K. S. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE tenant is the revision petitioner. For the sake of convenience, the respondents here in, the land lords, arc referred as the petitioners, as in the trial court. They sought the tenant's eviction from a shop premises, on the ground of their requirement to occupy the shop in order to carry on their business in cloth. Hitherto, petitioners have been carrying on business in the same road in a shop belonging to one j. b. kempanna setty charities, (for short 'the charities' ). The charities obtained -eviction order against the petitioners and in the said circumstances, petitioners purchased the schedule premises tenanted by the respondent (i. e. , the tenant) so that after evicting the tenant, petitioners may continue to carry on their business in avenue road itself. ( 2 ) THE tenant contested the claim of the petitioners. The trial court has accepted the petitioner's case and ordered eviction. Hence this revision petition by the tenant. ( 3 ) THE relationship between the parties though questioned by the tenant earlier in the trial court, it is not pursued now. ( 4 ) THE trial court held that, (1) merely because the petitioners are running textile business in jayanagar, it cannot be said that their requirement in respect of the schedule premises is not a bona fide one, since P. W. 1 stated that petitioners suffered loss in this business run at jayanagar; (2) no oblique motive was proved as to why petitioners intend to evict the tenant; (3) P. W. 1 was willing to offer the jayanagar shop to the tenant, which the latter was not willing to accept; (4) the tenant feigned ignorance of the paper publication made by the charities stating that shops were available in the newly erected building of the charities and thus no attempt was made by the tenant to secure an alternative premises, which was available; (5) the petitioners have established their business in avenue road and they are now under order of eviction from the shop wherein they are carrying on their trade and hence this requirement for their own premises is bona fide and reasonable; and (6) greater hardship will result to the petitioners by refusing to make an orde. r of eviction, when compared to the hardship that may result to the tenant by an order of eviction. r of eviction, when compared to the hardship that may result to the tenant by an order of eviction. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the tenant and the petitioners at great length, I do not find any justification to disagree with the trial court's finding. ( 6 ) THE petitioners assert that they have been carrying on their business in shop No. 409, avenue road, belonging to j. B. Kempanna setty charities. Charities sought eviction of the petitioners and other tenants in the building, on the ground that it required it to put up a new building in the place of the existing building after demolishing the existing building; this eviction petition was filed in the year 1976, (came to be re-numbered subsequently as hrc. 512/1980 ). As against these petitioners, claim for eviction was made under clause (p) also, alleging that petitioners had acquired vacant possession of other suitable premises. This eviction petition was allowed on 16-9-1982 under clause (j); however, eviction sought under clause (p) was refused. Petitioners and charities filed civil revision petitions in this court. Crp No. 1736/1983 filed by the firm of the petitioners, i. e. , M/s. Lakshmi cloth stores. The crp filed by the charities was crp No. 719/1983. On 9-6-1987, the crp filed by the petitioners was dismissed, but the crp filed by the charities was allowed, thereby the eviction order against the petitioners came to be made under both clauses (j) and (p ). This court held that, premises acquired by the petitioners at jayanagar was suitable to carry on the business in cloth and hence clause (p) was available to the charities to evict them. In the meanwhile, when these crps were pending before this court and in view of the possibility of the eviction order being confirmed, petitioners purchased the schedule premises which is also situated in avenue road, just across the road, opposite to the building of the charities; this was on 23-5-1987. The tenant herein was notified of the purchase and the petitioners sought vacant possession from the tenant, on the ground that the petitioners required the schedule premises for their own occupation to continue to carry on their cloth business. However, petitioners filed appeals to the Supreme Court against the eviction Order, obtained by the charities. The tenant herein was notified of the purchase and the petitioners sought vacant possession from the tenant, on the ground that the petitioners required the schedule premises for their own occupation to continue to carry on their cloth business. However, petitioners filed appeals to the Supreme Court against the eviction Order, obtained by the charities. In the said appeals (civil appeals No. 3476 and 3477 of 1987), parties entered into a settlement and the same was agreed upon to be made the order of the Supreme Court in the appeals. Accordingly, the Supreme Court made an order dated 24-11-1987 (fix. P. 7) which reads thus: "proposed terms of settlement on behalf of the respondent pursuant to the order of this Hon'ble court dated 23-11-1987: 1. That the petitioner will handover vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in his occupation being shop No. 409, to the respondent on or before 31-12-1987 for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction of the building. The respondent will reconstruct the new building within two years thereafter. 