JUDGMENT 1. -Question raised in this writ petition, which is directed against the award dated, 29.9.84 passed by the Labour Court, Kota, in reference case No. 61/82 relates to the .1. jurisdiction of the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal and National Tribunal under section-11A of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and also the limits within which the High Court should interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or the National Tribunal. 2. Brief facts which are necessary for the purpose of deciding the question raised in this writ petition are that one Kalyan Singh who was employed with the Instrumentation Ltd., was served with a charge-sheet dated, 14.1.80. A domestic enquiry was held against the workman. On the basis of that enquiry, the inquiry officer found the workman guilty of the charges levelled against him and on the basis of the report submitted by the inquiry officer, the management served a show cause notice containing proposal of dismissal of the workman. Since the explanation submitted by the workman was not found to be satisfactory his service was terminated vide order dated, 8.3.80. The workman approached the Conciliation Officer through the respondent No. 1. Parties could not settle the matter before the Conciliation Officer and therefore, failure report was submitted to the Government. The State Government then made a reference of the dispute relating to termination of the service of the workman under section 10(1) (d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act of 1947). The respondent No. 2 submitted its statement of claim and the petitioner submitted written statement. While the Union contended that the workman was not guilty of any delinquency and his dismissal from service was unwarranted and unjustified and that the inquiry was not fair and also that the punishment was highly excessive, the management submitted that the inquiry had been held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, full opportunity of defence was given to the workman, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report after considering the evidence produced during the course of inquiry and there was every justification for punishment of dismissal because the workman had used physical force against his officer during the course of his talk in relation to his non-promotion. 3. 3. By its order dated, 21.10.83, the labour Court, Kota, held that the domestic inquiry held against the petitioner was just and fair. It then considered the evidence produced during the inquiry and come to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the workman was correctly held as proved. On the question of quantum of punishment the Labour Court held that the workman had entered Service on 8.6.87 as Welder. His service was satisfactory and he was given three promotions between 1967 to 1971. That was indicative of his satisfactory and efficient performance of duties. The Labour Court took notice of the fact that the punishment had been imposed only with reference to the particular act of mis-conduct committed by the workman. The workman had been deprived of his promotion for ten years and there is no allegation of any delinquency except the one with reference to which he was dismissed from service. The Labour Court also took notice of the fact that the workman had been taking active part in the activities of the Instrumentation Employees Union. On that basis, the Labour Court held the punishment of dismissal from service was highly excessive and was not justified. On the basis of this opinion the Labour Court directed that a penalty of stoppage of four grade increments without cumulative effect and forfeiture of the wages for the intervening period will serve the ends of justice and accordingly it passed the impugned award. 4. In assailing the award passed by the Labour Court for reinstatement of the Workman, Shri Subhash Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner, has very streneously argued that discipline is one of the essentials of an industry. Productivity in the industries depend on disciplined working and it is for the management to decide as to what punishment should be inflicted on a workman who is found guilty of an act of serious mis-conduct. An act which is subversive of discipline and which amounts the grave misconduct cannot be tolerated by the management. Once the Management has objectively considered the circumstances and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service, there was absolutely no justification for the Labour Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment. Shri Jain argued that although section 11A empowers the Labour Court to alter the nature of punishment imposed on the employee, this power can be exercised in the rarest of the rare cases. Shri Jain argued that although section 11A empowers the Labour Court to alter the nature of punishment imposed on the employee, this power can be exercised in the rarest of the rare cases. No general power has been conferred on the Labour Court to alter the punishment imposed by the Management. Shri Jain submitted that the Labour Court has passed the award without fully appreciating the facts available on record and the award passed by it suffers from error of law apparent on the face of it. The Labour Court has acted arbitrarily in interfering with the quantum of punishment imposed by the Management. 