Judgment : The appeal and the AAO are by the defendant in the suit O.S.No.101 of 1979 against whom the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and damages, and for possession of the property has been decreed, dismissing his application I.ANo.996 of 1979 under Scc.9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act. 2. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff is the owner of the property and the defendant is a tenant therein. On the allegation that there was arrears of rent from 12. 1974 to 30.8.1977 amounting to Rs.8,800 and has caused damage to the property to the value of Rs.3,000 and the defendant is liable to pay that amount, and the tenancy has been terminated, and the plaintiff wants the defendant to be evicted, and that the defendant has set up title against the plaintiff, the suit has been filed. 3. The defendant company contended that there was an oral agreement to sell the property to it by the plaintiff for a sum of Rs.75,000 in respect of which it paid an advance of Rs.5,000, and after this agreement there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and therefore it did not pay the rent, and hence the plaintiff is not entitled to evict it. It would further submit that it never set up hostile title in respect of the suit property against the plaintiff. Then the defendant submitted to a decree for arrears of rent of Rs.8,800 and prayed that a decree may be passed for this amount and in respect of other claims by the plaintiff the suit may be dismissed. Then the defendant filed an application I.A.No.996 of 1979 under Sec.9 of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act for direction to the plaintiff to sell the land to it for a price to be fixed by the court. 4. The trial court on the trial of the various issues framed held that apart from the arrears of rent of Rs.8,800 admitted to pay damages to the value of Rs.3,000 and held that the City Tenants’ Protection Act has not been extended to Palayamkottai Municipality wherein the suit property is situate in so far as the non-residential buildings are concerned and therefore the suit property being a non-residential building the tenant is not entitled to the benefits under the City Tenants’ Protection Act. On these findings the trial court decreed the suit as prayed for and dismissed the petition filed under Sec.9 of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. 5. In the appeal, Mr.O.V.Balusamy, learned counsel for the appellant-defendant contends that the trial court is in error in holding that the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act has not been extended to the non-residential buildings in Palayamkottai and on this finding dismissing the petition under Sec.9 of the Act and decreeing the suit for eviction since there is a Notification making the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act applicable to non-residential buildings also to Palayamkottai. In this connection he points out G.O.Ms.No.1285, Revenue, dated 35. 1975 mentioned at page 144 of the Book entitled Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act, by V.N.Krishna Murthy, It is also mentioned therein that the said G.O. has been published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette Part II, Sec.IV, dated, 26. 1975 at pages 302 and 303. From a reading of this government order it is clear that the City Tenants’ Protection Act which had already been extended in respect of residential buildings in Palayamkottai has been extended to non-residential buildings also. Therefore the suit premises comes within the Act and hence as a tenant the defendant will be entitled to the benefits under the Act. 6. However, Mr.T.R.Mani, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord argued that there is no proof that the said Notification has been laid before the Legislative Assembly as required under Sec.1(6) of the Act. But that requirement relates to Notifications issued under Sec.1(2) or 1(4), that this Notification has been issued under Sec.2(1)(i) and therefore there is absolutely no substance in this contention. V.Ramaswamy, J. has also staled so in R.Govindaswami v. Bhoopalan and others, (1977)2 M.L.J. 206 , when the same point was argued. 7. It is then argued on behalf of the respondent-landlord that the defendant has denied the title of the landlord by contending that there is an agreement to sell the suit property and the landlord has received an advance of Rs.5,000 and therefore the defendant cannot contend that as a tenant it is entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act. But it is nowhere stated in the Act that merely because a tenant raises any such contention, even if he is really a tenant, he will not be entitled to the benefits of the Act. But it is nowhere stated in the Act that merely because a tenant raises any such contention, even if he is really a tenant, he will not be entitled to the benefits of the Act. 8. However, Mr.T.R.Mani, in support of his contention would rely on a recent Division Bench decision of this Court in Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar and others, (1990)1 L. W. 46, wherein it is held that a tenant who denies the title of the landlord is not entitled to the benefits of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. This judgment was rendered on a reference made