JUDGMENT B. P. Singh, J. These three writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners challenging their removal from the Bihar School Service Board, a Board constituted under the provision of the Bihar Non Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act, 1991 (1981). Since these three writ petitions have been heard together, they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The relevant facts may first be noticed. In C.W.J.C. No 4491 of 1990 petitioner Dr. Radha Krishna Poddar was appointed as a Chairman of the Bihar School Service Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) by a Notification dated 3rd January, 1989 (Annexure-2). He has been removed from that office by Notification published in the Gazette on 16.7.1990 (Aunexure-1) The case of the petitioner is that he was a teacher with vast teaching experience in several colleges. He retired from service on 14th September, 1988, when he was the head of the Department of English in B.N. College, Patna, where he also functioned as the Principal of the Morning section from February, 1987. In view of his experience as a teacher he was appointed as the Chairman of the Board for a period of three years under section 10 of the Act, by a Notification dated 3.1.1989 (Annexure-2). The Notification discloser, that the petitioner had been appointed as the Chairman of the Board for a period of that years from the date on which he assumed charge of his office it is his case that a criminal conspiracy was hatched up and a proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure was initiated against him by the Inspector of Police, Cabinet Vigilance by lodging a complaint on 21.4.1990, on the basis of which a first information report was drawn up on 22.4.1990. The petitioner was arrested in connection with that case on the night intervening 21st and 22nd April, 1990. Subsequently, the petitioner was released on bail by the High Court-by order dated 29.6.1990 and he thereafter joined office on 6th July, 1990. All of a sudden a Notification was issued in the Extraordinary Gazette of 16th July, 1990, where under a large number of persons appointed on several Boards constituted by the State of Bihar under various Acts were removed. The petitioner is one of the persons whose services have been terminated by order dated 16th July, 1990, with effect from 17th July, 1990. 3. The petitioner is one of the persons whose services have been terminated by order dated 16th July, 1990, with effect from 17th July, 1990. 3. I am noticed that Annexure-1 contains several Notification, six in number, which had been published in the Extraordinary Gazette on 16th July, 1990. Notification no. 136/C mentions that the State Government is satisfied that Sri R. K. Poddar, Chairman, Bihar School Service Board, Patna, who had been appointed by Notification dated 3rd January, 1989 has been working in a manner which is detrimental to the interest of the Board. Therefore, in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act, Sri R. K. Poddar, Chairman, Bihar-School Service Board is removed from his post with effect from 17th July, 1990. The Notification further mentions that Shri R.K. Poddar shall be paid one month's pay in lieu of notice and hence, a cheque no. 804079 dated 16th July, 1990, for a sum of Rs, 4,754/- is enclosed. 4. The case of the petitioner is that there was no reason for taking recourse to such action without communicating the same to the petitioner and taking steps to tender one month's salary to the petitioner. According to the petitioner, he has neither received any notice nor has he been paid his salary. In fact the Notification was received in the office of the Human Resources Development on 18th July, 1990, though the service of the petitioner stood terminated with effect from 17th July, 1990, The petitioner had been appointed for a period of three years and held a tenure post, and hence his appointment could not be terminated without assigning reasons, and without notice to show cause. It has been submitted in the writ petition that sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act was arbitrary. It is further the case of the petitioner that so far he understood, the Chief Minister of Bihar (respondent no. 3) after assuming office has started a personal vendetta against the petitioner to settle some old score with him when the petitioner was his teacher in B.N. College and the entire action taken against the petitioner is malafide. Even the criminal proceeding against him is malafide as a result of personal vendetta of respondent no. 3. 3) after assuming office has started a personal vendetta against the petitioner to settle some old score with him when the petitioner was his teacher in B.N. College and the entire action taken against the petitioner is malafide. Even the criminal proceeding against him is malafide as a result of personal vendetta of respondent no. 3. The aforesaid criminal proceeding had been challenged by the petitioner before the High Court in an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same was pending I may notice here that in a supplementary affidavit filed by the petitioner, it has been stated that a Special Leave Petition is now pending before the Supreme Court of India for quashing of the Criminal proceeding and cognizance taken therein. Apparently, therefore, his petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been dismissed by the High Court and the petitioner has moved the Supreme Court for quashing of the criminal proceeding. It is not necessary to refer to the legal submissions urged in the writ petition since I shall deal with them while stating the submissions urged before us at the hearing of this petition. 5. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent-State of Bihar in which it has been stated, inter alia, that the actions of the petitioner as Chairman of the Board word found to be detrimental to the interest of the Board as well as against the public interest, and Vigilance case no l2 of 1990 dated 21.4.1990 was lodged against the petitioner under sections 420, 467, 201 and 120 (B) of the Indian Penal Code read with section 13(2) and 13(1) (D) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Serious irregularities as well as misconduct committed by the petitioner in the matter of appointment of Lecturers were discovered. It was on this account that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground that his actions were detrimental to the interest of the Board and, therefore, in exercise of power vested in Government under Section 10 (7) of the Act he was removed from the office which he was holding. It was on this account that the services of the petitioner were terminated on the ground that his actions were detrimental to the interest of the Board and, therefore, in exercise of power vested in Government under Section 10 (7) of the Act he was removed from the office which he was holding. The claim of the petitioner that he had a right to hold the office for three years has been refuted, and it has been stated that the services of the petitioner could be terminated anytime within a period of three years in case of unsatisfactory performance as contemplated by section 10 (7) of the Act. The removal of the petitioner was, therefore, in accordance with law. The petitioner was removed after giving him one months salary in lieu of notice and there was no question of violation of principles of natural justice. An affidavit in reply has been filed on behalf of the petitioner, but that contains mostly legal submissions. 6. A supplementary counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State on 4.10.1991 in which it has been stated that Oil 16th July, 1990 two letters were addressed to the petitioner; One containing the impugned Notification along with cheque no. 804078 dated 16th. July, 1990, and another letter bearing no. 141/C dated 16th July, 1990 relating to arrears of salary for the; period 1.4.90 to 21.4.90 and 6.7.90 along with the cheque no. 804078 dated 16.7.90. A team of officers consisting of Deputy Director, Secondary Education, Assistant Director, Cultural Education and an Assistant of the Department were deputed to Serve the letter containing the Notification and the cheque, but they reported that the petitioner and the other three members of the Board who had been similarly removed, Were absent from their residences and, therefore, service could not be effected. The Notification along with the cheque was thereafter sent through registered post on 18.7.90. The report has been annexed as Annexure-R/3 to the affidavit. The two letters addressed to the petitioner have been annexed as Annexures R/1 and R/2. Annexure R/4 is the postal receipt through which the notification along with the cheque was sent to the petitioner and three other members. 7. To this the petitioner has filed a reply in which the averments made in the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State have been controverted. Annexure R/4 is the postal receipt through which the notification along with the cheque was sent to the petitioner and three other members. 7. To this the petitioner has filed a reply in which the averments made in the supplementary counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State have been controverted. A further affidavit has been filed by the daughter-in-law of the petitioner stating that she was present in the house throughout on 17th and 18th July 1990 and no one visited their house with a view to serve any order or letter meant for the petitioner. 8. Relevant facts of C.W.J.C No 7059 of 1990 are as follows : Petitioner Ambika Prasad Pandey is one of the cadre of Principal/Headmaster of Nationalised High Schools. Presently he is the Principal of late Devipad Chaudhary Saheed Smarak High School, Patna, earlier known as Miller School. He has wide experience in the educational field including experience in teaching. By Notification dated 3rd January, 1989, he was appointed as a member of the Board for a period of three years with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office. The Notification has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition and is the same as Annexure-2 in C.W.J.C. No. 4491/90. According to the petitioner, tile Congress Government was in power when he had been appointed. When the Janta Dal Government came in power, the Chief Minister started reconstituting different Boards and Corporations of the State. A conspiracy was hatched up to malign and remove the Chairman and members of the Board, and suddenly a criminal case was instituted against the Chairman and other members of the Board including the petitioner. The criminal case related to alleged acts of omission and commission of the Chairman and members of the Board in regard to the working and functioning of the Board in matters relating to selection and recommendation of candidates for appointment to the posts of Assistant Teachers, Head Masters etc. Accordingly Vigilance P.S. Case no. 12 of 1990 was instituted on 21.4.1990. The petitioner surrendered in the court of Special Judge, Vigilance, but ultimately bail was granted to him by the High Court on 7.9.1990. During his absence the impugned notification removing him from office of member of the Board was served at his residence upon a minor member the family on 17.7.1990. 12 of 1990 was instituted on 21.4.1990. The petitioner surrendered in the court of Special Judge, Vigilance, but ultimately bail was granted to him by the High Court on 7.9.1990. During his absence the impugned notification removing him from office of member of the Board was served at his residence upon a minor member the family on 17.7.1990. Before issuance of the impugned Notification (Annexure-2) removing the petitioner, no show cause was issued and no charge was framed against the petitioner nor was he afforded any opportunity to say anything in the matter. His appointment, which was for a period of three years, was suddenly terminated without asking reasons and without issuance of show cause. The petitioner has stated that even the criminal proceeding against him was malafide and the result of the personal vendetta of the Chief Minister (respondent no. 3). He has challenged the said proceeding in an application under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the same was pending before this Court in Crim. Misc. no. 4868 of 1990. The order of removal has been challenged on several grounds to which I shall refer later. 9. An amendment petition was filed by the petitioner on 4.12.1990 wherein it has been stated that the State Government had appointed the Chairman and members of the Bihar School Service Board by Annexure-4 dated 18th November, 1990. The petitioner challenged the validity of Annexure•-4 and prayed for its quashing. 10. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondent stating that the State Government had been receiving complaints that the members of the Board including the Chairman had been abusing their powers and showing undue favour to some of the candidates for personal gain. Complaints were being made by large number of candidates who sought interview either with the officers or the Minister concerned and public representatives to ventilate their grievances. When it came to the knowledge of the State Government that members of the Board and the Chairman were indulging in arbitrary action motivated by illegal gain, it was considered necessary to institute a case so that the matter could be thoroughly investigated. Accordingly, Vigilance P.S. Case no. 12 of 1990 was instituted and the investigation of the case has revealed shocking material. Accordingly, Vigilance P.S. Case no. 12 of 1990 was instituted and the investigation of the case has revealed shocking material. It has been found in course of investigation that some of the persons claimed that they had paid money on behalf of candidates for securing appointment. In course of investigation the Chairman and the members of the Board were required to make available assessment sheets in which the marks awarded had been recorded for academic achievement as well as marks in the interview. Neither the Chairman nor any of the members could produce the assessment sheets on the basis of which recommendations are said to have been made for appointment of teachers. Even a search in the office of the Board, did not reveal any record to throw any light on the process of selection adopted by the Board. Residence of the Chairman was also searched as also the residences of other members. A list of selected candidates was found, but that did not contain any other particulars, except the names, It transpired during the investigation that other persons having better academic achievements had not been selected by the Board, whereas persons of inferior academic achievements had been included in the select list. The Government having received this information from the investigating officer had to take a decision whether it would be proper to act on the basis of such recommendation and select list sent by the Board, The State Government found that the action of the petitioner as a member of the Board was detrimental to the interest of the Board as also against public interest, Since he was acting contrary to the interest of the Board, a Notification was issued in exercise of powers conferred by section 10(7) of the Act removing the petitioner from office. The order was perfectly justified in the facts and circumstances of the case and was not illegal for any reason whatsoever. 