R. C. LAHOTI, J. ( 1 ) ONE set of defendants, consisting of defendants Nos. 2 to 9, has come up in appeal, aggrieved by the judgments and decrees of the two courts below, directing the suit filed by the plaintiff/ respondents Nos. 1 to 4 to be decreed in part granting a decree of declaration of title with respect to the part of the suit property, also declaring plaintiffs' entitlement to take water from the two wells proportionate with certain shares. The trial Court has held that the four plaintiffs with Mangilal, the defendant No. 1 are Bhumiswamis of the land described in para 12 (a) of the plaint, also entitled to have their names mutated in the revenue papers accordingly, that the plaintiffs are entitled to take water from the well S. No. 164 to the extent of 1/4th; that S. No. 443 area 3 acres 8 decimal had fallen to the share of the plaintiffs and Mangilal the defendant No. 1 and they were the Bhumiswamis entitled to have their name mutated in the revenue papers; that the plaintiffs were also entitled to take water from the well S. No. 419 to the extent of 3/8th. As to land S. No. 163 and S. No. 155/1968, the suit filed by the plaintiffs seeking separate possession by partition and recovery of mesne profits has been directed to be dismissed. ( 2 ) THE following is the family tree of the parties which has not been disputed: - thus the dispute is mainly between the heirs of late Mukund on the one side and the heirs of late Sitaram on the other side. The defendants Nos. 10 to 17 are the collaterals of these parties. ( 3 ) THERE were two agricultural holdings in the family. One of the holdings consisted of 25. 84 acres, situated at village Rajoda and known as Ryotwari Khata. The land forming part of this Ryotwari Khata is not subject-matter of dispute between the parties though a reference may be required to be made to it hereinafter and that is why this fact is being mentioned. There is another holding consisting of 51-32 acres situated at village Rajoda and known as Khata haq malikana which is the subject-matter of dispute. The details of the land forming part of Khata haq Malikana are given in para 10 of the plaint. There is another holding consisting of 51-32 acres situated at village Rajoda and known as Khata haq malikana which is the subject-matter of dispute. The details of the land forming part of Khata haq Malikana are given in para 10 of the plaint. The survey numbers, the area and the location of the land are not in dispute. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the plaintiffs, Khata haq malikana was acquired in the name of Shobharam with the aid of joint family funds, the earnings of Ryotwari Khata forming nucleus for such acquisition and having been so acquired the land continued to be enjoyed jointly by Shobharam and Mukund and their family members until the year 1931-32 when it came to be partitioned. The partition was oral one whereat 24. 26 acres of land described in plaint para 12 (a) fell to the share of Mukund and 25. 90 acres of land described in plaint para12 (b) fell to the share of Shobharam. Both of them entered in possession of the land falling to their respective shares. Hiralal who was a collateral of Shobharam and Mukund was given 2. 36 acres of land described in para 14 of the land for the purpose of maintaining himself as a licensee and that land has continued to remain in his possession always. There were wells situated over S. Nos. 164 and 419. As the wells were not capable of being partitioned, it was agreed upon at the time of partition, that Mukund shall be entitled to take water to the extent of 1/4th from the well S. No. 164 and to the extent of 3/8 from the well S. No. 419, in accordance with which shares the plaintiffs have always been taking the water. In spite of the land having been partitioned, the names of Mukund, and thereafter his heirs, were not recorded in the revenue papers and the names of Shobharam and thereafter Sitaram and his sons continued to remain recorded. The dispute arose when Sitaram expired on 1-4-l970 and the defendants Nos. 2 to 9 applied for mutation in their own names while the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 filed objections simultaneously praying for their own names to be mutated. The proceedings in mutation ultimately terminated in favour of the defendants Nos. 2 to 9. The dispute arose when Sitaram expired on 1-4-l970 and the defendants Nos. 2 to 9 applied for mutation in their own names while the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1 filed objections simultaneously praying for their own names to be mutated. The proceedings in mutation ultimately terminated in favour of the defendants Nos. 2 to 9. The plaintiffs also claimed acquisition and perfection of title as Bhumiswami by adverse possession over the land described in para 12 (a) of the plaint. ( 5 ) AS could be expected, Mangilal the defendant No. 1, did not make appearance in the suit and remained ex parte from the very beginning. ( 6 ) THE suit was contested by the defend ants Nos. 2 to 9 by pleading that there was neither a joint family nor any joint family property of late Sitaram and Mukund. Shobharam had separated himself even during the life time of late Kunwarji and had commenced separate residence and separate cultivation. Khata haq malikana was separate and personal acquisition of late Shobharam who had shown mercy to Hiralal by giving 2. 