High Powered Committee constituted by resolution on 13.7.89, held a number of meetings to consider the impact of high-rise building construction as appearing in the terms of reference quoted earlier. The High Powered Committee constituted by resolution on 13.7.89, held a number of meetings to consider the impact of high-rise building construction as appearing in the terms of reference quoted earlier. The minutes of the meetings of the High Powered, Committee to which reference has been made in sufficient detail, do not disclose any cogent reasons or materials on the basis of which the impugned embargo could be justified. On the other hand, we will refer to one or two of the minutes which are significant. It is interesting to note that at the third meeting held on 20.8.1989, the Committee itself suggested that the terms of reference were not adequate as they were in respect of high rise buildings only and recommended that the terms of reference should be enlarged to include long-span buildings as well and the Government should be moved accordingly. It appears, however, that this recommendation of the Committee was not accepted by the Government. But the fact that this recommendation was made is a clear indication of the fact even the High Powered Committee realised that the problems which the Committee was considering could not be remedied only by restrictions in respect of high-rise buildings. The Committee was not in a position to submit a final report but it only submitted an interim report. Even in the interim report what the Committee said was that there was an urgent need for taking preventive action to prevent further deterioration of the situation created by large-scale and ill-controlled construction of high-rise buildings. Therefore, the Committee was emphasising indiscriminate expansion without proper control. In fact it recommended "putting general ban on fresh construction of high-rise buildings with height of 13.5 metres and above for limited period." (our emphasis). It did not say that construction should be allowed of all such buildings which had been sanctioned upto 18.12.89. 46. The 1990 Amendment Act was, according to the State, enacted in the light of the recommendations of the High-Powered Committee constituted in July 1989. Quite apart from the fact that the deliberation of the High-Powered Committee as recorded in the minutes does not disclose any sufficient materials in the conclusion reached by the Committee, it is apparent that even the recommendations of the Committee were not translated into the 1990 Amendment Act. The 1990 Amendment Act permitted construction of high-rise buildings to go on even after 18th December 1989. The 1990 Amendment Act permitted construction of high-rise buildings to go on even after 18th December 1989. The contention of the petitioners that there was no discernible principle or reason behind the embargo on the application for sanction of buildings beyond 13.5 metres in height but not against high-rise construction is arbitrary and did not have any material nexus with the object of the enactment, has substance and we have no hesitation in accepting the same. 47. In that view of the matter the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 398A of the 1990 Amendment Act which results in rejection of all applications for sanction of buildings exceeding 13.5 meters in height must also be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Since, however, the State has put forward its contention in justification of such direction, it is necessary to deal with the same. In one of the lists submitted by the State pursuant to the Court's direction, it has been shown that 270 applications for high-rise buildings beyond 13.5 meters were pending for sanction as on 18th December 1989. The State contends that if these pending applications were not rejected but were allowed to be processed under the old building rules then the very mischief sought to be prevented by the amendment would have escaped the legal embargo to a large extent and a large number of high-rise buildings would have been sanctioned under the old building rules till the new rules were enforced. Although apparently attractive, on a closer scrutiny it is difficult to accept this contention. The Statement of Objects and Reasons as well as the proceedings of the High-Powered Committee clearly reveal what was "the real mischief sought to be prevented". As pointed out earlier, the mischief was essentially to reduce the pressure of the number of people occupying a building. The blanket rejection of the 270 applications for construction of buildings beyond 13.5 would not have any nexus with the object sought to be achieved and would inevitably lead to arbitrariness. 48. There is another aspect of matter. It was also contended on behalf of the State that since the new building rules were being framed it was necessary to put such an embargo. It is, however, not the case of State that the new building rules were only concerned with imposing absolute embargo on construction of buildings exceeding 13.5 meters in height. It was also contended on behalf of the State that since the new building rules were being framed it was necessary to put such an embargo. It is, however, not the case of State that the new building rules were only concerned with imposing absolute embargo on construction of buildings exceeding 13.5 meters in height. The new building rules as the State itself has contended were being made in a comprehensive manner dealing with all aspects of construction of buildings. If that is so, then one would have expected that all pending plans which relate to construction of buildings beyond 13.5 meters in height should have been suspended or rejected instead of some being singled out without classification based on an intelligible differentia. The content ion of the State should, therefore, be rejected. 