Judgment :- 1. This petition under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is by the defendant in O.S. No. 25 of 1988. Upon an application by plaintiff who is the respondent to this petition a commission was appointed under Rule 9 of Order 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) for the purpose of measuring and demarcating the property in the suit. The commission visited the property on 25-6-1989 and filed his report with a plan, on 30-1-1990. The defendant filed LA. No. 2893 of 1990 and prayed that the report of the commissioner and the plan, be set aside. The learned Munsiff, Kayamkulam, dismissed the application. The order of dismissal of LA. No. 2893 of 1990 is impugned by the defendant. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are briefly as under: O.S. No. 25 of 1988 is for fixation of boundary between the properties in schedule A and B which belong respectively to the plaintiff and the defendant. The evidence of the Commissioner and the surveyor was led in the application. The property in schedule A consists of survey No. 545/7 and 547/8-A and the property in schedule B consists of survey Nos. 547/8,545/7 and 544/9- A. The main grievance of the defendant is that the plan given by the commissioner does not give the check lines where the boundary bends at one place. According to the defendant, the commissioner's report is contrary to the facts, for two reasons: a ) The commissioner has assumed in his report that the plaint A Schedule property includes the Orange shaded portion which has been acquired for a public road. According to the defendant the plaintiffs property of 29 cents must exclude the two cents of property since acquired for the road. b) The commissioner has not shown in his report the existence of roads to the north and east of the plaintiffs property. 3. The learned judge considered the evidence. He accepted the explanation of the Commissioner that notwithstanding absence of check lines in the plan, the schedule A property includes the orange and red portions acquired for the road. He rejected the application. 4. 3. The learned judge considered the evidence. He accepted the explanation of the Commissioner that notwithstanding absence of check lines in the plan, the schedule A property includes the orange and red portions acquired for the road. He rejected the application. 4. In view of the facts of this case and arguments advanced by counsel, two questions arise for consideration: (i) Does the rejection by the Munsiff, of the application to set aside the report of the Commissioner appointed under Rule 9 of Order 26 of the Code constitute "any case which has been decided by any court", within the meaning of sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code? (ii) Did the learned Munsiff in making the impugned order, exercise jurisdiction not vested in him by law or failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested or acted in exercise of his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity? 5. The High Court's power to revise the orders of subordinate courts is circumscribed by the limitations contained in S.115 of the Code. The limitations relating to jurisdictional errors contained in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section(1) of S.115 attract frequent application. However, the Revisional jurisdiction under S.115 of the Code can be invoked only in "any case which has been decided" by the subordinate court. These words circumscribe and limit the Revisional jurisdiction in a fundamental way. If the order sought to be revised does not "decide" "a case" the High Court does not possess the power to revise such orders. 6. In every case in which the High Court's power of Revision is invoked the fundamental question is: Does the order of the subordinate court decider case? What is the content of the expression "any case which has been decided"? Does the word "case" mean the whole suit or proceedings? Or does it also apply to a part of the proceedings? Must the order dispose off the entire proceedings? What must the order of the subordinate court do, in order to constitute "any case which has been decided?" These questions have been answered by the Supreme Court: (i) The expression "case is a word of comprehensive import embracing all civil proceedings, other than suits. (ii) "Case" includes a part of the suit or proceedings and need not dispose off the entire suit or proceedings. (ii) "Case" includes a part of the suit or proceedings and need not dispose off the entire suit or proceedings. (iii) In order to constitute "a case which has been decided", the order sought to be revised must decide or affect the right and obligation of a party (Major S.S. Khanna v. Brigadier F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497). (iv) A case may be said to be decided if the court adjudicates, for the purpose of the suit or other proceeding, some right or obligation of the parties in controversy. (Baldevdas Shivlal & another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. & Others (AIR 1970 SC 406). 7. The Code underwent a change with effect from 1-2-1977, by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976). The amending Act retains the originals. 