36 acres of land for sustaining him in financial stringency. On the death of Shobharam, disputes arose between his widow Chandanma and his son Sitaram. Some of the land out of the suit property was given by Sitaram to Chandanma for the later being maintained during her lifetime. Chandanma leased out the land to Mukund for being cultivated subject to the condition that Mukund would pay the revenue payable on the land and thus Mukund and his heirs were nothing but sub-lessees of Chandanma. Suit for recovery of possession from them was already filed and was pending. Mukund's right to take water from the two wells was denied. It was also submitted that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by time. ( 7 ) THE defendants Nos. 10 to 17 filed their own written statement but it is not necessary to notice the pleas taken by them inasmuch as the controversy in so far as those defendants are concerned, has not survived for adjudication after the decision of the trial Court, the suit against them having been dismissed by the trial Court and that part of the decree having achieved a finality against the plaintiffs. ( 8 ) HAVING recorded the evidence of the parties, the trial Court has held that the khata haq malikana was a joint family acquisition of the joint family of the two brothers namely Shobharam and Mukund. The plea of partition as set up by the plaintiffs has been found to be proved. The trial Court has also held in the alternative, that the plaintiffs had perfected their title by adverse possession over the land described in para 12 (a) of the plaint. Their right to take water from the wells in the proportion claimed by the plaintiffs has also been found proved. The suit has been decreed accordingly. ( 9 ) THE defendants preferred an appeal. The lower appellate Court has sustained all the findings recorded by the trial-Court except one. On the question of adverse possession, the lower appellate Court has held placing reliance on a single Bench decision of this Court in Mangilal v. Onkar, 1976 JLJ SN 39, that Bhumiswami rights were incapable of being acquired by adverse possession. While confirming finding that the haq malikana khata was a joint family acquisition, the lower appellate Court has also held that assuming Shobharam had acquired the land in his name, the evidence suggested that it was thrown in the common stock of the family property and remained joint till partition took place between Sitaram and Mukund. ( 10 ) VIDE Order dt. 27-9-77 this appeal by the defendants was admitted by this Court for hearing parties on the following three questions :--" (I) Whether the title to agricultural land can be prescribed by adverse possession for more than 12 years? (ii) Whether the plaintiff's claim was barred by limitation? (iii) Whether the plaintiffs had acquired status of pacca tenant under the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, when the M. P. Land Revenue Code came into force?" vide order dated 4-2-1992, liberty was allowed to the appellants to urge the following additional substantial question of law at the time of hearing:- (1 ). Whether for the reasons given in the grounds Nos. Whether for the reasons given in the grounds Nos. 2 to 5 in the memorandum of this appeal, it was not open to the Court below to go behind the entries in the revenue records and inquire into the question of title of the plaintiffs and defendant No. 1 to the lands in dispute and whether for the same reasons it has to be held that the plaintiff and the defendant No. 1 have not acquired the status of Bhumiswamis of this land according to law? ( 11 ) ATTACKING the findings recorded by the Court below, the learned counsel for the defendant/appellant submitted that there was overwhelming documentary evidence available on record leading to an inference that the acquisition by Shobharam of Khata haq malikana was his own personal one; that if an agricultural holding stood recorded in the name of Shobharam alone as a tenure holder of agricultural rights, the land would be deemed to have been held by him in those rights and there was no question of determining the nature of acquisition by reference to the principles of personal law i. e. , Hindu Law and hence the Court below have committed a gross error of law in holding the Khata haq malikana to be the joint family acquisition of the so-called joint Hindu family property consisting of the two brothers Shobharam and Mukund; that there was no question of any rights having been acquired by the plaintiffs by adverse possession; and hence the suit was liable to be dismissed reversing the decrees of the two courts below. The learned counsel for the plaintiff/ respondents argued in support of the decrees under appeal submitting that all the findings recorded by the courts below were those of facts not open to interference is second appellate jurisdiction. Alternatively, it was submitted by the learned counsel that in the event of this Court arriving at a finding that the suit property was not a joint family property of Shobharam and Mukund then in that event the matter deserved to be remanded and sent back to the lower appellate Court which had not recorded any finding on the question of acquisition of title by adverse possession acting on the erroneous view taken in Mangilal v. Onkar, 1976 JLJ SN 39, which view now stands overruled too. ( 12 ) THE learned counsel for the defendant/ appellants submitted that the Sanad dated 12-3-1928 (Ex. D/2) issued by the Member, State-Counsel In-charge, of the Revenue State, Dewas (Senior) stated that 52. 