P. K. MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of the judgment and order dated October 11, 1991 delivered by N. K. Mitra, J. of this Court whereby the writ application was finally disposed of by the learned Judge by directing the respondents to allow 91 persons (who affirmed supplementary affidavits and had been able to prove the authenticity of. their respective titles) to be absorbed without any delay by Damodar Valley Corporation (hereinafter referred to as D. V. C. ). ( 2 ) THE facts leading to the moving of the writ petition by the Damodar Valley Displaced Employees' Union (hereinafter referred to as the Union), and the others are set out hereinbelow. ( 3 ) PETITIONER No. 1 the Union and petitioner Nos. 2 and 3, who were added as petitioners, moved this joint writ petition, inter alia, praying for writ in the nature of Mandamus upon the respondents concerned, to give appointment to the "displaced persons" not only from the "existing approved panel in existing formation" as per office circular dated April 6, 1990, being Annexure "e" to the writ petition, but also from the added writ applicants of Civil Order No. 1716 (W) of 1988, as per earlier directions of the Hon'ble Court. ( 4 ) IN the writ petition, petitioners referred to the relevant provisions of section 22 (2) (V) of the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948, wherein, it has been provided for re-settlement of the population displaced by the dams, acquisition of land for reservoirs and protection of water sheds. ( 5 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, the expression "displaced person" has been explained in the said office circular which means "a person whose lands have been acquired by the Damodar Valley Corporation for the construction of the projects (Excepting B and I) and in whose family none of the family members is already in Damodar Valley Corporation Service, the family for this purpose will be taken as it existed at the time of the acquisition of the land and will include also parents, grand parents brothers/ sisters". ( 6 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, a subsequent memorandum was issued by the Damodar Valley Corporation, Maithon, on February 10, 1978, for preparation of panel for filling up Class III Posts except Security Guards in terms of Civil Order No. PIR/ll/policy-83 dated September 15, 1977 in Maithon Project of Damodar Valley Corporation. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, a subsequent memorandum was issued by the Damodar Valley Corporation, Maithon, on February 10, 1978, for preparation of panel for filling up Class III Posts except Security Guards in terms of Civil Order No. PIR/ll/policy-83 dated September 15, 1977 in Maithon Project of Damodar Valley Corporation. On the basis of the Memorandum dated February 10,1978 a panel was prepared by the Damodar Valley Corporation, in which 701 names of displaced persons were included. After preparation of the panel, the writ petitioners were under the impression that they would be absorbed on priority basis as provided under section 22 (2) (V) of the said Act, but unfortunately no endeavour was made by the Damodar Valley Corporation to re-settle the displaced persons. ( 7 ) A group of persons whose names were in the panel came up before this Court earlier, in a writ petition for not providing jobs by way of resettlement in terms of Memorandum No. PLB/ll/policy-83 dated September 25, 1977, to the persons displaced, due to acquisition of land, for the construction of Maithon Dam and reservoir and treating discriminately in granting facilities and privileges for the purpose of resettlement of the persons displaced due to the construction of other projects of Damodar Valley Corporation. ( 8 ) ON the said writ petition Mr. Justice Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee had been pleased to pass Civil Order No. 1716 (W) of 1988, thereby restrained the respondents from giving any appointments, in Group 'c' Posts till the hearing of the writ application. The said application contained the names of the persons from the existing panel only. ( 9 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, at the time of preparation of the existing panel, unfortunately most of the names of the displaced person were not included, inasmuch as, the authority concerned prepared the panel, without making wide publication, about the preparation of the panel and the panel was prepared whimsically and arbitrarily by the authority concerned, without knowledge of the displaced persons. ( 10 ) SINCE, the names of the most of the displaced persons were not included in the existing panel, Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. had been pleased to direct the writ petitioners to make public advertisement, in the newspapers about moving of the writ petition before this Court and pursuant to the said directions of His Lordship, the advertisement was made in the newspapers and accordingly the displaced persons came to know about the pendency of the said application. Two applications for addition of