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1992 DIGILAW 1002 (ALL)

Radhey Shyam Saxena v. Committee of Management, Saraswati Vidyalaya, Inter College, Bareilly

1992-08-05

M.K.MUKHERJEE, R.A.SHARMA

body1992
JUDGMENT M. K. Mukherjee, C.J. 1. Radhey Shyam Saxena, the appellant before us, was at all material times working as a teacher in Saraswati Vidyalaya Inter College, Bareilly ('College' for short). While so employed he was placed under suspension on September 6, 1982, followed by an inquiry into charges levelled against him through a charge-sheet The Inquiry Committee recommended his dismissal from service with effect from the date of his suspension and the Committee of Management of the College ('Committee' for short) passed a resolution to that effect on February 12, 1983. The Committee further proposed that the papers be sent to the District Inspector of Schools ('Inspector' for short) for approval of the order of dismissal. The Inspector, however, approved termination of the services of the appellant, and not his dismissal, by his order dated April 8, 1983. The Committee then issued a formal letter terminating the services of the appellant with effect from September 6, 1982, the date of his suspension 2. The appellant challenged the termination of his services by filing an appeal before the Regional Deputy Director of Education which was dismissed. He then moved a writ petition, being C.M.W.P. No. 13054 of 1984, which was allowed by a learned Judge of this Court on January 8, 1985, solely on the ground that the termination of services with effect from a date prior to the approval was hit by section 16-G (3) (a) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act. 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). While allowing the writ petition the Court observed that the petitioner (the appellant) was unable to show any other defect in the proceedings including any defect in the order of the District Inspector of Schools or the Deputy Director of Education. 1921 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'). While allowing the writ petition the Court observed that the petitioner (the appellant) was unable to show any other defect in the proceedings including any defect in the order of the District Inspector of Schools or the Deputy Director of Education. The Court also made the following observations in its judgment :- "It is, however, made clear that the petitioner's (the appellant's) services can be terminated afresh by the Committee of Management on the basis of the approval granted by the District Inspector of Schools, which has been confirmed by the Deputy Director of Education in appeal, by passing a fresh resolution, and serving a, fresh order of termination." Thereafter an application was filed by the appellant for reviewing the above judgment and the said application was dismissed with the remark that the above-quoted observations should not be taken to mean that the termination order if made could be validated in view of the observations made in the judgment and that every termination order had to be judged on its own averments, 3. In view of the judgment allowing the writ petition the Committee passed another resolution on February 6, 1985 terminating the service of the appellant with effect from April 9, 1983, that is to say, the day following the day the Inspector approved the: termination of the services of the appellant. In terms of the said resolution the Committee issued another letter terminating the services of the appellant. 4. This order of termination was again assailed by the appellant through another writ petition and by an order dated 28, 1991, a learned Judge of this Court allowed the writ petition in part by quashing the order dated February 6, 1985, so far as it directed the termination of the appellant's service with effect from April 9, 1983 and held that the appellant would be deemed to be in continuous service upto 5-2-198S and entitled to all consequential benefits, besides three months' pay in lieu of three months' notice. The above order is under challenge in this Special Appeal. Mr. The above order is under challenge in this Special Appeal. Mr. Khan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, first contended that though the learned Single Judge noticed in his judgment that the termination of the appellant's service by the impugned order dated 6-2-1985 was made under Regulation 26 of] the Regulations framed under the Act, the learned Judge failed to consider that such termination could not be made without offering the appellant three months' salary before effecting the termination. The learned counsel submitted that offer of three months' salary was a precondition for terminating the services of a teacher under Regulation 26 and as admittedly no such offer was made, the termination was bad in law. 5. It is, of course, true that in the impugned judgment the learned Judge has referred to Regulation 26 in upholding the termination of the appellant's service and directing the College authorities to pay three months' pay in lieu of notice. Indeed, the learned Judge has observed that Regulation 26 is the only provision which provides manner of termination of services of a permanent employee in a recognised institution. But then, Regulation 26 relates to termination of service of a permanent employee on the ground of abolition of the post which he was holding, and it does not apply to a case of termination of services pursuant to a disciplinary proceeding. A plain reading of Regulation 26 unmistakably shows that termination referred to therein is limited to the ground of abolition of the post and the reasons for such abolition have also been incorporated therein, In the fact of the instand case, there cannot be any manner of doubt that Regulation 26 has no manner of application and that the appropriate provision which is applicable to the facts of the instant case, is section 16-0 (3) (a) of the Act, which reads as under :- "(3) (a) No Principal, Headmaster or teacher may be discharged or removed or dismissed from service or reduced in rank or subjected to any diminution in emoluments, or served with notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector The decision of the Inspector shall be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations. (b) The Inspector may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management : Provided that in the cases of punishment, before passing orders, Inspector shall give an opportunity to the Principal Headmaster or the teacher to show cause within a fortnight of the receipt of the notice why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted. (c) .............. (d) .............. 6. From the above provision it is evidently clear that the appellant's services could be terminated with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector following the disciplinary proceeding. As has been already noticed, in the instant case the College authorities decided to dismiss the appellant in view of certain misconduct, but while granting approval the Inspector Instead of stigmatising the appellant, which would have been the result of a dismissal order, chose to substitute it by an order of termination. The order of termination in the instant caste, which was approved by the Inspector was therefore not a case of termination simpliciter but culmination of a disciplinary proceeding. For the above discussion, the first contention of Mr. Khan must be rejected. The other contention raised by Mr. Khan in support of the appeal was that the impugned order of termination was passed at a point of time when section 21 of the U. P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards Act. 1982 ('1982 Act' for short) had come into force and in view of clause (3) thereof the said order was void for prior approval of the Commission constituted under the said Act had not been obtained to terminate the services of the appellant. 7. The 1982 Act came into force on July 14, 1981, but section 21 came into force on January 1, 1984. Section 21, so far as it is relevant for our present purpose, reads as under :- "21. Restriction on dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of teachers -(1) No teacher specified in the schedule shall be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank and neither bis emoluments may be reduced nor he may be given notice of removal from service by the management unless prior approval of the Commission has been obtained. Restriction on dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of teachers -(1) No teacher specified in the schedule shall be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank and neither bis emoluments may be reduced nor he may be given notice of removal from service by the management unless prior approval of the Commission has been obtained. Provided that, where reference for prior approval of the Inspector was made in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, before January 1, 1984, no prior approval of the Commission shall be necessary and such reference shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that Act as if this Act had not come Into force. (2) .......... (3) Every order of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or removal from service or reduction in emoluments of a teacher in contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be void." 8. From a plain reading of the proviso to sub-section (1) above it is patently clear that if reference for prior approval of the Inspector had been made in accordance with sub-section 3 of section 16-G of the Act before January 1. 1984, no prior approval of the Commission was necessary In the instant case we have already found that approval of the Inspector was sought for and obtained as far back as on April 8, 1983 and the impugned order of termination had been passed on the basis of the said approval. That necessarily means that no approval of the Commission was necessary In accordance with section 21 of the 1982 Act. The second contention of Mr. Khan therefore, must also fail. As no other contention was raised in support of the appeal, the appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.