JUDGMENT R.S. Dhavan, J. - U.P. Handloom Intensive Development Corporation is a public sector undertaking of the State of U.P. It challenges an award of the Labour Court, Gorakhpur dated 15.10.1981 Annexure-8 to the writ petition. 2. Shri Zahir Uddin, the respondent No.1 is the workman concerned, was employed by an appointment letter dated 17th January, 1977 on an ad hoc basis in a pay scale of 300-500 rupees. His services, as the appointment letter says, were liable to termination without notice. He was appointed as a Bunker Sevak. By a letter dated 31.12.1977, Annexure-2 to the petition, the workman concerned received a termination order. The letter dated 31.12.1977, in effect, stated that his services are no longer required and, thus, with immediate effect, his services were brought to an end. The text of the letter reads, "Zahir Uddin Bunkar Sevak Ki Sevaon Ki Aavashyakta ab nigam ko nahin hai ataiv tatkalin prabhav se unki sevain samapt ki jati hain". 3. The workman raised an industrial dispute. Conciliation proceedings failed and the matter was referred under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to the Labour Court, Gorakhpur for adjudication as case No. 60/1979 in the matter relating to the workman Zahir Uddin and the concern U.P. Handloom Intensive development Corporation. The reference order in fact was whether the services of Zahir Uddin, terminated on 31.12.1977, were valid and proper and legal and if not to what reliefs and benefits the workman was entitled to. 4. In the pleadings before the Labour Court, the defence was, to the effect, that the workman concerned was appointed temporarily and on an ad hoc basis at the concern to supervise the work of a weavers' centre. He was appointed as a Bunker Sevak, which was a technical post but in the absence of nonavailability of technical personnel, it was admitted in the written statement that a number of Bunkar Savaks had been appointed and regularised by the selection board and that no person who was not qualified technically, was appointed as a Bunkar Sevak. The written statement did not say that the workman concerned was not qualified. 5. The matter moved into adjudication on the exchange of pleadings of the parties after each side was given an opportunity to lead its evidence. The written statement did not say that the workman concerned was not qualified. 5. The matter moved into adjudication on the exchange of pleadings of the parties after each side was given an opportunity to lead its evidence. The Labour Court, Gorakhpur did not agree with the contention of the Corporation, as an employer, that the workman had not discharged continuous service. The Labour Court held that the termination was illegal, that the workman's services had been illegally retrenched, that other Bunkar Savaks had been retained but the services of Zahir Uddin were terminated. There were other contentions of the Corporation which were noticed, (a) that the matter was not an industrial dispute (b) that the workman concerned was not workman within the meaning of law. 6. The Labour Court also noticed the admission of the employer that the workman concerned discharged the work of a Bunkar Sevak which was a work of a technical nature. Another fact that other Bunkar Savaks were retained and the services of the workman concerned were terminated was an aspect not denied by the employer and became an admission on record. 7. There was an allegation on record by the workman concerned that the termination order had been tailored at the behest of a minister who, the workman alleged, came from the same constituency where the workman resides. The Labour Court did not go into this question. 8. On behalf of the employer much emphasis has been laid before this Court on the issue that the year during which Zahir Uddin worked was 16 days short of one complete year. The letter of appointment is dated 17th January, 1979. The one of termination is dated 31st December, 1977. The entire argument on behalf of the Corporation has been built on this technicality. 9. The argument of the Corporation not taken before the Labour Court but before this Court is thus. The workman did not work for one year. Thus, he is not entitled to the benefit of continuous services. The one of termination is dated 31st December, 1977. The entire argument on behalf of the Corporation has been built on this technicality. 9. The argument of the Corporation not taken before the Labour Court but before this Court is thus. The workman did not work for one year. Thus, he is not entitled to the benefit of continuous services. If the workman is to take advantage of the expression, "continuous service" then it is implied that he must first work for one year and the advantage of continuous service can only follow thereafter, To base this argument the submission is that the definition of continuous service as under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be compared to Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, before the amendment. The logic of the argument is that as the definition of 'continuous service' in the U.P. Act is identical to the repealed section in the Central Act, thus, any interpretation which the Courts have given to for this phrase in the Central Act though repealed is good for the U.P. Act. 10. The case on which reliance was placed by the petitioner corporation was the matter of Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. The Workmen 1963 (7) FLR 236 (SC). Hereinafter