32 hectares of land was allotted individually in the name of Shobharam conferring him with malikana haq (proprietary rights ). The Hindu Law does not prohibit a personal acquisition by a member of the family. The documentary evidence brought on record by both the parties unerringly indicate that while ryotwari khata was partitioned and thereafter recorded separately in the names of the two brothers consistently with the lands therein having fallen to their respective shares, all the survey numbers forming part of khata haq malikana continued to remain recorded in the name of Shobharam and thereafter of Sitaram which is a tell-tale circumstance showing that the khata haq malikana was the individual property of Shobharam, it was never partitioned and if only the plea of the plaintiff/ respondents that it was partitioned was correct then there is no reason why even khata haq malikana should not have stood bifurcated into two and recorded separately in the names of the two brothers just as was done in the case of the land forming part of khata ryotwari. ( 13 ) THE first question which arises for consideration is whether the nature of tenure rights acquired in an agricultural holding or entitlement to it by one or more members of the family other than the person in whose name the land stands allotted and recorded in the revenue papers can be determined by reference to the principles of personal law. ( 14 ) THE questions as to the nature of right held by a tenure holder in agricultural holdings governed by the tenancy laws from time to time and whether that right and the incidents relating thereto were capable of being determined by reference to the principles of personal law, have been subject-matter of several decisions which may now be noticed. ( 15 ) IN Hiralal v. Radhabai, (S. A. No. 69/55 decided on 31-12-1958) question arose whether someone, claiming to be a reversioner, alleging the estate held by a female pakka tenant to be a limited estate, pressing the principles of Hindu Law into service, could file a suit in relation to the land held by the female pakka tenant during her lifetime. V. R. Niwaskar, J. , upheld the contention that interest as recognised under the general principles of the Hindu Law had no place in the scheme of the M. B. L. R. T. Act and hence the plaintiff claiming to be a reversioner had no right to institute a suit for declaration with respect to agricultural holdings during the lifetime of pakka tenant. It was further observed that Sections 82 and 83 of the Act indicate the difference in the order of succession among the male and female pakka tenants but there is nothing in these Sections or anywhere else in the Act to suggest that a female pakka tenant is put in any inferior position than a male pakka tenant. ( 16 ) IN Daryay v. Nandabai (S. A. No. 533/60 decided on 5-10-62 at Indore), the importance and impact of anyone having been recorded as pakka tenant in the revenue papers on 15-8-50, the date of coming into force of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950, came to be examined by reference to S. 54 (vii) thereof which reads as under:-"pakka Tenant - means a tenant who has been or whose predecessor in interest had been lawfully recorded in respect of his holding as a 'ryot Pattedar', 'mamuli Maurusi', 'gair Maurusi' and 'pukhta Maurusi' when this Act comes into force or who may in future be duly recognised as such by a competent authority. "the contention raised was that the definition was qualified by the phrase - "should have been lawfully recorded " and that permitted an enquiry being made into the question as to whether the recorded pakka tenant had rightfully succeeded to the title. The contention was repelled in following terms:-"in my opinion the contention is without force. The term 'lawfully recorded' has reference to the legality of procedure followed in the matter of recording and not the real title unless the dispute as to title was pending after the mutation order was made and assailed by means of a suit". It was further observed:-"the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was enacted after the integration of twenty-two princely states with differing systems of land tenure. The Act meant to provide a rough and ready test for treating a tenant as a Pakka Tenant for the purpose of the Act. It was further observed:-"the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was enacted after the integration of twenty-two princely states with differing systems of land tenure. The Act