11. It will thus be not iced that the petitioners in these two writ petitions were appointed as Chairman and member of the Board by the same Notification and were also removed at the same time by issuance of a Notification on 16th July, 1990. After their removal other members of the Board were appointed as also Chairman, namely, Dr. Rash Lal Yadav. 12. The next writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 2634 of 1991 is the writ petition filed by Dr. After their removal other members of the Board were appointed as also Chairman, namely, Dr. Rash Lal Yadav. 12. The next writ petition, C.W.J.C. No. 2634 of 1991 is the writ petition filed by Dr. Rash Lal Yadav, who has also been removed from office subsequently by Notification dated 4th April, 1991. I shall now state the relevant facts of C.W.J.C. No. 2634 1991. 13. The petitioners in this writ petition Dr. Rash Lal Yadav contends that he was the Head of the Department in Maithili in Kunwar Singh College. Lakhisarai. He was selected for appointment as Chairman of the Board for a term of three years from the date he assumed charge of his office vide Notification dated 18-11-1990 (Annexure-1). He states that the Chairman and member of the predecessor had mismanaged the affairs of the Beard to such an extent that Vigilance cases had been instituted against them and some of the members were taken into police custody. Bulk of the Boards records were seized by the Vigilance Department and the criminal prosecution is still continuing. On account of corrupt practices of the previous Chairman and the members of the Board, the Board' had lost the faith of the people. The petitioner on being appointed as Chairman of the Hoard found that no panels had been prepared for appointment of teachers as also for their promotion as Headmasters despite advertisements published in the years 1985, 1987 and 1988, and this had seriously affected the whole system or education at the Secondary School stage. The petitioner also found that the staff of the Board had not been paid their salary for several months for want of funds and about Rs. 2,00000/- were due on account of arrears of rent of the building in which the, office of the Board was located. The Board had practically no funds, and after frantic search it was found that the Board had only Rs. 5,000/- in its various accounts. In these circumstances, the petitioner with a view to find funds to run the Board, placed the matter before the Board and the Board by its resolution dated 21-1-1991 resolved to enhance the cost of application forms to Rs. 20- and fee for interview etc. to Rs. 100/- for general categories and to Rs. 25/- for members belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. 20- and fee for interview etc. to Rs. 100/- for general categories and to Rs. 25/- for members belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Two members of the Board were subsequently appointed and this resolution was again placed before the full Board for consideration. Such a decision had been taken by the Board after making enquiries from other similar Boards and when it was found that in other Boards as well such fee was being charged. The Board had communicated its decision to the Government on 23-1-1992. Advertisements were issued thereafter and the fee at an enhanced rate was charged from the new applicants. The Board interviewed candidates, but suddenly when the process of selection was in progress and several panels had been sent to the Government, a letter dated 5-3-1991 was issued by the State Government, which was received by him on 11th March, 1991. The Government communicated its decision to the petitioner that in accordance with its declared policy no fee should be realized from the applicants. According to the petitioner, he placed the matter before the Board on that very date. The Board expressed its happiness if it could avoid realizing fee from the applicants, provided fund were made available for the very existence of the Board. It also sought guidelines from the Government as to how the fees already collected should be refunded. The resolution of the Board was sent to the State Government under cover of letter dated 12th March, 1991. The petitioner sent a reminder seeking the guidelines for refund of fees already collected. By letter dated 22-3-91 the Commissioner-cum-Special Secretary, Department of Human Resources Development mentioned the fact that in the legislative Council the Minister in-charge, Secondary Education had declared that no fee will be realized, still the petitioner in the press Conference stated that the Board will continue to realize the fee. A privilege motion had been raised and the petitioner was requested to take immediate action for implementation of the said Government decision. According to the petitioner in this letter there was no reference to the subsequent reminders that the petitioner had sent to the State Government seeking guidelines. The petitioner on the following day refuted that he had made any such declaration in the press Conference that the Board will go on realizing fee and informed the Government that no fee was being realized. The petitioner on the following day refuted that he had made any such declaration in the press Conference that the Board will go on realizing fee and informed the Government that no fee was being realized. He sought a further direction as to whether the Board should function as an independent body according to the provisions of the Act or should act as a Department of the Government. 14. In this case the stand of the petitioner is that the Additional Commissioner-cum Special Secretary after considering the matter brought to the notice of the Government the pitiable financial condition of the Board. He had further opined that under the scheme of the Act, the Government had probably no power to interfere with the functioning of the Board as was being done. The Minister in-charge, however, did not agree with the noting of the Additional Commissioner and the petitioner states that the impugned Notification dated 4-4-91 was issued removing the petitioner from the post of Chairman of the Board in purported exercise of power under Section 10 (7) of the Act on the ground that the petitioner had been acting in a manner which adversely affected the interest of the Board. By a Notification of the same date Dr. S D. N. Singh was appointed as Chairman of the Board in place of the petitioner. In paragraph 24 of the writ petition the petitioner has stated that Sri Ram Chandra Purve, Cabinet Minister In-charge, Secondary Education, who is respondent no. 4 in the writ petition, had his own malicious reasons to remove the petitioner from the post of Chairman because the petitioner had not obliged him in the matter of selection of his favourite candidates. It has further been alleged in paragraph 25 of the writ petition that the petitioner was being pressurized by the politicians including some Cabinet Ministers to select their favourite candidates for the post of teachers, etc. and for promotion to the post of Headmaster. Since the petitioner could not oblige such politicians and did not succumb to their pressures, he earned their wrath and was made the target for victimization. The petitioner has annexed as Annexure-11 series some of the letters addressed to him by respondent no. 4 Sri Ram Chandra Purve. Similarly the petitioner has annexed as Annexure-12 series, letters written by the other Ministers, such as Sri Suryadeo Rai, Minister of State for Excise. The petitioner has annexed as Annexure-11 series some of the letters addressed to him by respondent no. 4 Sri Ram Chandra Purve. Similarly the petitioner has annexed as Annexure-12 series, letters written by the other Ministers, such as Sri Suryadeo Rai, Minister of State for Excise. He has annexed as Annexure-13 series other letters written to him by other Ministers bringing pressure upon him to oblige their candidates. The case of the petitioner is that on account of political pressure exerted by the politicians upon the Chief Minister and the Cabinet Minister in-charge, Secondary Education, who was also biased against the petitioner for personal reasons, the Chief Minister without appreciating the provisions of law and without reaching an objective satisfaction about the facts and circumstances of the case, ordered for the issuance of the impugned orders (Annexures 9 and 10) where under the petitioner was removed from office and respondent no. 5 was appointed in his place. 15. The petitioner has challenged the impugned Notification on several grounds to which I shall refer later. 16. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State it has been stated that the petitioner immediately after joining the Board, decided to shift the office of the Board to another premises on a monthly rental of Rs. 16.000/- as against Rs. 8000/- being paid earlier. He drew a cheque on 16-2-1991 for a sum of Rs. 1,00000/- and paid the same by way of advance for furnishing the new premises. Moreover, the Government received complaints from large number of candidates that the interviews conducted by the petitioner were a farce, inasmuch as the petitioner used to call 150 candidates for interview each day and the procedure was not followed properly. Only the formality of calling candidates for interview was adopted and no questions to test the merit of the candidates were ever asked. Only formal queries were made from each candidate even some of the experts who had been members of the interview board complained to the Government that in course of inter view they were not permitted by the Chairman even to put questions to the candidates. If any expert wanted to put a question to the candidate he was shabbily treated by the Chairman. They also reported that the Chairman only asked questions relating to the caste and community of the candidates. If any expert wanted to put a question to the candidate he was shabbily treated by the Chairman. They also reported that the Chairman only asked questions relating to the caste and community of the candidates. The behavior of the Chairman with some candidates was indecent. The candidates were never allowed to remain before the Board for more than two minutes. Copies of some of the complaints have been annexed as Annexure-A of the counter affidavit. Apart from such complaints, even the members of the Board were thoroughly dissatisfied with the manner in which the petitioner was functioning. One of the members, namely, Mrs. Saroj Bala Sinha, who had been appointed along with the petitioner, complained that the petitioner did not have any discussion with the members of the Board regarding the procedure to be adopted at the interviews, nor did he consult the members in the matter of selection of candidates. In fact, he did not even consider it necessary to obtain the signatures of the members on the final list prepared by the Board. Selections were not fair and proper since as many as 150 candidates were called for interview in a day, which was not proper for judging the ability of the candidates. Similarly, another member of the Board Dr. P. Lakra by his letter dated 28.3.91 reported to the Government that though he had joined as a member of the Board on 16.2.1991, the petitioner had placed certain papers before him for his signature which related to some decisions which had been taken by the Board prior to his joining. This created a very embarrassing situation for him. The letters of these two members have been annexed as Annexures B and B/1. The Government, therefore had information that the interviews were not being conducted fairly and that the procedure followed was improper, arbitrary and perfunctory, particularly in view of the fact that 30 marks out of 100 were awarded for personal interview. The interviews were conducted in such a manner that the Board could not inspire confidence of the candidates. Having received such complaints regarding misbehavior of the Chairman with the experts and members, the Government came to the conclusion that the manner in which the petitioner was working was not conducive nor was it in the interest of the Board. The interviews were conducted in such a manner that the Board could not inspire confidence of the candidates. Having received such complaints regarding misbehavior of the Chairman with the experts and members, the Government came to the conclusion that the manner in which the petitioner was working was not conducive nor was it in the interest of the Board. It appears that the petitioner had invited applications for appointment of teachers of various schools where plus 2 course was being taught. The Government informed the petitioner by letter dated 18.2.1991 that in such schools posts of lecturers had been created only in four subjects, namely, Physics, Chemistry, Maithili and Ancient History. Since other posts had been created, no panel should be prepared in regard to subjects other than the four mentioned above. Despite the clear instruction of the Government the petitioner took a decision to call candidates for interview for selection of lecturers in the subject of Geography as well. Similarly the petitioner had enhanced the application fee and interview fee to Rs. 25/- and Rs 100/- respectively. In view of the fact that such fee was being collected and applications had been asked for even for subjects for which was no requisition from the Government, a sum of Rs. 100000/- was collected by the Board. Even if the fee was collected at the old rate, a sum of Rs. 10,00000/- could have been realized and another expenses of Board. The State Government grants a sum of Rs. 6,00000/- for meeting the expenses relating to the salary of staff. This grant had not been made since criminal cases were pending against the earlier Chairman and the members. However, since the petitioner joined the fund was made available and a sum of Rs. 5,00000/- was immediately released for payment of salary to the staff etc in fact, the petitioner had paid a sum of Rs 2,04,000/- towards salary to the staff. 