S. K. DUBEY, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, the 'act') for enhancement of compensation, awarded on 25-9-1984, in Claim Case No. 83/1983, by the Third Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Indore (for short, the 'tribunal' ). ( 2 ) THE facts of this case are not in dispute, nor the owner, the driver and the Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. , (for short, the Insurance Company') have challenged the award on any of the findings recorded against them. ( 3 ) AT the relevant time of accident on 7-10-1983, the claimant, a girl, aged about 11 years, a student of Class IV, was dashed by a motor vehicle (Car No. CPO 503), driven by respondent No. 2, owned by respondent No. 1, and insured with the Insurance Company/respondent No. 3; as a result of that, the claimant received a fracture compound of tibia and fibula of right leg lower 1/3rd. She was taken to the M. Y. Hospital, Indore, where she was admitted as an indoor patient; she was operated by Dr. D. K. Taneja (P. W. 2), Reader in Orthopaedics and consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon, Medical College and M. Y. Hospital, Indore, was put under plaster, and was discharged from the Hospital on 11-10-1983; she remained under plaster till 20-12-1983, and received treatment as an outdoor patient till 10-1-1984. As regards factors contributing to disablement, the Doctor opined that (i) limitation of dorsi-flexion was by 10; (ii) wasting of 11/2 cm. in right thigh and 1 cm in right calf, (iii) healed scar on right leg in lower 1/3rd. Physical disability was assessed by Mc Bride formula and permanent disablement was found to be six percent. Thereafter, the claimant presented an application under Section 110-A of the Act, and claimed compensation of Rs. 32,000/ -. The defence of the respondents was that the driver respondent No. 2 did not drive the car rashly and negligently; the claimant came running to the middle of the road and, thus, the accident was caused due to her negligence. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,000/- towards special diet and conveyance charges; Rs. 2500/- towards physical disability; Rs. 3500/- for permanent disablement and incapacity to work, and Rs. 3000/- for mental pain and sufferings. Thus, in all, Rs. 10,000/- were awarded. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 1,000/- towards special diet and conveyance charges; Rs. 2500/- towards physical disability; Rs. 3500/- for permanent disablement and incapacity to work, and Rs. 3000/- for mental pain and sufferings. Thus, in all, Rs. 10,000/- were awarded. ( 4 ) SHRI R. N. Dave, counsel for the appellant, and Shri N. C. Behl, counsel for the respondent No. 3, were heard. ( 5 ) THE term 'compensation' has been explained by a Division Bench of this Court in case of Mangilal v. Pramod, 1988 Acc CJ 307, wherein it has been pointed out that the word 'just' occurring in S. 110-B of the Act is of a very wide amplitude. It is true that a claimant should not be permitted to make a fortune out of misfortune that has befallen on him but as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi, 1980 Acc CJ 55, the determination of the quantum of compensation must be liberal, not niggardly since the law values life and limb in free country in generous scales. Therefore, compensation to a living person for his sufferings and disablement has to be substantial and not merely token. ( 6 ) NO amount of money can restore the fractured human frame to its original condition. In determining the monetary compensation under S. 110-B of the Act, various factors have to be taken into consideration. The determination of compensation by any precise mathematical calculation is not possible in the very nature of things, and the determination of compensation in arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master. ( 7 ) IN the head of 'pecuniary loss' suffered by the claimant, full compensation can be awarded, while in the head of 'non-pecuniary loss' or 'general damages', items of loss and injury for which compensation is claimed have to be quantified in terms of money. Personal injuries sustained may be simple or grave and, in addition to pain and hardship, may occasion loss of pleasures of life. Damages are awarded in respect of pain and suffering already undergone and likely to be undergone in future, in respect of the loss of the amenities of life and in respect of the reduction in the expectation of life. Damages are awarded in respect of pain and suffering already undergone and likely to be undergone in future, in respect of the loss of the amenities of life and in respect of the reduction in the expectation of life. Assessment of damages for pain and suffering has necessarily to depend upon a reasonable view of the case having regard to all the circumstances, while it has also to be remembered that the damages awarded should be compensatory and not punitive. Therefore, for awarding damages for the loss of pleasures of life, the personal circumstances of the claimant are to be taken to form the background of the assessment. While assessing the damages, note has also to be taken of the fall in the purchasing power of money and also of the fact that the claimant can claim compensation only once. See also a Division Bench decision of this Court in Deepti Tiwari v. Banwari Lal, 1966 Acc CJ 217. ( 8 ) ORDINARILY, the appellate Court does not interfere in the compensation awarded unless it is too inadequate or too excessive. ( 9 ) CONSIDERING the case in hand in the above background, the Tribunal while awarding pecuniary loss, did not consider the loss of education of one year; because of the accident, the claimant could not appear in the examinations. For that, the Tribunal ought to have awarded at least a sum of Rs. 2000/-, which the claimant was entitled. ( 10 ) AS regards compensation in the head of general damages, comparable cases have been relied by the counsel for the appellant as well as the respondent No. 3. The Allahabad High Court in case of Rajendra Prakash Rastogi v. U. P. State Road Transport Corporation, 1988 Acc CJ 702, has awarded compensation of Rs. 21,500/- for the fracture of right tibia and fibula to an injured girl, aged 17 years, a student of intermediate. ( 11 ) ). A Division Bench of this Court in case of Lachiyabai v. Darshansingh Punjabi, 1988 Acc CJ 920, has awarded Rs. 30,000/- for a woman of earning capacity and for pain and suffering, to a woman, aged 35 years, who became crippled and was not able to stand and walk properly. ( 12 ) IN case of Sureshsingh v. Kamlesh, 1987 Acc CJ 429, another Division Bench of this Court, has enhanced compensation from Rs. 14,000/- to Rs. 30,000/- for a woman of earning capacity and for pain and suffering, to a woman, aged 35 years, who became crippled and was not able to stand and walk properly. ( 12 ) IN case of Sureshsingh v. Kamlesh, 1987 Acc CJ 429, another Division Bench of this Court, has enhanced compensation from Rs. 14,000/- to Rs. 30,000/-, for the fracture of thigh bone, to a boy, aged 16 years, whose permanent physical disability was assessed at 10%, while in the same case in respect of another injured, aged 40 years, an employee in a press, who suffered fracture of tibia and fibula the Division Bench enhanced compensation from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 30,000/ -. ( 13 ) IN the present case, permanent physical disability has been assessed at 6%. The claimant, a girl aged 11 years, has to suffer this disability throughout her life, which may be an obstacle in her marriage. Therefore, considering the comparable cases and the background, I am of opinion that the compensation in the head of general damages should not have been less than Rs. 18,000/ -. Thus, as discussed above, the compensation in the head of pecuniary loss deserves to be enhanced to Rs. 2000/- and in the head of non-pecuniary loss or general damages, for physical and permanent disability and pain and suffering, the amount of compensation deserves to be enhanced from Rs. 9,000/- to Rs. 18,000/ -. Thus, in all, the claimant/appellant is entitled to Rs. 20,000/ -. ( 14 ) COMING to interest, Shri Bahl has placed reliance on a decision of the apex Court in case of Jyotsna Dey v. State of Assam, 1987 Acc CJ 172, and submitted that some time be given for depositing the enhanced amount, and in case the Insurance Company fails to deposit, then only 12% interest be awarded from the date of the application on the amount so enhanced. In my opinion, the submission of Shri Bahl is right and deserves to be accepted. ( 15 ) ). In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs the amount of compensation awarded' by the Tribunal is enhanced from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. In my opinion, the submission of Shri Bahl is right and deserves to be accepted. ( 15 ) ). In the result, the appeal is allowed with costs the amount of compensation awarded' by the Tribunal is enhanced from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 20,000/-, which shall be deposited by the Insurance Company/respondent No. 3 within two months from today, failing which the claimant/appellant shall be entitled to recover the amount with interest at the rate of 12% per annum, calculated from the date of the application till payment. The respondent No. 3/insurance Company will, of course, get credit for the amount already paid or deposited by it with the Tribunal, and interest shall be calculated taking into account such payment if already made. ( 16 ) AS the claimant/appellant has now become major and elected to proceed with the appeal, the amount of compensation as enhanced by this Court shall be disbursed to her only. ( 17 ) COUNSEL's fee Rs. 500/- if already certified. Appeal allowed. .