parties were made before this Court and accordingly the displaced persons, whose names were not in the existing panel of 701 drawn up by the Corporation Maithon Division) , were included as writ petitioners. ( 11 ) ULTIMATELY, the matter was heard in presence of the learned Advocates of both the parties on August 12, 1989 and Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. was pleased to dispose of the writ application by directing the respondent Corporation and other respondents, to carry out the order contained in the judgment with immediate effect. ( 12 ) IN the said judgment, His Lordship, inter alia, observed as follows :-" (a) These 701 persons are awaiting for absorption more than ten years and Court can take judicial notice that within the period of ten years, a large number of persons other than the displaced persons have been appointed depriving the displaced persons and the quota reserved or earmarked for displaced persons must been used for absorption of persons from the other categories. Such a thing is not permissible and that it is a matter of great pity that the panel had been prepared in the year 1978 and as yet not a single person has been absorbed permanently and only 40 persons of them absorbed for doing casual work. (b) This is a glaring example how the public sectors are failing to discharge their statutory duties imposed upon them by the Statute. They are the creatures of law and they are the answerable to law. In this particular case, the right that was created in favour of the petitioners, has been denied by the authority of the Corporation in a manner which is contrary to public interest". They are the creatures of law and they are the answerable to law. In this particular case, the right that was created in favour of the petitioners, has been denied by the authority of the Corporation in a manner which is contrary to public interest". ( 13 ) ACCORDINGLY, His Lordship directed the said Corporation to take immediate steps for absorption of the displaced persons for panel so prepared in this behalf and for this purpose, if any appointment has been given in the quota earmarked for the displaced persons, those posts should be restored to the displaced persons and appointment should be given from the said panel on the basis of the old quota. ( 14 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, since the respondent Corporation authorities failed to comply with the directions of this Hon'ble Court and to implement the said judgment, the petitioners in Civil Order No. 1716 (W) of 1988, had to move a contempt petition before the said learned Judge, on January 25,1989. ( 15 ) IN the meantime, the Corporation by letter dated September 29, 1989, addressed to Sri B. Choubey, the General Secretary of the Damodar Valley Corporation Employees and Displaced Union, intimated in the following manner :-"in reference to your letter dated 28. 9. 89, I am directed to inform you the present quota for absorption of the displaced persons from the existing panel is likely to be increased from 15% to 30%. The matter is going to be placed before the next Corporation meeting and just after receiving the approval of the Corporation the formal order will be issued to this effect". ( 16 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, since the Corporation authorities had agreed to enhance the quota of the "displaced persons" from 15% to 30%, the writ petitioners in Civil Order No. 1716 (W) of 1968 decided not to proceed with the contempt application and the said application was disposed of by Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. by order dated December 21, 1989, with the expectation that the Damodar Valley Corporation will act in terms of the decision, as expeditiously as possible. ( 17 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, thereafter from time to time they went to the Corporation to find out when the judgment of this Court would be implemented, and thereafter they came to know that the quota will be increased from 15% to 30% from the existing panel only. ( 18 ) IMMEDIATELY thereafter, the added writ petitioners protested against such arbitrary action of the Corporation and wrote a letter to that effect to the Corporation on January 24, 1990. ( 19 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, as per office circular dated April 6, 1990, Clause 1. 0 which runs as follows :-"appointment to Group 'c' Posts in a particular formation other than the posts of security guard may be made amongst the following categories of persons against vacancies arising from time to time after 31. 5. 88 in accordance with the percentages shown against each category :- (i) Displaced persons. . 30% (ii) Compassionate. . 25% (iii) Direct Recruitment. . " further, according to the writ petitioners, Clause 2. 