BHATT, J. ( 1 ). By this Revision under Sec. 397 read with Sec. 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (code for short hereinafter) petitioners have challenged the conviction and sentence order passed by the learned j. M. F. C. , Visnagar in Criminal Case No. 1754 of 1986 which was confirmed in Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1988 by the learned Sessions Judge, at Mehsana. 1. 1. A conspectus of the material facts giving birth to the present revision may be, shortly, stated at this stage so as to appreciate the merits of the present revision and challenge against it. ( 2 ). The petitioners herein are the original accused Nos. 1 and 3 respectively in Criminal Case No. 1754 of 1986. The petitioners and one Kachraji Anopji thakore were tried for the offences punishable under Secs. 457, 380 and 114 of the I. P. Code. According to the prosecution case one P. S. I. Parmar of Visnagar Police Station in course of investigation into the offence of housebreaking, suspected the petitioners to have committed some of the offences of house-breaking. Therefore they were interogated- It is alleged that accused persons had voluntarily discovered some places from where they have committed house-breaking in respect of gold ornaments. It is also alleged that the accused persons discovered a shop of goldsmith to whom they had sold the stolen gold and silver ornaments. After the discovery of the place and the shop of the goldsmith, one Gandabhai Mevabhai filed FIR in Visnagar Police Station. On investigation the accused persons were charge-sheeted in the Court of learned j. M. F. C. , at Visnagar and a Criminal Case No. 1754 of 1986 was filed against all the three accused persons. ( 3 ). The accused persons were charged for the offence punishable under sec (c)s. 457, 380 and 114 of the I. P. Code, at Ex. 7, in the Court of learned J. M. F. C. , to which accused persons denied and claimed to be tried. ( 4 ). The prosecution relied on 5 prosecution witnesses to prove the charges against the accused persons. The viva voce evidence of the prosecution is consisted of following five witnesses : ( 21 ). There is one more infirmity in the aforesaid two panchnamas. Prosecution has not been able to distinctly prove as to what statement was made by whom. The prosecution relied on 5 prosecution witnesses to prove the charges against the accused persons. The viva voce evidence of the prosecution is consisted of following five witnesses : ( 21 ). There is one more infirmity in the aforesaid two panchnamas. Prosecution has not been able to distinctly prove as to what statement was made by whom. In so far as the discovery panchnama of the place of the complainant, at Ex. 17, is concerned the Panch witness Kantilal, at Ex. 16 has stated that two accused persons made the statement leading to the discovery. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove as to who, what statement leading to the discovery, permissible under Sec. 27, in case of joint statement, was made. In the present case the prosecution failed to point out as to who made, what statement, which led to the discovery of the place of the complainant. Prosecution cannot place reliance on such joint statement against the accused under the provisions of Sec. 27. In view of the provisions of Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act, which is in form of proviso to Sees. 24, 25 and 26, a joint statement made by the accused is not per se inadmissible in the evidence but it is very week piece of evidence on which any reliance can be placed by the prosecution. In case of joint statement by the accused, like one on hand, it would be very difficult to come to the conclusion which of the two accused persons gave any specific and definite information to the police and panchas which related distinctly to the discovery of the place of complainant from where the offence of house-breaking was committed. In this view of the matter the aforesaid discovery evidence cannot be used against the accused persons in order to connect them with the crime in question beyond doubt. Similarly insofar as discovery Panchnama at Ex. 13, in respect of the shop of the goldsmith is concerned, prosecution is not in a position to take any slightest of the profit out of the discovery panchnama. In fact panch witness has turned hostile. Apart from that even if the said panchnama is believed to have been proved in that case also the fact discovered is the shop of the goldsmith, who has not supported the prosecution version. In fact panch witness has turned hostile. Apart from that even if the said panchnama is believed to have been proved in that case also the fact discovered is the shop of the goldsmith, who has not supported the prosecution version. The goldsmith, whose shop is alleged to have been discovered by original accused no. 3, Mobuji Keshuji Darbar, does not distinctly as such relate to the culpability of the accused. There is no dispute about the fact that no ornaments were found from the shop of that said goldsmith. The ingots allegad to have been made out of the stolen ornaments and found from the shop of goldsmith do not prove that they were made out of the ornaments stolen from the house of complainant Gandabhai Mevabhai, who is examined at ex. 8. Unfortunately, the goldsmith has also not