115 in tact, except that it is now renumbered as sub-sections (1) and adds a proviso to it. The basic limitation in the original section that there must be "case decided", did not undergo any change. The amending Act added a new sub-section (2). The effect of the proviso to sub-section (1) and the Explanation after sub-section (2) need to 'be examined. It has been urged that the proviso and Explanation have so enlarged the meaning of the expression "case decided" that any order made in a pending suit or proceeding is "a case decided". If this argument is valid, the impugned order, as indeed every order, constitutes a "case which has been decided". 8. The effect of the proviso may be considered first. The proviso/- to sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code, enjoins that the High Court shall not revise an order except where (a) the order, if made in favour of the petitioner, would have finally disposed off the suit or (b) the order, if not revised, would cause failure of justice. The proviso introduces a further restriction on the High Court's power of revision and limits it to specified situations. The original words of the section which is now sub-section (1), laid down that the High Court may call for the record of "any case which has been decided". These words which limit the High Court's power of revision to "any case decided" have not been touched by the proviso. These 1. Sub-section (1) of S.115 of Code of Civil Procedure: "115. These words which limit the High Court's power of revision to "any case decided" have not been touched by the proviso. These 1. Sub-section (1) of S.115 of Code of Civil Procedure: "115. Revision - (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been' decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears (a ) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit:" 2. Proviso reads: "Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made." words limit the High Court's Revisional power to those cases where the subordinate court "decided" "any case". The rule of interpretation of provisos, will place the meaning of this proviso in perspective. While sub-section (1) empowers the High Court to revise orders amounting to any "case decided", the proviso, creates an exception, to the power of revision created by sub-section (1). The power of revision can be used if there is a "case decided". When there is a "case decided" the power of revision shall not be exercised unless the "case decided" falls within the cases set out in clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. This is the plain meaning of the proviso. The effect of an excepting proviso is to except it out of the proceedings portion of the enactment or to qualify what is enacted therein which but for the proviso would be within it (Craies on Statute Law --Seventh Edition, Page 218). If the proviso were not there, the power of revision would not be subject to clauses (a) and (b). If the proviso were not there, the power of revision would not be subject to clauses (a) and (b). The proviso is but a limitation on the exercise of power enacted by sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code. It cannot be construed as enlarging the scope of revisional power beyond what is stated in sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code. The proviso applies only if there is "a case decided". Once there is a case decided, and the High Court proposes to revise the order of the subordinate court, the proviso cautions the High Court that it shall consider whether the situations defined in clauses (a) and (b) exist. If they don't, the High Court is, by the proviso enjoined not to revise the order. The proviso begins with the order "the High Court shall not vary or reverse any order", unless the two conditions at (a) and (b) are fulfilled. The proviso does not say that where conditions (a) or (b) exist, the order sought to be revised need not constitute "a case decided" or that there need not be a "case decided". It is erroneously assumed in some judicial decisions that the proviso has so enlarged the meaning of "case decided" as to include in the "case decided" every order irrespective of whether it decides a right or obligation. If this argument is accepted it means that the proviso has wiped out the main-sub¬section (1) which it is supposed to qualify. A plain reading of the proviso leaves no doubt, that it qualifies and limits the revision of "cases decided". It subserves the revisional power of the High Court created by sub-section (1) of S.115 and does not operate to neutralize it. 9. The proviso precludes the exercise of power by the High Court referred to in limited cases specified in clauses (a) or (b). The restriction imposed by the proviso on the High Court's power to revise the orders of the subordinate courts is not an enlargement of the meaning of the expression "any case which has been decided". The proviso comes into operation only if the conditions in sub-section (1) of S.115 are fulfilled. One of those conditions is that there must be "a case which has been decided". The proviso comes into operation only if the conditions in sub-section (1) of S.115 are fulfilled. One of those conditions is that there must be "a case which has been decided". All that the proviso means is that the exercise of High Court's power of revision is limited by conditions imposed by clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. But the power of revision arises only if a case has been decided. This basic condition imposed by sub-section (1) of S.115 continues to govern the revisional power. The Allahabad High Court has taken the same view (Manohar Lai v. Valerior (Cannpore) Pvt. Ltd. & another, AIR 1980 All. 327). 