17. In view of the above circumstances and having regard to the fact that the manner in which interviews were being conducted, and the affairs of the Board mismanaged, candidates could have no faith in the Board. 17. In view of the above circumstances and having regard to the fact that the manner in which interviews were being conducted, and the affairs of the Board mismanaged, candidates could have no faith in the Board. The Government was left with no choice but to remove the petitioner immediately because otherwise he would have held a meeting of the Board for selection on 18.4.1991 causing harassment to a large number of candidates and creating embarrassment for the Government by making recommendations. In these circumstances, the State Government in exercise of its authority under the Act decided to remove the petitioner. A counter-affidavit has also been filed on behalf of respondent no. 5, who has been appointed as Chairman of the Board in place of the petitioner under Annexure-10. In his counter affidavit the aforesaid respondent has asserted the fact that he has taken over as Chairman of the Board with effect from 4th April, 1991 and has been working as the Chairman of the Board ever since. He has also supported the allegations in the counter affidavit of the State and has submitted that the Government was justified in removing the petitioner from the post of Chairman of the Board. 18. A rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the petitioner in which has sought to justify the decision taken by him to shift the office of the Board to the new premises on a higher rent. The petitioner has also justified his conduct and has justified his actions. The facts stated in the rejoinder affidavit will be considered later, if necessary. 19. One fact which I may notice at the threshold is that in none of the writ petitions the petitioner has prayed for declaring unconstitutional any of the provisions of the Act. Though it has been stated in the writ petition, that the provisions of the Act are arbitrary, no specific relief has been asked for to declare any of the provisions of the Act as unconstitutional. The petitioners have mainly prayed for setting aside the orders removing them from office and other consequential reliefs. 20. Sri Ganesh Prasad Singh, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2631 of 1991 has urged before us four main submissions. The petitioners have mainly prayed for setting aside the orders removing them from office and other consequential reliefs. 20. Sri Ganesh Prasad Singh, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2631 of 1991 has urged before us four main submissions. He submitted firstly, that sub-section (7) of section 10 of the Act, if interpreted to confer an absolute power upon the State Government without any limitation, was arbitrary and unreasonable. He submitted that to save the Act from the vice of invalidity, the principles of natural justice should be read into the provisions, so that before any action is taken by the State Government under sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act, the person concerned must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. Secondly, he submitted that the doctrine of pleasure was applicable only to the cases of Government servants public servants employed under the State but did not apply to persons who were not employed by the State holding a civil post but were statutory authorities, such as the Chairman of the Board, in the instant case. Thirdly, he submitted that even if it is assumed that the doctrine of pleasure applied to the case of the petitioner there being no guideline for exercise of such power so as to provide a safeguard against arbitrary exercise of such power, the provision was arbitrary and unreasonable providing for absolute power to remove the Chairman of the Board. Such power could be exercised even without affording to the person concerned an opportunity of being heard in the matter. He lastly submitted that the order was tainted with malice both in fact and in law. 21. Mr. Chandra Shekhar, Senior Advocate, appearing for the petitioner in C.W.J.C No. 7059 of 1990 contended that in the in stunt case the pleasure theory was not applicable, because the petition had been removed on certain grounds, even though he had been appointed for a particular term. Assuming that it was open for the State Government to appoint the petitioner to hold office during the pleasure of the State Government the State Government having not exercised that power, and having appointed the petitioner for a fixed term of three years, the doctrine of pleasure could not apply in the instant case. Assuming that it was open for the State Government to appoint the petitioner to hold office during the pleasure of the State Government the State Government having not exercised that power, and having appointed the petitioner for a fixed term of three years, the doctrine of pleasure could not apply in the instant case. He secondly submitted that since the State Government purported to remove the petitioner on the ground that he had acted in a manner pre judicial to the interest of the Board, that action had to be justified, and it must be established before the Court that the State Government had formed such an opinion on the basis of relevant materials. Thirdly, he submitted that the State Government was under a duty to exercise the power of removal judicially. Effect of stigma apart, principles of natural justice imply fair play in action. Therefore, if such power was sought to he exercised by the State Government, it ought to have afforded the petitioner a reasonable opportunity of being heard, whether the power exercised by the state Government was judicial or executive in nature. 22 Mr. B C. Ghosh, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.W.J.C. 4491 of 1990 contended that the petitioner had neither received the order nor the cheque said to have been sent to him. He therefore submitted that the services of the petitioner had not been validly terminated in accordance with law. He further submitted that personal allegations had been made against the Chief Minister (respondent no. 3), which had not been denied and, therefore it must be held that the allegations against the Chief Minister had been admitted, and, therefore, the action was wholly malafide He also submitted that section 10 (7) of the Act provided no guideline, nor the procedure, which must be followed before such power was exercised It was, therefore, arbitrary. He lastly contended that the doctrine of pleasure was not an absolute doctrine which had no limitation. He lastly contended that the doctrine of pleasure was not an absolute doctrine which had no limitation. The law is well settled that even the doctrine of pleasure is subject to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India 23 The learned Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State submitted that having regard to the legislative history of the enactment in question, it must be held that the requirement of the principles of natural justice cannot be read into the Act, because by necessary implication their application excluded. He, therefore, submitted that the action of the Government could not be challenged on the ground that it was in breach of the principles of natural justice. He submitted that the provisions of the Act were perfectly valid and constitutional and the Act laid down clear guidelines for the exercise of power under Section 10 (7) of the Act. He also submitted that the doctrine of pleasure is not confined to Civil servants who are governed by Articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution of India. He submitted that the doctrine of pleasure applied to other offices also held under the President of India, Governor of the State and the Central Government or the State Government as the case may be but the power must be exercised in a reasonable manner So as not to offend Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution 0f India. In the instant case, he contended that the Government had exercised its power under Section 10 (7) of the Act having regard to the guidelines provided in the Act itself and on the basis of satisfaction reached by its validity having regard to the materials available to it which were relevant for the purpose. In such a case if the Government had formed an opinion on the basis of the relevant materials, and the opinion formed by it was not perverse, the action of the Government could not be challenged in the instant writ petition. He urged that in the matter of appointment to the Board, most of the members and the Chairman are already employed under the State, except in the case of a person who was appointed after retirement in such cases, the service jurisprudence or Labour jurisprudence is not strictly applicable because of the nature of appointment. He urged that in the matter of appointment to the Board, most of the members and the Chairman are already employed under the State, except in the case of a person who was appointed after retirement in such cases, the service jurisprudence or Labour jurisprudence is not strictly applicable because of the nature of appointment. He lastly submitted that if the situation so warranted, it was open to the State to take immediate action in public interest. In doing so there was no question of arbitrariness, because there are no conditions of service which can be breached Atmost, if it is held that the principles of natural justice can be read into the Act, in appropriate cases a hearing may be given even after the action is taken, because delay in taking action may result in serious injury to public interest. 24. I shall first consider the submission urged on behalf of the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 2634 of 1991 that the doctrine of pleasure is not applicable to persons, who are not members of a public service or holders of a civil post within the contemplation of Article 310 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel elucidated that even if the law declares that such a person shall hold office during the pleasure of a designated authority, that law should be declared to be void and inapplicable, because according to him, the doctrine of pleasure shall apply only to cases governed by Article 310 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel relied upon two decisions in support of this proposition. He firstly referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram Deka Vs. North East Frontier Railway ( AIR 1964 SC 600 ) particularly paragraph 12 thereof. I find nothing in that decision to support the broad proposition formulated on behalf of the petitioner. It is no doubt true that in that case the Supreme Court was concerned with the provisions of Article 310 of the Constitution of India, but there is nothing in the decision to persuade us to hold that apart from civil posts covered by Article 310 of the Constitution the doctrine of pleasure shall not apply to the holder of any other post, even if the law so prescribes. 25. 25. The next decision relied upon by the learned counsel is that of a learned Single Judge in the case of R. P. Raja Vs State of Bihar (1987 P.L.J.R. 275). No doubt, the decision- supports the case of the petitioner, but I am of the view that the decision does not lay down the law correctly. We will briefly refer to the facts of that case and the law laid down by the learned Single Judge. The petitioner was appointed as the Chairman of Ranchi Regional Development Authority. The Ranchi Regional Development Authority was constituted under the Bihar Regional Development Authority Act, 1981 Sub-Section (7) of section 3 of the Act provided that the Chairman shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government. In the case of members of the Authority, however, sub-section (8) of Section 3 provided that they shall hold office for a term of three years from the date of their nomination. Section 5 provided the procedure for removal of members of the Authority and the grounds on which they could be removed. The proviso to section 5 provided that if the Government proposed to take action under sub-section (1), an opportunity of explanation shall be given to the member concerned and no such action shall be taken except after taking into consideration his explanation, if any, and after recording reasons in support of such action. The petitioner by Notification dated 13th June, 1985 was removed from the office of Chairman of the Authority. It was urged before the Court, interalia, that sub-section (7) of section 3 insofar as it provided for the Chairman holding office during the pleasure of the State Government was ultra vires. The submission was upheld. It was held that the doctrine of pleasure itself did not create anything, but merely conferred authority. The procedure for termination was to be found elsewhere and that there was unanimity in the matter of exercise of pleasure under Article 310 that it should be exercised in the manner indicated in Article 311 and not otherwise. By parity of reasoning it must be held that the pleasure mentioned in sub-section (7) of section 3 of the Act could only be exercised as laid down in Section 5 of the Act. By parity of reasoning it must be held that the pleasure mentioned in sub-section (7) of section 3 of the Act could only be exercised as laid down in Section 5 of the Act. The learned Judge also held that the pleasure theory cannot apply to the petitioner because it was a service concept and, therefore, it could not apply to the case of the petitioner, who was not a member of a public service nor the holder of civil post, but was appointed under the Act as the Chairman. Such a person could not be a Government servant. He, therefore, further held that sub-section (7) of Section 3 insofar as it made applicable to the case of Chairman the pleasure doctrine, was ultra vires. He observed that the pleasure is a constitutional privilege conferred on the Governor. There is nothing in the Constitution providing for the pleasure to non-service man, nor is pleasure a matter of legislative enactment either in the body of the Constitution or in the seventh schedule. The State has no authority to legislate on the pleasure of the Governor. The Governor's pleasure is what is stated in Article 310 of the Constitution and it cannot be taken away; so also it cannot be extended. 