JUDGMENT - MANE A.D., J.:---This civil revision application is filed by the decree-holders challenging the legality or correctness of the order dated August 31, 1983 directing the inclusion of certain properties in a preliminary decree for partition in pursuance of the application, Exhibit 91. There are few facts, which are either admitted or not disputed and same require mention in order to consider the question involved in the revision. 2. The petitioner No. 1 filed Special Civil Suit No. 30 of 1963 on December 21, 1963, for partition and separate one-sixth share in the properties and business, more particularly set-out in Schedule 'A' and Schedule 'B' of the plaint. In Schedule 'C' and Schedule 'D' the property was mentioned, which is the subject matter in the present revision. Those properties were excluded for the simple reason that they were in possession of the Receiver appointed by the High Court in the High Court Suit No. 3022 of 1947 and in the Insolvency Proceedings, respectively. The suit was accordingly decreed in respect of the properties described in Schedule 'A' and Schedule 'B' on August 14, 1967, declaring the shares of several parties to the suit with the direction to effect the partition through the Collector for separate possession of the share of the petitioner therein under Order 20, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure, so far as the decree relating to the land assessed to revenue is concerned. 3. Subsequent to the passing of the preliminary decree in the suit as aforesaid, the respondents filed their application inter alia submitting that some of the properties mentioned in Schedule 'C' and Schedule 'D' to the plaint be included in the preliminary decree as same have been released and eligible for partition along with particle estate. That application has been opposed by the petitioners solely on the ground that separate suit in respect of those properties is required to be filed on the basis of the finding recorded by the learned trial Judge, who decided the suit. It has been contended that these properties are situated at Jalgaon and involve several issues and therefore, properties could not be included in the preliminary decree for the purpose of drawing the final decree. 4. The learned trial Judge by his impugned order rejected the objection and directed inclusion of these properties in the preliminary decree for partition according to law. 5. Mr. 4. The learned trial Judge by his impugned order rejected the objection and directed inclusion of these properties in the preliminary decree for partition according to law. 5. Mr. P.R. Deshmukh, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that the impugned order is erroneous and bad in law. The learned Counsel submitted that the decree passed in the suit is a final decree and the Court below becomes functus officio and therefore, has no power to amend the final decree, which is executable by the Collector under section 54 read with Order 20, Rule 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Reliance has been placed on the decision in the case of (Ramabai Govind v. Anant Daji)1, A.I.R. 1945 Bom. 338(F.B.) and (Keshao Raghunath v. Waman Keshao Dasopant)2, A.I.R. 1971 Bom. 26. 6. On the other hand, Mr. A.S. Bajaj, learned Counsel for the respondents, vehemently urged that the view taken by the learned trial Judge is perfectly legal and justified. Relying on the decision in the case of (Phulchand v. Gopal Lal)3, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 1470, followed in (Syed Ikramuddin v. Syed Mohamed Ali)4, A.I.R. 1986 A.P. 267, and unreported judgment of Orissa High Court the learned Counsel further urged that there arises no illegality or irregularity in the impugned order when the Court has power to correct a preliminary decree in the interests of justice and as such, this Court should not interfere with the impugned order in the revision. 7. The question whether a decree is preliminary or final has to be decided on a reference to that decree itself. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 18 of Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure refers to the partition suit relating to "Estate assessed to Government revenue as covered in section 54 of the Code", whereas, sub-rule (2) deals with the partition decrees relating to any other movable or immovable property. Under sub-rule (1) the Court has to pass a decree declaring the rights of several parties interested in the suit insofar as it relates to the estate assessed to Government revenue and shall direct that the Collector will make the partition. The contention of Mr. Under sub-rule (1) the Court has to pass a decree declaring the rights of several parties interested in the suit insofar as it relates to the estate assessed to Government revenue and shall direct that the Collector will make the partition. The contention of Mr. P.R. Deshmukh, learned Counsel for the petitioners is that once the Court passes the decree and transfers the same to the Collector for effecting partition, the Court becomes functus officio and could have no jurisdiction to pass a decree or deliver possession in accordance with the decree. This contention is sought to be supported by the observations in the case of Ramabai Govind (cited supra) to the following effect : "in the case of a decree under Order 20, Rule 18(1), Civil Procedure Code, the Court is not even now expressly required to pass any further decree. When the Court passes a preliminary decree under sub-rule (2), it appoints a Commissioner under Order 26, Rule 13 to effect a partition; after receiving his report, the Court is to pass a final decree under Order 20, Rule 14(3). There is no corresponding provision in the Code that after making a partition the Collector should report to the Court in order that it may pass a final decree. In fact no other final decree is ever passed, after a decree is once passed under Order 20, Rule 18(1). A preliminary decree cannot forever remain a preliminary decree, but contemplates a final decree upon which the decree holder may take out execution, a term which in decrees for partition