10. The construction of the proviso to sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code and the explanation, propounded by me, is entirely consistent with the statement of objects and reasons of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976)1. The proviso to sub-section (1) was enacted with the object of limiting the exercise of Revisional power against interlocutory orders. The meaning of "case decided" was not intended to be touched. The explanation was added so as to clear the doubt as to whether interlocutory orders are included within "case decided". The idea that decision or adjudication of a right or obligation, is not necessary to constitute "case decided" was not in the mind of the legislature. 11. The explanation explains that any case which has been decided" includes any order made or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suitor other proceeding. The function of an explanation is to make clear or intelligible what is already enacted. Consistently with its function the explanation clarifies that the order sought to be revised need not be an order disposing off the whole suit or proceeding. What it means is that any order or an order deciding an issue, may amount to "any case which has been decided". It does not lay down that every order made in the course of a suit or proceeding or an order deciding an issue need not have the attributes of "a case decided". The characteristics or attributes of "a case .... decided" have been stated by the Supreme Court. (Major S.S. Khanna v. Brigedier F.J. Dillion, AIR 1964 SC 497; Baldevdasshivlal & another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. & others, AIR 1970 SC 406). The characteristics or attributes of "a case .... decided" have been stated by the Supreme Court. (Major S.S. Khanna v. Brigedier F.J. Dillion, AIR 1964 SC 497; Baldevdasshivlal & another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. & others, AIR 1970 SC 406). The explanation merely lays down that the orders specified therein shall not be excluded from the "case decided" merely by reason of their interlocutory character. The explanation does not suggest, even remotely that the meaning of the expression "any case which has been decided" has been so enlarged as to cover cases which do not decide any right or obligation of a party. This has been made clear by the Supreme Court in Baldevdas Shivlal (Baldevdas Shivlal & another v. Filmistan Distributors (India) Pvt. Ltd. & others, AIR 1970 SC 406) where the judgment in S.S. Khanna (Major S.S. Khanna v. Brigedier F.J. Dillion, AIR 1964 SC 497) was explained. The Supreme Court observed: "But it was not decided in S.S. Khanna's case that every order of the court in the course of a suit amounts to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided if the court adjudicates some right or obligation ; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of S.115 of the Civil P.C." (emphasis supplied) The explanation extends the Revisional power of the High Court to cases in which only an issue is decided and which do not terminate the suits. The basic requirement that 1. "The committee, however, feel that, in addition to the restrictions contained in S.115, an overall restriction on the scope of application for revision against interlocutory orders should be imposed. Having regard to the recommendations made by the Law Commission in its Fourteenth and Twenty seventh Reports, the Committee recommended that S.115 of the Code should be retained subject to the modification that no revision application should lie against an interlocutory order unless either of the following conditions is satisfied, namely: (i) That if the orders were made in favour of the applicant, it would finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings: or (ii) That if the order, if allowed to stand, is likely to occasion failure of justice or cause an irreparable injury. The Committee feel that the expression "case decided" should be defined so that the doubt as to whether S.115 applies to an interlocutory order may be set at rest. Accordingly, the Committee have added a proviso and an Explanation to S.115." 2. Explanation: In this section, the expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding." there must be a "case decided" continues to be an essential component of S.115 of the Code. 12. In Harvinder Kaur (Harvinder Kaur & Anr. v. Godha Ram & Anr., AIR 1979 P & H. 76) the Punjab & Haryana High Court and in Manohar Lai (Manohar Lai v. Valerior (Cannpore) Pvt. Ltd. & anr. AIR 1980 All. 327) the Allahabad High Court, held that the explanation to S.115 of the Code 'does not mean that an order sought to be revised need not be "a case decided". The correct view therefore is that the explanation merely means that the order sought to be revised need not dispose off the whole suit or proceeding. But in any event, it must decide or adjudicate upon a right or obligation and must amount to a "case decided". 