JUDGMENT : M. KATJU, J. 1. This writ petition and connected writ petition No. 11967 of 1991 (Indian Oxygen Shramik Sangh v. The Additional Labour Commissioner and others) as well as writ petition No. 3010 of 1991 (IOL Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others) are being disposed of by a common judgment. 2. I have heard Shri S N. Verma, Sri Prabhat Mukerji, and Shri Prem Chandra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Shri J. N. Tewari and Shri Rakesh Tewari learned Counsel for the Respondents and have perused the counter and rejoinder affidavits and I am disposing of the same finally. 3. The writ petition No. 4206 of 1991 is dissected against a show-cause notice dated 15-2-1991 issued by the Additional Labour Commissioner Kanpur on the application of the Respondent No. 3 Union for payment of Rs.2,91,178.82, as wages under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial peace (Timely payment of wages) Act, 1978 (hereafter referred to as the 1978 Act) A true copy of the said notice dated 15-2-1991 is Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The said notice has been issued on the application of the Union purporting to be on behalf of its workmen. True copies of the said application and affidavit are annexure-2 to the writ petition. 4. The allegation of the Petitioner in paragraph 8 of the writ petition is that its factory where the workmen in question were employed has been closed down on 10-1-1991. A perusal of the impugned show cause notice dated 15-2-1991 shows that the claim of the workmen which has been challenged in this writ petition is for wages for the period from 10-1-91 to 31-1-91 i. e. for a period subsequent to the closure. 5. Several points have been raised in this case by learned Counsel for the Petitioner but in my opinion the writ petition deserves to succeed on only some of them, and hence I am not going into the other points which he has raised. 6. It has been held by this Court in the case of Jay Shree Tea Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal(1) and Others, (1991) 2 LLJ 154 that Section 6-W of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act which requires the employer to take permission of the Government before closing down the establishment is ultra vires Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 6. It has been held by this Court in the case of Jay Shree Tea Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal(1) and Others, (1991) 2 LLJ 154 that Section 6-W of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act which requires the employer to take permission of the Government before closing down the establishment is ultra vires Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. In view of this decision, which I am respectfully following, there was no requirement for the employer to take permission from the Government before closing down its establishment. In the circumstances the workmen cannot validly claim the wages for the person subsequent to the closure, and they can only claim closure compensation u/s 25-FFF of the Act. It has been alleged in paragraph 13 of the petition that the closure compensation has already been paid. In paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit the allegation that the closure compensation has been paid has not been specifically denied and the only allegation is that the Award of the Industrial Tribunal dated 27-7-1981 regarding dearness allowance which was modified by the Supreme Court on 2-5-1985 has not been fully implemented. Since in this petition I am only concerned with the validity of the claim of wages subsequent to the closure on 10-1-1991 I am not going into the question regarding whether dearness allowance awarded by the Tribunal on 27-7-1981 as modified by the Supreme Court has been paid or not. 7. It has been alleged in paragraphs 35, 36 and 37 of the writ petition that in view of the financial constraints it is not possible for the company to continue running the Kanpur unit, and hence it was decided to close the same, and it was closed on 10-1-1991. 8. In paragraph 11 of the counter affidavit the Respondent has denied that the establishment is closed and has alleged that the closure is a farce. In my opinion, it is no doubt open for the workmen to contend that there was in fact no closure vide Workmen of The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1974 SC 1132 but this matter can only be gone into in a full fledged adjudication on a reference u/s 4-K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act (or Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act) to the Labour Court or the Tribunal. Ltd. Vs. Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., AIR 1974 SC 1132 but this matter can only be gone into in a full fledged adjudication on a reference u/s 4-K of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act (or Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act) to the Labour Court or the Tribunal. In may opinion, if there is a serious dispute of facts regarding the liability of the employer to pay any amount it can only be adjudicated upon in a reference by the State. Government to the Labour Court or the Tribunal. The case of the employer is that the Kanpur Unit was closed down on 10-1-1991. Hence if the workmen want to dispute the factum of closure the remedy is to raise an industrial dispute and get the matter referred u/s 4-K of the Uttar Pradesh Act 5 or Section 10 of the Central Act and then the matter can be decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. This serious dispute cannot be decided by the Additional Labour Commissioner u/s 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978. 9. In Payment of Wages Inspector Vs. Surajmal Mehta and Another, AIR 1969 SC 590 , the Supreme Court held that the Payment of Wages authority had a limited jurisdiction, and he could not decide cases involving complicated questions of law or fact. In my opinion the ratio of this decision will also apply to applications filed under the 1978 Act, Since the powers of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act as well as the 1978 Act are similar. A comparision of the provisions of both these Acts makes this clear. Section 18 of the Payment of Wages Act giving the Payment of Wages authority certain powers of the civil Court is similar to Section 4 of the 1978 Act. Hence, the scope of the jurisdiction under the 1970 Act has to be construed as similar to the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, and consequently held that this jurisdiction is a limited one. Hence, the scope of the jurisdiction under the 1970 Act has to be construed as similar to the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, and consequently held that