meant to provide a rough and ready test for treating a tenant as a Pakka Tenant for the purpose of the Act. This test was that he should have been lawfully recorded as a Ryot Pattedar in respect of a holding when the Act comes into force i. e. , on 15-8-1950. This test is satisfied in this case. " ( 17 ) IN Dagadibai v. Shyamrao (S. A. No. 409/61 decided on 16-4-1964 at Indore) challenge to an alienation made by a female pucca tenant was laid by the plaintiff claiming to be the reversioner, pleading that the alienation was void in accordance with the principles of Hindu Law. P. K. Tare, J. (as he then was) referred to the Division Bench decision in Gangaram v. Pyari Bahoo, 1963 MPLJ 684, and held:-"a female pacca tenant could as well be a Parsi, a Christian or a Muslim. Still she would be governed by the provisions of Section 84, or Section 83 read with Section 82 of the M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950. Her personal law would have no place in the scheme of succession provided by the Act. Therefore, the concept of a reversionary interest of a reversioner being in a position to challenge the alienation by a limited owner cannot be made applicable to such a case. " ( 18 ) IN Jhabarsingh v. Sodansingh (S. A. No. 297/62 decided on 24-12-1965 at Indore), V. R. Nivaskar, J. examined the question from yet another view point and observed:-"in my opinion, the definition of pucca tenant in Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act indicates that the person who is or whose predecessor-in-interest has been recorded as a pattedar tenant in the erstwhile Holkar State territory is such a tenant. In this case defendants Nos. 2, 3 and the father of defendant No. 4 were the recorded tenants at the commencement of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. They, therefore, became pucca tenants with rights to alienate the property with the permission of the Collector. Succession to them is provided for as indicated in S. 82 of the Act. 2, 3 and the father of defendant No. 4 were the recorded tenants at the commencement of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. They, therefore, became pucca tenants with rights to alienate the property with the permission of the Collector. Succession to them is provided for as indicated in S. 82 of the Act. Thus, there is basic change in the scheme of the Act and whatever rights existed before on the principle of survivorship or reversion were no longer to remain in force. To this extent the vested rights, as claimed by the plaintiffs, were intended to be affected. The decisions in AIR 1926 PC 100 (supra) and 1949 MBLR 111 (supra), will have no application because under the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act the record at the time of coming into force of the Act as a pucca tenant determined the title. " (Underlining by me) ( 19 ) IN Mansharam v. Mazid Khan (S. A. No. 58/67 decided on 19-2-80) at Indore a similar question arose. Alienation made by Tulsiya, a pakka tenant was sought to be challenged relying on the principles of Hindu Law, submitting that the plaintiff had acquired the rights by birth in the lands acquired by his father Tulsiya as a ryot pattedar tenant. Relying on the Division Bench decision in Gangaram Ahir v. Pyari Bahoo (1963 MPLJ 684), S. R. Vyas, J. repelled the contention and held:-". . . . . even a Hindu widow, who has been recognised as a pakka tenant under the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act (later on has been recognised as a Bhumiswami under the M. P. Land Revenue Code) has an absolute and unrestricted right to transfer her holding and on her death the nearest heirs to her husband have no right to claim succession by reversion as is permissible under the general principles of Hindu Law. On the analogy of this decision it has, therefore, to be said that in this case Tulsiya had an absolute right to transfer by sale the rights in his holding in favour of respondents Majitkhan and others and during his lifetime the appellant cannot challenge the sale made by his father. On the analogy of this decision it has, therefore, to be said that in this case Tulsiya had an absolute right to transfer by sale the rights in his holding in favour of respondents Majitkhan and others and during his lifetime the appellant cannot challenge the sale made by his father. The question of the plaintiff acquiring any rights in the holding held by his father either as a Raiyat Pattedar tenant or a pakka tenant or as a Bhumiswami would arise only on the death of his father and he can succeed only in accordance with those provisions of the Act (now the M. P. Land Revenue Code) and not during his lifetime. " (Underlining by me) ( 20 ) IN Gyansingh v. Lalibai (S. A. No. 203/80 decided on 15-11-1991 at Gwalior) also the view taken on a review of several decisions was that the incidents of a right held by a recorded pakka tenant were not capable of being determined by reference to the provisions of personal law. ( 21 ) IN Ramji Dixit v. Raghunath, AIR 1965 All 1 , the Full Bench was posed with a case of transfer made by a female inheriting the holding from last male holder. It