26. I fail to understand the basis for the proposition that the pleasure theory is a service concept and, therefore, cannot be made applicable to posts other than those contemplated by Article 310 of the Constitution. It is no doubt true that the doctrine of pleasure as incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution of India applies to members of the public Services or persons holding posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or States. The judgments of the Supreme Court in Moti Ram Deka (supra) as also in Union of India Vs. Tulsi Ram ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) were rendered in cases where Article 311 applied since those cases related to persons who were governed by the provisions of Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution, The observations of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be understood in the light of these important facts. Tulsi Ram ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) were rendered in cases where Article 311 applied since those cases related to persons who were governed by the provisions of Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution, The observations of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be understood in the light of these important facts. But, there is nothing in the judgments of the Supreme Court to warrant the proposition that the doctrine of pleasure can never apply to any other persons holding any other office, other than those contemplated by Articles 309 and 310 of the Constitution. In fact, Articles 156 of the Constitution of India itself provides that the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. Undoubtedly, the Governor of a State is not one who is the holder of a civil post or a member of any public service within the contemplation of Article 310 of the Constitution of India. It cannot therefore, be said that the doctrine of pleasure can never apply to any person who is not holding a post contemplated by Article 310 of the Constitution of India. In fact the learned Advocate General brought to our notice several legislations enacted by the Parliament as well as State Legislatures which incorporate the doctrine of pleasure. I shall later refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court as well where such a provision was noticed and applied. 27. The doctrine of pleasure has its origin in distant history. It originated in a society with vastly different values than those that exist in the present day society. It is not codified, and obviously it is futile to attempt to state the doctrine with precision or scientific exactitude. It originated at a time, and in a society, where the monarch was absolute in the true sense of the term. Democratic rights had not come into existence. Under the Anglo Saxon system all offices were held during the pleasure of the king and later the crown. The occupants of the office could claim no right to hold the office unless the crown so desired. At one time even the Prime Minister of England held the office at the pleasure of the King. With the march of history and the evolution of the democratic process, the doctrine was first regulated and then curtailed in its application. The occupants of the office could claim no right to hold the office unless the crown so desired. At one time even the Prime Minister of England held the office at the pleasure of the King. With the march of history and the evolution of the democratic process, the doctrine was first regulated and then curtailed in its application. The conventions of the British Constitution did limit the prerogative of the Crown and so it was that the pleasure doctrine lost its pristing glory when the Parliament of the people asserted its right to have a Prime Minister who enjoyed the confidence of the majority in Parliament, rather than one who enjoyed the king's favour. Similarly, in the field of service law, Parliamentary enactments regulated and curtailed the application of the doctrine in its rigorous form. 28. The doctrine of pleasure is recognized by the Indian Constitution. It finds recognition in Article 310 of the Constitution. But as held in Moti Ram Deka's case Article 310 has to be read subject to Article 311. Thus, the doctrine cannot apply contrary to the mandate of Article 311, the provisions whereof are absolute and paramount in the field covered by them Article 311 imposes qualification on the exercise of such pleasure, and therefore, the English Common Law Rule has not been adopted by the Constitution in its entirety and with all its rigorous implication. Articles 309 to 311 of the Constitution deal with persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or the States. From this it does not follow that the doctrine cannot be applied by the Legislature to persons who hold other offices, though they are not appointed to a public service or posts contemplated by Article 310 of the Constitution. Indeed, as earlier noticed, the Constitution itself makes the doctrine applicable to the office of Governor of a State, since in terms Article 156 provides that the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. The Governor holds a constitutional office and is not a public servant. 29. Indeed, as earlier noticed, the Constitution itself makes the doctrine applicable to the office of Governor of a State, since in terms Article 156 provides that the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. The Governor holds a constitutional office and is not a public servant. 29. I, therefore, find myself unable to subscribe to the view that the doctrine of pleasure is applicable only to members of public service on the basis that it is a service concept, and despite dear categoric legislative intendment as expressed through a law enacted by it, it cannot be made applicable to other offices, which are not within the contemplation of Article 310 of the Constitution of India. I, therefore, hold that the judgment of this Court reported in 1987 PLJR 275 to this extent does not lay down the law correctly and must be overruled. I hold that there is nothing to inhibit the legislature to enact a law which applies the doctrine of pleasure to any other office, other than those contemplated by Article 310 of the Constitution of India. The doctrine of pleasure is not confined to Article 310 of the Constitution, and in appropriate cases the legislature has the legislative competence to apply it to other posts. 30. I should not be understood to mean that the doctrine of pleasure will apply ipso facto to all offices, but it is open to the legislature to apply the doctrine in given cases. The law may itself impose qualification on exercise of such pleasured and lay down the guidelines and procedural safeguards that it may deem proper. The power so conferred by law may be challenged in a given case on the ground that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. But once the law passes the test of Article 14 of the Constitution, it cannot be impugned on the ground of legislative competence, namely, that the legislature could not apply the doctrine of pleasure to those who hold other offices or posts which are not civil posts within the contemplation of Article 310 of the Constitution of India. 31. We Also find that the judgment In Raja's case is in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme Court in D.C. Saxena Vs. State of Haryana ( AIR 1987 SC 1463 ). 31. We Also find that the judgment In Raja's case is in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme Court in D.C. Saxena Vs. State of Haryana ( AIR 1987 SC 1463 ). In that case the appellant D.C. Saxena was appointed as Chairman of Haryana School Board of Examination under the provision or Haryana Board of School Examination Act. Section 4A of the Act provided that Chairman, Vice-Chairman and members of the Board shall hold office during the pleasure of the State Government. Section 9 of the Act provided for the power to remove members. It was provided that if in the opinion of the State Government the continuance in office of any person as a member is not in the interest of the Board the State Government may, in consultation with the Board, make an order removing such person from such membership. The proviso, however, made it obligatory for the State Government to communicate to the member concerned the reasons for his proposed removal, and to pass an order of removal only after giving an opportunity to such member to tender an explanation in writing. The appellant was removed from office by order dated 8.6.86 which did not disclose any particular reason for his removal. The order only said that the Governor of Haryana was pleased to curial the tenure of office of Dr. D. C. Saxena as Chairman of the Board with immediate effect. It may be noticed that by reason of this order appellant Saxena ceased to function as Chairman of the Board even though his term of two years had not expired. An argument was advanced before the Supreme Court that the procedure laid down in Section 9 was not followed and that this omission rendered the removal of the appellant is bad. The Court held as follows :- “The contention that S. 9 has been violated is wholly without force because, in our opinion, S.9 does not come into play at all in this case. The Court held as follows :- “The contention that S. 9 has been violated is wholly without force because, in our opinion, S.9 does not come into play at all in this case. It is apparent, on all comparison of the terms of S. 4A and S.9 that while the former deals with the general power of the State Government to terminate the tenure of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and member, the latter carves out a special field dealing with a category of cases where the State Government may remove a member whose continuance in office is not in the interest of the Board. A case falling within S.9 is a case where removal must be for reasons personal to the Member and flow from his conduct or such other factor which requires that, in the interest of justice and fair play, he should be given an opportunity to tender an explanation. In the view that S.9 carves out a special field, S. 4A left with an abridged scope. So abridged it deals with cases other than those where the continuance of a member calls for termination in the interest of the Board and requires that such member be given an opportunity of tendering an explanation before such removal. S. 4A can be said to include cases where the tenure of a Chairman, Vice-Chairman or a member is liable to terminate on grounds of general policy.” 32. It is true that in that case the constitutional validity of Section 4A was not challenged, but what is significant is that the doctrine of pleasure was incorporated in the Act, even in regard to an office which was not a civil post within the meaning of Article 310 of the Constitution of India and that doctrine applied. 33. The learned Advocate General rightly submitted that the doctrine of pleasure is not inconsistent with appointment for a fixed term. He submitted that both can co-exist, and laid great emphasis on the provision of Article 156 of the Constitution of India, which provides not only that the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President, but further provides that subject to the pleasure doctrine, the Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office. Obviously, therefore, the term of five years is subject to the pleasure of the President and the President may before the expiry of that term dismiss the Governor or remove him from office. The Presidents pleasure in the matter of removal of a Governor is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution, and apparently does not appear to be subject to the rule of natural justice. Since the Governor holds office at the pleasure of the President, he need not assign any reasons. 34. In the instant case, however, we are not concerned with the absolute doctrine of pleasure, because having regard to the provisions of the Act with which we are concerned, the pleasure has been exercised only in the manner provided by the law. It was rightly contended by Sri Chandra Shekhar in CWJC No. 7059 of 1990 that in the instant case the State Government appointed the petitioner for a period of three years. His appointment was terminated before the expiry of that period on one of the ground mentioned in the Act. The question which has to be answered in these writ petitions is whether the termination of the appointment before the expiry of the term of three years is valid. I shall advert to this aspect of the matter later. But I will at this stage deal with the submission urged on behalf of the petitioners in all these writ petitions that since the appointments were terminated prematurely in breach of the principles of natural justice, the notifications terminating the appointments are bad in law. In one form or the other, all the petitioners have contended that the order has been passed in breach of the principles of natural Justice. Even if the Act did not provided for an opportunity being given to the petitioners of being heard before their appointments were terminated, the State Government ought to have afforded to them such an opportunity in accordance with the law well-settled. The learned Advocate General replied by saying that the Act does not provide for giving of an opportunity to the petitioners of being heard before their appointment is terminated. He submitted that by necessary implication the law excludes the application of the principles of natural justice. The law must be tested as it is and without reading into the law the requirements of natural justice. He submitted that by necessary implication the law excludes the application of the principles of natural justice. The law must be tested as it is and without reading into the law the requirements of natural justice. He submitted that the action taken under the law does not become bad merely because the principles of natural justice have not been followed. It is open to contend that no injustice bas resulted even if those principles are not followed having regard to the larger public interest. 