2. That the petitioner will institute eviction proceedings against his tenant in occupation of premises situated at No. 304, avenue road, within one month from today. 3. That the petitioner will be reinducted in the suit premises after its reconstruction and will be provided one of the shops consistent with the findings recorded by the high court as per para 14 of its judgment, subject to clause (4) below. 4. That the petitioner undertakes to vacate the premises after reinduction within four years of such reinduction. Thereafter the petitioner/tenant is at liberty to move this Hon'ble court for extension of time on compelling grounds. 5. That the order of eviction passed by the high court against the petitioner would stand confirmed subject to the above terms. " ( 7 ) ON 31-12-1987, petitioners handed over possession of the premises belonging to the charities, in terms of the compromise (vide Ex. P. 8 ). ( 8 ) THERE is no dispute that the charities having put up the new building has given a small portion of the same to the petitioners who were thus reinducted into the building and continued to carry on their business, again, in that building; but, in terms of clause (4) of the Supreme Court Order, Ex. P. 8 ). ( 8 ) THERE is no dispute that the charities having put up the new building has given a small portion of the same to the petitioners who were thus reinducted into the building and continued to carry on their business, again, in that building; but, in terms of clause (4) of the Supreme Court Order, Ex. P. 7, the petitioners are to vacate it again, on the expiry of four years from the date of the said reinduction. ( 9 ) THE present eviction petition by the petitioners, was filed after the Supreme Court disposed of the civil appeals referred to above. Para 4 of the eviction petition referred to this event and the petitioner's assert that in the circumstances they have to seek alternative accommodation for their business. The eviction petition was filed within a month of the order of the Supreme Court, in terms of the said order. ( 10 ) IT seems the petitioners were reinducted into the building constructed by the charities in December 1989 which means, they are to vacate it by the end of December 1993. ( 11 ) SRI H. B. Datar, the learned counsel for the tenant, contended that, (i) the order of the Supreme Court in the civil appeals filed by the petitioners was not binding on the tenant and that, the said order was the result of the manipulative tactics adopted by the petitioners, in order to create a ground to seek the eviction of this tenant; (ii) the requirement of the petitioners is neither reasonable nor bona fide. Petitioners possess suitable premises of their own in jayanagar wherein cloth business can be carried on and hence, the schedule premises is not reasonably required by them. Further, the petitioners are already carrying on business in another premises at avenue road in the name of kuruvadi textiles which conclusively establishes the fact that the petitioners do not require the schedule premises. The jayanagar premises was found to be suitable for the business of the petitioners, by this court, in the crp filed by the charities and therefore, this court had ordered their eviction, under clause (p) of Section 21 (1); if so, said finding is sufficient, even now to uphold that the petitioners have alternative suitable accommodation and hence there is no requirement to occupy the schedule premises. (iii) agreement to vacate after four years of the reinduction referred to in the order of the Supreme Court is opposed to the Provisions of Section 21 (1) (j) of the act read with sections 25 to 28 of the act and hence it should not be taken note of, at all. Re. Contention No. 1: ( 12 ) IF this contention is acceptable, the other questions may not survive or at any rate, would loose significance while appreciating the case of the landlord. ( 13 ) THE emphasis was on the motive in reporting the settlement before the Supreme Court and the terms of settlement are attacked as manipulative, in the context of the present proceedings. ( 14 ) IN the eviction petition, the petitioners have disclosed the order of the Supreme Court dated 24-11-1987 made in civil appeal nos. 3476 and 3477 of 1987; the terms of the order are quoted in para 4, itself. A copy of the said order was filed into the court along with the eviction petition. In the objections filed by the tenant, he averred that such an order cannot be made by the Supreme Court and the tenant not being a party to the proceedings, before the Supreme Court, said order would not bind him; according to him, obviously the petitioners and the charities colluded and manoeuvred to make it appear that the petitioners have a cause to file the petition; it is only a make believe arrangement. ( 15 ) 3rd petitioner was examined as P. W. 1. It was suggested to him that the terms of settlement before the Supreme Court providing for the petitioners to vacate the new premises after 4 years, was created in order to evict the present tenant; P. W. 1 denied this suggestion and further stated that after the said four years, it was not possible for the petitioners to continue in the said shop. The tenant, who examined himself as r. w. 1 does not speak anything about this suggestion; in his deposition, he did not attribute any oblique motive to the petitioners, either in the matter of reporting the settlement before the Supreme Court or for seeking eviction of this tenant r. w. 1. Manipulative conduct, no doubt, cannot be proved by direct evidence; basically, it has to be inferred from the circumstances. Manipulative conduct, no doubt, cannot be proved by direct evidence; basically, it has to be inferred from