by Ratnavel Pandian, J. (as he then was) because of some conflicting decisions according to him on the point. The learned Judge found that there were two Division Bench decisions and a single judge decision holding the view that a tenant who denies the title of the landlord is not entitled to the benefits of the Tamil Nadu City Tenants’ Protection Act while one single judge (V.Ramaswami, J.) relying on a Supreme Court decision in Damadilal v. Parashram, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2229, holding the opposite view which was followed by another single judge (Ratnam, J.) and therefore according to the learned judge it was better the matter was decided by a larger bench. But the matter was not referred to a Full Bench, but observing that the point has already been decided by two Division Benches, the reference also has been decided by another Division Bench consistingofSathiadev,and Sivasubramaniam, JJ. 9. This Division Bench, to arrive at its conclusion, mainly relied on an earlier Division Bench decision in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Ammal and others, (1965)2M.L.J. 188, consisting of K.Veeraswamy, J. as he then was and P.Kunhamed Kutti, J. In that case it was argued on behalf of the tenant that even if there was determination of tenancy by forfeiture on account of tenant’s denial of landlord’s title claiming to be he is the owner, still he comes within the category of ‘tenant’ in Sec.2(4) of the Act i.e., a tenant continuing in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy. But this argument was rejected stating that there is no room for a person who continues to be in possession after the termination of tenancy and who claims that he continues to be in possession as an owner of the properly, to claim benefits under the provisions of the Act. It is further staled that, “clearly the Act is not intended to protect such owners, for there is no need for it.” 10. In the present case, in the written statement, the defendant has simply stated that there was an oral agreement to sell the property to him and an advance amount had been paid and therefore there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and therefore he did not pay the rent. The question is whether this amounts to denial of title and therefore amounts to forfeiture under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. In the written statement itself the defendant has stated that he never set up any hostile title in respect of the suit property against the plaintiff, which means he never denied the landlord’s title. 11. Further, even if it amounts to denial of title, Sec.111(g) requires that the landlord must give notice of his intention to determine the lease. Only when such notice is given there will be determination of tenancy. Such a notice does not appear to have been given in this case. Hence it cannot be said there was termination of lease. Hence, it is not a case of tenant continuing in possession after determination of lease. 12. Even if it is to be held that the tenancy stands terminated or determined by forfeiture due to denial of title, still the question arises whether he can be held to be a tenant coming within the third category of ‘tenant’ defined in Sec.2(4) of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. It will be here convenient to reproduce the relevant portion of Sec.2(4). “2(4). It will be here convenient to reproduce the relevant portion of Sec.2(4). “2(4). ‘Tenant’ in relation to any land- (i) means a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied, and (ii)includes — .(a) any such person as is referred to in subclause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement....” As seen above, the Division Bench in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Animal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , appears to be of the view that when a tenant continues to be in possession after the determination of the tenancy and says that he is continuing in possession as owner of the property, there is no room for him to seek protection under the provisions of the Act. But as far as our case is concerned, no doubt, the defendant tenant has stated in the written statement that there was an agreement of sale and it is in possession under the agreement and therefore it did not pay rent. But then it admits the arrears of rent and submits to a decree for that arrears. In the petition filed under Sec.9 of the City Tenants’ Protection Act it has stated that the plaintiff is the landlord and it is a tenant as per the definition in the Act and therefore it is entitled to the benefits under the Act. This clearly shows that the defendant does not claim to be the owner. The suit itself has been filed treating the defendant as a tenant. It is strange that in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Ammal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , from the sentence extracted above from that judgment, it appears, according to the Division Bench, once the tenant denying the landlord’s title claims that he is the owner he really becomes the owner and there is no need to protect him. 13. Even if the defendant says that it is the owner, in that case it has to be decided whether its claim is true. His word is not the last word, and simply because he claims to be the owner which is not correct, the character as a tenant does not change into the character of an owner. 