35. In view of the submission urged before us, I shall first deal with the legislative history of the enactment, because it is the submission of the Advocate General that having regard to the earlier Ordinance, which was later replaced by the Act, the legislature by necessary intendment has excluded the applicability of the principles of natural justice. 36. Board was first established under the provisions of Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management and Control) Ordinance, 1980. Section 10 of the Ordinance is significant and relevant portion of which is reproduced below:- “10. Establishment and function of School Service Board : (1) The State Government shall by notification in the official gazette establish a Board to be called the School Service Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) from a date to be appointed by the State Government. (2) The Board shall be a corporate body having perpetual succession and common seal and shall sue and be sued by that name. (3) The Board shall have chairman and four members who shall be appointed by the State Government. (4) Amongst the Chairman and the members of the Board there shall be one member who possess a teaching experience of not less than 10 years in any University and one who possess administrative experience for not less than 10 years under the central or the State Government and one who have at-least 10 years experience of administration and inspection of Secondary Schools under the central or the State government. Amongst the Chairman and members there shall be one member of the Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. (5) The pay of the Chairman of the Board shall be Rs. 2500/- per month and that of the member shall be Rs. 2250/- per month. Their other terms and conditions of service shall be as such as may be determined by the State Government. (5) The pay of the Chairman of the Board shall be Rs. 2500/- per month and that of the member shall be Rs. 2250/- per month. Their other terms and conditions of service shall be as such as may be determined by the State Government. (6) The term of the office of .he Chairman and members of the Board shall be three years from the date they take charge of their office. On expiry of the said period the State Government may extend their term but the total period of such term of office shall not exceed six years. (7) If the State Government is satisfied that the Chairman or any member of the Board is incapable of working or refuses to work or work in a manner which in the opinion of the State Government is detrimental to the interest of the Board the State Government may by notification in the official gazette remove the Chairman or such member from his office at any time. Provided that before issue of such notification the State Government shall give the Chairman or Member a reasonable opportunity to show cause why be should not be removed.” 37. The Ordinance was replaced by the Bihar Non-Government Secondary Schools (Taking Over of Management & Control) Act, 1981 (Act No. 33 of 1982). Though the other provisions remained substantially the same, in the Act significant changes were brought about in sub section (6) and (7), Sub-section 10 of the Act provided (translation from vernacular):- “The term of office of the Chairman and members of the Board shall be time years from they take charge of their office or during the pleasure of the State Government. On expiry of the said period the State Government may extend the term of the Chairman or any member of the Board but the total period of such term of office shall not exceed six years. On expiry of the said period the State Government may extend the term of the Chairman or any member of the Board but the total period of such term of office shall not exceed six years. Sub-Section (7) of the Act provided as follows :- “If the State Government is satisfied that the Chairman or any member of the Board is incapable of working, or refuses to work, or work in a manner which, in the opinion of the State Government is detrimental to the interest of the Board, then the State Government by issuance of a notification in the Official Gazette at any time remove such Chairman or member by giving him one month's written notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice with effect from the date mentioned in the Notification. 38. It will, therefore, be apparent that in sub section (6) for the first time the doctrine of pleasure was incorporated. In subsection (7) the Act provided that the State Government, if it was satisfied about the events mentioned in that sub-section, could remove the Chairman or any member of the Board by giving him one month's notice or one months pay in lieu of notice. Earlier, the Ordinance provided that before issuance of such Notification the State Govt. shall give the Chairman or the member, a reasonable opportunity to show cause why he should not be removed. The Legislature was aware of the provisions of the Ordinance which incorporated a rule of natural justice. While replacing the Ordinance with the Act, the legislature deliberately deleted the provision relating to giving of reasonable opportunity to show cause to the Chairman or member concerned. To me, it appears that the legislature deliberately omitted the provision sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Ordinance and in its place substituted the giving of One month's notice or one month's pay in lieu of notice. By this deliberate change the Legislature has consciously deleted the provision in the Ordinance with regard to the application of the rule of natural justice. 39. By this deliberate change the Legislature has consciously deleted the provision in the Ordinance with regard to the application of the rule of natural justice. 39. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in C.W.J.C. No. 4491 of 1990 submitted that the Ordinance promulgated by the Governor could not be equated with the law enacted by the Legislature and, therefore, on the basis of the changes made in the Act it could not be contended that the Legislature deliberately omitted to incorporate the principles of natural justice in the Act. I find it difficult to accept this submission. An Ordinance is also a law and when such Ordinance is sought to be replaced by an Act, the Legislature must be deemed to be aware of the existence of the Ordinance and the provisions thereof. Where in all other respects the provisions remained substantially the same, but only in some respects significant changes were brought about, it cannot be said that the Legislature did not intend what it enacted. Under the Ordinance there was a specific provision that before a Chairman or the members of the Board was removed, they must be given an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. In the Act, that was deleted, and in its place it was provided that they shall be entitled to one month's notice or one mouth's pay in lieu of notice. The departure from the Ordinance is deliberate and the legislative intendment clear. 40. I have, therefore, no doubt incoming to the conclusion that the Legislature deliberately omitted to incorporate the principles of natural justice in sub-section (7) of Section 10 of the Act, because it intended to exclude the operation of that principle in the matter of removal of Chairman and members of the Board. The law in this regard is well settled. The classic exposition of the law can be found in Union of India Vs. J.N Sinha ( AIR 1971 SC 40 ). The oft quoted passage reads as follows: - “Fundamental Rule 56(j) in terms does not require that any opportunity should be given to the concerned Govt. servant to show cause against his compulsory retirement. A Government servant serving under the Union of India holds his office at the pleasure of the President as provided in Article 310 of the Constitution. The oft quoted passage reads as follows: - “Fundamental Rule 56(j) in terms does not require that any opportunity should be given to the concerned Govt. servant to show cause against his compulsory retirement. A Government servant serving under the Union of India holds his office at the pleasure of the President as provided in Article 310 of the Constitution. But this 'pleasure' doctrine is subject to the rules or law made under Article 309 as well as to the conditions prescribed under Art 311. Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. A observed by this Court in Kraipak V. Union of India. AIR 1970 SC 150 , 'the aim of rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage or justice These rules can operate only in areas not cove• red by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law but supplement it. It is true that if a statutory provision can be read consistently with the principle of natural justice, the Courts should do so because it must be presumed that the legislatures and the statuary authorities intend to act in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But, if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principles of natural justice then the Court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of a power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power.” 41. The law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. J. N. Sinha has been consistently followed in all subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and, therefore, the law is well settled. We need not refer to all the authorities cited at the Bar, but we are tempted to refer to some of them only. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. J. N. Sinha has been consistently followed in all subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court and, therefore, the law is well settled. We need not refer to all the authorities cited at the Bar, but we are tempted to refer to some of them only. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills Vs. Union of India: (1981) 1 Supreme Court Cases 664, It has been observed as follows :- “The rules of natural justice can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. They can supplement the law but cannot supplant it (Per Hedge, J. in A.K. Kraipak). If a statutory provision either specifically or by inevitable implication excludes the application of the rules of natural justice, then the court can not ignore the mandate of the Legislature. Whether or not the application of the principles of natural justice in a given case has been excluded, wholly or in part, in the exercise of statutory power, depends upon the language and basic scheme of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power, the purpose for which it is conferred and the effect of the exercise of that power (see Union of India Vs. Col. J. N. Sinha)”. More recently in AIR 1991 SC 101 , the judgment of the Supreme Court in J. N. Sinha's case has been noticed with approval. It was observed ;- “It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or of recasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It is essentially used, firstly, for saving a statute from being struck down on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension of the principle that when two interpretations are possible one rendering it constitutional and the other making it unconstitutional, the former should be preferred. The unconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetence of the legislature to enact the statute or from the violation of any of the provisions of the Constitution. The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible together the intentions of the legislature from the object of the statute, the context in which the provisions occur and the purpose for which it is made. The second situation which summons its aid is where the provisions of the statute are vague and ambiguous and it is possible together the intentions of the legislature from the object of the statute, the context in which the provisions occur and the purpose for which it is made. However, when the provision cast in a definite and unambiguous language and its intention is dear, it is not permissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting is in accord with good reason and conscience. In such circumstances, it is not possible for the Court to remake the statute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to the legislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if the remaking of the statute by the Court is to lead to its distortion that course is to be scrupulously avoided. One of the situations further where the doctrine can never be caned into play is where the statute requires an extensive additions and deletions. Not only it is no part of the court's duty to undertake such exercise, but it is beyond its jurisdiction to do so. 42. Having regard to the settled position in law and the legislative history of the Act with which we are concerned in the instant cases, I have no doubt that the Legislature by necessary implication excluded the application of the principles of natural justice in cases of removal of Chairman and members of the Board. It is not, therefore, possible to lead into the Act the principles of natural justice and to say that even if the Act did not provide for affording a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the Chairman or member concerned, we should presume as a matter of interpretation that the law did not prohibit it and, therefore, read into the Act the principles of natural justice. The submission must, therefore, be rejected and it must be held that the Act must be tested as it is, and without reading into the Act the principles of natural justice with a view to save it from the vice of invalidity. I am, therefore, not referring to the large number of authorities cited at the bar in support of the contention that the principles of natural justice are attracted not only to judicial or quasi-judicial actions, but also to administrative actions. I am, therefore, not referring to the large number of authorities cited at the bar in support of the contention that the principles of natural justice are attracted not only to judicial or quasi-judicial actions, but also to administrative actions. The law is well settled but where the legislature excludes the application of the rule by express provision or by necessary implication, it is not open to the Court to ignore the legislative