the submission of learned counsel for the employer is that the Court may look to no other case in reference to the context, except the interpretation of a repealed definition of continuous services under the Central Act and not beyond it. 11. On behalf of the workman concerned the Court's attention had been drawn to the case of Dig Wadih Colliery v. Their Workman 1965 (11) FLR 99 (SC). The Court's attention is invited to particularly two passages, as below: "(5). The definitions in Section 2 of the Act do not apply if there is anything repugnant in the subject or context and the question is whether the definition of continuous service "can at all apply in considering Section 25-F when what is meant by the expression" one year of continuous service" in Section 25-F is, by Section 25-B, specially stated. The definitions in Section 2 of the Act do not apply if there is anything repugnant in the subject or context and the question is whether the definition of continuous service "can at all apply in considering Section 25-F when what is meant by the expression" one year of continuous service" in Section 25-F is, by Section 25-B, specially stated. If Section 25-B had not been enacted the contention of the Employers would have been unanswerable for the words of Section 25-F would have then have plainly meant that the service should be for a period of 12 months without interruptions other than those stated in Section 2(eee), itself. But Section 25-B says that for the purpose of Section 25-F a workman who, in a period of twelve calendar months has actuay worked for not less than 240 days shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service. Service for 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months is equal not only to service for a year but is to be deemed continuous service even if interrupted. Therefore, though Section 25-F speaks of continuous service for not less than one year under the employers, both conditions are fulfilled if the workman has actually worked for 240 days during a period of twelve calendar months. It is not necessary to read the definition of continuous service into Section 25-B because the fiction converts service of 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months into continuous service for one complete year ................" 12. The explanation to Section 25-8 is the same, mutatis mutandis as before, Mrs. Sen contended that the change in the law brought out his contention. We do not agree. The amended Section 25-B only consolidates the previous Sections 25-B and 2(eee) in one place adding some other matters which are not relevant to the present purpose, but the purport of the new provisions is not different. In fact the amendment of Section 25-F of the Principal Act by substituting in clause (b) the words, "for every completed year of continuous service" for the words, for every completed year of service" now removes a discordance between the unamended Section 25-B and the unamended Clause (b) of Section 25-F. Neither before these several changes nor after these is uninterrupted service necessary if the total services is 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months. The only change in the new Act is that this service must be during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made. The last amendment now removes a vagueness which existed in the unamended Section 25-8. 13. On behalf of the workman concerned the submission is, to the effect, that it will be too narrow a meaning on the expression 'continuous service' by looking to a case law on a repealed part of the statute. Learned counsel for the workman submits that seen in isolation, the logic may hold as presented on behalf of the employers, but, this aspect has been tread and examined by this Court and there is no conflict between the two enactments and there is conciliation and harmony between the Central and the State enactments and such has been the subject matter of attention by a Full Bench decision of this Court. 14. Thus, before the Court examines any other aspect, it would be appropriate to examine the full bench decision cited by the learned counsel for the respondents workman. This is the matter of Vishnu Dass v. State of U.P. 1974 LIC 1287 (FB). This decision was followed in the matter of Uttar Bharat Workman Mill v. Shyam Lai 1976 (1) LIC 102. The broad aspects of the two decisions are on a synthesis between the two paramateria legislation's one of the federal parliament, and the other by the State Legislature. The decision, in context resolves the issue whether an individual workman who raised the dispute and a reference had been made under the State enactment could be permitted to raise, an 'industrial dispute' without the dispute being espoused by a Union of workers. Section 2-A permits an individual workman to raise a dispute on his own. Such a provision was not in the State enactment until 1978. The contention is that, until amended, the State legislation did not permit an individual dispute to be raised, and following this analogy continuous service not having been defined under the definition clause of the Central enactment its implications would be understood by what is contained under Section 25-B of the Central Act. The contention is that, until amended, the State legislation did not permit an individual dispute to be raised, and following this analogy continuous service not having been defined under the definition clause of the Central enactment its implications would be understood by what is contained under Section 25-B of the Central Act. Again, by implications it is submitted that continuous service is to be seen on the basis of the workman actually having worked for one year during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date of the reference. 