supported the prosecution case. There is no evidence worth the candle to establish the guilt of the accused for the offences punishable under Sees. 457 and 380 of the I. P. Code. are concerned. The aforesaid two circumstances, as such, are tainted with material discrepancies. Even assuming that those circumstances are proved, then in that case also they cannot be said to have established the complete chain incriminating only and only accused persons for the offences punishable under Sees. 457 and 380 of the I. P. Code. Those circumstances cannot be said to be wholly incompatible with the innocence of the accused. Unfortunately, the learned trial Magistrate, with due respect, has failed to appreciate the relevant facts and the material provisions of Sec. 27 of the evidence Act and the settled proposition of law on this score. This Court is, extremely, unable to. uphold the conviction and sentence order passed by the learned trial Magistrate and which came to be confirmed by the learned sessions Judge, Mehsana. ( 22 ). The prosecution had also relied on the FIR produced at Ex. 9. It is dated 3-7-1986. The FIR is filed by the complainant Gandabhai Mevabhai, who stated in his complaint that the theft in his house occurred almost 15 days before. No reasonable explanation is given as to why FIR is lodged very late. In absence of any explanation for delay in FIR the version of the prosecution is weakened. In the present case it will be unsafe to place reliance on such FIR. No reasonable explanation is given as to why FIR is lodged very late. In absence of any explanation for delay in FIR the version of the prosecution is weakened. In the present case it will be unsafe to place reliance on such FIR. Delayed FIR does not help the prosecution. Mere delay is not fatal in every case. Delay has to be explained. It is found from the facts of the present case that the complainant could have given the FIR on the same day as there is an outpost in village Bhotwa, where complainant is residing. The FIR is lodged after almost 15 days before Police Inspector mr. Parmar on 3-7-1986. That in the present case delay in lodging FIR also creates suspicion about the version of the prosecution. The trial Court as well as the Sessions Court have committed serious illegality in not considering this aspect in favour of the accused in the present case. ( 23 ). The FIR in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be over emphasised from the stand point of the accused. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the Police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain prior information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of eye witnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment which is the creature of an after-thought. On account of delay the report only gets bereft and the advantage of spontaineitly danger creeps in and the introduction. of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the FIR should be satisfactorily accounted for. This proposition of law is very well settled. It is true that FIR is not substantive piece of evidence. It is also true that the FIR need not be elaborate with meticulously prepared. Nonetheless the importance of FIR made promptly cannot be minimised. This proposition of law is very well settled. It is true that FIR is not substantive piece of evidence. It is also true that the FIR need not be elaborate with meticulously prepared. Nonetheless the importance of FIR made promptly cannot be minimised. The underlying object of Sec. 154 of the Code is to obtain earlier information of an alleged criminal activity on record the circumstances before there is time for them to embellishment the prosecution story. The learned A. P. P. has not been able to show any reason why FIR came to be lodged 50 (15) days after the occurrence of the alleged theft in the house of the complainant. It appears that the P. S. I. on suspicion arrested the accused persons and thereafter in view of the alleged confession of the accused the fir is lodged without explaining the delay. In such a situation the FIR cannot be said to be realiable. Courts below have seriously erred in placing reliance on such FIR. ( 24 ). Even assuming that the two aforesaid circumstances, relied on by the prosecution are established, then, in that case also it cannot be concluded that the complicity of the accused persons is established beyond-reasonable doubt for the alleged offences punishable under Sees. 457 and 380 of the i. P. Code. ( 25 ). It must also be remembered that inference under Sec. 114 (a ). should never be reached unless it is a necessary inference from the circumstances of the given case which cannot be explained on any other hypothesis save and except that of the guilt of the accused. Such is not the fact scenario in the present case. The Court is entitled to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. In view of the provisions of Sec. 114 of the Evidence Act, the aforesaid two circumstances even if they are accepted at their face value then also they do not lead to any impeachable inference of the guilt of the accused persons. This is not a case of recovery or discovery of some visible material from the place shown by the accused. This is not a case of recovery or discovery of some visible material from the