0,3 of the said circular runs as follows :-"appointment of displaced persons should be made only from the existing approval panel in existing formation but before making appointment, all the above papers should be verified again". ( 20 ) THE writ petitioners, therefore, submitted that adjudication of the right of the petitioners had been made by this Hon'ble Court and this Court. directed the Corporation to enhance the quota for all the displaced persons including the added writ petitioners, whose names did not appear, in the "existing panel", in Civil Order No. 1716 (W) of 1988. ( 21 ) IN such circumstances, the present writ petitioners moved the writ petition, as according to them the respondent Corporation was estopped from contending that the appointments of the "displaced persons" should be made only from the "existing approved panels", in the existing formation, as alleged in the office circular or at all. ( 22 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the clause, 2. 03 of the office circular issued by the General Manager being No. PL-28/226 (Con) IV Pt. I (B) Pt. II 12, dated April 6, 1990, the present writ petition was , I, moved before this Court seeking for reliefs, as stated hereinabove. ( 22 ) BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the clause, 2. 03 of the office circular issued by the General Manager being No. PL-28/226 (Con) IV Pt. I (B) Pt. II 12, dated April 6, 1990, the present writ petition was , I, moved before this Court seeking for reliefs, as stated hereinabove. ( 23 ) THE writ petition being C. O. No. 4947 (W) of 1990 was initially taken up for hearing on December 21, 1990 by N. K. Mitra, J. and the learned Judge considering the submission of the respective Advocates for the parties, and also the supplementary affidavit, filed in Court, on that date, on behalf of the writ petitioners and affirmed by Mihir Kanti Pal, describing, him as Treasurer of the petitioner No. 1, directed the Damodar Valley Corporation, to consider the claims of the persons, enlisted in the list being Annexure 'a' to the said supplementary affidavit sympathetically and favourably regarding getting employment, under the said Corporation on account of their lands, being acquired by the Corporation positively, within six months from date after hearing them and by passing well reasoned order. The said persons, however, are to be identified by the Secretary of the petitioner No. 1 Union and such consideration should also be made in terms of the relevant Government Circular, namely, P. L. 28/226 (Con) IV Pt. I (B) Pt. 11-12, dated April 6, 1990 and on production of documentary evidence by the said persons in support of their respective claims. ( 24 ) HIS Lordship also directed that the decision of the Corporation must also be made, in accordance with law, and such decision will be final and binding upon the parties. The Civil Order was thus disposed of without any order as to costs with liberty to the parties to mention the matter if occasion, so arises. ( 24 ) HIS Lordship also directed that the decision of the Corporation must also be made, in accordance with law, and such decision will be final and binding upon the parties. The Civil Order was thus disposed of without any order as to costs with liberty to the parties to mention the matter if occasion, so arises. ( 25 ) AS the said direction dated December 21, 1990 had not been implemented, the writ petitioners had to mention the matter before N. K. Mitra, J, and after a protracted hearing His Lordship on October 11, 1991, delivered a detailed judgment and considering the facts and circumstances of the case specially the supplementary affidavits filed by 91 members of the petitioners; in the matter and held that all the said 91 persons, who affirmed such affidavits had been able to prove the authority of their respective title in respect of their respective land and, as such, they were entitled to be absorbed by the D. V. C. as per law and the D. V. C. was thus directed to absorb them without any delay, subject, however, to their physical fitness. For testing, the physical fitness of the said persons, the D. V. C was directed to constitute 'a Medical Board' in Calcutta positively within four weeks from the date consisting of responsible and respectable doctors including an Orthopaedic surgeon, before whom the said persons were to be examined within a month from the constitution of such Board. Regarding appearance before the said Medical Board, the authority Concerned was directed to serve sufficient prior notices to the said persons. The Civil Order was thus allowed without any order as to costs. ( 26 ) AGAINST the said direction dated October 11, 1991, the present appeal has been preferred before the Division Bench of this Court. ( 27 ) IT appears Nom the order sheet of the appeal proceeding that during the vacation, the appeal appeared before Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee and Shamsuddin Ahmed, JJ. on November 1, 1991, when Their Lordships directed the appeal to appear before the regular Bench and granted stay of operation of the impugned order for 3 weeks after long vacation and liberty was given to the parties to apply for extension, vacation or variation of the order, upon notice to the other side. on November 1, 1991, when Their Lordships directed the appeal to appear before the regular