13. Even if the defendant says that it is the owner, in that case it has to be decided whether its claim is true. His word is not the last word, and simply because he claims to be the owner which is not correct, the character as a tenant does not change into the character of an owner. If it is held to be true that he is owner then the defendant becomes entitled to the property and no question of seeking benefits under the provisions of the Act arises. If it is held otherwise, i.e., he is only a tenant, it is but natural that in that case he would pray for the benefits under the provisions of the Act. Thus even if one claims title to the property in himself against the landlord it does not necessarily mean he cannot pray for the alternative or the lesser relief if that claim of his fails. As afore seen under Sec.2(4) a tenant is a person who is liable to pay rent. It is not in dispute that the defendant has been a tenant. If his claim that under an oral argument he is entitled to purchase the property and as per the terms of the agreement the landlord and tenant relationship has ceased, and if that contention is not sustainable, then it must be held that he continues to be a tenant, and then if it is to be held that by virtue of his claiming that the landlord and tenant relationship has ceased the tenancy is determined, still he must be held to be a tenant coming under the third category of ‘tenant’ under Sec.2(4). Thus it would appear that the ratio in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Ammal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , does not appear to be correct, and in any case that will not apply to the facts of our case. 14. Thus it would appear that the ratio in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Ammal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , does not appear to be correct, and in any case that will not apply to the facts of our case. 14. The next case that found favour with the Division Bench in Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990)1 L.W. 46 , is the one decided by Ramaprasada Rao, C.J. In Boologanathan v. Govindarajan and others, (1979)2 M.L.J. 47 , in which the learned judge has followed the above referred to Division Bench decision in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Animal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , and on the reasoning given in that judgment and also referring to the forfeiture clause in Sec. 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act the learned judge held that once there is a denial of the landlord’s title the relationship of landlord and tenant gets automatically severed and the latter cannot take advantage of the statutory benefits under the City Tenants’ Protection Act. But as stated above, even in the case of denial of title by the tenant there is no question of automatic termination of tenancy, and for that to amount forfeiture and severance of tenancy the landlord must give notice in writing of his intention to determine the lease, and even if there is determination under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act the tenant who continues in possession will still be a tenant under Sec.2(4) of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. 15. Then the Division Bench has relied on a judgment of S.A.Kader, J. In Saidapet Handloom Cloth Producers and Sellers Association Saidapet Madras v. D.ArumugaNadar, 1985 T.L.N.J. 207. There too the learned judge relied on the Division Bench decision in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Animal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , and Boologanathan v. Govindarajan and others, (1979)2 M.L.J. 47 . On the principle of estoppel also the learned judge has held that the tenant who has denied the title of the landlord cannot claim benefits under the City Tenants’ Protection Act. But the learned judge has not referred to any law under which such estoppel arises. .16. On the principle of estoppel also the learned judge has held that the tenant who has denied the title of the landlord cannot claim benefits under the City Tenants’ Protection Act. But the learned judge has not referred to any law under which such estoppel arises. .16. While so, Ramaswami, J. in R.Govindaswamy v. Bhoopalan, (1977)2 M.L.J. 206 , before whom also the decision of the Division Bench in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Animal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , was relied on, after referring to a decision of the Supreme Court in Damadilal v. Parashram, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2229, wherein it has been held that a statutory tenant upon the determination of tenancy depending upon the provisions of the Act under which the right of estate or interest in the premises in contradistinction to only a personal right is claimed and if the provisions show that the tenant, even after the determination of tenancy is treated on par with those persons who have contractual tenancy in their favour, the right of the person in whose possession after the determination of tenancy is the same as a contractual tenant and that he could not be denied the right of protection under the Act, came to the conclusion that a tenant who is in possession after determination of tenancy by forfeiture on account of denial of title would be a tenant within the meaning of Scc.2(4) and therefore he would be entitled to invoke the provisions of Sec.9 of the Act. This decision of Ramaswami, J. was followed by Ratnam, J. in Nachimuthu Mudaliar v. Ponnusamy, (1980)1 M.L.J. 529: 93 L.W.814. 