5. Shri Virendra Bandhu, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, argued that the Labour Court has been conferred with an appellate jurisdiction not only in respect of the findings recorded during the course of domestic inquiry but also in respect of the quantum of punishment. Therefore the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal has got unlimited jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment awarded by the Management, once it comes to the conclusion that the punishment is unjustified or is excessive or is disproportionate. Shri Bandhu submitted that the Labour Court is entitled to examine the justification of the punishment in the context of the nature of allegations levelled against the workman and if it finds that the Management has acted unjustly, there is every reason for the Labour Court to interfere with the award of punishment. Shri Bandhu further argued that this court must not interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court merely because, it is possible for this Court to come to a conclusion different than the one recorded by the Labour Court. According to Shri Bandhu the Labour Court has taken into consideration all relevant circumstances and then expressed the view that the punishment of dismissal from service was unduly harsh and excessive and the opinion expressed by the Labour Court should not be upset by this Court. 6. Shri C.N. Sharma, Senior Advocate, who argued the matter as an intervener, submitted that on the basis of the domestic inquiry held by it, the Management must consider all relevant factors before imposing a particular punishment. The Management must give good reasons for imposing a particular punishment in the light of the proved act of mis-conduct. 6. Shri C.N. Sharma, Senior Advocate, who argued the matter as an intervener, submitted that on the basis of the domestic inquiry held by it, the Management must consider all relevant factors before imposing a particular punishment. The Management must give good reasons for imposing a particular punishment in the light of the proved act of mis-conduct. The Management must take into consideration the length of service of the workman, nature of the delinquency committed by him, the circumstances if any, which gave provocation for the act of delinquency committed by the workman. Shri Sharma argued that a good employer should not, in every case, impose penalty of dismissal or removal from service. The Management must adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the workman. Only in extreme cases involving act of moral turpitude the management should award the punishment of dismissal. He further argued that the Labour Court or the Tribunal should also not lightly interfere with the punishment imposed by the Management. Such interference should be made only on the basis of convincing reasons. The Labour Court or the Tribunal must indicate in its order as to why the punishment imposed by the Management has been considered to be unjust, arbitrary or capricious. 7. Section-11A was inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 w.e.f. 15.12.71. Prior to the insertion of section-11A the courts had indicated the limitations of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or the National Tribunal to interfere with the findings of guilt and the quantum of punishment awarded by the Management in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen ( AIR 1958 S.C. 130 ) . The Supreme Court discussed the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the Industrial Tribunal when adjudicating a dispute relating to dismissal or discharge and observed : "Undoubtedly, the management of a concern has power to direct its own internal administration and discipline, but the power is not unlimited and when a dispute arises, industrial Tribunals have been given the power to see whether the termination of service of a workman is justified and to give appropriate relief. In cases of dismissal on misconduct, the Tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. In cases of dismissal on misconduct, the Tribunal does not, however, act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. It will interfere (1) when there is want of good faith, (ii) when there is victimisation or unfair labour practice (iii) when the management has been guilty of a basic error or violation of a principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials the finding is completely baseless or perverse." 8. The same principle was reiterated in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Its Workmen ( AIR 1960 S.C. 160 ) , where the Supreme Court held that, where the employer was not guilty of victimisation or unfair labour practice, the Tribunal will be generally relectant to interfere with the order of punishment passed on the basis of proper domestic enquiry held in consonance with the principles of natural justice. 9. In Management of Ritz Theatre (P) Ltd. v. Its Workmen ( AIR 1963 S.C. 295 ) , the Supreme Court held that, if on the basis of a properly held domestic enquiry, an order of dismissal is passed against the employee, it can be challenged only if it is shown that the conclusion reached at the departmental inquiry were perverse or the impugned dismissal is vindictive or malafide and amounts to unfair labour practice. 10. In Hind Construction and Engineering Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen ( AIR 1965 S.C. 917 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : "The award of punishment for misconduct under the standing orders if any, is a matter for the management to decide and if there is any justification for the punishment imposed the Tribunal should not 'interfere. The Tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or whether it is excessive or too severe, but, where the punishment is shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the particular conduct and past record or is such as no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances, the Tribunal may treat the imposition of such punishment as itself showing victimisation or unfair labour practice." 