mandate and read into the law that which the legislature never wanted to be read as a part of the law. 43. I shall now consider the submission urged on behalf of the petitioners that subsection (7) of Section 3 (10) of the Act is ultra vires, since it confers upon the State Government the arbitrary power of removal which is uncontrolled and unguided. The challenge is also on the ground that the provision is arbitrary, because the action of removal contemplated by the section is in breach of the principles of natural justice and the person removed has no opportunity of representing his case before the State Government before his removal is notified. I have earlier quoted subsection (7) of Section 3 (10). The removal of the Chairman or the members of the Board is permitted on three grounds, namely, where the Chairman or any member is incapable of working or refused to work, or works in a manner which in the opinion of the State Government is detrimental to the interest of the Board. Before issuing a notification under sub-section (7) the State Government must be satisfied that the conditions for the exercise of power are satisfied. It is well settled that even where an action is justified on the subjective satisfaction of an authority, the circumstances On the basis of which the action is taken must first be objectively established. Once the existence of the circumstance is established, it has next to be seen as to whether those circumstances are relevant, having regard to the action taken. The only other enquiry permissible in such cases is to see whether the action taken is not malafide or perverse. If the circumstances are objectively established and the action is not malafide, the sufficiency of the material on the basis of which action is taken is beyond judicial scrutiny. The only other enquiry permissible in such cases is to see whether the action taken is not malafide or perverse. If the circumstances are objectively established and the action is not malafide, the sufficiency of the material on the basis of which action is taken is beyond judicial scrutiny. Sub-section (7) of section 3 (10) provides that• the power of removal of a Chairman or member of the Board can be exercised only in three circumstances. It can be exercised when such a Chairman or member becomes incapable of working. This will obviously apply to cases where a person incurs incapacity whether physical or otherwise. The second situation contemplated is one where such a Chairman or member refuses to work. If it is found that the Chairman of the Board or any of its members has not been coming for work or refuses to perform the duties of his office, the Government if satisfied may remove him. The third event in which a Chairman or member of the Board may be removed is where the State Government is satisfied that he has been working in a manner which, in the opinion of the State Government, is detrimental to the interest of the Board. Before forming its opinion the Government has to consider the material which is available to come to a conclusion that the manner in which he has been working is detrimental to the interest of the Board. If the action of the Government is challenged, it may be required to produced that material and satisfy the Court that it had acted bonafide on the basis of relevant material. Since the section itself provided, for the circumstances in which the power of removal can be exercised by the State Government, it cannot be said that the power conferred by sub-section (7) of Section 3 (10) is unguided and arbitrary. The guidelines for exercise of the power have been laid down in the section itself by enumerating the ground on which such power can be exercised. 44. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi. Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) a similar contention was raised with regard to section 10 (3) (c) of the Passports Act, 1967. The guidelines for exercise of the power have been laid down in the section itself by enumerating the ground on which such power can be exercised. 44. In Smt. Maneka Gandhi. Vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) a similar contention was raised with regard to section 10 (3) (c) of the Passports Act, 1967. Sub-section (3) (c) of Section 10 of that Act provided that the passport authority may impound or cause to impound or revoke a passport or travel document, if he deemed it necessary so to do in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of India, friendly relations of India with another foreign country or in the interest of the general Public. In that case impounding of the passport was sought to be justified on the ground that such impounding was necessary in the interest of general public Section 10 (3) of the Act therefore, set out four grounds which could justify the making of an order impounding a passport. It was urged before the Supreme Court that section 10 (3) (c) conferred unguided and unfettered power on the passport authority to impound a passport and hence it was violative of equality clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution. It was urged that the interest of general public was too vague and indefinite to offer any real guidance to the passport authority and the passport authority could, without in any way violating the terms of the section impound the passport of one and not of at, another, at its discretion. The Court held that the words in the interest of general public have a clear well defined meaning and the Courts have often been called upon to decide whether a particular action is in the interest of general public or in the public interest and no difficulty has been experienced by the Courts in carrying out this exercise. It was, therefore, held that the Act provided sufficient guidelines and the power conferred on the passport authority to impound a passport could not be unguided or unfettered. Applying the same principles to the cases in hand it cannot be said that the Act confers upon the State Govt. an unfettered and unguided power. It does not confer upon the State Government the power to remove a Chairman or member of the Board without saying anything else. Applying the same principles to the cases in hand it cannot be said that the Act confers upon the State Govt. an unfettered and unguided power. It does not confer upon the State Government the power to remove a Chairman or member of the Board without saying anything else. The power is coupled with the duty to act only in given circumstances, and only if the State Govt. is satisfied about the existence of those circumstances the power call be exercised. The circumstances in which the power can be exercised are quite clear and unambiguous and provide a sufficient guide to the State Government in the exercise of that power. When such power is exercised, it is always open to anyone to challenge the same on the ground that the power has not been exercised in accordance with the Act or that the order has been passed malafide. There is therefore, sufficient safeguard against arbitrary invasion of rights of Chairman or member of the Board. I find that sub-section (7) of Section 3(10) does not confer unfettered, unguided and arbitrary powers on the State Govt. but provides the guidelines for the exercise of such power. The sub-section is, therefore, not ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is a different matter that the power may not be exercised in accordance with the mandate of the law, but in that event the aggrieved party may seek his remedy before a court of law by challenging the action, and not the law itself. The submission, therefore, that sub-section (7) of section 3(10) is ultra vires on the ground that it gives unguided and unfettered powers to the State Government to remove a member or Chairman, must be rejected. 45. The next aspect of the submission may now be considered, namely, whether sub section (7) of Section 3(10) is ultra vires and must be stuck down because it excludes the applicability of the principles of natural justice. As was observed in J.N. Sinha's case (supra) rules of natural justice are not embodied rules nor can they be elevated to the position of fundamental rights. In that case the Court was considering the validity of Rule 56(j) of the fundamental Rules relating to compulsory retirement. The Court came to the conclusion that the Rules excluded the application of the Rules of natural justice. In that case the Court was considering the validity of Rule 56(j) of the fundamental Rules relating to compulsory retirement. The Court came to the conclusion that the Rules excluded the application of the Rules of natural justice. The Court then observed :- “Now coming to the express words of Fundamental Rule 56(j), it says that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a Government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The right conferred on the appropriate authority is an absolute one. That power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. If that authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before Courts. It. is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral, grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision.” In Smt. Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India (supra) the Court observed: “Now it is true that since the right to prior notice and opportunity of hearing arises only by implication from the duty to act fairly, or to use the words of Lord Morris of Borth-Y-Gest, from fair play in action it may equally be excluded where, having regard to the nature of the action to be taken, its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provision, fairness in action does not demand its implication and. even warrants its exclusion. There are certain well recognized exceptions to the audi alteram partern rule established by judicial decisions and they are summarised by S. A. de Smith in Judicial Review of Administrative Act, 2nd Edn. at pages 168 to 179. If we analyse these exceptions a little closely, it will be apparent that they do not in any way militate against the principle which requires fair play in administrative action. The word 'exception' is really a misnomer because in these exclusionary cases, the audi alterarn partern rule is held inapplicable not by way of an exception to 'fair play in action' but because nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case." 46. The word 'exception' is really a misnomer because in these exclusionary cases, the audi alterarn partern rule is held inapplicable not by way of an exception to 'fair play in action' but because nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case." 46. I am also tempted to refer to the observations in the dissenting judgment of O. Chinappa Reddy, J, in Swadeshi Cotton Mills (supra) since those observations are apt to the present circumstances, and acquire significance in view of the observations later in Tulsi Ram Patel's case to which I shall refer later. Justice Chinnappa Reddy observed:- “Where authority functions under a statute and the statute provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner and in no other. No wider right than that provided by statute can be claimed nor can the right be narrowed. Where the statute is silent about the observance of the principles of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance with the principles of natural justice. The implication of natural justice being presumptive it may be excluded by express words of statute or by necessary intendment. Where the conflict is between the public interest and the private interest, the presumption must necessarily be weak and may therefore, be readily displaced. The presumption is also weak where what are involved are mere property rights. In cases of urgency, particularly where the public interest is involved, pre-emptive action may be a strategic necessity. There may then be no question of observing natural justice......Natural justice, like Ultra Vires and Public Policy, is a branch of the public law and is a formidable weapon which can be welded to secure justice to the citizen. It is productive of great good as well as much mischief. While it may be used to protect certain fundamental liberties, civil and political rights it may be used, as indeed it is used more often than not, to protect vested interests and to obstruct the path of progressive change. In the context of modern welfare legislation, the time has perhaps come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, and natural justice in its application to vested interests...... In the context of modern welfare legislation, the time has perhaps come to make an appropriate distinction between natural justice in its application to fundamental liberties, civil and political rights, and natural justice in its application to vested interests...... The exclusion of natural justice, where such exclusion is not express, has to be implied by reference to the subject, the statute and the statutory situation. 