13. Having regard to the analysis made in the foregoing para graphs I hold that the prerequisite for exercise of the power under S.115 of the Code is that the subordinate court's order must constitute "any case which has been decided". The subordinate court's order does not constitute "any case which has been decided" unless it decides any right or obligation of a party to the suit or proceeding. If the order of the subordinate court does not constitute "a case decided" there is no question of exercising Revisional power. For reasons stated in paragraphs 8 to 12 above, the proviso to sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code and the explanation do not neutralise or wipe out the fundamental prerequisite that the order sought to be revised must be "a case which has been decided". The proviso and the explanation operate within the parameters of "case decided". The operation of the proviso and the explanation arise only where "any case which has been decided" exists. 14. The next question is whether the impugned order decides or adjudicates upon any right or obligation of either party to the suit. 15. The proviso and the explanation operate within the parameters of "case decided". The operation of the proviso and the explanation arise only where "any case which has been decided" exists. 14. The next question is whether the impugned order decides or adjudicates upon any right or obligation of either party to the suit. 15. In the light of the Supreme Court's judgment defining what a case decided is, the question for consideration is whether the impugned order rejecting the prayer for setting aside the commissioner's report decides or adjudicates upon any right or obligation of the parties. This calls for an appreciation of the nature of the order. Where a court deems local investigation to be requisite or proper for the purpose of elucidating any matter in dispute, the Court may issue a commission. (Rule 9 Order 26 C.P.C.). The commissioner after local inspection and taking evidence, is required to return such evidence to the court with his report (Rule 10(1) Order 26 C.P.C.). The report of the commissioner and evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit. Such evidence, namely, the report and the evidence together "shall form part of the record". The commissioner is liable to be examined in the court personally, touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report. (Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 26 C.P.C.). The court is not bound to accept the report or the evidence (Code of Civil Procedure - Mulla). It evaluates the report and the quality of the evidence. Upon such evaluation, if, the court is "dissatisfied with the proceedings of the Commissioner" it may direct further inquiry to be made as it thinks fit. 16. Against these provisions of law, consider the legal status and value of the report of the commission appointed under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code. 17. Although the report of the commissioner is itself evidence in the suit the status of the report is not higher than any other piece of evidence (Parvathi Rudrani v. Lexmi Yesoda, 1981 KLT 357 para.10). All that sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 26 confers on the report of the commissioner, is the status of evidence. That is why it has been characterised as "evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record". All that sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 26 confers on the report of the commissioner, is the status of evidence. That is why it has been characterised as "evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record". The report made by the commissioner in regard to the facts noticed by him is not binding on the court. The court may accept the report or reject it. It is open to the court to consider at a later stage of the suit in the light of the evidence adduced, the report of a commissioner which has been rejected earlier and examine the commissioner again (Mulla on the Civil Procedure Code, page 1879 & Ashutosh v. R.C. Dey, AIR 1953 A.P. 133). It is permissible, having regard to the facts of individual cases, to appoint successive commissions for the purposes laid down in Order 26 of the Code (Swam/ Premananda Bharathi v. Swami Yogananda Bharathi, 1985 KLT 144). But the very fact that successive commissions may be appointed signifies that the report of the commissioner is" only a piece of evidence which may be evaluated at different stages and if the court is not satisfied with the report the court may appoint another commission. In other words, the commission's report is essentially a temporary, transient, step in the process of arriving at a final determination of the cause. It is not determinative of any right or obligation. 18. It is necessary to understand what the court has done by the impugned order. The court refused to set aside the report of the commissioner as it was satisfied with the evidence and report of the commissioner. The result of the order is that the commissioner's report and the evidence continue to be a part of the evidence. In a nutshell, therefore, what the impugned order has done is to continue to keep on the record of the suit the report of the commissioner which, as already stated, is of the same character as any other piece of evidence now on record or that may be brought on record in future. It is not different from a document which may be prod need by the parties in evidence or the statements in the testimony of witnesses or the parties. It is not different from a document which may be prod need by the parties in evidence or the statements in the testimony of witnesses or the parties. By its very character the commissioner's report is subject to the same process of evaluation, acceptance or rejection, as every other piece of evidence is. All that the impugned order did was to refuse to reject the evidence brought on the record through the commissioner's report. Does this order "decide" a case? Does it "adjudicate" upon a right or obligation of either party? 