J. M. MAHAPATRA, J, J. ( 1 ) THE appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 20-8-1988 of the learned Sessions Judge, Sambalpur convicting the appellant under section 302, I. P. C. and sentencing him to imprisonment for life. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case may he briefly stated thus. The appellant is the husband of the deceased and they were living together prior to the incident. They were woodcutters by profession and used to earn their livelihood by cutting and collecting fuel in the jungle and selling it. It is alleged by the prosecution that. on 16-1-1988 when both the appellant and the deceased had been to Chandali forest behind the campus of Sambalpur University for collecting fuel, the appellant suddenly dealt blows on the cheek and head of the deceased by means of a tangia he was carrying, causing injuries on her person. Thereafter, the appellant left the place, Information was lodged for the incident at the Burla Police Station and P. W. 10, the S. I. of Police of Burla Police Station registered a case against the appellant under sections 302/201, I. P. C. and proceeded with the investigation. During the investigation of the case the dead body of the deceased was not traced out, and as such no medical evidence is available on record. The Investigating Officer, P. W. 10, however, accompanied by the appellant under arrest with P. W. 3, a Scientific Officer, D. F. S. L. , Sambalpur went to the spot near Chandali hill behind the Sambalpur University campus. It is stated that at the instance of the appellant, the Investigating Officer seized some broken bangles, a bindi and saree said to have belonged to the deceased. The Investigating Officer had sent all these incriminating articles for chemical examination and serological test. He also took steps for recording the confessional statement of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sambalpur. On completion of investigation charge sheet was submitted against the appellant. The appellant being committed to the Court of Session stood his trial for the offence of murder of the deceased and was eventually found guilty of the offence and convicted thereunder. ( 3 ) THE plea of the appellant at the trial was one of total denial of his complicity in the crime. The appellant being committed to the Court of Session stood his trial for the offence of murder of the deceased and was eventually found guilty of the offence and convicted thereunder. ( 3 ) THE plea of the appellant at the trial was one of total denial of his complicity in the crime. He has denied to have made any confessional statement before the Magistrate, and he has also denied to have made extra-judicial confession before his father, P. W. 7. ( 4 ) IN support of its case prosecution has examined as many as ten witnesses of whom P. W. 7 the father of the appellant was the informant. P. Ws. 1, 2 and 9 are the seizure witnesses, P. W. 3 the Scientific Officer and P. W. 4, the photographer, both attached to D. F. S. L. , Sambalpur, P. Ws. 6 and 7 the brother and father of the appellant who spoke regarding the extra-judicial confession of the appellant before them, P. W. 8 has been examined to state that he had lent his tangia (M. O. IV) to the appellant, and P. W. 10 is the Investigating Officer who investigated into the case and eventually submitted charge sheet against the appellant. ( 5 ) THE learned trial Judge relying mainly on the judicial confession of the appellant recorded under Ext. 20 by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sambalpur (Not examined in this case) and other circumstantial evidence that both the appellant and the deceased left the house together for cutting fuel and the recovery of certain articles M. Os. I to VI belonging to the deceased in the forest area behind the Sambalpur University campus came to hold that the appellant was the author of the crime for the murder of his wife and has accordingly held him guilty of the offence of murder and has convicted him under section 302, I. P. C. ( 6 ) THE present case presents a peculiar feature in that the dead body of the deceased, if any; was not traced out. The deceased was not medically examined for injuries on her person. In such state of affairs, although there is strong suspicion that the deceased might have met her death following the assaults by means of the tangia, yet there is no tangible materials on record to hold that the deceased in fact met her death. The deceased was not medically examined for injuries on her person. In such state of affairs, although there is strong suspicion that the deceased might have met her death following the assaults by means of the tangia, yet there is no tangible materials on record to hold that the deceased in fact met her death. We would, therefore, now proceed to examine whether the prosecution evidence is cogent and reliable and acceptable to hold that the appellant had in fact dealt tangia blows on the deceased as transpires from the materials on record. ( 7 ) THE first item of evidence is the judicial confession, Ext. 20, recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sambalpur who is not examined by the prosecution in this case. The confessional statement, Ext. 20 and the order sheet of the Court of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Sambalpur marked as Ext. 21 would go to show that the appellant was produced before the Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate in police custody on 24-1-1988 with a prayer of the Investigating Officer for recording his confessional statement. On the same day, as the order sheet reveals, the