this jurisdiction is a limited one. It is only where the claim of the workmen cannot be seriously disputed that recourse can be taken to the 1978 Act, and in cases involving seriously disputed question of fact or law the workmen must approach the Government to make a reference u/s 4-K of the Uttar Pradesh Act or Section 10 of the Central Act and they cannot take recourse to the 1978 Act. 10. Learned Counsel for the Respondent has urged that the impugned notice is only a show-cause notice and hence this Court should not interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is no doubt true that ordinarily this Court does not interfere with a show-cause notice, but there is no absolute bar. It there is patent lack of jurisdiction a writ of prohibition will issue from this Court to stop the authority from acting beyond its jurisdiction. In the present case since the Petitioner has alleged that there was closure of Its Kanpur Unit on 10-1-1991, it was not open to the Additional Labour Commissioner to issue a recovery certificate under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978 and instead he should have directed the workmen to approach the State Government for a reference u/s 4-K of the Uttar Pradesh Act or Section 10 of the Central Act. 11. Shri J. N. Tewari has urged that the decision in Jay Shree Tea's case (supra) only held Section 6-W of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act to be invalid, and it has not held Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act to be also invalid. I am not in agreement with this contention. Section 6-W of Uttar Pradesh Act is in pari material to Section 25-O of the Central Act, as has been held in Jay Shree Tea's case. Hence, it is implicit that the Court in Jay Shree Tea's case held Section 25-O of the Central Act to be also unconstitutional. I am not in agreement with this contention. Section 6-W of Uttar Pradesh Act is in pari material to Section 25-O of the Central Act, as has been held in Jay Shree Tea's case. Hence, it is implicit that the Court in Jay Shree Tea's case held Section 25-O of the Central Act to be also unconstitutional. In fact, in Jay Shree Tea's case this Court has even expressly declared Section 25-O of the Central Act to be unconstitutional in the following words : I respectfully agree with the conclusion of the learned Judge that the new Section 25-O has been enacted in the teeth of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Excel Wear's case (Supra) and in the light of the Jaw declared by that judgment the Section is liable to be struck down. The Court further observed "I may make it clear that I am of the view that inspite of the provisions of review and reference made in the new subsection (5) of Section 25-O of the Central Act, the provisions as" contained in sub-section (2) of the said Act impose unreasonable restrictions." 12. Thus, it is clear that in Jay Shree Tea's case, the Court was of the opinion that even after its amendment Section 25-O is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 13. Shri J. N. Tewari then invited my attention to Sections 25-S and 25-J of the Central Act. In my opinion, these provisions have no relevance in view of the fact that Section 25-O of the Central Act has been held to be unconstitutional by this Court. 14. Shri Tewari also referred to the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd 1992 1 CLR 1010 , where it has been held that Section 25-N of the Industrial Disputes Act is constitutional. However, in this judgment itself it has been mentioned that there are distinguishing features between Section 25-N and Section 25-O of the Central Act, and hence this decision is no authority for the proposition that Section 25-O is also constitutionally valid. Moreover, in closure the entire establishment is closed, but it is not so in retrenchment, and hence the two cannot be equated. 15. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the impugned show-cause notice dated 15-2-1991 is wholly illegal and beyond jurisdiction and is hereby quashed. Moreover, in closure the entire establishment is closed, but it is not so in retrenchment, and hence the two cannot be equated. 15. In the circumstances, I am of the opinion that the impugned show-cause notice dated 15-2-1991 is wholly illegal and beyond jurisdiction and is hereby quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs. 16. As regards writ petition No. 11967 of 1991 (Indian Oxygen Shramik Sangh v. The Addl. Labour Commissioner and others), the facts disclosed in this petition are that the Company had filed an application dated 7-11-1990 u/s 25-FFA of the Industrial Disputes Act before the State Government which was rejected by the State Government on 5-1-1991. Thereafter the Union filed an application under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978 claiming wages for period subsequent to the closure. However, while these proceedings were pending this Court on 27-2-1991 had passed a stay order in writ petition No. 4206 of 1991 and hence, the Additional Labour Commissioner sent a letter dated 26th March, 1991 informing the Union that in view of the High Court's stay order no proceeding will be held on the application of the Union dated 18-8-1991. Aggrieved against this letter of 26-3-1991 the Union has filed this writ petition. 17. In my opinion, since I have already allowed writ petition No. 4206 of 1991 IOL Limited v. State of U. P & others), consequently writ petition No. 11967 of 1991 is liable to be rejected. Since I am of the opinion that the proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978 for claiming wages for the period after the date of closure are illegal, this writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. 18. As regards writ petition No. 3010 of 1991 (IOL Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh & others), this writ petition is directed against the show cause notice for prosecuting the Petitioner company for not taking permission prior to the closure. It has already been held in Jay Shree Tea's case (supra) that no such permission is required, and I have held that the decision in Jay Shree Tea's case amounts to declaration of section 25-O of the Central Act to be unconstitutional also. Hence, the impugned show cause notices (annexnre-1/to I-I) are illegal and are hereby quashed. It has already been held in Jay Shree Tea's case (supra) that no such permission is required, and I have held that the decision in Jay Shree Tea's case amounts to declaration of section 25-O of the Central Act to be unconstitutional also. Hence, the impugned show cause notices (annexnre-1/to I-I) are illegal and are hereby quashed. The writ petition No. 3010 of 1991 is therefore, allowed. No order as to costs.