the circumstances. But can it be said, that the proved circumstances are such that the terms of settlement incorporated in the order of the Supreme Court are the result of the manipulation and collusion? ( 16 ) MR. Kumar contends it to be otherwise. He contended that the settlement between the charities and the petitioners (m/s. Lakshmi cloth stores) was inevitable having regard to the nature of the case, in the eviction petition filed against the petitioners by the charities. Trial court had ordered eviction under clause (j); but, charities had filed a civil revision petition pressing its claim for eviction under clause (p) also. If the claim is upheld by the high court for any reason, the petitioners have no chance of getting back premises in avenue road from which they are to be evicted by the charities; the court may for the purposes of clause (p) may hold the premises of the petitioners in jayanagar as suitable for this cloth business, though, in fact, jayanagar is not comparable as a trading centre, with that of avenue road; this is a well known fact. Jayanagar is predominantly is a residential zone with retail traders located in some parts. The real business centre is avenue road, which is one of the busiest commercial localities in Bangalore. Petitioners have been carrying on their business in avenue road for decades; they have earned a goodwill in that locality. Many of their sales were on credit basis and petitioners will not be able to recover the dues to them if they cease to carry on their business in avenue road. Deposition of P. W. 1 fully justifies the inference that if petitioners are to continue their business in cloth in jayanagar, they are bound to suffer loss. R. w. 1 has clearly admitted that in avenue road, in a matter of a furlong, there are 20 cloth shops, which supports the case of the petitioners that avenue road is the real place to carry on business in cloth; even the neighbouring street has several cloth shops, in the said locality. P. w. 1 stated that in connection with the sales effected in avenue road, petitioners are yet to recover about Rs. 50,000/ -. P. w. 1 stated that in connection with the sales effected in avenue road, petitioners are yet to recover about Rs. 50,000/ -. The importance of avenue road and the acute need of the petitioners to continue to trade in avenue road, is further proved, by the fact, that petitioners have shifted to jayanagar, consequent on vacating the shop in avenue road, only as a temporary measure and the business that is shifted to jayanagar continue to be carried on in the same name and the bills have the same old address at avenue road. In this regard, r. w. 1 produced a few bills of the petitioners as exs. Rl to r5. R. w. 1 said that he obtained all of them from jayanagar shop of the petitioners. It seems three exhibits r3, r4 and r5 have the address of the shop as No. 226, avenue road, (premises belonging to the charities, which petitioners had to vacate under the Supreme Court's order ). ( 17 ) HAVING regard to the importance of avenue road as a business centre and the long standing associations developed by the petitioners for their business at avenue road, it is reasonable to infer that petitioners genuinely required a premises in avenue road to continue their business. Therefore, they proceeded to purchase the schedule premises, when, proceedings for their eviction was pending in the high court. Thereafter, having regard to the uncertainties involved as to the result of their appeals, in the supreme court, and the fact that they have already purchased the schedule premises, they, entered into a settlement with their landlord, the charities. It is necessary, here, to emphasis the fact that by the time the appeals reached the Supreme Court, petitioners had purchased a shop in avenue road and there is every likelihood of the Supreme Court rejecting the contention of the petitioners that they have no suitable premises in avenue road. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the tenant that the terms of settlement, incorporated in the order of the Supreme Court were the result of manipulative conduct of the petitioners and that they colluded with the charities only in order to create a situation to enable the petitioners to evict the tenant. The suspicion sought to be created by the tenant, by this plea, cannot lead to a genuine ground to nonsuit the petitioners. Re. The suspicion sought to be created by the tenant, by this plea, cannot lead to a genuine ground to nonsuit the petitioners. Re. Contention No. 2: ( 18 ) TO a large extent, the reasons given while rejecting the first contention, would apply to reject this contention also. ( 19 ) IT is true that, if a reasonable accommodation is available to the land lord at the time the need arises, and the landlord does not avail of it, then, the insistence of the landlord for eviction of the tenant on the ground the tenanted premises is required by him, for his occupation, will be unreasonable. In such a situation, the conduct of the landlord itself disentitles him to an order of eviction. Amarjit Singh v Khatoon Quamarin, AIR 1987 SC 741 is one such decision, where landlady lost her right to evict the tenant, because she let out an accommodation available to her in the ground floor, to another and sought eviction of the tenant from the first floor. Normally a landlord has a choice regarding the premises; but said choice should be made reasonably: ( 20 ) IN MM. Quasim v Manoharlal Sharma and others, AIR 1981 SC 1113 atp. 1121 the principal was stated thus: "when examining a case of personal requirement if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose premises is to negative the very rison d'etre of rent act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the court. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the rent act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in his possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlord's greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent put the premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb this very tendency the rent act was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the court administering the rent act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. The court must understand and appreciate the relationship between the legal rules and one of necessities of the life shelter- and the way in which one part of the society exacts tributes from another for permission to inhabit a portion of the glow. " ( 21 ) THERE fore, when it is pointed by the tenant that petitioners possess another premises of their own, in which they can carry on their business, the claim of the petitioners for the schedule premises will have to be scrutinised with greater care. Question is, whether jayanagar premises is suitable for the particular cloth business that is being carried on by the petitioners in avenue road. ( 22 ) THE test of suitability, here, has to be with reference to the nature and volume of business that is being carried on in avenue road, theoretically, cloth business can be carried on even in a residential locality, because, the consumers of the trading Article are the residents. But, each business has its own features, and success in a business like cloth depends on its location. Jayanagar is a well known residential locality in Bangalore. But, the customers of the petitioners may not be the residents of the jayanagar. I have already referred to the evidence of P. W. 1. Jayanagar is 6 kilo metres away from avenue road. P. w. 1 states that the shops owned by the petitioners in jayanagar are situated in the ground floor of the building, wherein, in the first floor they have been residing and it is predominantly a residential locality. I have already referred to the evidence of P. W. 1. Jayanagar is 6 kilo metres away from avenue road. P. w. 1 states that the shops owned by the petitioners in jayanagar are situated in the ground floor of the building, wherein, in the first floor they have been residing and it is predominantly a residential locality. The goodwill acquired by the petitioners is for M/s. Lakshmi cloth stores, in avenue road and therefore, even while petitioners had to vacate the tenanted premises at avenue road, temporarily they shifted it to this premises in jayanagar, with the same name, and the printed bills continued to bear the earlier address at avenue road. While in the case of a residential premises, convenience for residence is the main test, in the case of a business premises, goodwill earned by the trade in the tenanted premises, if any, has to be considered while testing the suitability of the alternative premises. ( 23 ) SUITABILITY of the premises has to be tested with reference to the requirement of the person, to whom, it is alleged to be suitable; the alternative premises available with the landlord should, reasonably be, a good substitute for the tenanted premises possession of which the landlord seeks in the eviction proceedings. The location, and its reputation for a particular business, availability of a particular type of customers, the extent of accommodation available, the goodwill earned in the existing locality and other factors would go into the consideration, while judging, both the suitability of the available premises and the reasonableness in the landlord's choice. The choice of the landlord should not be a disguise to hide the real intention to evict the tenant, somehow, the simple test is to see how a reasonable person would exercise his choice of the locality and the premises under a particular set of circumstances. It is a welll known fact that avenue road is a business centre, and has a large number of cloth dealers. It is one of the oldest commercial localities in Bangalore. The locality has wholesale dealers in cloth, also, a fact, that cannot be denied and if so, its relevance, while testing the reasonableness of the petitioners' insistence to have this business premises in avenue road cannot be ignored. ( 24 ) MR. It is one of the oldest commercial localities in Bangalore. The locality has wholesale dealers in cloth, also, a fact, that cannot be denied and if so, its relevance, while testing the reasonableness of the petitioners' insistence to have this business premises in avenue road cannot be ignored. ( 24 ) MR. Datar contended that the petitioners are bound by the finding given bythis court in the crps arising out of the eviction proceedings filed against them. In crps 1736 and 719/1983 decided on 9-6-1987, it was held by this court that the premises acquired by the petitioners in jayanagar was suitable for their cloth business and therefore the prayer for their eviction under Section 21 (1) (p), made by the charities, was granted. At para 16, the learned judge observed, in this regard: "law contemplates the suitability of the premises and not the suitability of the premises to carry on a particular trade or business. I have not come across any instance where places are earmarked for particular business. Neither the act nor the rules earmarked any place for any particular business. This court can take judicial cognisance of the fact of construction of shopping complex in jayanagar extension by spending crores of rupees and jayanagar layout is the best layout in south india, constituting by itself a township. Avenue road is clustered with variety of