appellant was remanded till 27-1-1988 for cool reflection. On 27-1-1988 the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate passed the order directing Sri J. N. Mishra, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Sambalpur to record the confessional statement of the appellant. On the very day, after administering the statutory warnings and after observing due formalities required for recording the confessional statement the Judicial Magistrate recorded the statement of the appellant as per Ext. 20. The substance of the statement is that the appellant suspected his wife for his illicit connection with some boys, and that the deceased told him that she would run away from the house with some boy. The appellant, therefore, took her on 16-1-1988 to the jungle behind the Sambalpur University building, and while the deceased was collecting fuel he dealt a tangia blow on her cheek as a result of which the deceased fell down. The appellant, thereafter, dealt further blow on the head of the deceased, and, thereafter, while the deceased was lying there the appellant left her there and decamped. He had also thrown the tangia at the spot before leaving the spot. The statement of the appellant further discloses that the appellant had accompanied the Investigating Officer to the spot and pointed out the tangia. He had also thrown the tangia at the spot before leaving the spot. The statement of the appellant further discloses that the appellant had accompanied the Investigating Officer to the spot and pointed out the tangia. whereafter the Investigating Officer seized the tangia and that the appellant also pointed out the wearing apparel of the deceased lying at the spot. ( 8 ) THE confessional statement of the appellant as referred to above, if accepted, to be true and voluntary and is found to have been recorded by observing the requirements of law for recording of confessional statement, there can be no manner of doubt that it is a very valuable piece of evidence connecting the appellant with the crime. Mrs. Das, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant has challenged this item of evidence on the ground that from the materials on record, it cannot be said to be true and voluntary. The voluntary character of the statement is challenged on the ground that no time for cool reflection was given to the appellant by the Judicial Magistrate, Sambalpur on appellants being produced before him for recording his confession, and about the true nature it is contended that there is no material evidence to corroborate what the appellant had stated in his confessional statement under Ext. 20. Coming to the first limb of the argument, reliance is placed on two decisions of the Apex Court one in the case of Shankaria v. State of Rajasthan, and the other in the case of Devendra Prasad Tiwari v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The earlier decision is directly on the point and is a larger Bench decision as compared to the latter one. The ratio of the decision in the earlier authority with regard to the recording of the judicial confession under section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In the aforesaid case the accused was in judicial custody for about 38 to 40 hours before being produced before the Magistrate for recording the confession, and there was also a little interval of about 15 minutes between the preliminary questioning and the actual recording of the confession. In such background their Lordships held that the statement was voluntary being free from police influence. In such background their Lordships held that the statement was voluntary being free from police influence. It would be appropriate to quote the relevant observations of their Lordships: There is no statutory provision in section 164, Cr. P. C. or elsewhere, or even an executive direction issued by the High Court, that there should be an interval of 24 hours or more between the preliminary questioning of the accused and recording of his confession. The condition precedent for recording a confession by the Magistrate in the course of police investigation is that the Magistrate should not record any confession, unless upon questioning the accused person making it, he has reason to believe that it is being made voluntarily. How much time for reflection should be allowed to an accused person before recording his confession, is a question which depends on the circumstances of each case. The object of giving such time for reflection to the accused, is to ensure that he is completely free from police influence. If immediately before the recording of the confession, the accused was in judicial custody beyond the reach of the investigating police for some days, then such custody from its very nature, may itself be a factor dispelling fear or influence of the police from the mind of the accused. In such a case, it may not be necessary to send back the accused person for any prolonged period to Jailor Judicial Lockup. Where the Magistrate was satisfied that confession is being made voluntarily and is preceded by judicial custody of 38 to 48 hours, held the interval of 15 minutes between the preliminary questioning and the recording of confession was sufficient. In the latter case of the apex Court, their Lordships did not accept the judicial confession of the accused recorded by the Magistrate for these infirmities, namely:1. There was no contemporaneous record to show that the appellant was actually kept in jail as ordered by Judicial Magistrate; 2. the judicial Magistrate recording the statement of the appellant did not question the appellant as to why he was making the confession, and 3. there was nothing in the statement to show that the Magistrate told the appellant that he would not be remanded to police lock up even if he did not confess his guilt. the judicial Magistrate recording the statement of the appellant did not question the appellant as to why he was making the confession, and 3. there was nothing in the statement to show that the Magistrate told the appellant that he would not be remanded to police lock up even if he did not confess his guilt. For these infirmities their Lordships construing the statements to be not voluntary discarded the confessional statement and ruled it out of consideration, though on other acceptable evidence dismissed the appeal and confirmed the sentence. In the earlier decision of the Apex Court (supra) the question as to when the retracted judicial confession can be taken into consideration as reliable and acceptable and as to what procedure is required to be followed have been succinctly dealt with by their Lordships. The mode of recording of the judicial confession as provided for in section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was discussed elaborately. We have referred to the observations in the preceding paragraph. In the latter decision, however, this has not been done, and only the observations made by their Lordships about the infirmities contained in the statement for which it did not receive their approval is noticed. From the foregoing discussions we find that there is some sort of conflict between two decisions of the Supreme Court, and that it is not possible to reconcile them. Following therefore, the principles of law on the question of precedents laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Mattulal v. Radhalal and Union of India and another v. K. S. Subramanian, both of which have been followed in the Full Bench decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Govindaniak G. Kalaghatigi v. West Patent Press Co. Ltd. and another5, we are inclined to follow with respects, the principles of law laid down in the earlier decision namely Shankaria State of Rajasthan (supra ). It would be profitable to quote the words of the Full Bench decision on the point. If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by a larger Bench while the other is by a smaller Bench, the decision of the larger Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. If two decisions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by a larger Bench while the other is by a smaller Bench, the decision of the larger Bench, whether it is earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by High Courts and other Courts. ( 9 ) CONSIDERING the facts of the present case in the background of the legal perspective discussed above, we have no doubt in our mind that the judicial confession of the appellant was voluntary. ( 10 ) COMING to the next test, whether the confession was true and trustworthy, we find that materials on record are galore on the point. The first item is that the incriminating articles, namely, the tangia, M. O. IV and the wearing apparel and some articles belonging to the deceased were found in the jungle and were recovered at the instance of the appellant. This fact is not only deposed to by P. W. s 3, 4 and 10, but also finds mention in Ext. 20, the confessional statement. We also find that there is evidence on record furnished by P. W. 1 that on the material date both the appellant and the deceased left for the jungle together. Considering all these items of evidence, we have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the confession of the appellant recorded as per Ext. 20 is true and trustworthy. ( 11 ) THE next item of evidence, namely, the extrajudicial confession of the appellant to P. W s. 6 and 7 cannot be relied upon as from the evidence of P. W s. 6 and 7, it appears that it is the outcome of threat given by P. W. 7. We, therefore, discard this item of evidence from consideration. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING the sum-total of the evidence as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, we hold, while agreeing with the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that it was the appellant and none else who had dealt axe blows on the cheek and head of the deceased. We, therefore, discard this item of evidence from consideration. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING the sum-total of the evidence as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, we hold, while agreeing with the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that it was the appellant and none else who had dealt axe blows on the cheek and head of the deceased. We, however, do not agree that the appellant can be held guilty of the offence under sections 302 or 304, I. P. C. in the absence of material evidence that as a matter of fact the death of the deceased had occurred as a result of the blows given by the appellant. From the materials on record, we are inclined to hold that the appellant had dealt axe blows on the vital parts like cheek and head, and has attempted to murder the deceased. We would accordingly hold that the appellant is liable to be convicted for the offence under section 307, I. P. C. ( 13 ) ON the aforesaid analysis, we alter the conviction of the appellant from one under section 302, I. P. C. to one under section 307, I. P. C. and we set aside the sentence of life imprisonment and in lieu thereof award imprisonment of seven years of rigorous imprisonment. ( 14 ) WITH the aforesaid modification, the appeal stands dismissed. Appeal dismissed.