47, In Union of India Vs. Tulsi Ram Patel ( AIR 1985 SC 1416 ) the Court was called upon to consider the pre• visions (If the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 of the Constitution, which dispensed with the enquiry in cases covered by that proviso. In that context it was observed :- “It is, however, as much in public interest and for public good that government servants who are inefficient, dishonest or corrupt or have become a security risk should not continue in service and that the protection afforded to them by the Acts and Rules made under Article 309 and by Article 311 be not abused by them to the deteriment of public interest and public good. When a situation as envisaged in one of the three clauses of the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 arises and the relevant clause is properly applied and the disciplinary inquiry dispensed with the concerned Government servant cannot be heard to complain that he is deprived of his livelihood. The Livelihood of an individual is a matter of great concern to him and his family but his livelihood is a matter of his private interest and where such livelihood is provided by the public exchequer and the taking away of such livelihood is in the public interest and for public good the former must yield to the latter. These consequences follow not because the pleasure doctrine is a special prerogative of the British Crown which has been inherited by India and transposed into our Constitution, adopted to suit, the Constitutional set up of our Republic but because public policy requires public interest and needs public good demands that there should be such a doctrine......Not only, therefore, can the principles of natural justice be modified but in exceptional cases they can even be excluded. There are well defined exceptions to the nemo judex in causa sua rule as also the audialteram partem rule. There are well defined exceptions to the nemo judex in causa sua rule as also the audialteram partem rule. The nemo judex in cause sua rule is susject to the doctrine of necessity and yields to it as pointed out by this Court in J. Mohapatra & Co. V. State of Orissa (1985) 1 SCR 322 , 334-5 : ( AIR 1984 SC 1572 , 1576) So far as the audi alteram partem rule is concerned both in England and in India, it is well established that where a right to a prior notice and an opportunity to be heard before an order is passed would obstruct the taking of prompt action, such a right can be excluded. This right can also be excluded where the nature of the action to be taken its object and purpose and the scheme of the relevant statutory provisions warrant its exclusion, nor can the alteram partem rule be invoked if importing it would have the effect of paralyzing the administrative process or where the need for promptitude or the urgency of taking action so demands, as pointed out in Menaka Gandhi's case at page 681 (of 1978) 2 SCR 621: AIR 1978 SC 597 at P. 629). If legislation and the necessities of a situation can exclude the principles of natural justice including the audi alteram partem rule, a fortioriso can a provision for a Constitutional provision has a far greater and all pervading sanctity than a statutory provision. In the present case, clause (2) of Article 311 is expressly excluded by the opening words of the second proviso and particularly its keywords this clause shall not apply, As pointed out above, clause (2) of Article 311 embodies in express words the audi alteram partem rule. This principle of natural justice having been expressly excluded by a Constitutional provision namely, the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311, there is no scope for reintroducing it by a side door to provide once again the same inquiry which the Constitutional provision has expressly prohibited, Where a clause of the second proviso is applied on an extraneous ground or a ground having no relation to the situation envisaged in that clause, the action in so applying it would be mala fide, and, therefore, void. In such a case the invalidating factor may be referable to Article 14. In such a case the invalidating factor may be referable to Article 14. This is, however, the only scope which Article 14 can have in relation to the second proviso, but to hold that once the second proviso; is properly applied and clause (2) of Article 311 excluded, Article 14 will Step in to take the place of clauses (2) would be to nullify the effect of the opening words of the second proviso and thus frustrate the intention of the makers of the Constitution. The second proviso is based on publicly and is in public interest and for public interest and for public good and the Constitution makers, who inserted it in Article 311 (2), were the best persons to decide whether such an exclusionary provision should be there and the situations in which this provision should apply.” 48. In view of the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court it can not be said as a general proposition that by mere exclusion of the rule of natural justice, the legislation will incur invalidity. It all depends on the scheme of the relevant statute, the nature of action to be taken, its objective and purpose. Where there is a dash between the public interest and private interest, obviously the latter must give way. The Court may also consider whether having regard to the scheme of the Act and the nature of action proposed and having regard to all relevant circumstances, anything unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to the person concerned to present or meet the case. In case where fundamental liberties, or civil or political rights are involved, it may not be possible to lightly brush aside the rules of natural justice, but cases where vested interests are sought to be protected, the presumption regarding applicability of the rule becomes weak and exclusion of the rule may be justified, if otherwise no injustice results. 49. In this background we may now consider the scheme of the Act, the purpose which it seeks to achieve and the ground on which the Act justifies removal of a Chairman or member of the Board without application of the principles of natural justice. The board consists of a Chairman and four members appointed by the State Government. The Chairman and member of the Board are persons who arc experts in the field of education, both in teaching and administration. The board consists of a Chairman and four members appointed by the State Government. The Chairman and member of the Board are persons who arc experts in the field of education, both in teaching and administration. The Board is required to make recommendations for appointment of teacher and for appointment or promotion of headmasters of Nationalized Schools. Obviously, therefore, the Board has to function not only efficiently but also honestly and fairly as a body of persons who are entrusted with the task of making selection. Such a body must, of necessity enjoy the faith of the people and the confidence of the candidates, who may appear before the Board for selection. If the image of the Board is poor and the selections made by it suspect, the Board will serve no public purpose. It is better not to have a Board than to have a Board with a tarnished image and corrupt reputation. Fairness and honestly in the selection of candidates is what goes to build up the image of the Board. This may be adversely affecters by members of the Board either by not working at all, or being incapable of do in g any work, or by their working in such a manner as to adversely affect the interest of the Board. It is difficult to make an exhaustive list of what actions will be detrimental to the interest of the Board. But it is obvious that if the members of the Board are charged with acting dishonestly and there is material to support that allegation or that there is material to establish that they are acting in such a manner as not to inspire public faith, such actions will certainly be detrimental to the interest of the Board. In such situations if the Government is satisfied, having regard to the material placed before it that the members of the Board are acting in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Board, can it be said that their removal by the Government results in injustice. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the Act does not give untrammeled and unguided power to the Government to remove any of the members or Chairman. It can remove them only under given circumstances enumerated in sub-section (7) of section 3 (10). One cannot lose sight of the fact that the Act does not give untrammeled and unguided power to the Government to remove any of the members or Chairman. It can remove them only under given circumstances enumerated in sub-section (7) of section 3 (10). Even when the Government purports to remove such member or Chairman in exercise of power conferred by sub-section (7) of section 3 (10) it must have material before it on the basis of which its opinion is, formed. When challenged, that material has to be disclosed, and it must not only be shown to exist but it must be further shown to be relevant. The action taken by the State Government may he challenged before a court of law on the ground that it is not in accordance with sub-section (7) of Section 3 (10) of the Act or is malafide. This is a sufficient safeguard against any unfair action. Having regard to the provisions of the Act and the guidelines provided therein, I have no doubt that even if the principles of natural justice are not made applicable, no unfairness results there-by, and the aggrieved person can always challenge the action before a court of law and establish that the action was either in breach of the statutory provision, arbitrary or malafide. One cannot lose sight of the fact that the Board has a public function to perform and no one can be permitted to perform that function in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Board. If the material discloses that a particular member or Chairman is acting in such detrimental manner, the larger public interest demands that he must be removed forthwith without causing any further mischief. 50. The matter may be looked at from another angle having regard to the nature of the appointments. Under the Act the Chairman and the members must have the requisite experience. They are persons who are either employed in Government service or have retired from service. Even, if they are removed from the office of the Chairman or member of the Board, if they are in service, they continue to hold their posts in the service until the same is terminated in accordance with law. Those who have been nominated to the Hoard and who have retired from Government service continue to get such posts retirement benefits to which they are entitled. Those who have been nominated to the Hoard and who have retired from Government service continue to get such posts retirement benefits to which they are entitled. It is, therefore, not a case where Article 21 of the Constitution is involved. By removal of a Chairman or members of the Board, their livelihood is not affected, nor is any other fundamental right of theirs infringed. In the application of the rules of natural justice, courts have zealously protected the fundamental liberties of the citizens. Whenever their fundamental rights are infringed, particularly right to livelihood and there by right to life, or any other political right, the courts have insisted upon the application of the rules of natural justice Chairman and members of the Board are appointed to perform a public duty and if the State Government is of the opinion that they have been working in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the Board which will necessarily be prejudicial to the public interest, their removal in those circumstances cannot be said to be unfair. The public interest must override the vested interests of such members to hold their offices. Having regard to the nature of appointment and the duty to be performed by the members of the Board. I have no doubt that if there is a clash between their personal interest and the public interest, the former must give way. If the law provides for their removal in such circumstances, the law must be held to be valid. Of course, the action taken tinder the law may be challenged and it may be shown that the requisite opinion had not been formed bonafide, or that there was no material to support that opinion, or that the material taken into accounts was irrelevant. These safeguards are sufficient to prevent miscarriage of justice, and it is not necessary, where the law excludes to read into the Act the principles of natural justice. 51. In this context I shall now refer to the relevant facts of C.W.J.C. No. 7059 of 1990 and 4491 of 1990. It is not in dispute that in regard to these petitioners police cases had been instituted. Serious charges have been leveled against them. The charges include charges of cheating, falsification of documents as also charges of corruption. Their house were raided and searched. It is not in dispute that in regard to these petitioners police cases had been instituted. Serious charges have been leveled against them. The charges include charges of cheating, falsification of documents as also charges of corruption. Their house were raided and searched. The petitioners were kept in police custody and they were released on bail after sometime. The Criminal proceedings against them were sought to be quashed, but it appears that the same have not been quashed by the High Court, and in one case it is stated that it Special Leave Petition is pending before the Supreme Court. We have not been informed about the result of that Special Leave Petition. These facts are not disputed. What is said is that the prosecution itself is based on false charges and is malafide. That is the subject matter of another proceeding, but what is obvious is the fact the petitioners are charged of serious offences including the charge of corruption and have been released on bail by the High Court. What would be the in pact on the public mind if such persons are permitted to hold office either as Chairman or member of the Board? Will the public not lose faith in the efficacy of the Board if such persons are permitted to functas Chairman or member of the Board? Is it not better that such a Board did not exist rather than having persons with serious allegations of corruption as members and Chairman of the Board? I have no doubt that once there is material to prima facie establish their involvement in serious offences including the charge of corruption in the discharge of duties as member and Chairman of the Board, it is the duty of the State Government to remove them forthwith to save the image of the Board and to make its existence useful to society. If on the basis of such material the State Government is of the opinion that their actions are detrimental to the interest of the Board, on cannot find fault with the formation of that opinion. The very justification for the existence of such Board is the belief that it will act fairly and honestly and enjoy the faith and confidence of the Public at large. The very justification for the existence of such Board is the belief that it will act fairly and honestly and enjoy the faith and confidence of the Public at large. If such faith and confidence of the public is eroded by the actions of the members, the very justification for the existence of the Board vanishes. In these circumstances, therefore, I find that the State Government was fully justified in removing the petitioners in exercise of power under sub section (7) of section 3 (10) of the Act. The State Government would have failed to discharge its obligation if it did not take the action it took because their continuance even for a single day was detrimental to the interest of the Board and also to public interest. If they were permitted to continue, they would have in normal course