Bench and granted stay of operation of the impugned order for 3 weeks after long vacation and liberty was given to the parties to apply for extension, vacation or variation of the order, upon notice to the other side. ( 28 ) ON November 27, 1991, the appeal appeared in the presence of the learned Advocates of the respective parties before the Bench presided over by the Learned Chief Justice sitting with Altamas Kabir, J. ( 29 ) IT was recorded in the order sheet of the appeal, that on December 2, 1991, the Bench presided over by the Learned Chief Justice sitting with Altamas Kabir, J. granted no further extension of stay, but passed directions for affidavits and in the meantime counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioners have assured that they should not take steps for initiating any proceeding for contempt. ( 30 ) ULTIMATELY, the appeal appeared before us on December 10, 1991, after "being, assigned" by the Learned Chief Justice and it was heard-in-part on that date. The hearing was continued on December 13, 1991, December 19, 1991, January 31, 1992, February 19, 1992 and on February 25, 1992, the hearing was concluded. ( 31 ) DURING the pendency of the appeal, as the interim order of stay was not extended by the Appeal Court, an application for contempt was moved before the learned Single Judge on February 14, 1992, and by order dated, February 17, 1992, as the appeal being F. M. A. T. No. . 3664 of 1991, was pending consideration before us, the learned Single Judge observed that the application for contempt be placed before us, and, as such, the application for contempt is also appearing before us for disposal. ( 32 ) MR. Samaraditya Pal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the, appellant D. V. C. having placed the relevant facts from the writ petition and the prayers, submitted in the first place that the learned Judge had acted without jurisdiction in passing the order on October 11, 1991 by extending the scope of the writ petition. ( 32 ) MR. Samaraditya Pal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the, appellant D. V. C. having placed the relevant facts from the writ petition and the prayers, submitted in the first place that the learned Judge had acted without jurisdiction in passing the order on October 11, 1991 by extending the scope of the writ petition. ( 33 ) IN the second place, he submitted that no such order could be passed, directing absorption of 91 persons by the D. V. C. , on the basis of the supplementary affidavits, affirmed by the said 91 persons, in a disposed of matter. ( 34 ) IN support of this branch of submission he placed strong reliance on the. observations of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma, reported in AIR 1987 SC at page 943. In paragraph 10 of the said Judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows :-"the High Court's order is not sustainable for yet another reason. Respondent's writ petition challenging the order of dismissal had been finally disposed of on 10. 8. 1984, thereafter nothing remain pending before the High Court. No miscellaneous application could be filed in the writ petition to revive proceedings in respect of subsequent events after two years. If the respondent was aggrieved by the notice dated 29. 1. 86 he could have filed a separate petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the notice as it provided a separate cause of action to him. The respondent was not entitled to assail validity of the notice before the High Court by means of a miscellaneous application in the writ petition which had already been decided". ( 35 ) ELABORATING this branch of submission Mr. Pal has placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench consisting of P. D. Desai, C. J. (as His Lordship then was) and Shyamal Kumar Sen, J. of this Court in the case of Mayurakshi Gramin Bank, Suri and Anr. v. Kanchan Kumar Sarkar and Ors. , reported in 1989 (II) CHN at page 431. In paragraph 10 of the said Judgment Their Lordships observed as follows :-"the order under appeal, in our opinion, suffers from several infirmities. v. Kanchan Kumar Sarkar and Ors. , reported in 1989 (II) CHN at page 431. In paragraph 10 of the said Judgment Their Lordships observed as follows :-"the order under appeal, in our opinion, suffers from several infirmities. On the basis of the averments made in the application upon which the order was passed, it was impossible to treat it as one for direction and or clarification. By way of the said application, what was really attempted to be achieved was rehearing and a fresh decision of the writ petition on substantially the same grounds which were urged before the Trial Court earlier. It is difficult to appreciate how such an application could have been made and entertained and that too nearly one year and three months after the writ petition was disposed of and how any relief, whatsoever could have been granted in such a proceeding. It is settled law that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final. No departure from that principle is justified even