11. In that particular case, the Supreme Court upheld interference in the quantum of punishment of dismissal by the Labour Court when it found that the punishment of dismissal for the act of absence of the employee could not have been imposed by any reasonable employer. 12. In that particular case, the Supreme Court upheld interference in the quantum of punishment of dismissal by the Labour Court when it found that the punishment of dismissal for the act of absence of the employee could not have been imposed by any reasonable employer. 12. These judgments indicate the broad parameters within which the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal could interfere with the findings of guilt recorded by the management and the quantum of punishment imposed by it on its employee. This was the position till 14.12.1971. 13. The statement of objects and reasons set out in the Bill introducing section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act reads thus : "In India Iron and Steel Company Ltd. v. Their Workmen ( AIR 1958 S.C. 130 P. 138) , the Supreme Court while considering the Tribunal's power to interfere with the management's decision to dismiss, discharge or terminate the service of a workman, has observed that in case of dismissal on misconduct, the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the management." The International Labour Organisation in its recommendation (No. 119) concerning termination of employment at the initiative of the employer, adopted in June, 1963, has recommended that a worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment should be entitled to appeal against the termination among others, to a neutral body such as an arbitrator, a court, an arbitration committee or a similar body and that the neutral body concerned should be empowered to examine the reasons given in the termination of employment and the other circumstances relating to the case and to render a decision on the justification of the termination. The International Labour Organisation has further recommended that the neutral body should be empowered (if it finds that the termination of employment was unjustified) to order that the woker concerned unless reinstated with unpaid wages, should be paid adequate compensation or afforded some other relief. The International Labour Organisation has further recommended that the neutral body should be empowered (if it finds that the termination of employment was unjustified) to order that the woker concerned unless reinstated with unpaid wages, should be paid adequate compensation or afforded some other relief. In accordance with these recommendations, it is considered that the Tribunal's power in an adjudication proceeding relating to discharge or dismissal of a workman should not be limited and that the Tribunal should have the power in cases wherever necessary to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions - if any, as it thinks fit or give such other reliefs to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. For this purpose, a new S. 11A is proposed to be inserted in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947........ 14. The ambit and scope of section-11A came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. The Management ( AIR 1973 S.C. 1227 ). In that case, the Apex Court in the first place referred to the law laid down by the Court in respect of the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court. It also referred to the statement of objects and reasons and proceeded to say: "The object is stated to be that the Tribunal should have power in cases, where necessary, to set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement or award any lesser punishment." Their Lordships further held that, "Even a mere reading of the section, in our opinion, does indicate that a change in the law as laid down by this Court has been effected." 15. Their Lordships then took notice of the rival contentions raised on behalf of the employees and employers and then referred to some principles of interpretation of welfare legislation and held that even after section-11A has been inserted the employer and employee can adduce evidence regarding legality and validity of the domestic enquiry, if one had been held by an employer. The court further held that the Tribunal has to consider the evidence and come to the conclusion one way or the other. The court further held that the Tribunal has to consider the evidence and come to the conclusion one way or the other. Even in cases, where an inquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of mis-conduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in an appropriate case and hold that no mis-conduct is proved. The court further observed : "It has to be remembered that a Tribunal may hold that the punishment is not justified because the misconduct alleged and found proved is such that it does not warrant dismissal or discharge. The Tribunal may also hold that the order of discharge or dismissals not justified because the alleged misconduct itself is not established by the evidence. To come to a conclusion either way, the Tribunal will have to reappraise the evidence for itself. Ultimately, it may hold that the misconduct itself is not proved or that the misconduct proved does not warrant the punishment of dismissal or discharge. That is why, according to us, section 11A now gives full power to the Tribunal to go into the evidence and satisfy itself on both these points. Now the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to reappraise the evidence and come to its conclusion enures to it when it has