49. The arbitrariness of the interim legislation is also evident from the impermissible classification between sanction-holders and non-sanction-holders as on 18th December 1989. The admitted and professed object of the 1990 Amendment Act was remedial and this remedy as recommended by the High-powered Committee was to prevent constructions. The sanctioning authority is the Corporation. An applicant for sanction has no control over the proceedings which ultimately result in the sanction. The Corporation may take a month or a number of months or a year a number of years to grant sanction. In fact, in Terra Firma, the application for sanction was made in March 1989. From the list submitted by the Corporation, it appears that although applications submitted subsequent to March 1989 have been sanctioned, yet Terra Firma's application was kept pending in spite of repeated follow up by Terra Firma. The sanction, therefore, as far as far as the applications are concerned, is fortuitous as, if not more than the event of confirmation in public services as pointed out by the Supreme Court in S. B. Pattawardhan v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1977 SC 2051 , to which our attention was drawn by Mr. Pal. A classification which is based on such arbitrary foundation is beyond the parameters of a permissible classification. The differentia has no nexus with the object to be achieved. The construction of high-rise buildings by a sanction-bolder will also add to the problem which the 1990 Amendment Act is supposed to remedy. Pal. A classification which is based on such arbitrary foundation is beyond the parameters of a permissible classification. The differentia has no nexus with the object to be achieved. The construction of high-rise buildings by a sanction-bolder will also add to the problem which the 1990 Amendment Act is supposed to remedy. The Amendment Act has been sought to be applied retrospectively by providing for automatic rejection of all pending applications which is arbitrary and unjust. It also violates the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The applications made earlier on point of time but not sanctioned because of the procedural formalities, may stand rejected, whereas the applications made subsequent thereto may have been already sanctioned. On the date of the submission of the plan there was no embargo on the sanction according to the existing law. If the Municipal authority kept the plan pending and unduly delayed the matter of sanction the applicants cannot be made to suffer. The Amending Act creates unreasonable discrimination in the sense that some plans have already been sanctioned while on the same basis other plans stand rejected. 50. The 1990 Amendment Act was also challenged by Terra Firma as being violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In the view that we have taken, it is strictly not necessary to consider this question in any further detail. Since no justifiable ground for the restrictions has been disclosed either in the affidavit or in the materials produced before the Court and particularly the reports, the conclusion must be that the restrictions are not reasonable restrictions within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. We would refer to one of the judgments of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Pal, namely M/s. Laxmi Khandasari v. State of U.P., AIR 1981 SC 873 (supra). In this case while dealing with Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution the Supreme Court made the following observations: "......It is no doubt well settled that where a citizen complains of the violation of fundamental rights contained In sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 or for that matter in any of sub-clause (a) to (g) thereof, the onus is on the State to prove or justify that the restraint or restrictions imposed on the fundamental rights under clauses 2 to 6 of the Article are reasonable. We, therefore, fully agree with the contention advanced by the petitioners that where there is a clear violation of Article 19(1)(g), the State has to justify by acceptable evidence, inevitable consequences or sufficient materials that the restriction, whether partial or complete is in public interest and contains the quality of reasonableness...... 51. Learned counsel has put emphasis on the proposition that "the State has to justify by acceptable evidence, inevitable consequences or sufficient materials that the restrictions contain the quality of reasonableness." According to him there is no acceptable evidence or inevitable consequences or sufficient materials, in the facts of this case. These comments appear to us to be justified in the background of the materials made available to this Court by the State. It is only to be added that the affidavit filed on behalf of the State did not contain materials apart from merely recording the Objects and Reasons and was therefore, hopelessly inadequate for meeting the challenge of Article 19(1)(8). It was at the instance of this Court and by reason of directions given by this Court that the records of the proceedings of the two committees and the/reports and other lists, containing certain information regarding pendency of plans etc. were produced by the State. We permitted this indulgence to the State because the question related to the vires of a Statute. But as Indicated earlier these materials do not, in our opinion, amount to the State discharging the onus of establishing that the restrictions imposed by the impugned law are reasonable within the meaning of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Total ban on sanction of plans for buildings above 13.5 mt. in height irrespective of their location of site really amounts to unreasonable restriction. For example, at a site with wide open frontage there may not actually be any real difficulty for high-rise building whereas at a site with narrow frontage it may really cause difficulty for sanction of such high-rise building. There are really no intelligible criteria made