19. That brings me to the question of the meaning of "right" and "obligation". In its ordinary meaning the word "obligation" means something that one is bound to do or forbear, an imperative duty as imposed by a promise, religion, conscience, ideals or social standards. In its legal meaning it is a duty arising out of a contract or a legal liability. "Obligation" thus conveys the sense of being bound to do or forbear from doing something. In legal parlance obligation means a duty enforceable by law. It implies a right in any person to which it is correlated and it restricts the freedom of the obligee with respect to definite acts and forbearances. In order that such obligation is enforced by a court, it must be a legal obligation and not merely a moral obligation. The obligation may arise out of a duty cast by the statute, a contract or customary law. "Right" is something to which one has a just claim or a power, privilege or condition of existence in which one has a natural claim of enjoyment or possession. Again, "right" may be an interest which is recognised and protected by law. The possessor of the right can enforce it by an appropriate action in a court. It furnishes a complete answer to any action or claim intended to interfere with such right. The "right" or "obligation" may relate to the right to property, the right in respect of a procedure or a right of access to a judicial Tribunal, 01 any other right recognised bylaw. The "right" or "obligation" may be limited to the en tire subject matter of the right or a part of it. 20. The "right" or "obligation" may relate to the right to property, the right in respect of a procedure or a right of access to a judicial Tribunal, 01 any other right recognised bylaw. The "right" or "obligation" may be limited to the en tire subject matter of the right or a part of it. 20. If the evidence of the commission's report is merely evidence, does it decide a duty, does it create a relationship which has a sense of being bound to do or forebear from doing something? All that it does is to bring before the court a set of facts - liable to be accepted or rejected. By itself it creates no obligation. So also it creates no interest in the subject matter. Nor does it enable either party to interfere with the right or claim of its opponent. A true comprehension of the nature of the evidence of the commission, suggests that far from deciding any right or obligation, the commission's evidence, merely provides, a vehicle through which determination of a right or obligation may be made in future, when the suit or other proceeding is decided. A vehicle which carries the parties and the court towards the determination of any right or obligation, is not the same thing as the decision or adjudication. The report of the commission is an instrument which helps decision-making. It is not a decision or adjudication. 21. It is useful to consider how admission of evidence is understood in the context of "case decided". In Parsuram Dubey (Parasuram Dubey v. Mahanth Laxman Das & Ors., AIR 1974 Pat. 278), Sagarmol (Sagarmol v. Gulabchand & Ors, AIR 1978 P & H. 251) and Nandkishore (Nandkishore v. Krishna Chand, AIR 1977 H.P. 68) the Patna, Punjab & Haryana and Himachal Pradesh High Courts respectively have held that order admitting a document in evidence is not a "case decided". Therefore, it is clear that admission of evidence - in this case the commission's report -does not decide any right or obligation. The court may, on evaluation, reject the evidence. The Patna High Court has gone to the extent of suggesting that even if such evidence causes prejudice to party, it does not decide a case, because such decision can be challenged in appeal. 22. The court may, on evaluation, reject the evidence. The Patna High Court has gone to the extent of suggesting that even if such evidence causes prejudice to party, it does not decide a case, because such decision can be challenged in appeal. 22. No doubt the Code of Civil Procedure enacts that the report of the commission "shall form part of the record". In the case of other evidence, it becomes part of the record when tendered and admitted. This distinction between the two modes of admission of evidence merely suggests that the commission's report becomes evidence by operation of law; the other documents become evidence by act of parties. In both the cases what is brought on record is nothing more than evidence. 