to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it in which an employer relies on the findings recorded by him in a domestic enquiry. Such a power to appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion about the guilt or otherwise was always recognised in a Tribunal when it was deciding a dispute on the basis of evidence adduced before it for the first time. Both categories are now put on a para by Section 11A." 16. On the question of quantum of punishment their Lordships held that prior to section-11A the Tribunal had no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the Management and it had to sustain the order of punishment imposed on the basis of proved misconduct unless it was harsh indicating victimisation, but, under section-11A, even if misconduct is held to be proved, the Tribunal may be of the opinion that the order of discharge or dismissal for the particular act of misconduct is not justified. The Tribunal may hold that the proved misconduct does not import punishment by way of discharge or dismissal and it can under such circumstances, award to the workman lesser punishment. 17. In Para 45 of the judgment, their Lordships of the Supreme Court took notice of the departure made by the Legislature in certain respects in the law laid down by the Supreme Court by observing that, for the first time power has been given to the Tribunal to satisfy itself whether misconduct is proved. This is particularly so even when findings have been recorded by an employer in an inquiry properly held, the Tribunal has also been given power to interfere with the punishment imposed by an employer. The proviso to Section 11-A emphasizes that the Tribunal has to satisfy itself one way or the other regarding misconduct, punishment and the relief to be granted to the workman only on the basis of material on record before it. In Para 48 their Lordships further observed that, if a proper enquiry is conducted by an employer and a correct finding is arrived at regarding misconduct, even though, it now has power to differ from the conclusions arrived at by the Management will have to give very cogent reasons in not accepting the view of the employer. In para 58 of the judgment their Lordships again reiterated the position by making following observations : "We have already expressed our view regarding the interpretation of section 11A. We have held that the previous law, according to the decisions of this Court, in cases where a proper domestic enquiry had been held, was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the finding of misconduct except under certain circumstances. The position further was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interfere with the punishment imposed by an employer both in cases where the misconduct is established in a proper domestic enquiry as also in cases where the Tribunal finds such misconduct proved on the basis of evidence adduced before it. These limitations on the powers of the 716 Tribunal were recognised by this Court mainly on the basis that the power to take disciplinary action and impose punishment was part of the managerial functions. That means that the law, as laid down by this Court over a period of years, had recognised certain managerial rights in an employer. These limitations on the powers of the 716 Tribunal were recognised by this Court mainly on the basis that the power to take disciplinary action and impose punishment was part of the managerial functions. That means that the law, as laid down by this Court over a period of years, had recognised certain managerial rights in an employer. We have pointed out that this position has now been changed by Section 11A. The section has the effect of altering the law by abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a fording of misconduct arrived at by an employer as well as the punishment imposed by him." 18. In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha ( AIR 1980 S.C. 1896 ) , by majority decision the Supreme Court held that, while exercising power under section 11A the Tribunal can examine the validity of an order of discharge simpliciter and if it appears that purported exercise of power to terminate service of the employee was in fact, the result of misconduct alleged against the workman, the Tribunal will be justified in dealing with the dispute on the basis that the order of discharge is in effect an order of dismissal; and if the industrial Court is satisfied that the order of discharge is punitive or that it amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice. 19. In Jaswant Singh v. PEPSU Roadways Transport Corporation ( AIR 1984 S.C. 355 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court upheld an award of the Labour Court directing reinstatement of the driver of the Road Transport Corporation in service who had been dismissed from service because, in view of the Supreme Court, the opinion formed by the Labour Court that the punishment of dismissal was rather heavy and was not called for, did not warrant interference by the Supreme Court. 20. In Management of Hindustan Machine Tools v. Mohmmod Usman ( AIR 1984 S.C. 321 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court upheld the award passed by the Labour Court of substituting the penalty of dismissal from service by stoppage of increments for two years on the basis of its finding that the punishment of termination is disproportionately heavy. 21. 20. In Management of Hindustan Machine Tools v. Mohmmod Usman ( AIR 1984 S.C. 321 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court upheld the award passed by the Labour Court of substituting the penalty of dismissal from service by stoppage of increments for two years on the basis of its finding that the punishment of termination is disproportionately heavy. 