in the Writ jurisdiction. No attempt by way of an application for clarification and/or direction could and should be encouraged to upset the final decision already rendered in a writ petition. It is also noteworthy in this connection that the order under appeal does not purport to clarify the previous order". ( 36 ) LASTLY, he contended that impugned judgment and/or directions dated October 11, 1991 was totally inconsistent with the final judgment and order dated December 21, 1990 as by the aforesaid judgment the D. V. C. was directed to consider the case of the persons mentioned in the supplementary affidavit, in terms of the circular dated April 6, 1990. The impugned judgment, however, contained directions and discloses an exercise of powers which are totally alien to the office circular dated April 6, 1990. ( 37 ) MR. Pal, further added that the persons, who were admittedly not in any way related to the original land owner, Shri Sasanka Sekhar Paul (who had admittedly received compensation from D. V. C. at the time of acquisition) have been included, within the scope of expression "displaced Persons" although the definition of "displaced Person", in the office circular dated April 6, 1990, could not be made applicable to them. ( 38 ) ACCORDING to Mr. ( 38 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Pal, the affidavits, which were filed by the 91 persons before N. K. Mitra, J. do not and cannot establish any title in favour of these persons, as the said affidavits rely on a declaration made by Mrinal Kanti Paul (son of late Sasanka Sekhar Paul) declaring that his late father had settled bits of land, in favour of these 91 persons, who are writ petitioners. Mrinal kanti Paul being 5 years old at the time of acquisition of the lands of Sasanka Sekhar Paul, could not have such knowledge, unless it is derived from records. Therefore, according to Mr. Pal, these 91 persons were not included in the panel of 1978 and the Court prepared, a panel, different from the panel of 1978. ( 39 ) MRS. Maitreyi Ghosh, led by Mr. Subrata Roy Chowdhury, appearing at the final hearing of this appeal submitted that the learned Judge had no other alternative but to direct the D. V. C. (appellant herein) to absorb 91 persons, on the basis of the averments made in the supplementary affidavits, as D. V. C. was not agreeable to have the matter referred to a judicial officer to act as an Arbitrator for the purpose of adjudication of the title of the writ petitioners. ( 40 ) SHE added that D. V. C. once having agreed to give employment to 100 displaced persons, subject to verification of the documents examined by the Corporation, is estoppel from taking any other plea for not absorbing the said 100 persons, as right titles have been adjudicated in respect of 91 persons, on the basis of the supplementary affidavits. She further added, it is too late having regard to the chequered history of the case to suggest that there was nothing on record that there was no such agreement by D. V. C. ( 41 ) IN this aspect, she further referred to the earlier directions of N. K. Mitra, J. in C. O. No. 4947 (W) of 1990, which was disposed of on the suggestion of the parties and in order to get rid of the obligations, the office circular dated April 6, 1990, defining "displaced persons", had to be issued, in order to by-pass the directions contained in the said judgment, which has been challenged in the second round of the writ proceeding before this Court. She further added that the learned Judge had no occasion to adjudicate the disputed questions of fact, relating to adjudication of the title of the writ petitioners as the D. V. C. authorities were under the obligation to give employment to 100 persons, though they were not in the panel of 1978. ( 42 ) MRS. Ghosh further submitted that D. V. C. being a statutory Corporation was bound to function in accordance with the positive guidelines provided in the statute, creating the Corporation. The Parliament while enacting the Damodar Valley Corporation Act, 1948, for the multipurpose development project to ameliorate the economic conditions of the people of D. V. C. and its adjoining areas, kept in view, the unsettling effect of the said project, on a section of the population of the region who will be rendered homeless and deprived of their means of livelihood. ( 43 ) UNDER section 22 (2) (V) of the Act, it is made an obligation on the part of the D. V. C. that all persons displaced and deprived of their means of livelihood due to acquisition of lands for the purpose of the projects be re-settled on priority basis. The Parliament did not rest at that and further made provisions for annual monitoring of the progress of the project, including the re-settlement of the displaced persons. ( 44 ) UNDER section 45 of the Act, it is made obligatory on the part of the D. V. C. to lay an Annual Report before the Parliament on each of the Heads enumerated in the section. Section 45 (1) (ix) speaks of re-settlement of "displaced persons". ( 45 ) ACCORDING to the writ petitioners, these provisions have been