out by the impugned Act on the basis of which total prohibition on the sanction of such high-rise buildings has been made. Apart from the submissions in this respect, the learned Advocate General had made some submissions in the course of oral hearing. The learned Advocate General submitted that Article 14 does not require micro/macro classification. Apart from the submissions in this respect, the learned Advocate General had made some submissions in the course of oral hearing. The learned Advocate General submitted that Article 14 does not require micro/macro classification. In the course of oral submissions he also said that the soil of Calcutta is prone to subsidence and therefore not suitable for multistoried buildings and that the Ordinance had been promulgated to bring about controlled development of multistoried buildings. In aid of his submission that Article 14 did not require micro/macro classification he also relied on Murthy Match Works v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, reported in AIR 1974 SC 497 and B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pan, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1146 . 52. These submissions are of no substance. The Court should take judicial notice of that fact that multi-storied buildings are being constructed in Calcutta over a substantial period of time. The records or reports disclosed by the State do not anywhere suggest that the soil of Calcutta is unsuitable for multi-storied buildings. Nor do the records substantiate the submission that the ordinance was brought about for controlled development of multistoried buildings. 53. The case of Murthy Match Works v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise (supra) cited by the learned Advocate General relates to a complaint made by the manufacturers of matches that there was discrimination in the levy of Excise Duty on matches sought to be imposed on the medium-sized manufacturers. Certain broad principles relating to classification were discussed in this case. It is difficult to appreciate how this case is of any assistance in deciding the real questions which have arisen in the instant case. 54. In the other case (B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pan) reported in AIR 1975 SC 1146 ) (supra) the Supreme Court was considering the embargo imposed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy (Second Amendment) Act, 1969 providing in s. 13(3A) a restriction on new transferee landlords from filing suits for eviction against tenants within 3 years of the date of transfer. After considering the Statements of Objects and Reasons of the Bill leading to the amendment the Supreme Court found the embargo to be reasonable. After considering the Statements of Objects and Reasons of the Bill leading to the amendment the Supreme Court found the embargo to be reasonable. The Supreme Court found that a large number of original land owners living in their own homes could not, under the principal Act, claim recovery of possession, being occupants of their own houses and likewise they could not urge the grounds of recovery for re-building, not being financially able to invest on such costly venture. These landlords had to look up the modest old time rentals as the only source of return. The Supreme Court then observed: "The social upshot of this scheme was that the old landlords found their ownership a poor return investment, saw a new class of wealthier investors streaming into cities and towns ready to buy premises, evict old tenants, re-let on rack-rents or rebuild and reap rich return. They had no buildings of their own and could prove plans to rebuild thus disarming the non-evictability provision of s. 13 of the basic Act. The transferees could thus get decrees for eviction under the basic Act. Naturally, transfers of buildings to this somewhat speculating class increased and the spectacle of eviction litigation or potential eviction proceeding was projected on the urban scene. The Legislature promptly reacted by the Amendment Act to rescue the lessees by clamping down new restrictions by way of s. 13(3A). A 3-year moratorium as given to the tenants from being hunted out of their homesteads by imposing a ban on institution of suits for eviction by transferee landlords." It is on the basis of such reasoning that the Supreme Court found the embargo to be reasonable. Since it has been already demonstrated that there is no valid principle for the imposition of the embargo in the instant case, nor do the relevant reports or records disclose any such principle, Anita Pan's case ( AIR 1975 SC 1146 ) (supra) is of no assistance. 55. Finally, we deal with the point raised in relation to circumventing the interim order made by this Court in the earlier writ petition filed by the Licensed Building Surveyors Association. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State has frankly admitted that in view of the restraint imposed by the interim order the State had no other alternative than to take recourse to the ordinance-making power and amendment of the Statute itself. The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State has frankly admitted that in view of the restraint imposed by the interim order the State had no other alternative than to take recourse to the ordinance-making power and amendment of the Statute itself. But it is well settled that the Courts are not concerned with the motives of the legislature. We do not find any substance in the submission that the 1990 Amendment Act is to be declared as bad merely because the State was motivated by the consideration of making the interim order ineffective. It is also well settled that the legislature can enact a law which changes the basis on which a particular judicial decision bits been rendered and can even pass a validating Act with retrospective effect validating the past transaction which has been judicially set aside after making such changes regarding the basis of the judicial determination. 