15. The synthesis of the two decisions above is to the effect that Section 12 of the U.P. Act, in effect, permits the State Government to refer any industrial dispute or matter connected therewith under the Central Act or to deal with any report of settlement in accordance with the provisions of the central Act. What engaged the attention of the Full Bench was that a narrow meaning to curtail avenues of industrial adjudication was not rendered, notwithstanding a dispute of an individual workman had been referred under the State Act and, thus, the reference itself could not be held to be bad. It is not possible for this Court to take a view inconsistent with the decisions of the Full Bench in re, the matter of Vishnu Dass (supra). As a fact of the matter, the contention of the employer is simply this that this Court should be inhibited and not notice the later decision of the Supreme Court but only those which interpret Section 25-B, in reference to the term 'continuous service' when the Central Act had not been amended. The argument requires the Court to construct an interpretation which is narrow and based on a repealed enactment in matters relating to industrial adjudications when the spirit of such legislation's is to resolve disputes by conciliation and adjudication. 16. One argument on behalf of the employers is out of context and not compatible with the law on the aspect of evaluating 'continuous service' whether under the State Act or the Central Act. Continuous service contrary to what has been submitted is not to be reckoned from a period prior to the date of reference referring the matter for adjudication. One argument on behalf of the employers is out of context and not compatible with the law on the aspect of evaluating 'continuous service' whether under the State Act or the Central Act. Continuous service contrary to what has been submitted is not to be reckoned from a period prior to the date of reference referring the matter for adjudication. It is simply to be seen if it is discharged during a period of twelve calendar months as is referred to in the State Act and likewise in the Central Act. Further, under Section 25-B of Central Act, in the context the expression is not to the effect that it is to be calculated from the date of reference of the matter for adjudication but during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made. Putting it simply, continuity is to be seen from the date in reference to which the claim is made on seeking the status of continuous service. 17. Barring arguments of the learned counsel for the two parties there is another aspect of the matter in so far as the nature of work is concerned. It is not in issue that it was not a casual, temporary or seasonal work. It was of a permanent nature. Under industrial adjudication the fact that the appointment may have been labelled as an ad hoc will give no support to the employer to make ad hoc arrangement for work which is otherwise permanent, lasts throughout the year and is not temporary in nature. This would be unfair labour practice. 18. This aspect of the matter of taking work with the help of temporary engagement on a permanent nature of work was criticised by the Supreme Court in the matter of Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Badri Prasad 1961 (3) FLR 83 . 19. In the circumstances of the present case, the work of Bunkar Sevak (weaver) was one which was permanent in nature. The accepted position without issues is that once continuous service has been discharged the order of termination of service of the person who has discharged continuous service would be illegal and consequently an illegal retrenchment which would entitle the workman to tie consequential relief of reinstatement. 20. The accepted position without issues is that once continuous service has been discharged the order of termination of service of the person who has discharged continuous service would be illegal and consequently an illegal retrenchment which would entitle the workman to tie consequential relief of reinstatement. 20. This academics on continuous service, in the facts and circumstances of this case, on behalf of the employer was misconceived and if accepted it would make bad precedent. In effect, it would be unfair labour practice and this is what the Labour Court has notice in the impugned award. Further the fact that others have been brought in after due selection in another matter. This is irrelevant as it is not a case of the petitioner employer before this Court nor before the Labour Court, that the workman was either a casual worker or an inefficient one. Instead on record he was supervising the weavers' centre where he was employed. 21. In these circumstances regard being had to the meaning of the expression of continuous service and the fact that the work which the workman was discharging was admittedly of a permanent nature, this court finds no occasion to use a writ of certiorari for correcting any error in the impugned award. The award is correct. 22. Thus, the present writ petition fails. The impugned award dated October 15, 1981 is upheld and the petition is dismissed with costs.