21. In Ved Prakash v. M/s Delton Cables India (P) Ltd. ( AIR 1984 S.C. 914 ) , a three Judges Bench of the Supreme Court declared that dismissal of an employee on the charge of abuse of some workers and officers of the Management by him was unjustified. The Supreme Court held that, no responsible employer would ever impose in like circumstances, the punishment of dismissal to the employee and that victimisation or unfair labour practice could well be inferred from the conduct of the Management in awarding the extreme punishment of dismissal. 22. In Jitendra Singh v. Vaidya Nath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. ( AIR 1984 S.C. 976 ) , while examining the scope of Section 11- A the Supreme Court observed : "Wide discretion is vested in the Tribunal under this provision and in a given case on the facts established, the Tribunal can vacate the order of dismissal or discharge and give suitable direction. 23. In Baldev Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court ( AIR 1987 S.C. 104 ) , the Supreme Court upheld an award passed by the Tribunal setting aside the termination of service of a driver of the Roadways for misconduct which resulted in some loss to the Corporation. 24. In Rama Kant Mishra v. State of U.P. ( AIR 1982 S.C. 1552 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court interfered with an award of the Labour Court which had upheld the dismissal of an employee found guilty of using indiscreat, improper and abusive language and threatening postures. The court held that mere use of such language without any other misconduct during 14 years of service did not warrant penalty of dismissal from service. The court substituted the penalty of dismissal by withholding of two increments with future effect. 25. The court held that mere use of such language without any other misconduct during 14 years of service did not warrant penalty of dismissal from service. The court substituted the penalty of dismissal by withholding of two increments with future effect. 25. In D.C.M. v. Sriram Fertilizers Karmchari Union (1988 R.L.R. (1) 984) , this Court considered the award passed by the Tribunal which had substituted the penalty of dismissal by stoppage of two grade increments with cumulative effect, but held that award of full back wages was not justified. That was a case in which the charge levelled against the workman was that he had threatened the wife of a co-worker with dire consequences. He had threatened his co-workers with assault and other act of insubordination. In para 8 of the judgment the Division Bench of this Court took note of the fact that the Tribunal had given several reasons for considering the punishment of dismissal to be too harsh and incommensurate with the misconduct found proved, and further held that the reasons given by the Tribunal cannot be held to be arbitrary or perverse. 26. In D.C.M. Ltd. v Labour Court, Kota ( 1990 (1) RLR 611 ) , while observing that the Labour Court should not have interfered with the punishment this Court declined to interfere with the award where the workman had been reinstated in pursuance of the award passed by the Labour Court. In that case, the charge which had been found proved against the workman was that he was in the habit of remaining absent and he had been punished on previous three occasions. 27. In Managing Director, Orissa Agro Industries Corporation v. Bhimse Maharana (1990 Lab. I.C. (Vol. 23) 1531) , a division bench of Orissa High Court considered the scope of section 11A and after making reference to larger number of decisions including the decision of the Supreme Court in Scooters India Ltd. v. Labour Court, Lucknow (AIR 1984 S.C. 149) and observed: "That justice just be tampered with mercy and that the erring workman should be given an opportunity to reform himself are principles which should be kept in mind while dealing with the punitive action taken against the workman. As observed by the Gujarat High Court in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation's case (1983 Lab.I.C. 1349) (supra), in imposing punishment on an erring employee an enlightened approach informed with the demands of the situation and the philosophy and spirit of the times requires to be made. It cannot be said that the length of service of the delinquent workman, has past good record and is socio-economic condition are not relevant factors which should weigh with the Labour Court while exercising its discretion under section 11A of the Act. The very denial of 50 per cent of backwages to the opposite party No. 1 was considered by the Labour Court to be sufficient punishment for the misconduct proved against the workman and this view adopted by the Labour Court in the facts of the case cannot be said to be either unreasonable or contrary to law." 28. In N. Kuppo Swami v. E.I.D. Pary' (J) Ltd. (1991 (2) LLN 566 , a division bench of Madras High Court held that after coming to the conclusion regarding the finding of guilt the Labour Court or the Tribunal is under an obligation to consider whether the order of dismissal or discharge is justified and whether the punishment imposed by the management is reasonable or disproportionate to misconduct held proved. In that case, the Labour Court had interfered with the punishment of dismissal of a workman for neglect of duty resulting in financial loss to the company by theft of company's cash during night. The High Court upheld the award passed by the Labour Court. 29. In B.P.L. India Ltd. v. B.P.L. and P.S.P. Thezhilaly Union (1990 LLR 529) , a learned Single Judge of Kerala High Court held that an act of assault on management staff by the striking workers was a grave act of misconduct and such act must attract serious and grave punishment. 