of property must include delivery of possession. The Collector cannot pass a final or indeed any other decree in a civil suit for partition, and yet the Civil Court is not required by the Code to pass any further decree or to make its decree final at any stage. The Collector cannot pass a final or indeed any other decree in a civil suit for partition, and yet the Civil Court is not required by the Code to pass any further decree or to make its decree final at any stage. Upon this footing, the first and only decree to be passed by the Court would be a final decree." It may be stated that the question involved in that case was whether the application to send the papers to the Collector is governed by the Limitation Act and rejecting that contention the Court ruled that whether a decree contemplated in Order 20, Rule 18, sub-rule (1) is in the nature of a preliminary decree or a final decree, an application made by a party to a decree under Order 20, Rule 18(1), asking that the papers be sent to the Collector for effecting a partition as directed in it is of the nature of a mere proceeding in the suit rather than an application to execute the decree, and there is no period of limitation for making it. The effecting of partition by the Collector carrying out an order already passed by the Court is not 'execution of the decree' as contemplated by that expression in col. L of Article 182 of Schedule I, Limitation Act. In the present case, the question is whether the Court could mould the decree passed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 18 of Order 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, even though the decree relating to "estate assessed to Government revenue" is referred to the Collector for actual partition and separate share. The decision in the case of Phulchand (cited supra) requires emphasis. It lays down that there is nothing in the Code which prohibits the passing of more than one preliminary decree if the circumstances justify the same and that it may be necessary to do so particularly in the partition suit. The Supreme Court has also observed in (Venkata Reddy and others v. Pethi Reddy)5, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 992, that a preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, insofar as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. The Supreme Court has also observed in (Venkata Reddy and others v. Pethi Reddy)5, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 992, that a preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, insofar as the matters dealt with by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate making of two decrees a preliminary and a final decree-the decree which would be executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. An order passed in the supplemental proceedings after the preliminary decree, with regard to such properties, in my opinion, amounts to another preliminary decree. 8. It would have been a different matter if the respondent require the preliminary decree to be reopened to enable them to reagitate the matters which have now been decided under the preliminary decree or after the preliminary decree they intend to include the properties which have been acquired by the petitioners, in which cases the disputed questions require to be decided in the final decree. The proceedings for effecting partition of other properties as per the decree are still pending before the Collector. The respondents filed Civil Application No. 912 of 1991 for production of certain documents to show that in Chamber Summons taken on August 8, 1991, in the High Court Suit No. 302 of 1947 it has been clearly stated that the decree passed against the petitioners was satisfied and the property mentioned in Schedule 'C' was liable to be released. It appears that the properties consist of six Lands Survey Nos. 9, 443, 508, 530 and 541. The lands Survey Nos. 9 and 443 have been sold. Therefore, rest of the lands are available for partition between the parties. The respondents have also stated that the Receiver appointed in the Insolvency Proceedings has been discharged in respect of the properties mentioned in Schedule 'D'. 9. There is no challenge to these facts as asserted by the respondents in their application. Significantly, the petitioners themselves have included these properties in the suit for partition, but on account of appointment of Receiver in respect of those properties, the Court while passing the decree, excluded those properties. 9. There is no challenge to these facts as asserted by the respondents in their application. Significantly, the petitioners themselves have included these properties in the suit for partition, but on account of appointment of Receiver in respect of those properties, the Court while passing the decree, excluded those properties. I do not find any apparent ground for the petitioners to take exception when the respondents applied for inclusion of those properties for partition. In my opinion, in a partition suit even after the preliminary decree if on the basis of subsequent facts there are changes in the situation or changes in the grouping of shares amongst the parties, the decree for partition can be suitably moulded and the Court in such circumstances does not become functus officio. The rule that a final decree cannot be moulded or the Court cannot go behind the preliminary decree on a matter determined by the preliminary decree cannot be applied in the instant case. It always open to the parties before the final decree, upon proper proceedings to bring in further properties for partition. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the decree, which is sought to be moulded, is the final decree. In the circumstances of the case and in view of the discussion as aforesaid, I do not think that there is any ground to interfere with the impugned order which is perfectly justified to avoid multiplicity of the proceedings between the parties. 10. In the result, the civil revision application is rejected. Rule is accordingly discharged with no order as to costs. Civil revision application rejected. -----