specifically made to harmonise the part-III and part-IV of the Constitution. The writ petitioners/displaced persons of Maithon, being the citizens of India are also equally entitled to the benefits of the State action and also to the protection/enforcement of the right under part-III of the Constitution, like citizens of other parts of the country. ( 46 ) IT is the Fundamental Right of a citizen not to be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except according to the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution. According to Mrs. Ghosh, the right of life, includes the right to livelihood. No person can live without the means of living. ( 46 ) IT is the Fundamental Right of a citizen not to be deprived of his life or personal liberty, except according to the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution. According to Mrs. Ghosh, the right of life, includes the right to livelihood. No person can live without the means of living. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the Constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point or abrogation. ( 47 ) FURTHER, according to Mrs. Ghosh, under Article 38 (2), 39 (D) and 41 of part IV of the Constitution it is the duty of the state to secure to the citizen an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work and to exclude these from the contents of right to life would mean abrogation of guarantee under Article 21. ( 48 ) IN this context, strong reliance has been placed by Mrs. Ghosh on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, reported in AIR 1986 SC page 180, wherein Supreme Court observed, as follows :-"the right to life includes the right to livelihood. The sweep of the right of life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important fact of that right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without the means of living that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the Constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of the right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. In view of the fact that Article 39 (a) and 41 require the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pendentry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right to life conferred by Article 21, AIR 1960 SC 932 Disting". ( 49 ) RELIANCE has also been placed on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Karjan Jalasay Yojana Assargrasth Sahkar Ane Sangharsh Samiti v. State of Gujrat and Ors. , reported is AIR 1987 SC page 532, wherein Supreme Court observed as follows :-"simultaneously with taking possession of the acquired land from any person in occupation of it, such person shall be provided either alternative land of equal quality but not exceeding three acres in area and if that is not possible, then alternative employment where he would be assured a minimum wage. Such alternative employment shall be provided to the head of the family whether such head be a man or a woman, the family to be taken into account being one consisting of parents and minor children". ( 50 ) MRS. Such alternative employment shall be provided to the head of the family whether such head be a man or a woman, the family to be taken into account being one consisting of parents and minor children". ( 50 ) MRS. Ghosh further submitted that in a similar situation grievances of three writ petitioners, who moved a writ petition, being identical with that of the writ petitioners, in C. O. No. 14502 (W) of 1979 and Manoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. ( as His Lordship then was) of this Court has been pleased to direct the D. V. C. to give employment to each of three petitioners therein in Class III post, within one month from the date of vacancies arise in those post or if there were vacancies the writ petitioners to get employment within one month from the date of the communication of the order. An appeal being F. M. A. T. No. 3226 of 1991 was preferred by the D. V. C. before the Division Bench of this Court and the Division Bench consisting of U. C. Banerjee and S. K. Guin, JJ. , refused to interfere with the said order and the writ petitioners got ad hoc employment, subject to final decision of the main writ petition. ( 51 ) MRS. Ghosh has also placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Minerva Mills v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1789 as well as the judgment in the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. Ahu Kavur Bai and Ors. , reported in AIR 1984 SC page 326, in order to ascertain the effect of the principles of Fundamental Rights as enshrined in Part III and directive principles of State Policy, in part IV of the Constitution. ( 52 ) THUS, it has become necessary for us, to consider as to whether the learned Single Judge has committed any jurisdictional error and/or infirmity in passing direction, on a disposed of petition, which was disposed or by a judgment and order dated December 21, 1990, with liberty, however, given to the parties to mention the matter if occasion so arises and further this Court has to assess whether the observations made in the case of State of U. P. v. Brahm Datt (supra), is a bar, in entertaining the matter once again pursuant to the liberty. ( 53 ) IN our view, the observations made in the case of State of U. P. v. Brahm Datt (supra), cannot have any application in the instant case, as in the said case, separate and subsequent causes. of action had already taken place after disposal of the writ petition and, as such, it was not open to the Court to re-open the proceedings by means of miscellaneous petition. 