30. In South India Sugars Ltd. v. First Additional Labour Court, Madras (1990 (L.L.R. 86) , a Division Bench of Madras High Court also took a similar view while holding that if a worker assault a security Guards it will amount to grave misconduct and would warrant extreme punishment of dismissal. 31. The principle of proportionality has been recognised by the courts of various European countries as also English courts. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1984 (3) All. 31. The principle of proportionality has been recognised by the courts of various European countries as also English courts. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (1984 (3) All. E.R. 935) , it has been said : "Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call "illegality", the second 'irrationality' and the third `procedural impropriety'. This is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of "proportionality" which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community." 32. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court indirectly accepted the theory of proportionality of punishment by holding that an order of punishment which is shockingly disproportionate or is highly disproportionate vis-a-vis the gravity of misconduct is liable to be declared as arbitrary and thus violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 33. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh ( 1983 (2) S.C.C. 442 ) , the court held : "It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be commensurate by the gravity of the misconduct and any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution." 34. In Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, AIR 1985 S.C. 1416 , a constitution bench of the Supreme Court was dealing with a case under proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India and observed that, where the court fords that the penalty imposed by the impugned order is arbitrary or grossly excessive or out of all, proportion to the offences committed or not warranted by the facts and circumstances of that particular Government service, the court will also strike down the impugned order. 35. 35. In Shankar Das v. Union of India, 1985 S.C. 772 , their Lordships were dealing with a case of an employee who was dismissed from service after being convicted for a criminal offence, after observing that the competent authority did possess the power to make an order of punishment under clause (a) of proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution, their Lordships further observed : "But, that power, like every other power, has to be exercised fairly, justly and reasonably. The right to impose penalty carries with it the duty to act justly." 36. The principle of proportionality has specifically been applied in Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India ( AIR 1987 S.C. 2386 ) and also in Sardar Singh v. Union of India ( AIR 1992 S.C. 417 ) . In Ranjit Thakur's case their Lordships observed : "The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence had to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an out-rageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correct. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review." 37. The matter can be looked from yet another angle. In case of conviction of a person for a criminal offence by a court of competent jurisdiction the Legislature has itself recognised the need for an opportunity of hearing to the convicted person before the court imposes a particular sentence on the basis of conviction. This legislative recognition is to be found in the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In incorporating the provision for opportunity of hearing to the accused before passing of sentence, the Legislature has taken note of the widening horizons of the concept of life and liberty as given in Part-III of the Constitution. This legislative recognition is to be found in the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In incorporating the provision for opportunity of hearing to the accused before passing of sentence, the Legislature has taken note of the widening horizons of the concept of life and liberty as given in Part-III of the Constitution. Under the provisions of the new Code of Criminal Procedure a person convicted of an offence can plead and persuade the court that a severe sentence is not warranted having regard to the nature of offence, the manner of its commission and its impact on the society, apart from the consequences of his being sent behind the bars. All the courts are vested with wide discretion to award sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence. If that is the position regarding the liberty of an individual there is little justification for over-looking the principle of proportionality in the matter of awarding punishment to the employee who is found guilty of an act of misconduct. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have, in Board of Trustees, Port of Bombay v. D.R. Nadkarni ( 1983 (1) S.C.C. 124 ) followed the principles laid down in A.K. Roy v. Union of India ( 1982 (1) S.C.C. 271 ) , in the context of Article 22 (3) (b) read with Article 21 for holding that in a departmental enquiry an employee is entitled to the assistance of a legally trained person if. the department is represented by a legally trained person. While following the law laid down in the context of Article 21 and 22 their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed : "And this view was taken as flowing from Article 21 which mandates that no one shall be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the law. The expression `life' does not merely connote animal existence or a continued drudgery through life. The expression `life' has a much wider meaning. Where therefore the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely to adversely affect reputation or livelihood of a person, some of the finer graces of human civilisation which make life worth living would be jeopardised and the same can be put in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair procedure." 