ORDER : J.S. Verma, J. The appellant, Roshan Lal Narula (now dead and substituted by the legal representatives) took on rent a premises in Chandigarh from the respondent on 1.6.1971, admittedly, for residential purpose alone. The said Roshan Lal Narula started his practice as a lawyer in October 1971 and began using a portion of the said premises for his professional purpose. The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to the 'Act') was extended to Chandigarh w.e.f. 4.11.1972. In October 1977, the respondent filed a petition for eviction of the aforesaid tenant Roshan Lal Narula on the grounds of her personal need and unauthorised change of user of the premises by the tenant. 2. The Rent Controller by his Order dated 12.3.1980 decreed eviction of the tenant from the said premises on the ground of unauthorised change of user of the premises after the coming into force of the aforesaid Act because of using a portion of the same for professional purposes. The Rent Controller also held that the bonafide need set up by the respondent-landlord had been adequately proved by the evidence adduced but no order for ejectment on that ground was made for the reason that the premises was a 'scheduled building' as defined in Section 2(h) of the Act. 3. The tenant, Roshan Lal Narula, preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority which was dismissed by Order dated 17.8.1981. The appellate order clearly states that the decision of the rent Controller on the ground of personal need of the landlord and that finding of fact was not challenged in appeal and the appeal was confined only to law points. The tenant preferred a revision to High Court which was dismissed by the order dated 23.2.1981. Hence this further appeal by special leave filed by the tenant. 4. During the pendency of this appeal, the sole appellant Roshan Lal Narula died on 16.1.1990. His L.Rs. have been brought on record. The tenant preferred a revision to High Court which was dismissed by the order dated 23.2.1981. Hence this further appeal by special leave filed by the tenant. 4. During the pendency of this appeal, the sole appellant Roshan Lal Narula died on 16.1.1990. His L.Rs. have been brought on record. It has been stated that the order of eviction could not be passe on the ground of change of user contained in Section 13(2)(ii)(b) of the Act, since the user remained unchanged ever since the application of the act In reply Shri Arun Jaitely, learned counsel appearing for the respondent landlord contended that the finding of personal need of the landlord recorded by the Rent Controller being unassailed, and the premises having ceased to be a 'scheduled building' as defined in Section 2(h) on the death of original tenant Roshan Lal Narula the order of eviction can be sustained on the ground contained in section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) alone. He further submitted that the ground of change of user arising on account of the change being made without the written consent of the landlord and being against the express terms of the lease continues to be available to support the decree for eviction which has been passed on that ground. 5. The first question is whether the premises continues to be a 'schedule building' even after its admitted non-user for a scheduled purpose ever since the death of original tenant Roshan Lal Narula on 16.1.1990 to give rise to the further argument of non applicability of Section 13(3)(a)(i)(a) urged in support of the appeal. 6. Section 2 of the Act contains the definitions. Clauses (d), (g) and (h) hereinafter define 'residential building', 'non-residential building' and 'scheduled building' as under :- "(d) 'Non residential building' means a building being used solely for the purpose of business or trade ; Provided that residence in a building only for the purpose of guarding it shall not be deemed to convert a 'non-residential building' to a 'residential building,'" "(g) 'residential building' means any building which is not a non-residential building;" "(h) 'scheduled building' means a residential building which is being used by a person engaged in one or more of the professions specified in the Schedule to this Act, partly for his business and partly for his residence." 7. From the above definitions, it is clear that a building used solely for the purpose of business or trade is a 'non-residential building' and every building' defined in Section (2) a which is not a 'residential building' is residential building. Section 2(h) then says that a 'scheduled building' means a 'residential building' which is being used by a person engaged in one or more of the professions specified in the Schedule of the Act, partly for his business and partly for the residence. Accordingly, 'scheduled building' is a residential building which is being used for one of the scheduled purpose and the definition further makes it clear that it is a 'scheduled building' during the period of such user of that building while it continues to be 'residential building'. The emphasis therefore, is on the user and its period for the purpose of characterising a 'residential building' as a 'scheduled building'. In view of this clear provision, there can be no doubt that a 'scheduled building' does not cease to be a 'residential building' during its user for a scheduled purpose even though it ceases to be a 'scheduled building' when such user ceases. 8. This being so, in the present case the 'residential building' in question ceased to be a 'scheduled building' on the death of Roshan Lal narula on 16.1.1990 when its user for the one of the scheduled purposes comes to an end, while it continued to be a 'residential building' as defined in Section 2(g) of the Act. For this reason, the finding of provisional need of the landlord not being assailed by the tenant, the order of eviction can be sustained on the ground contained in Section 13(3)(i)(a)(i) of the Act alone and the argument of non-applicability of that provision does not arise. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant attempted to contend that there was no occasion for the appellant to assail the finding of bonafide need recorded in the landlord's favour by the Rent Controller since the decree was not based on that ground, the premises being treated as a 'scheduled building'. We are unable to accept this contention. We find it clearly stated in the judgment of the Appellate Authority that no attempt was made on behalf of the tenant to challenge the Rent Controller's finding on the ground of personal need, the appeal being confined only to question of law. We are unable to accept this contention. We find it clearly stated in the judgment of the Appellate Authority that no attempt was made on behalf of the tenant to challenge the Rent Controller's finding on the ground of personal need, the appeal being confined only to question of law. We are satisfied that the appellant had full opportunity to assail that finding, if he was so inclined, but the challenge was not made to that finding for the obvious reason that the finding of landlord's personal need was unassailable in the present case. 10. It also appears from the record that during this period the respondent's husband has retired from Government service on 30.10.1992 and the increasing need of the family members of landlord has been further aggravated by the non availability of Government accommodation on his retirement. It is, therefore, obvious that the decree for eviction passed against the appellant can be sustained on the above raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. For this reasons, we do not consider it necessary to go into the other points urged by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of this appeal. 11. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 1,000/-.