business, mostly of jewellary and not exclusively confined to textile business only. In the absence of any earmarking of places, for carrying on a particular trade or business, it is not possible to accept the plea that the premises which the tenant has acquired is not suitable for carrying on the business in textile. " ( 25 ) THIS decision has not became final. It was challenged before the Supreme Court and though the order of eviction was confirmed, it was in terms of the settlement arrived at between the charities and the petitioners. The present tenant was not a party there. According to Mr. Kumar, the decision of this court stood merged in the decision of the Supreme Court and therefore the observations of this court, made as to the suitability of jayanagar shop were stood superseded. The learned counsel advanced the doctrine of merger, along with, the principle, that, even a decision rendered on the basis of a compromise, is a decision of the court, and not a mere contract. The learned counsel advanced the doctrine of merger, along with, the principle, that, even a decision rendered on the basis of a compromise, is a decision of the court, and not a mere contract. ( 26 ) IN C. F. Angadi v Y. S. Hirannayya, AIR 1972 SC 239 it was held at p. 243: "although a contract is not the less a contract because it is embodied in a judge's Order, or, as said by parke, j. , in Wentworth v Bullen, (1829)9 b and c 840, 850 :109 er 313 "the contract of the parties is not the less a contract, and subject to the incidence of a contract, because there is superadded the command of a judge", still we think it is something more than a contract. The judicial committee of the privy council in charles hubert kinch v Edward keith walcott, AIR 1929 PC 289 observed: "an order by consent not discharged by mutual agreement and remaining unreduced is as effective as an order of the court, made otherwise than by consent and not discharged on appeal. A party bound by a consent order must when once it has been completed obey it, unless and until he can get it set aside in proceedings duly constituted for the purpose. The only difference in this respect between an order made by consent and one not so made is that the first stands unless and until it is discharged by mutual agreement or is set aside by another order of the court; the second stands unless and until it is discharged on appeal. " in Govind Varman v Murlidliar Srinivas, AIR 1953 bom. 412 , the Bombay high court held that a consent decree passed by a competent jurisdiction cannot be treated on the same footing as a contract between the parties, that although it is not true that before a court passes a consent decree, it can and should examine the lawfulness and validity of the terms of the proposed compromise, but when once that stage is passed and a decree follows, different considerations arise and therefore, where a compromise decree contains a term against alienating certain property and gives the other party right to its possession on such alienation, the decree is not a nullity in spite of the fact that the term is opposed to Section 10, t. p. act. And the fact that it is contrary to law would not affects its binding character unless it is set aside by taking proper proceedings. " ( 27 ) THERE fore, it is clear that the order of the Supreme Court is the final decisionin the proceedings between the charities and the petitioner and the order of the Supreme Court is not enforceable merely because it is the result of an agreement, but because, it has the sanctity of being the order of Supreme Court. This order operates in supersession of all earlier orders, ( 28 ) IN commissioner of income tax, Bombay vm/s. Amrutlal blwgilal and co. , air 1958 SC 868 , the doctrine of merger which is relevant to the instant situation, was stated thus, at p. 871: "there can be no doubt, if an appeal is provided against an order passed by a tribunal, the decision of the appellate authority is the operative decision in law. If the appellate authority modifies or reverses the decision of the tribunal, it is obvious that it is the appellate decision that is effective and can be enforced. In law, the position would be just the same if the appellate decision merely confirms the decision of the tribunal. As a result of the confirmation or affirments, of the decision of the tribunal by the appellate authority, the original decision merges in the appellate decision and it is the appellate decision alone which subsists and is operative and capable of enforcement. " ( 29 ) IN the circumstances, the efficacy of the observations made by this court incrp No. 1736 of 1983 etc. , has been lost. With utmost respect to the learned judge, I am constrained to take a different view on the question. In fact, in the deposition of r. w. 1, he stated that for his business in crackers, avenue road is the only suitable locality in Bangalore, thereby admitting by necessary implication that each locality has its own special attraction for particular trading activity. It is not possible to agree with the proposition that 'law contemplates the suitability of the premises and not the suitability of the places to carry on a particular trade or business. It is not possible to agree with the proposition that 'law contemplates the suitability of the premises and not the suitability of the places to carry on a particular trade or business. ' the concept of 'suitability' in the context of Section 21 (1) (p) would necessarily include, the suitability of the premises for the particular purpose, which is already served by the premises from which tenant is sought to be evicted. The premises available with the tenant should be reasonably a good