38. The expression `life' has a much wider meaning. Where therefore the outcome of a departmental enquiry is likely to adversely affect reputation or livelihood of a person, some of the finer graces of human civilisation which make life worth living would be jeopardised and the same can be put in jeopardy only by law which inheres fair procedure." 38. On the question of power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, I may notice the often quoted decision of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan ( AIR 1964 S.C. 477 ) . In that case a constitution bench of the Supreme Court observed : "The jurisdiction of High Court to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be correct by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot, however, be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding being within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the points cannot be agitated before a writ Court." 39. In Mohmmod Umar Sahib v. Kadalaskar ( AIR 1970 S.C. 61 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations with reference to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. In Mohmmod Umar Sahib v. Kadalaskar ( AIR 1970 S.C. 61 ) , their Lordships of the Supreme Court made the following observations with reference to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. "Where the evidence adduced before the trial Judge was not so immaculate that another Judge would have taken a different view it cannot be said that there was no evidence on which the trial Judge could have come to the conclusion he did. When the trial court accepts the evidence the High Court which is not hearing an appeal cannot be expected to take a different view in exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution." 40. In Jitendra Singh v. Valdya Nath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd. (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court, examined the scope of interference by the High Court in the award passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal in exercise of its power under section-11A and observed : "Under section 11-A, advisedly wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awarding relief according to the circumstances of the case. But, the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution does not enjoy such power, though as a Superior Court it is vested with the right of superintendence. The High Court is undisputably entitled to scrutinise - the orders of subordinate Tribunals with the well accepted limitations. In that case the Supreme Court interfered with the order of High Court which had in turn interfered with the award of the Labour Court." 41. The principles which emerge from the above referred decisions are that prior to the introduction of Section-11A w.e.f,15.12.71, the Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal which had the jurisdiction to adjudicate . upon. the disputes referred to them had very limited jurisdiction to interfere with the action of the management in the award of punishment to the workman for acts of misconduct. On the basis of domestic enquiry duly held it is for the employer to decide as to what punishment should be imposed on the employee. The management's power to manage its own internal administration and maintain the-discipline was fully recognised. The Tribunal or the Labour Court could not act as a court of appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of the Management. The management's power to manage its own internal administration and maintain the-discipline was fully recognised. The Tribunal or the Labour Court could not act as a court of appeal to substitute its own judgment for that of the Management. The area of interference was limited to the cases of want of good faith, victimisation or unfair labour practice or where the management was guilty of violation of principles of natural justice or where the findings of guilt were found to be perverse. On the basis of proved misconduct what punishment should be awarded, was a matter which rested by and large within the discretion of the management. The position has however, undergone a drastic change with the introduction of section-11A. By this section the Labour Court etc. can no re-appraise and re-evaluate the evidence in a duly held domestic enquiry and come to its own conclusion with regard to the various charges. The Labour Court etc. is now required to satisfy itself whether the charge(s) levelled against the employee can be treated as proved against the workman on the basis of evidence recorded during the course of inquiry. The position is the same in the case where the inquiry is held or where no inquiry is held on the inquiry is found to be defective and the parties are allowed to lead evidence before the Labour Court or the Tribunal. Even in cases where the domestic enquiry is duly held or in cases where no enquiry is held or the enquiry is found to be defective for want of compliance of principles of natural justice and the evidence is allowed to be led by the parties before the Tribunal and ultimately the charges are found as proved, the Labour Court or the Tribunal is under a legal duty to consider the entire material and satisfy itself about