53a. In this context, it will be necessary for us to refer to the Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 26 paragraph 554 at page 278 wherein 'liberty to apply' has been defined in the following manner : "the circumstances or the nature of a judgement or order often render necessary subsequent applications to the court for assistance in working out the rights declared. All orders of the court carry with them inherent liberty to apply to the Court, and there is no need to reserve expressly such liberty in the case of orders which are not final. Where in the case of a final judgment the necessity for subsequent application is foreseen, it is usual to insert in the Judgment words expressly reserving liberty to any party to apply to the court as he may be advised. " ( 54 ) THUS, in our view, the learned Judge had not committed any mistake by entertaining the entire matter once again for disposal, in terms of the earlier liberty given by His Lordship. ( 55 ) IN our view, the observations, made in the case of Mayurakshi Gramin Bank, Suri v. Kanchan Kumar Sarkar and Ors. (supra), referred to by Mr. S. Pal, are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. ( 56 ) FURTHER, in our view, the teamed Single Judge has rightly directed absorption of 91 persons, subject to their medical fitness as their respective titles have been established in respect of the lands in question, as the D. V. C. was not agreeab1e to have the matter decided by an independent judicial officer, as an Arbitrator. ( 57 ) WE are also of the opinion that the office circular dated April 6, 1990, redefining "displaced persons", has been passed only to by-pass the earlier directions of Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. referred to hereinabove. ( 57 ) WE are also of the opinion that the office circular dated April 6, 1990, redefining "displaced persons", has been passed only to by-pass the earlier directions of Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee, J. referred to hereinabove. ( 58 ) FURTHER, in our view, it appears from the D. V. C. Act that nowhere it has been postulated that a displaced person whose land has been acquired by the D. V. C. has to be the owner of the land. Even: in the circular dated September 15, 1977, the definition of displaced person does not require that a person, whose lands have been acquired by D. V. C. has to be the owner of the land. But for the first time in the impugned circular dated, April 6, 1990, in the connotation of the term 'family' the term 'self' has been defined as the "head of the family who is the owner of the land". ( 59 ) IN our view, by further defining the term 'displaced person', by the impugned circular dated April 6, 1990, D. V. C. had tried to supplant the intention of the legislature by an administrative order, but under the rules of law, an administrative order can, only supplement, and not, supplant a statutory provision. ( 60 ) IN our opinion, since it has not been defined in the statute it is the duty of the court to interpret it in accordance with its ordinary dictionary meaning. In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary Vol. I, page 53, "displaced" has been defined as "to shift from one place to other", "to put out of the proper or usual place", "to remove from a position". Similarly it has been defined in Webster's the New Collegiate Dictionary, India Edition. ( 61 ) IT also appears to us that alternatively the claimants are covered under the restrictive meaning of the word 'displaced persons' mentioned in the circular dated April 6, 1990, because from the record, it appears that at that time these persons enjoyed the land ''as owners" thereof and the Corporation has deprived them of their home and hearth. ( 61 ) IT also appears to us that alternatively the claimants are covered under the restrictive meaning of the word 'displaced persons' mentioned in the circular dated April 6, 1990, because from the record, it appears that at that time these persons enjoyed the land ''as owners" thereof and the Corporation has deprived them of their home and hearth. The Committee report and the documents annexed to the supplementary affidavit were analysed to see whether 91 persons, who were alleged to be not directly connected with the land owners are entitled to be absorbed or not and whether they had, by their documents, been able to prove their title and possession in respect of the lands acquired by D. V. C. ( 62 ) IN our view, from the registered deed of declaration made by Mrinal Kanti Pal, the eldest son of the erstwhile owner/jamindar it has been established that the grant was made in favour of the employees permanently and the grantees owned, used, enjoyed and possessed the said lands as owners thereof without any demur, protect, claims, demand from anybody else. ( 63 ) WE have also gone with the detailed reasonings given by the learned Judge, in his Judgment dated October 11, 1991. In his Judgment, the learned Judge observed as follows :-"accordingly, the attitude of the DVC in raising flimsy pleas over the title of the 100 persons as mentioned above is nothing but to avoid their statutory obligations and the obligations cast upon them by the earlier order of this Hon'ble Court as referred to above. Such attitude cannot be supported in any way. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court also in its decision in AIR 1987 SC 532 and also in the case of Lalchand Mahato and Ors. v. Coal India and Ors. (C. P. M. No. 1633 of 1982), a copy of which order has been produced before this Court by Mrs. Ghosh, observed inter alia, that it is obvious that it should be regarded as basis to every developmental programmes, that before any developmental project is taken up, the social cost involved in it must be evaluated with a view to balancing the advantages of such developmental project against any resulting disadvantages. Every developmental project must provide for simultaneous rehabilitation of the persons who are thrown out of their lands and house on account of acquisition of land for such developmental project. Every developmental project must provide for simultaneous rehabilitation of the persons who are thrown out of their lands and house on account of acquisition of land for such developmental project. No developmental project, however, can possibly justify improvement of large sections of people and their utter distribution and in the said case the Supreme Court further made it clear that simultaneously with taking possession of the acquired, land from any person in occupation of it, such persons shall be provided with either alternative land of equal quality or if i. e. , not possible, then alternative employment where he would be assured a minimum wage. No position of any part of the acquired land shall be taken from any person unless and until he is either provided with alternative land of equal quality or alternative employment which is not temporary in character so that he and the members of his family do not remain without means of subsistence even for a single day. Accordingly, it is not too late for the DVC to say that they have neither any statutory obligation, nor the order of Bhagabati Prosad Banerjee J. , can be construed to mean that they are bound to give employment to the persons displaced on account of acquisition of their lands, by the D. V. C. " in the result, we are in agreement with the finding of the Learned Judge and, as such, we are not going to interfere with the said Judgment of the Learned Judge. ( 64 ) THE appeal is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs. ( 65 ) WE dispose of the application for contempt by directing the appellant D. V. C. to absorb the 91 writ petitioners, subject to their physical fitness, who have been able to prove their title, forthwith, preferably within a period of one week from communication of the operative part of this Judgment. ( 66 ) THE time to examine physical fitness by constitution of Medical Board by the appellant D. V. C. , is extended by another period of 10 days from communication of the operative part of this judgment and if the respondent/writ petitioners are found medically fit, the respondent/writ petitioners are to give appointment within a week from the sitting of the Medical Board, in terms of this Judgment. ( 67 ) WE make it clear, that if in case all the 91 persons could not be absorbed at a time, in that case the appellant D. V. C. would be restrained from making any appointment future, without absorbing the 91 writ petitioners, who had been able to prove their title. Regarding the remaining 9, the appellant D. V. C. will be at liberty to ascertain their title and subject to their medical examination of their physical fitness, the appellant D. V. C. will issue formal appointment letter. ( 68 ) FURTHER, we direct that the appellant D. V. C. would not take any plea that the writ petitioners have crossed their age limit, because of the protracted litigation pending before this Court and issue appointment letter, forthwith, subject to medical fitness without any further plea. ( 69 ) THE contempt petition, referred to us by the learned Judge is also disposed of accordingly along with the appeal. ( 70 ) LET xerox copy of the operative part of this Judgment, from page 17, be supplied to the learned Advocates of both the parties, upon observing all necessary formalities. ( 71 ) PRAYER for stay of operation of this judgment, made on behalf of the appellant, is considered, but refused in the facts of the present case. A. K. Bhattacharji, J. , I agree. Appeal dismissed. Contempt application disposed of.