was contended that the female acquired only a life interest in the estate which could not have been so transferred as to continue to be valid beyond the lifetime of the female. The learned Chief Justice expressing the majority view observed :"an agricultural tenant has no religion and no personal law except as expressly provided in the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. It applies to Hindus, Muslims, Christians etc. regardless of their religion and, therefore, regardless of their personal law except as regards succession in certain cases. It contains its own provisions regarding inheritance and transfers; and when it has left certain matters to be governed by the personal law it has done so by an express provision. Personal law has never been applied proprio vigore to questions of inheritance and transfer of tenancy rights as it has been applied to inheritance and transfer of proprietary rights. " ( 22 ) THE Full Bench decision was followed by a Division Bench of that Court in Mahendra Singh v. Attar Singh ( AIR 1967 All 488 ). Personal law has never been applied proprio vigore to questions of inheritance and transfer of tenancy rights as it has been applied to inheritance and transfer of proprietary rights. " ( 22 ) THE Full Bench decision was followed by a Division Bench of that Court in Mahendra Singh v. Attar Singh ( AIR 1967 All 488 ). The Division Bench held-"the Bhumidhari rights are special rights created by Act I of 1951 and these new rights are solely to be governed by the provisions of the Act. The notions of Hindu Law or Mohammedan Law which would be applicable to other property not governed by any special law cannot be imported into the rights created by this Act. ""the principles of coparcenery property are not applicable to Bhumidhari rights. " ( 23 ) SECTION 152 of U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (1 of 1951) which came up for consideration before the Division Bench was in pari materia with the provisions contained in S. 70 of the Madhya Bharat Act and S. 165 of the Madhya Pradesh Code. That provision, as quoted in para 4 of the report, reads as under:- "152. The interest of a Bhumidhar shall be transferable subject to the conditions hereinafter contained in this chapter. " ( 24 ) A Division Bench in Ramsingh v. Baldev (AIR 1932 All 643) had held:- "an occupancy tenure is the creation of statute, and where a special rule of succession has been laid down in the statute, it is the statute which regulates the devolution of inheritance and not the personal law of the tenant. " ( 25 ) THIS Court is, therefore, unhesitatingly of the opinion that, the two Courts below did err in law in holding that the suit property though allotted by the State in the name of Shobharam alone yet was a property belonging to the joint family of the two brothers in accordance with the principles of Hindu Law governing joint Hindu families and joint Hindu family properties. ( 26 ) THE next question to be determined is whether the plaintiff/respondents had acquired any title by adverse possession over the land survey numbers detailed in para 12 (a) of the plaint. ( 26 ) THE next question to be determined is whether the plaintiff/respondents had acquired any title by adverse possession over the land survey numbers detailed in para 12 (a) of the plaint. ( 27 ) THE Single Bench decision in Mangilal v. Onkar, 1916 JLJ 43, taking the view that Bhumiswami rights are incapable of being acquired by adverse possession stands over ruled by the Full Bench decision in Kashiram Gari v. Nathu, 1980 JLJ 879 , wherein it has been held:-"title may be acquired by adverse possession on the land of a Bhumiswami who can transfer his land without any impediment. A person in possession in his own right and adverse to the recorded Bhumiswami can claim the rights of a Bhumiswami acquired by adverse possession, but when he puts forth such a claim before the State Government his right can be recognised only if it is found that such rights were lawfully acquired. " ( 28 ) THE view taken by the lower appellate Court cannot, therefore, be sustained and it has to be held that Mukund and his heirs could have acquired Bhumiswami rights in the suit property by prescribing title hostile to the real owner i. e. , Shobharam. ( 29 ) HAVING taken the view abovesaid, it was open to this Court to have remanded the case to the lower appellate Court for the purpose of re-hearing and recording a finding on the question whether the acquisition of such title by adverse possession by plaintiff/ appellants was proved. However, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the suit was instituted in the year 1971 and a long period of 20 years has already been lost in litigation. It was suggested during the course of hearing to both the learned counsels for the parties that they should address the Court on this aspect of the case also so that this Court may itself record a finding avoiding the necessity of remand. Thanks to the co-operation extended by both the learned counsels who have addressed this Court in details on this aspect of the case too and carried this Court through the documentary and