the justness of the punishment imposed by the employer. While awarding punishment to an employee for a proved misconduct the employer is required to take into consideration the relevant factors like length of service, gravity of misconduct alleged against the employee, the nature of service and the impact of delinquency of the employee on the nature. The employer cannot award a punishment arbitrarily. The Legislature has conferred wide discretion on the Labour Court and the Tribunal to interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded by the employer. The employer cannot award a punishment arbitrarily. The Legislature has conferred wide discretion on the Labour Court and the Tribunal to interfere with the quantum of punishment awarded by the employer. In a given case, if after examination of the relevant factors the Labour Court or the Tribunal feels satisfied that the penalty imposed by the employer is not commensurate with the act of misconduct or is unjust it can award a lesser punishment. Of course, for interfering with the quantum of punishment awarded by the employer the Tribunal has to record cogent reasons, while the employer cannot award penalty to the employee arbitrarily or whimsically. The Labour Court or the Tribunal cannot also interfere with the award of punishment without assigning cogent reasons. 42. When the Labour Court or the Tribunal in exercise of its power under section-11A interferes with the award of punishment and the employer challenges the order of Labour Court or the Tribunal before the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 the High Court will always keep in mind the self-imposed legislations for interference in its certiorari jurisdiction. The High Court will not upset the award passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal merely became on a re-appreciation of evidence available on record or reconsideration of the entire case it is possible for the High Court to come to a different conclusion or to form a different opinion. The High Court will have to give due regard to the legislative wisdom of conferring wide discretion on the Labour Court or the Tribunal by virtue of the provisions of section-11A to interfere with the punishment awarded by the employer. The High Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion conferred upon the Labour Court or the Tribunal unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the award of the Labour Court or the Tribunal suffers from error of law apparent on the face of-it. Notions of discipline differ from person ' to person and if the Legislature has thought it proper to confer an appellate jurisdiction on the Labour Court or the Tribunal, there is little justification for the High Court to usurp that jurisdiction and act as an appellate Court while considering the legality of award passed by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. 43. 43. The award passed by the Labour Court which is under challenge in this writ petition now deserves to be scanned in the light of the principle enumerated above. While upholding the fording of guilt recorded by the employer the Tribunal took into consideration the length of service of the workman, which was 13 years at the time of incident. The Labour Court also took in consideration the fact that during ten years the workman had not been given any promotion. The Labour Court also took into consideration the fact that no other allegation of mis-conduct had been levelled against the workman. The Labour Court also took note of the fact that the workman was an active participant in the trade union activities and had even contested the election for the office of the Union. Thereafter, the Labour Court. observed that there can be no manner of doubt that the workman must discharge their duties with the discipline and that there was little justification for use of force but also observed, it cannot also be ignored that the delinquency had been committed by the workman on account of provocative circumstances, namely, that his promotion had been withheld for ten years and therefore, the extreme penalty of dismissal from service was not warranted. The Labour Court recorded a specific fording that it was satisfied about the unjustness of the punishment. In taking into consideration this view it cannot be said that the Labour Court has acted contrary to law or acted without jurisdiction or that its approach is perverse. The Labour Court had the jurisdiction to exercise its discretion on the quantum of punishment and therefore it after taking various relevant factors into consideration came to the conclusion that the punishment of dismissal from service was not justified having regard to the facts of the case. I ford little justification for holding that the award passed by the Labour Court suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or that the Labour Court acted without jurisdiction. The Labour Court was fully conscious of the gravity of misconduct and therefore denied entire back wages to the workman while ordering his reinstatement with a penalty of stoppage of four annual grade increments. That in my opinion, was perfectly justified. 44. Thus, I ford no justification for quashing the award dated, 24.9.84 passed by the Labour Court. The Labour Court was fully conscious of the gravity of misconduct and therefore denied entire back wages to the workman while ordering his reinstatement with a penalty of stoppage of four annual grade increments. That in my opinion, was perfectly justified. 44. Thus, I ford no justification for quashing the award dated, 24.9.84 passed by the Labour Court. The writ petition fails and it is hereby dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed . *******