This revision, petition is directed against the order dated 18.3.85 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Goalpara in Case No. CR 4/81. The impugned order is available at Annexure B to the present petition. 2. Briefly stated facts are as follows: - The opposite party No. 2 and 3 were prosecuted under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. From the offence report submitted by the Area Food Inspector, Goalpara, PW I against the above two petitioners it appears that on 29.9.80, the Food Inspector alongwith one witness visited the shop of the above two accused-opposite parties and collected sample of Vanaspati Ghee (Dalda) manufactured by the present petitioner - viz. Hindusthan Lever Limited. The sample was sent to the Public Analyst and was found to be adulterated and thereafter both the accused - petitioners were charged and prosecuted. From the record it appears that two witnesses viz. the Food Inspector and the Peon of Office of the Chief Medical & Health Officer, Goalpara, PWs 1 and 2 were examined and the statement of the accused persons were also recorded. Both the accused-opposite parties filed a petition in the above case before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate that as the food article in question was manufactured by Hindusthan Lever Limited and the accused-petitioners were given warranty and action may be taken by the learned Court. The learned Court by the impugned order issued notice on the present petitioner and the copy of the said notice is available at Annexure A to the present petition. 3. This revision petition came up before the Hon'ble Chief Justice on 31.3.92 and following orders were passed: “One of the questions arising in the case is whether in the original prosecution against a person who is a distributor and dealer, the manufacturer can be impleaded subsequently under section 20 A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1958. The question has been answered in the negative by a Single Bench of this Court in the decision reported in 1976 ALR 236. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner it appears that the decision requires reconsideration. I therefore, refer the case for decision of Division Bench." In view of the above order, the matter is listed before this Division Bench. 4. We have heard Mr. AC Borbora, learned counsel for the petitioner and also Mr. Narzary, learned Public Prosecutor. 5. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner it appears that the decision requires reconsideration. I therefore, refer the case for decision of Division Bench." In view of the above order, the matter is listed before this Division Bench. 4. We have heard Mr. AC Borbora, learned counsel for the petitioner and also Mr. Narzary, learned Public Prosecutor. 5. From the order of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice it is clear that the Chief Justice desires that the decision of this Court in Kamala Prasad Agarwalla & others vs. Sarat Chandra Bora, 1976 ALR 236 rendered by a Single Judge requires reconsideration. 6. We have gone through the entire judgment and in our opinion, the above decision does not require any reconsideration. The law laid down by this Court in the above decision have also been follows by other High Courts. 7. In the above decision, the ratio laid down is that under section 20 A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 when a vendor is prosecuted, only then the manufacture, distributor or dealer of any article can be added as an accused. In otherwords, when a manufacturer, distributor or dealer is prosecuted, the provisions of section 20 A is not applicable. 8. Mr. Borbora has placed reliance in various decisions of the High Courts and in our opinion, from the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court we can hold that the above decision of this Court does not require reconsideration. 9. In Food Inspector, Palghat Municipality vs. Seetharam Rice & Oil Mills, 1974 FAC 534, in para 11, the Full Bench of the said Court, inter alia, held that to invoke power under this section viz. section 20 A: (1) there must have been a trial of an offence under the Act pending against a person other than the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any article of food; (2) there must have been evidence adduced before the Court during the trial that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is concerned with the offence with which the person proceeded against in the trial is charged: and (3) the Court must also be satisfied on the evidence adduced before it that such manufacturer, distributor or dealer is concerned with this offence. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Borbora has also refer to another decision of the Delhi High Court in PL Lamba vs. State, 1975 (I) FAC 337, wherein it was held that the powers of the Court to invoke section 20 A to proceed against manufacturer, dealer or distributor can be exercised only during the trial who is not himself a manufacturer, distributor or dealer. Mr. Borbora has also referred to other decisions of the various Courts and we are of the opinion that in view of the Full Bench decision of the Kerala High Court and Delhi High Court, we need not burden this judgment by referring in various other decisions. However, we may refer to another decision of the Kerala High Court in Damodaran vs. Abdulla Kunhi, 1988 (I) FAC 17, wherein it was, inter alia, held that section 20 A is applicable only when the trial is pending against any person other than a manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any food articles. 11. A controversy has been raised as to whether the opposite party No. 2 and 3 are dealer or not. In the present revision petition it has specifically been stated in para 9 that the opposite party No. 2 i.e. the firm M/s Ramlal Manik Chand is the appointed dealer and/or distributor of the presentre vision petitioner. In the said para 9, the system of marketing of product by the petitioner company has been clarified and it has been specifically stated that the petitioner company appoints dealer and/or distributor in every town to sale the product in question to retailor and semi-whole seller. That apart, while cross-examining PW 1, it was also suggested on behalf of the accused-opposite parties that they are dealing agent of the petitioner company viz. Hindusthan Lever Limited. We have also perused the record and we find that while moving the petition on behalf of the accused-petitioners for impleading the present petitioner as an accused, one invoice and a consignment note were annexed and these are on record. From the quantities sent to the accused as would appear from the above two documents, we can safely accept the statement made in the present petition that the accused-opposite parties 1 and 2 were dealer and/or distributor of the petitioner company. 12. We find that the term `Vendor' as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, is a merchant, a retail dealer, a supplier. 12. We find that the term `Vendor' as defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, is a merchant, a retail dealer, a supplier. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination a distributor and/or dealer can be termed as vendor. As the petitioner company has been added as an accused in the trial against a dealer and/or distributor, in view of the above law laid down by this Court, as well as, other High Courts including Kerala High Court, we have no habitation in holding that the impugned order is bad in law and liable to be quashed, which we hereby do. 13. Mr. Narzary, learned Public Prosecutor has urged that for adding any party under section 20 A no consent under section 20 is necessary. We need not go into this aspect of the matter as the question of sanction has not been pleaded before us. 14. Mr. Narzary has further pleaded that a manufacturer, dealer and vendor can be jointly prosecuted. In that context, the learned counsel has placed reliance in Bhagawan Das Jagdish Chander vs. Delhi Administration, (1975) 1 SCC 866 , Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Purshottam Das Jhunjnnwala, AIR 1983 SC 158 and State of Punjab vs. Devinder Kumar & others, AIR 1983 SC 545 . We are in full agreement with the learned Public Prosecutor that dealer, manufacturer or distributor alongwith the vendor can be prosecuted by impleading all of them initially (emphasis supplied). But in the case in hand, the facts are different. The initial prosecution was not against the manufacturer. In fact, we are sorry to say that in the case in hand the Food Inspector did not take adequate steps for roping in all the persons involved in the transaction. It was the duty of the Food Inspector to do so, to bring home the culprit. In this connection, our attention has been drawn by Mr. Narzary to a decision of this Court in Sri Ramesh Sarma vs. State of Assam, 1989 (2) GLJ 182, wherein this Court held that in order to avoid multiplicity of proceeding and conflict of findings it is imperative that the Magistrate Court should implead these persons under section 20A, whenever the conditions laid down in the section are satisfied in a case during the trial. But we are sorry to say that in spite of the law laid down by this Court it is not being followed by the authorities who supposed to implement the provisions of this Act. 15. In the result, we hold that the earlier decision of this Court in Kamala Prasad Agarwalla vs. Sarat Chandra Bora, 1976 ALR 236 does not require any reconsideration. We further hold that the impugned order dated 28.3.85 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Goalpara in Case No. CR 4/82 is set aside and the Rule is made absolute. Petition is disposed of accordingly. Office to send down the record immediately so that the trial can be completed against the accused persons against whom first offence report was submitted.