oral evidence adduced by the parties. Thanks to the co-operation extended by both the learned counsels who have addressed this Court in details on this aspect of the case too and carried this Court through the documentary and oral evidence adduced by the parties. ( 30 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for parties at length this Court is of the opinion that the documentary and oral evidence adduced by the parties in the case unhesitatingly leads to conclusion that in the khata haq malikana from the very beginning, ever since the time of its acquisition by Shobharam, right or wrong late Mukund and his sons were claiming a title by share therein and that is why in early 40s when the khata ryotwari was partitioned, Mukund entered into exclusive possession of the land detailed in para 12 (a) of the plaint forming part of khata haq malikana also. How this conclusion follows will be presently demonstrated by reference to the documentary and oral evidence adduced by the parties. 30-01. Ex. P/10 is the certified true copy of the application dated 4-7-1927 moved by Sitaram to Tahsildar Dewas (Senior), the contents whereof indicate that the Nazarana (premium) payable as a consideration for the Sanad Ex. D/2 was payable in three instalments. The first instalment was deposited in the name of Shobharam, the second instalment was deposited in the name of Sitaram, the amount of third instalment was tendered along with the application making a prayer that the Sanad might be directed to be issued in the names of Shobharam and Mukund sons of Kunwarji. 30-02. The Sanad which was issued thereafter is Ex. D/2 dated 12-3-1928. It declares that the land covered by the grant shall be treated as the personal property of the grantee i. e. , Shobharam, inheritable as per Dharmashastra. 30-03. Ex. P/5 is the certified copy of a report dated 19-2-1933 Submitted by the then Patwari of thevillage in his official capacity reporting the factum of death of Shobharam for the purpose of mutation of the heirs of the deceased in the revenue records touching both the holdings i. e. , the khata ryotwari consisting of 25. 84 acres and the khata malikana haq consisting of 52. 32 acres. 84 acres and the khata malikana haq consisting of 52. 32 acres. The Patwari report is followed by a declaration or Statement in writing subscribed by Sitaram attested by witnesses to the effect that in both the khatas Sitaram had one-half share and his uncle Mukund also had one-half share and he had no objection to the names of the two being mutated on both the khatas in one-half Share each. This very document also incorporates an affidavit (statement on oath) by one Heera Supporting the prayer for mutation in the names of Sitaram and Mukund both in equal rights. 30-04. Ex. P/18 is the certified copy of the order dated 20-3-1941 passed in Appeal Hujur Darbar holding that it was clearly made out that in malikana haq khata and ryot pattedari khata both, late Shobharam in his lifetime had separated Mukund by giving his share but as no steps were taken for bringing on record the name of Mukund in malikana haq khata land that is why name of Mukund could not be directed to be mutated on the death of Shobharam in whose name, the khata haq malikana land Stood recorded. The jurisdiction to determine the question of title being not vested in revenue courts, it was left open to Mukund to have the question of title determined by judicial Court and then have the decision implemented before the revenue courts. 30-05. Ex. P/11 is the certified copy of the application dated 21-1-1952 jointly moved by Shobharam and sons of Mukund in respect of the joint holding admeasuring 52. 32 acres held by them in equal rights and stating that as there was a dispute between the applicants they were seeking a direction to the village Patwari to have their lands demarcated explaining each of the applicants separately the land held by each of them so that the dispute between them could be settled. 30-06. Ex. P/12 is the certified copy of the order dated 17-7-1955 in file No. 73/2/9/1952 relating to release of loan for constructing a well. The order refers to 52. 32 acres of land as Shamalati Khata joint holding) of the applicants who were none else than the four plaintiffs. 30-07. Ex. 30-06. Ex. P/12 is the certified copy of the order dated 17-7-1955 in file No. 73/2/9/1952 relating to release of loan for constructing a well. The order refers to 52. 32 acres of land as Shamalati Khata joint holding) of the applicants who were none else than the four plaintiffs. 30-07. Ex. D/1 is the certified copy of order dated 15-2-1956 passed in proceedings under S. 92 of M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 initiated by the four plaintiffs and Mangilal the defendant No. 1 as plaintiffs against Sitaram s/o Shobharam impleaded therein as defendant, complaining of encroachment by the defendant over 2. 40 acres area of land S. No. 153. It was held by the revenue court that the Khata admeasuring 52. 34 acres was the joint family holding of the parties being separately possessed and enjoyed by them pursuant to a mutual partition and inasmuch as the plaintiffs were in possession as owners the applicability of S. 92, M. B. Land Revenue and Tenancy Act was not attracted. 