23. Smf. Harvinder Kaur (Smt. Harvinder Kaur & Ann v.Godha Ram & Ann, AIR 1979 P & H. 76) was a case of rejection of an application for issuance of a commission under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the order rejecting the application for appointment of a commission does not decide or adjudicate upon any right or obligation, and therefore is not "case decided". In Ramgulam Chowdhary, (Ramgulam Choudhary & Ors. v. Nawin Ch-oudhary and Ors., AIR 1972 Pat. 499) a case from Patna, it was held that an order permitting the plaintiff to examine a witness (handwriting expert) after the defendant had closed his case, was not "a case decided". The importance of this decision is that it lists some of the orders which do not constitute "cases decided". "As for example, some question in examination or cross-examination is disallowed, while it ought to have been allowed; some document is wrongly admitted in evidence, while it ought not to have been admitted, a pleader commissioner's report is confirmed or set aside and further investigation ordered; these will be the types of interlocutory orders which to my mind cannot be interfered with by the High Court within the meaning of S.115 of the Code". (emphasis supplied) 24. In Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Rajarishi Exports (P) Ltd., AIR1978 Ori.179) the Orissa High Court held that rejection of a petition requiring the opposite party to answer interrogatories in more clear explicit and specific manner, is revisable under S.115 of the Code. (emphasis supplied) 24. In Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. (Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. v. M/s. Rajarishi Exports (P) Ltd., AIR1978 Ori.179) the Orissa High Court held that rejection of a petition requiring the opposite party to answer interrogatories in more clear explicit and specific manner, is revisable under S.115 of the Code. It held that that the explanation to S.115 of the Code, introduced by the amendment in 1976, has so widened the meaning of the phrase "case decided" that the Supreme Court's judgment in Baldevdas Shivlal (Baldevdas Shivlal & Ann v. Filmstan Distributors (India) pvt. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 406) is "no longer good" The judgment of Orissa High Court does not contain any reasons for its conclusion about the effect of the explanation. The statement of objects and reasons of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act (Act 104 of 1976) also negative the interpretation adopted by the Orissa High Court. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Baldevdas (Baldevdas Shivlal & Ann v* Filmstan Distributors (India) pvt. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 406) while explaining S.S. Khanna's (S.S.'Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497) case, elucidates the effect of the explanation introduced several years later. The Supreme Court says that S.S. Khanna's (S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497) case did not hold that every order of the court amounts to a case decided. This implies that "deciding a case" and making an order during the pendency of a suit or proceeding are different activities. The court makes several orders during the course of a suit or proceeding. Some of them adjudicate or decide rights or obligations-others do not. The revisional authority extends only to those orders which decide rights or obligations. The explanation does not say that every order, whether it decides a right or not, is a "case decided". In my opinion the judgment in Baldevdas Shivlal (Baldevdas Shivlal & Ann v. Filmstan Distributors (India) pvt. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 406) continues to govern cases of revision even after the introduction of the amendment to Civil Procedure Code. The judgment of Orissa High Court, based on the erroneous assumption that after the introduction of the explanation every order is a "case decided", does not lay down the correct law. 25. Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 406) continues to govern cases of revision even after the introduction of the amendment to Civil Procedure Code. The judgment of Orissa High Court, based on the erroneous assumption that after the introduction of the explanation every order is a "case decided", does not lay down the correct law. 25. In Sabitri Debi (Sabitri Debi & am v. Baikuntha Das & anr., AIR 1979 Ori.140) the Orissa High Court held that an order refusing to send a document to an expert is not a' case decided". Six years later in Doshei Dei, (Doshei Dei and others v. Rama Fiouta & ors., AIR 1985 Ori.77) while holding that the explanation had widened the meaning of "case decided," the Orissa High Court affirmed that "every order passed by a court in the course of a suitor proceeding does not amount to a case decided". In a nutshell therefore, the Orissa High Court also considers that every order must be examined to see whether it satisfies the requirements of "case decided". The Calcutta High Court, (Food Corporation of India v. Birendra Nath Dhar AIR 1978 Cal.264) held that in view of the amendment to S.115 of the Code, Baldevdas (Baldevdas Shivlal & Ann v. Filmstan Distributors (India) pvt. Ltd. & Ore., AIR 1970 SC 406) is no longer applicable. For reasons already stated in paragraph 24 above, this view is not correct. In Mahant Som Prakash Das (Mahant Som Prakash Das v. Sri. Udasin Pan-chayati Akhara Bara & others, AIR 1983 Pat. 35) refusal by a court to entertain documents not in possession of a party was held to negative the right to produce evidence granted by Rules 1 and 2 of Order 13 of the Code. Consequently there was a "case decided". This case is based on a finding that the right of a litigant to lead evidence was adjudicated upon. Therefore the judgment is correct on the special facts of that case. In Orugunati Ranganayakamma (Orugunati Ranganayakamma v. Madhuri Lakshminarasamma, AIR 1979 A.P. 8) the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that refusal to appoint a commission to examine a witness may cause miscarriage of justice. There is no finding that such an order is "case.... decided". 