17. Sec.18 of the City Tenants’ Protection Act provides that the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 shall to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Act be deemed to have been repealed or modified. Since Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act provides various modes of determination of tenancy, and the definition of tenant in Sec.2(4) includes a person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, and when there is no provision whatsoever in the City Tenants’ Protection Act itself as to how a tenancy is to be determined, it can be held that Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act shall not be deemed to have been repealed or modified. But the Division Bench in Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990)1 L.W. 46 , appears to say that in view of Sec.13of the present Act it is not necessary to discuss about the provisions contained in Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. This means they do not seem to hold that by virtue of denial of title of the landlord by forfeiture the tenancy is determined. But they seem to say following the reasoning given in the earlier Division Bench decision in Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Animal and others, (1965)2M.L.J. 188, that once a tenant sets up title in himself or third persons there is no scope for him to claim benefits under the provisions of the Act. As I have already stated above this reasoning is fallacious and incorrect. If it may repeat, only because a tenant has denied the title of the landlord or states that there is no landlord and tenant relationship between the parties because of an agreement to sell, he does not cease to be a tenant particularly when the definition of tenant under the Act includes also a person who continues to be in possession of the property after the determination of the lease. As said above, a tenant may claim a right of absolute title to the property but if he could not prove that claim certainly his possession would be that of a tenant and as such he can claim benefits under the Act. It depends upon what the court will hold on the facts proved. .18. Then the Division Bench in Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam v. Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990)1 L.W. 46 , referred to the object of the Act stated in the Bill and the preamble of the Act and also to the definition of ‘tenant’ in Sec.2(4), and would state that from all these it would appear that the Act will not apply to a tenant who denies tenancy agreement. But with great respect I do not see anything in them to arrive at such a conclusion. 19. But with great respect I do not see anything in them to arrive at such a conclusion. 19. For all these reasons, I am of the view that as Ratnavel Pandian, J. himself has desired, the point in question i.e., whether a tenant who has denied the title of the landlord, or as in this case a tenant who has denied the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant since the landlord has agreed to sell the land to the tenant is entitled to the benefits under the City Tenants’ Protection Act, is desirable to be decided by a larger Bench. Hence the appeal may be placed before My Lord the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. After this point is decided the appeal may be posted before me for final disposal. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Venkataswami, J.: These matters are posted before us on a reference by Bellie, J., for a decision by a larger Bench, on the following question: "Whether a tenant who has denied the title of the landlord, or, as in this case, a tenant who has denied the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant, since the landlord has agreed to sell the land to the tenant, is entitled to the benefits under the City Tenants’ Protection Act?" 21. Brief facts that are necessary for the disposal of this reference alone are stated hereunder. 22. The respondent herein filed O.S.No.101 of 1979, on the file of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, for recovery of arrears of rent, damages and for recovery of possession of the suit property, with future damages for use and occupation. It is averred in the plaint that in the earlier suit filed, namely O.S.No. 155 of 1972, for recovery of arrears of rent, the defendant (appellant herein) has taken a stand that he was not liable to pay any rent in view of an agreement for sale. The respondent has taken a stand that the appellant has set up a hostile title in respect of the suit property against the plaintiff. Before filing the suit, a registered notice dated 14. 1973, determining the tenancy of the defendant and calling upon him to vacate the schedule mentioned property and handover vacant possession to the plaintiff on 1. 1974 was given. 23. Before filing the suit, a registered notice dated 14. 1973, determining the tenancy of the defendant and calling upon him to vacate the schedule mentioned property and handover vacant possession to the plaintiff on 1. 