30-08. Ex. P/13 is certified copy dated 13-10-70 of a letter addressed by Sitaram to the Chairman of the Dewas Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. stating that Govind Mukund had 1/4th right in taking water from the well S. No. 164 which right was being enjoyed by them from times immemorial and therein he i. e. , Sitaram had nothing to object. 30-09. Ex. P/17 is the certified copy of the reply petition dated 12-10-70 filed by the sons of Sitaram in mutation proceedings before Tahsildar where at the sons of Mukund had in their objection-petition claimed mutation over 26. 90 acres area out of the suit holding. The contents of this document show that the objectors i. e. , the sons of Mukundram had alleged the land to be ancestral, wherein they would also have title. 30. 10. Ex. P/9 is the certified copy of the order dated 17-5-1971 rejecting the objection petition in mutation proceedings on the ground that question of disputed title could not be decided by revenue Courts. 30. 11. There are certified copies of revenue records also, filed by the parties and available on record. Khasra Samvat 2011-20l5 (1954-1958) Ex. P/13, Khasra 2020-2024 (1963-1967) Ex. P/14, Khasra Samvat 3025 (1968) Ex. P/15, and Khasra 2026-2027 (19697l) Ex. 30. 11. There are certified copies of revenue records also, filed by the parties and available on record. Khasra Samvat 2011-20l5 (1954-1958) Ex. P/13, Khasra 2020-2024 (1963-1967) Ex. P/14, Khasra Samvat 3025 (1968) Ex. P/15, and Khasra 2026-2027 (19697l) Ex. P/16 show that all the land detailed in para 12 (a) of the plaint and alleged to have fallen to the share of Mukund in the partition, though recorded in the name of Sitaram, have been continuously shown recorded to be in possession of Mukund. 30. 12. Badrilal s/o Sitaram (D. W. 1) appearing as witness No. 1 for the defendants Nos. 2 to 9 made crucial admission at several places specially paras 6, 15 and 19 in his statement. He admitted that the holding admeasuring about 52 acres had been a subject-matter of dispute for over 40 years and that there was no writing available suggestive of the fact that the land was given to Mukund by Chandanma on license or sub-lease but one thing was certain that on the death of Mukund the land was not resumed by Chandanma but continued to be possessed and cultivated by the sons of Mukund and even they (defendants Nos. 2 to 9) had not taken any steps for resuming possession over the land. Vide para 19 he admitting that ever since the date when the land had gone in possession of Mukund and his heirs, till the date of institution of the suit, no steps were taken for resumption of the land and/or for sharing of the profits from Mukund and his heirs and that since very beginning Mukund and his heirs had been cultivating the land as owners. 30. 13. Kashiram s/o Hiralal (D. W. 1) appearing for the defendants Nos. 10 to 17 admitted that the land forming part of haq malikana khata had always been in the family of Mukund and Shobharam and so much of the land out of haq malikana khata as was in possession of the plaintiffs had been in their such possession as owners for last 40 years at least. ( 31 ) ). 10 to 17 admitted that the land forming part of haq malikana khata had always been in the family of Mukund and Shobharam and so much of the land out of haq malikana khata as was in possession of the plaintiffs had been in their such possession as owners for last 40 years at least. ( 31 ) ). The learned counsel for the plaintiff/respondents has rightly submitted that even if the other evidence adduced on behalf of the plaintiffs was not read, the statements of these two D. W. S. were enough to prove all the ingredients of adverse possession leading to vesting of title in the plaintiffs over the land in suit claimed by the plaintiffs. Vide para 20 Badrilal (D. W. 1) has clearly admitted that the plaintiffs had 1/4th right in taking water from the well situated over S. No. 164 and water to that extent was being taken by Mukund and his heirs eversince the lifetime of Chandanma. ( 32 ) IN spite of the land having been recorded in the name of Shobharam, consequent to the grant Ex. D/2 having been made in his name, 24. 06 acres area out of that land has been in exclusive possession of the plaintiffs and the defendant No. 1, since early 40s i. e. , for about a period of 30 years prior to the institution of the suit, late Mukund and his sons prescribing title thereon as owners, continuously and openly. They had always been asserting their rights as owners acting on an assumption though wrong that it was the joint acquisition and therefore, they were entitled to enjoy one-half area of the land which had come to their possession at a time when the other joint holding of theirs known as ryotwari khata was partitioned. They had always been claiming and canvassing their right to have their names recorded as owners in the revenue papers though they could not succeed in doing so because the revenue Courts invariably refused to entertain and enter into question of title. There is no