26. Therefore the judgment is correct on the special facts of that case. In Orugunati Ranganayakamma (Orugunati Ranganayakamma v. Madhuri Lakshminarasamma, AIR 1979 A.P. 8) the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that refusal to appoint a commission to examine a witness may cause miscarriage of justice. There is no finding that such an order is "case.... decided". 26. To sum up therefore: (i) The High Court's revisional powers under S.115 of the Code can be exercised only if the order of the subordinate court sought to be revised constitutes "any case which has been decided". (ii) The court makes numerous orders during the pendency of a suit or proceeding. Every such order is not "case which has been decided" within the meaning of sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code. Some of these orders decide or adjudicate upon rights or obligations of litigants. The court also makes orders which do not determine any right or obligation. It is only those orders which decide or adjudicate upon rights or obligations of either party that come within the meaning of "case which has been decided". (iii) The proviso to sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act - Act 104 of 1976 restricts the High Court's power of revision created by sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code, to those cases which fall within clauses (a) and (b) of the proviso. The proviso therefore operates to limit or restrict the general power of revision created by sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code. The proviso does not even remotely imply or mean that an order made during the pendency of a suit or proceeding, irrespective of whether it decides a right or obligation or not, is "any case which has been decided" within the meaning of sub-section (1) of S.115 of the Code. The legislature, aware of the meaning of "any case which has been decided" has refrained from touching the fundamental prerequisite of Revisional power that the order sought to be revised must constitute "case which has been decided". (iv) Similarly the explanation introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act - Act 104 of 1976 does not enlarge and extend the meaning of the expression "any case which has been decided" to every interlocutory order irrespective of whether it decides or adjudicates upon a right or obligation or not. (iv) Similarly the explanation introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act - Act 104 of 1976 does not enlarge and extend the meaning of the expression "any case which has been decided" to every interlocutory order irrespective of whether it decides or adjudicates upon a right or obligation or not. The explanation was introduced for the purpose of clearing the doubt as to whether interlocutory orders fall within the expression "any case which has been decided". The explanation merely lays down that an interlocutory order may also constitute "any case which has been decided". It does not lay down that a decision or adjudication of a right or obligation is not necessary to constitute "any case which has been decided". The explanation explains the meaning of "any case which has been decided". Its purpose is to make known and intelligible what has already been enacted. Consistently with this purpose the explanation merely clarifies that "case decided" may cover interlocutory orders also. (v) The report made and evidence recorded by the commission for local investigation has the status of evidence and nothing beyond that. All that the commission's report and evidence does is to bring before the court, a set of facts which are subject to the same process of evaluation, acceptance or rejection by the court, as any other piece of evidence is. The report and the evidence of the commission is a vehicle through which the court proceeds towards the determination of a right or obligation arising in the suit or proceeding. It is an instrument which helps in decision-making and therefore is not the same thing as the decision itself. An order appointing commission or refusing to set aside the commission, is a step in the process of elucidation of matters in dispute before the court. Such a step does not decide or adjudicate upon any right. Therefore such an order is not a "case which has been decided". (vi) The order rejecting application for setting aside commission's report has the effect of continuing to keep on the record of the suit the report and evidence of the commission. It does not decide or adjudicate upon any right. 27. The learned Munsiff possesses the authority to appoint a commission, refuse to appoint a commission or to cancel or refuse to cancel the commission appointed by him. It does not decide or adjudicate upon any right. 27. The learned Munsiff possesses the authority to appoint a commission, refuse to appoint a commission or to cancel or refuse to cancel the commission appointed by him. In making the impugned order he has acted within his authority. He has exercised the power which he possessed. In exercise of such power he has not committed any irregularity or illegality. Even if he is in error in accepting the explanation of the commissioner, he is still within his authority. No error which justifies interference in revisional jurisdiction is discernible. 28. In view of my conclusions this civil revision petition is dismissed.