made selections and would have put the State in an embarrassing situation. In the circumstances that existed, their recommendations could carry no credibility. The fact that the criminal proceedings are pending against the petitioners in these two writ petitions has not been denied and, therefore, the existence of the material on the basis of which the action, was taken is not in dispute. The material on record is also relevant for the purpose of formation of opinion as to whether their continuance is not detrimental to the interest of the Board having regard to the charges of corruption leveled against them. I, therefore, •find that the action of the Government is fully justified and is in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The action is neither arbitrary not discriminatory nor unreasonable. It has resulted in no injustice, and, therefore, the action cannot be challenged on the ground of breach of the principles enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 51A. So far as CWJC No. 2634/91 is concerned, the material on the basis of which the Government has acted has been placed before us. It appears from the materials so placed that the petitioner was acting in an arbitrary manner. The experts who were associated with the selection process were thoroughly unhappy, as they had no role to apply in the process of selection, because the petitioner gave them no opportunity to put questions. Similar was the fate of the other members of Board, who had submitted written complaints to the State Government. The experts who were associated with the selection process were thoroughly unhappy, as they had no role to apply in the process of selection, because the petitioner gave them no opportunity to put questions. Similar was the fate of the other members of Board, who had submitted written complaints to the State Government. The petitioner was running the Board as a one man show. Even where financial liabilities were incurred he did not bothered about the directives of the Government. While on one hand he pleaded that there hardly Rs. 5000/-in the account of the Board, be spent one lakh of rupees to the furnishing of the new premises to which the Board shifted after he took over as the Chairman. While on one hand, he pleaded that there was financial stringency, he selected a new premises for the office of the Board paying double the rent which was being paid when he was appointed as Chairman Despite the fact that no posts in certain subjects were sanctioned, be persisted in inviting application and interviewing candidates for appointment as teachers in those subjects. The manner in which he was interviewing large number of candidates in one day, must have seriously eroded the faith of the candidates, who appeared before the Board, because they-must have got the impression that the interview was a mere eye wash and that the selection would be made on other - considerations. Large Dumber of representations made to the State Government, itself disclose that there was resentment all a round, so much so that even the employees of the Board complained against him and his manner of working. On the basis of such materials the Government formed an opinion that he was working in a manner which was detrimental to the interest of the Board. I find no fault with the State Government if it formed such an opinion, because no other opinion was possible in the facts and circumstances of the case. His removal was, therefore, justified, in accordance with the Act, and cannot be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable. 52. I shall now consider the plea of malafide raised by Dr. Rash Lal Yadav in CWJC No. 2634/91. In paragraph no. 24 the petitioner has made an allegation that the Cabinet Minister in-charge, Secondary Education, namely. Sri Ram Chandra Purbe (respondent no. 52. I shall now consider the plea of malafide raised by Dr. Rash Lal Yadav in CWJC No. 2634/91. In paragraph no. 24 the petitioner has made an allegation that the Cabinet Minister in-charge, Secondary Education, namely. Sri Ram Chandra Purbe (respondent no. 4) has his own malicious reasons to remove the petitioner from the post of Chairman for not obliging him by selecting his favorite candidates. It is further stated that the petitioner has been pressurized by the politicians including certain Cabinet Ministers for selecting their favourite candidates and since the petitioner could not oblige such politicians and did not succumb to their pressures he earned their wrath and was made a target of victimization. The petitioner has annexed to his writ petition some letters written to him by the Cabinet Minister in-charge Secondary Education (respondent no. 4). He has also annexed some other letter written by other Ministers, such as Sri Suryadeo Rai, Minister of Stare, Excise Department who has been impleaded as respondent no. 7 in the writ petition de has further stated in paragraph no. 32 of the writ petition that political pressures were also exerted upon him by other Minister and has annexed several letters as Annexure 13 series. He has therefore, submitted that because of these reasons the Chief Minister without appreciating the provisions of law and with out his objective satisfaction as to the facts and circumstances of the case, ordered for issuance of the impugned notification 53. It is difficult to understand the plea of malafide as pleaded by the petitioner He states that the Cabinet Minister, in-charge of Secondary Education, has his own malicious reasons to remove the petitioner, and this is because he has not selected his favorite candidates No particulars have been given as to the candidates who were the favourites of the aforesaid Minister and who were not appointed despite the pressure exerted upon the petitioner. Same can be said about the general and vague allegations made against other Ministers Several letters, which have been annexed, no doubt show that Some of candidates brought letters from some of the Ministers, mast of which were to the effect that the bearer of the letter was known to the Minister and that they may be heard and helped. Same can be said about the general and vague allegations made against other Ministers Several letters, which have been annexed, no doubt show that Some of candidates brought letters from some of the Ministers, mast of which were to the effect that the bearer of the letter was known to the Minister and that they may be heard and helped. Beyond this there is nothing to show that any pressure was brought on the petitioner to appoint those candidates and since he did not succumb to the pressure it was decided to remove him from the office of the Chairman. It is common knowledge that large number of persons go to the politicians and seek help in the matter of appointments. As a matter of course some chits or letters are given to them for their satisfaction. That by itself will not establish that the Minister concerned also exerted pressure on the authority concerned for complying with the request, particularly when there is no special reason for the Minister concerned to take interest in a particular candidate. The letters disclose that the bearers of the letters belonged to the constituency of the Minister concerned. Be that as it may, there is nothing to show that any pressure was brought on the petitioner to appoint the candidates who were recommended. No particulars have been given as to which candidates were the favorites candidates of the Ministers who were not appointed The letters do not speak for themselves, as they are mere recommendatory letters written by politicians in normal course to keep the person concerned pleased. Nothing more is intended, und nothing more is done At least there is no evidence to indicate that any further follow up action was taken. Such vague allegations of malafide do not satisfy the test of law, and on the basis of such material it is difficult to uphold the pica of malafide. The petitioner himself states in his writ petition that the order for his removal was passed by the Chief Minister Respondent no. 6 is the Minister for Industry and he was represented by a counsel at the hearing of this petition. No argument was advanced against the Minister for Industry and really speaking there is no plea of mala fide against him. Only some recommendatory letters said to have been written by him have been brought on record without any specific plea. 6 is the Minister for Industry and he was represented by a counsel at the hearing of this petition. No argument was advanced against the Minister for Industry and really speaking there is no plea of mala fide against him. Only some recommendatory letters said to have been written by him have been brought on record without any specific plea. Counsel for respondent no. 6 rightly submitted that on such vague allegations the plea of malafide cannot be upheld. 54. In CWJC No 4491/90 certain personal allegations have been made against respondent no. 3, the Chief Minister of Bihar. In paragraph no. 15 the petitioner states: “That the petitioner understands that respondent no. 3 ever since he assumed his office as Chief Minister of Bihar has started a personal vendetta against the petitioner to settle some old score with him when the petitioner was teacher in B. N. College and the entire action taken against the petitioner is malafide.” Sri B. C. Ghose, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that this allegation has not been denied by the Chief Minister himself. Therefore it must be taken as true. In my view, the personal allegations against the Chief Minister (respondent no. 3) are so vague that they must be rejected out right. The allegation is not based on his knowledge, but is based on information derived from the various sources mentioned therein. No source has been mentioned in paragraph-15 of the writ petition. The paragraph begins with the words" that the petitioner understands." It is, therefore, obvious that the allegation is made neither on the basis of personal knowledge nor on the basis of information derived from any source. This is sufficient to reject the plea of malafide. Apart from this it is stated in that paragraph that respondent no. 3 has started a personal vendetta against the petitioner to settle some old score. It is also not stated what are the old scores which the Chief Minster wishes to settle against him. The allegations are as general and vague as they can be and therefore, they must be rejected outright it is difficult to imagine how respondent no. 3 could have replied to the allegations made, except by a general denial. It is well settled that a plea of malafide must not only be specific and categoric, but must be supported by relevant materials. 3 could have replied to the allegations made, except by a general denial. It is well settled that a plea of malafide must not only be specific and categoric, but must be supported by relevant materials. All the ingredients are lacking in the instant case. The plea of malafide against the Chief Minister must, therefore, be rejected. 55. It was then submitted that the notification removing the petitioner in CWJC No. 4491/90 was never served upon him, nor did he ever receive the cheque mentioned in the aforesaid notification, whereby one month's pay in lieu of notice was offered to the petitioner. Learned Advocate General submitted that the• petitioner deliberately avoided to receive the notification and the cheque. One fact cannot be denied, namely, the number of the cheque bas been mentioned in the notification itself. A supplementary counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State stating that all efforts were made to serve the notification on the petitioner along with the cheque. It has been stated that on 19th July, 1990 two letters, namely. one containing notification no. 136/C dated 16th July, 1990 along with cheque no. 80 4079 dated 16th July, 1990 and the other bearing no. 141-C dated 16.7.1990 enclosing therewith cheque no. 804078 dated 16.7.1990 which represented the arrears of salary for the period 1.4.1990 to 21.4.1990 and 6.7.1990 to 16.7.1990, were sent to the petitioner through a team of officers consisting of Deputy Director, Secondary Education, Assistant Director, Cultural Education and an Assistant of the Department. The officers reported that the Chairman and three other members of the School Service Board could not be found at their residences and, therefore, those letters could not he served upon them personally. In these circumstances, letters were sent through registered post on 18.7.1990. The report of the aforesaid officers has been annexed as Annexure-R-3 and the postal receipt through which the notification along with the cheque was sent to the petitioner has been annexed a8 Annexure-R-4 The petitioner has filed two supplementary affidavits refuting the claim of the State. It is stated that there appears to be no reason why the notification and the cheque could not be served upon the petitioner. It is stated that there appears to be no reason why the notification and the cheque could not be served upon the petitioner. An affidavit has been affirmed by the daughter-in-law of the petitioner stating that she along with her mother-in-law and another daughter-in-law was present in the house of the petitioner throughout on 17th and 18th July, 1990 and no one visited the house of the petitioner with any letter meant for the petitioner. 56. In my view, there is no reason to doubt the fact that efforts were made to serve the notification and the cheques on the petitioner. When the efforts failed the notification and the cbeque were sent to him through registered post. Moreover, even if the notification and the cheques were not served upon the petitioner immediately, that will not effect the validity of the order of removal, It is difficult to apply the principles of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, to the facts of the instant case. The petitioner is not a workman, and he was not sought to be retrenched. In terms of the Act he is entitled to one month's Salary in lieu of notice, which has been offered to him. Even if the amount was not offered by the State Government, the petitioner could only claim that amount, but could not contended that the order of removal was itself had and vitiated on account of this fact. 57. I, therefore, find no merit in these writ petitions and all of them are, accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. N. S. Rao, J.-I agree. Application dismissed.