substitute for the existing premises so that it is possible to carry on the present business almost in the same manner, in the other available premises. A premises which is suitable to carry on an industrial activity, cannot be held as suitable to carry on a retail trade and vice-versa. Similarly the location of the premises has a strong bearing on the suitability of the premises for the particular business or the residence. Law need not earmark any locality for any particular business; in the commercial world, each locality has its own reputation. Diamond business cannot be carried on successfully in an area reputed for fish marketing. Suitability of the building takes its colour from the reputation and nature of its location. Shopping complex built in a residential locality like jayanagar is to provide trading facility for the residents, which, by itself will not convert the entire locality into a commercial locality suitable for cloth business and it cannot be said that buildings situated in interior parts of this residential zone is suitable for business. I am also aware that the cloth business can be carried on in any residential locality, but, the nature and quality of such a business in a highly commercial locality like avenue road will be entirely different with reference to the conveniences available to the trader and the goodwill already earned. Re. Contention No. 3: ( 30 ) IT is impermissible for this court to ignore the terms of the order of the Supreme Court and to hold that the clause pertaining to the reinduction of the petitioners for a period of four years is opposed to the sections 26 to 28 of the act. Re. Contention No. 3: ( 30 ) IT is impermissible for this court to ignore the terms of the order of the Supreme Court and to hold that the clause pertaining to the reinduction of the petitioners for a period of four years is opposed to the sections 26 to 28 of the act. In fact, the decision of the Supreme Court in c. f. angadi's case, AIR 1972 SC 239 and the observations made therein which I have already quoted, lays down the principle that, even if the terms of a compromise decree is opposed to any statute, still, the decree is enforceable, unless it is set aside by taking proper proceedings; no such proceedings has been taken to nullify the terms of the Supreme Court order. Hence full effect has to be given thereto. It was contended that the petitioners are carrying on business in avenue road in the name of kuruvadi textiles and therefore another premises is not necessary. But it has been proved by the tenant himself by producing Ex. R. 3, that this business is also in the same premises at No. 226, avenue road, having the same telephone numbers. Obviously for accountancy purposes, in the same shop, petitioners are having another trade name. ( 31 ) TENANT as r. w. 1 has said that he had not made any attempt to seek alternative accommodation. In fact P. W. 1 stated that in the new building put up by the charities, premises were advertised as available. The tenant has an annual turnover of rupees eight lakhs. He has his godown premises in another place called manganapalya. He is a dealer in crackers; this is a seasonal business. However, r. W. 1 states he is also dealing in stationery. Evidence on record indicates that sufficient fmancial means are available to the tenant, to take alternative accommodation. He lias not exerted himself in that direction. ( 32 ) IF eviction is denied to the petitioners, they will suffer greater hard ship as they are bound to vacate the premises now occupied by them in avenue road. Mr. Kumar submitted that petitioners are now paying a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/- to the charities in the new building, for a shop measuring 9' x 10', whereas in the same place they were earlier paying Rs. 70/- p. m. for the shop measuring 8' x 23'. Mr. Kumar submitted that petitioners are now paying a monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/- to the charities in the new building, for a shop measuring 9' x 10', whereas in the same place they were earlier paying Rs. 70/- p. m. for the shop measuring 8' x 23'. This shows the compelling necessity of a shop for the petitioners in avenue road, without which they would suffer greater hardship. Jayanagar shop, it is said, is not used any more for this business. R. w. 1 also in his evidence dated 5-7-1990 states that petitioners are now carrying on their business in avenue road in the shop provided to them by the charities, though, according to him, petitioners continue to do the same business in jayanagar also. P. W. 1 offered to lease the jayanagar shop of the petitioners to the tenant to carry on the latter's business, but the tenant rejected the offer on the ground of its unsuitability for his business. Therefore, I am of the view that there is a compulsive need for the petitioners to have their own premises to carry on their business in avenue road and that they have no other alternative premises. The trial court was justified in making an order of eviction under Section 21 (l) (h) of the act since the landlords are having time till the end of December 1993 to vacate the premises let out to them by the charities, the present tenant also can be allowed the same time to vacate the schedule premises. ( 33 ) IN the result, for the reasons stated above, this petition is dismissed. The tenant is granted time till the end of December 1993 to hand-over vacant possession of the premises subject to payment of rents regularly and filing an undertaking before this court within three weeks from today agreeing to vacate the premises voluntarily without compelling the landlords to file an execution petition. --- *** --- .