place shown by the accused. It is true that the expression fact discovered includes not only the physical object produced but also the place from which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this. This proposition is settled, this view is supported by the decision of Supreme Court rendered in Mohmed Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1976 SC 483 . In that judgment the decision of Supreme Court in Udaibhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1116 is relied on. In the present case no physical object is produced either from the house of the complainant. It is also an admitted fact that the stolen ornaments are also not producted from the shop of the goldsmith. The goldsmith also has not supported the prosecution case. The prosecution case is that acused Mobuji Keshuji had shown the shop of the goldsmith. The Panch has also not supported the prosecution case. Second Punch is not examinted. Therefore the discovery Panchnama at ex. 14 is not proved. Even if it held to be proved, it is not reliable. The discovery in Ex. 14, Panchnama is pursuant to the statement of one accused persons. As per the Panchnama, at Ex. 17 accused Meghaji Godadji pointed out the place of complainant from where nothing was found or produced. The Panch witness Kantibhai Leelabhai, at Ex. 16 has not supported the prosecution version. The Second Panch Leelabhai Mafabhai is not examined. Under this circumstances the Panch at Exh. 14 and 17 are not reliable and the Courts below have committed serious error in placing reliance on them. ( 26 ). The accused persons came to be convicted only on the aforesaid two circumstances. The trial Court and the Sessions Court have committed serious illegality in placing reliance on the aforesaid two circumstances of discovery. It is highly unsafe to convict the accused persons merely on the basis of uncorroborated circumstantial evidence pertaining to the alleged discovery or recovery of place. Therefore, even if it is presumed that the aforesaid circumstances are proved as required then also that cannot be relied on simplicitor without corroboration to prove the complicity of the accused persons for the offences punishable under Secs. 457 and 380 of the I. P. Code. Therefore, even if it is presumed that the aforesaid circumstances are proved as required then also that cannot be relied on simplicitor without corroboration to prove the complicity of the accused persons for the offences punishable under Secs. 457 and 380 of the I. P. Code. In State of Punjab v. Gurnam Singh, reporated in air 1984 SC 1799 , the apex Court has held that the conviction based merely on uncorroborated evidence as to recovery of weapon at the instance of accused is unsafe. ( 27 ). In the facts and circumstances of the present case and on the close analysis and appreciation of the evidence this Court has no hesitation in holding that the conviction of the accused persons for the offences punishable under Secs. 457 and 380 of the I. P. Code is bad in law and deserves to be quashed. The conviction and sentence order passed by the tiral Magistrate and confirmed by the Sessions Court are required to set aside. ( 28 ). Learned Counsel for the petitioner-original accused persons has, also, fairly stated that the accused persons do not claim any right over the muddamal gold ornaments. The muddamal ornaments were recovered by the Investigation Officer from the shop or one Soni Kanubhai Narsinhbhai, who was examined at Ex. 12, who was turned hostile to the prosecution case. It appears that while convicting the accused persons the trial Court was pleased to return the godl ornaments to the complainant as he was found best entitled to the possession thereof. This finding is confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge in a conviction Appeal No. 13 of 1988. Still however this Court had issued notice to goldsmith Shri Soni Kanubhai narsinhbhai. Notice is served on him and he has not appeared in the present revision. No claim is nude on behalf of the accused persons by the learned counsel appearing for them. In the facts and circumstances the order of the trial Magistrate to return the gold ornaments to the complainant appears to be justified and requires no interference even in the revision while setting aside the impugned conviction and sentence order. ( 29 ). No claim is nude on behalf of the accused persons by the learned counsel appearing for them. In the facts and circumstances the order of the trial Magistrate to return the gold ornaments to the complainant appears to be justified and requires no interference even in the revision while setting aside the impugned conviction and sentence order. ( 29 ). In the result the Revision Application is allowed, the impugned conviction and sentence order passed by the learned trial Magistrate in Criminal Case No. 1754 of 1986 and confirmed by the Sessions Court in Criminal Appeal No. 13 of 1988 is quashed. The petitioners-original accused Nos. 1 and 3 are acquitted from the cliarges against them for the offences punishable under Secs. 389, 457 read with Sec. 114 of the I. P. Code. The amount of fine, if paid, by the accused persons shall be refunded to the accused. The order of returning of muddamal article to the original complainant is confirmed. Rule made absolute accordingly. .