56. To sum up : we are strongly against such temporary embargo. A temporary measure is necessary for a temporary contingency. But an ad hoc legislation imposing embargo on high-rise construction for a year is pointless when it is considered that high-rise buildings in the city are not desirable. Such ad hoc legislation of a temporary nature for a problem that is permanent is bad as it merely has a destabilising effect without a solution to the problem. The haste inherent in such legislative embargo is also bound to create discrimination and other maladjustments creating a situation like the one present before us. The Ordinance was professedly promulgated to check unplanned and uncontrolled development of high-rise structures. True, the city is already beset with problems of the pressure of population and consequent pressure on the sewer system, road traffic system and the other conditions of civic system in the city. It is also true that a solution should be there. But such solution can come only from a permanent and well-drilled legislation. If any legislative check is to be imposed that should be done only after prior in-depth study of various factors involved in the problem. The legislature should beforehand elicit the interaction of the experts in the subject. No legislation of a temporary nature like the present one is of any help rather it creates a source of unguided power leading to anomalies offensive to the equality clause. 57. The legislature should beforehand elicit the interaction of the experts in the subject. No legislation of a temporary nature like the present one is of any help rather it creates a source of unguided power leading to anomalies offensive to the equality clause. 57. Moreover, any measures that ordinarily the legislature adopts are made prospective and the cases pending before the effective date should remain unaffected, otherwise cases of irrational discrimination are bound to arise. Retrospective legislation is supportable where it is necessary for special circumstances and the legislation has no chance of discriminating between citizens without reasonable classification. 58. In our opinion, a prohibitive legislation should have a mechanism of checks and balances. It cannot be total. There must be savings where savings are necessary for adjustment to all prevailing conditions. In the present Act we fail to discern any attempts at such balancing of factors. True, the infrastructure of the civic system is under heavy pressure and high-rise structures, if allowed to be concentrated in any area of the city, are bound to tell upon the civic services system. 59. But the whole thrust on the high-rise buildings is inadequate. A sprawling structure within the vertical limit may be more injurious to the city. The same had effect on the amenities of the city life may arise from construction of big horizontal structures. This aspect has not been given thought. This is an inconsistency of the legislation. 60. Again, it is not that every part of the city is under pressure of uncontrolled and unplanned development. There are areas where high-rise construction in a planned manner will not go to have any ill effect. On the other hand, high-rise construction enables the middle income group to have housing facility because the cost of housing in a high-rise structure is lower. No relaxation has, however, been conceived. The ban is absolute and extends to the entire city limits. This is patently unreasonable. Apart from the lack of adjustments, savings and balances, there could be no sense in imposing a ban for a year on high-rise construction. If the ban is found to be necessary to save the city from over-pressure, the legislation should have been a comprehensive one. Law was to be made after adequate deliberation by the legislature after being duly informed of the diverse aspects of the matter. If the ban is found to be necessary to save the city from over-pressure, the legislation should have been a comprehensive one. Law was to be made after adequate deliberation by the legislature after being duly informed of the diverse aspects of the matter. We do not find anything in the impugned Act that its legislation was finalised after study of the demographic situations of the various parts of the city and the available civic facilities and the varying pressure on them on account of human concentration. Nothing is before us to show that the problem has been looked into the context of conditions prevailing in the city zone by zone. The matter requires a well-thought and well-balanced legislation with necessary savings and relaxations with graduated degrees of prohibition depending on varied conditions. 61. For the reasons aforesaid, the writ petitions succeed. The Calcutta Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1990 and all actions taken pursuant thereto are declared unconstitutional and void. The Calcutta, Municipal Corporation is directed to dispose of all applications for sanction of buildings exceeding 13.5 meters in height pending as on 18th December 1989 in accordance with law, i.e. the Building Rules as in force as on that date and not the Rules which have come into force thereafter. There will be no order as to costs. Mr. Tarun Roy appearing for the Respondent asks for stay. 62. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, the stay is granted for four weeks only in those cases where the formalities regarding the sanction of the plans have not been completed and processing of such is yet to be completed. We make it quite clear that the stay will not operate in respect of those plans where all formalities had been completed and only ministerial act was necessary to be performed in handing over the sanctioned plans to the applicants as on 18th December, 1989. All parties concerned to act on a signed xerox copy of this judgment and order on the usual undertaking. Shyamal Kumar Sen, J.: I agree. Writ petitions succeed; appeal allowed.