This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 14.2.1984 passed in Title Appeal No. 18 of 1978 by the Additional District Judge Cachar and Karimganj partly allowing to appeal, modifying the judgement and decree dated 29.6.1978 passed by the Assisstant District Judge ' no.2, Cachar in Title Suit No. 69 of 19721 2. The brief fact of the case is that the appellants-plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration that they were entitled share of the 50% of the first schedule tend and the house standing thereon, for partition and also for recovery not possession of the house described in the second schedule of the plaint and confirmation of their possession in respect of third schedule land and also for other relief. The suit was contested by defendant No. 1 and 13. They filed written statements. After examination of the Witnesses, the second Assistant District Judge, Cachar decreed the Suit. The first respondent (defendant NOV 13) preferred an appeal (Title Appeal No. 18 of 1978) hi fee Court of the Additional District Judge. The Additional District Judge by his judgment and decree dated 14.2.84 partly allowed the appeal modifying the preliminary decree. In passing the judgment, the Additional District Judge observed thus : "the suit be decreed and the plaintiff's title in respect of 8 annas share of the first schedule land and their maliki right in respect of the houses described in the second schedule of the plaint along with the order for partition in respect of their 8 annas share of the first schedule land be declared". The appellant neither preferred any appeal against the said decision nor filed any cross objection as envisaged under Order 41 Rule 22 CPC. At the time of hearing of the appeal, the appellant, however challenged the findings arrived at in respect of the third schedule land. The Additional District Judge without going into merit of the case rejected the plea on the ground that appellant neither filed any appeal against not he filed any cross-objection, Hence, the appellant has preferred this appeal. The only ground raised before this Court in this second appeal is whether the respondents can challenge the finding of the trial Court in the appeal without filing any cross appeal or filing a separate appeal. I have heard both sides. 3. Mr. The only ground raised before this Court in this second appeal is whether the respondents can challenge the finding of the trial Court in the appeal without filing any cross appeal or filing a separate appeal. I have heard both sides. 3. Mr. Dhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the Additional District Judge was not justified in rejecting his prayer merely because no cross appeal was filed. Mr. SK Senapati, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supports the impugned judgment. 4. Now, the question falls for determination is whether the appellate Court was justified in rejecting the prayer. 5. Under Order 41 Rule 22, any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the decree, may not only support the decree, but also state that the finding against him ought to have been in his favour, provided he has filed such objection in the appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him. 6..This rate gives two distinct rights to the respondents. First is the right of upholding the decree of the Court second that of taking cross objection to the decree which the respondent might have taken by way of appeal In the first case he supports the decree and in the second case he attacks the decree. 7. Normally a party who is aggrieved by a decree should, if he seeks to escape from its Operation may appeal against it within the time allowed. But Rule 33 of the order 41 confers wide and unlimited jurisdiction on Courts to pass a decree in favour of a party who Has not preferred any appeal. But this power, however should Be exercised sparingly. In AIR 1963 SC 1516 (Pannalal vs. State of Bombay & others) Supreme Court held thus; "Even a bare reading of Order 41 Rule 33 is sufficient to convince any one that the wide wording, was intended to empower the appellate Court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a co-respondent. It empowers the appellate Court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as the case-may require. 8. It empowers the appellate Court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondents as the case-may require. 8. Use of the word "cross objection" in Order 41 Rule 22 expresses unmistakably the intention of the legislature that the objection has to be directed against the appellant. That the' legislature also wanted to give effect to the view that id exceptional cases an objection can be raised by a respondent against a co-respondent as indicated by the substitution of the word "appellant" in the third paragraph by the words "the party who may by such objection”. In Mahant Dhangir & another vs. Madan Mohan, AIR 1988 SC 54 ; the Supreme Court observed as :- "If the cross objection filed under Rule 22 of Order 41 CPC was not maintainable against the co-respondent, the Court could consider it under Rule 33 of Order 4f CPC Rule 22 and Rule 33 are not mutually exclusive. They are closely related" with each other. If objection cannot be urged under Rule 22 against co-respondent, Rule 33 could take over and* come, to the rescue of the objector. The appellate Court could exercise the power under Rule 33 even if the appeal is only against a part of the decree of the lower Court. The appellate Court could exercise that power in favour of all or any of the respondents although such respondent may not have filed any appeal or objection'. The sweep of the power under Rule 33 is wide" ehough 16 determine any question hot only between the appellant and respondent, but also between respondent and co-respondents. The appellate Court could pass any decree or order which ought to have been passed in the circumstances of the case. The appellate Court could also pass such other decree or order as the case may require, the words "as the case may require” used in Rule 33 of Order 41 have been put in wide terms to enable the appellate Court to pass any order or decree to meet the ends of justice. 9. Rule 33 confers the appellate Court a wholesome power to pass any order for giving effective relief to the parties. This is more apparent after the amendment of the Rule 33 of the order 41 CPC. 9. Rule 33 confers the appellate Court a wholesome power to pass any order for giving effective relief to the parties. This is more apparent after the amendment of the Rule 33 of the order 41 CPC. In view of the above, the Additional District Judge committed manifest error of law by rejecting the points raised by the appellant against that portion of the judgment passed by the Assistant District Judge, As per the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the Additional District Judge should have considered the submission and also should examine whether it was a fit case to invoke the power under Rule 33 of the Order 41. 10. In view of the above, I find sufficient force in submission of Mr.Dhar and therefore I feel that the appeal be, remanded to the appellate Court for proper adjudication of the matter after considering the points raised by the parties. The appeal is, therefore, remanded to the District Judge, Karimganj who should dispose of the appeal in the light of observation made hereinbefore. The respondents may by allowed to raise any other points against the claim of the appellant. 11. With these observations, the appeal is allowed and remanded to the appellate Court. No costs.