evidence worth the name adduced in support of the theory propounded by the contesting defendants that Mukund's possession had originated in licence at the instance of Chandanma, the widow of Shobharam. There is no evidence worth the name adduced in support of the theory propounded by the contesting defendants that Mukund's possession had originated in licence at the instance of Chandanma, the widow of Shobharam. The trial Court was therefore right in holding that the plaintiffs had succeeded in making out their alternative plea of acquisition of title by adverse possession. ( 33 ) IT has been contended by the learned counsel for the defendant/appellants that the suit land continuously remained recorded in the name of Shobharam (and then Sitaram) even during settlements effected from time to time. The tenancy laws in force from time to time in this part of the country invariably provided finality being attached to the entries made in settlement records, leaving it open to the person aggrieved to file civil suit disputing the correctness of the entry so made which having never been done by the plaintiffs they were debarred from disputing correctness of the entry so made. This argument though attractive cannot be accepted to defeat the claim of the plaintiffs. Finality may attach to the entry made in the revenue papers and the plaintiffs might be debarred by lapse of time from disputing the correctness of the entry so made still it they have perfected title in the property by prescribing hostitle title over the statutory period, the entry in the revenue papers/settlement papers and the finality attaching therewith cannot come in the way of acquisition of title by adverse possession being recognised by a competent Court of law. So long as the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property they can sue for declaration of title and confirmation of possession. A mere adverse entry in revenue papers cannot without more render their suit barred by time. ( 34 ) IN Mst. Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan, AIR 1960 SC 335 their Lordships have held:"there can be no 'right to sue' until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right, by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted. Where there are successive invasions or denials of a right, the right to sue under Art. 120 accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. Where there are successive invasions or denials of a right, the right to sue under Art. 120 accrues when the defendant has clearly and unequivocally threatened to infringe the right asserted by the plaintiff in the suit. Every threat by a party to such a right, however ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat so as to compel him to file a suit. Whether a particular threat gives rise to a compulsory cause of action depends upon the question whether that threat effectively invades or jeopardizes the said right. " ( 35 ) IN Jiwanlal v. State, 1964 MPLJ SN 30, this Court held:"if the owner is in possession of the property it is not obligatory on him to file a suit for declaration of his title because of the adverse entry in the revenue records. He is obliged to file such a suit only when his title to the property is denied by the defendant and the denial has the effect of disturbing his possession or doing him some other injury that is not capable of being remedied otherwise than by a suit for declaration. The plaintiff is not obliged to bring his suit immediately after he has knowledge of the adverse entry but can wait to bring his suit when an attempt is made to oust him from possession on the basis of the entry. Time does not begin to run against the plaintiff until an actual claim is made by the defendant on the strength of the entry in the papers. " ( 36 ) IT is clear that in spite of the land having remained continuously recorded in the name of Shobharam, and thereafter Sitaram, it is Mukund and thereafter his heirs who remained in possession and continued to enjoy the suit land which they always claimed to have fallen to their share in partition and hence remained in their possession as owners. Simply because they were not entered in the revenue papers as such, or they had failed in mutation proceedings and were also directed to have the question of title adjudicated upon by the civil court, they were not necessarily obliged to sue so long as their possession was not disturbed on the strength of the adverse entries in the revenue papers. The suit filed by the plaintiffs seeking declaration of title and confirmation of possession cannot, therefore, be held to be barred by time. ( 37 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the decrees of the Courts below are confirmed though for reasons different from those recorded by the lower appellate Court and partially different from the reasons recorded by the trial Court. The appeal is dismissed. In view of the nature of controversy arising for decision in the case and the relationship of the parties, it is directed that the costs shall be borne by the parties as incurred throughout. Counsel's fee as per schedule, if precertified. Appeal dismissed. .