1974 was given. 23. In the written statement, the appellant has stated that the written statement filed by him in O.S.No.155 of 1972 and 1 of 1975 be treated as part and parcel of the written statement filed in the present suit. In addition to that, the appellant has stated that the defendant paid Rs.5,000 as advance towards the said sale transaction. After the said sale transaction, there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Hence the defendant did not pay the rent. Copies of the earlier written statements filed by the appellant are made available before us in which the defendant has taken a stand as follows: "In the written statement in O.S.No.115 of 1972, the appellant has stated there is no subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant as between the plaintiff and the defendant for reasons stated herein below" Again, at the close of paragraph 10, it is stated as follows: "The relationship of landlord and tenant as already stated, has ceased to exist from the date of agreement of sale." 24. In the written statement filed by the appellant in O.S.No.1 of 1975, the appellant has stated as follows: "There is no subsisting relationship of landlord and tenant as between the plaintiff and the defendant for the reasons stated herein below." Again, in paragraph 9 the appellant has stated as follows: "The defendant submits that the suit as framed is not maintainable, in law. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The plaintiff is not also entitled to any damages for use and occupation of the plaint site since the defendant is not at all a trespasser. The only remedy available to the plaintiff is to have the balance sale price from the defendant.“ 25. Before the trial court, the defendant filed an application under Sec.9 of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. The suit was decreed by the trial court, including for possession. The trial court held that the provisions of the City Tenants’ Protection Act were not extended under that Act for non-residential premises in Palayamkottai and, therefore, the defendant cannot claim the benefits under the Act. The suit was decreed by the trial court, including for possession. The trial court held that the provisions of the City Tenants’ Protection Act were not extended under that Act for non-residential premises in Palayamkottai and, therefore, the defendant cannot claim the benefits under the Act. Consequently, the petition filed under Sec.9 was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the dismissal of the petition filed under Sec.9 of the Act, the appellant has filed C.M.A.No.448 of 1984 and against the decree in favour of the plaintiff, A.S.No.353 of 1981 has been filed. 26. When these matters were posted before Bellie, J., and arguments were addressed, the learned Judge was persuaded by the learned counsel for the appellant to refer the question mentioned above, for the decision of a larger bench. 27. The second part of the question referred to us, in our view, is also one form of denial of title of the landlord. 28. We would like to state at the outset that a reference on a similar question was made by Ratnavel Pandian, J., as he then was, on an earlier occasion and even though the learned single judge suggested the Reference to a larger Bench, the matter was referred to a Division Bench as there were two earlier Division Bench judgments on the same issue, and so, it was again posted before a Division Bench, consisting of Sathiadev and Sivasubramaniam, JJ. The judgment of the Division Bench in Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990)1 L.W. 46. We may state that there are two more Division Bench judgments, namely,Madhava Rao Naidu v. Sri Gangadeswarar Temple, (1946)2 M.L.J. 285 : 59 L.W. 579, and Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Ammal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , taking the same view as that of Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990)1 L.W. 46 . Even so, Bellie, J., was of the view that in the light of different views taken by two learned single judge in R.Govindaswami v. Bhoopalan, (1977)2 M.L.J. 206 and Nachimuthu Mudaliar v. Ponnusami, 93 L.W. 874: (1980)1 M.L.J. 529, the matter must again be referred to a larger Bench. 29. Even so, Bellie, J., was of the view that in the light of different views taken by two learned single judge in R.Govindaswami v. Bhoopalan, (1977)2 M.L.J. 206 and Nachimuthu Mudaliar v. Ponnusami, 93 L.W. 874: (1980)1 M.L.J. 529, the matter must again be referred to a larger Bench. 29. We find that in the latest judgment of the Division Bench, namely, Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990)1 L. W. 46, the learned Judges, while agreeing with the earlier two Division Bench judgments reported in Madhava Rao Naidu v. Sri Gangadeswarar Temple, (1946)2 M.L.J. 285 : 59 L.W. 579 and Veeraswami Naicker and another v. Alamelu Ammal and others, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , (both cited supra), held that they are still good law and lay down the correct position of law. Further, they held that the judgments of the learned single Judges, reported in R.Govindaswami v. Bhoopalan, (1977)2 M.L.J.206 and (1980)1 M.L.J. 529, (both cited supra) are no longer good law. In the above said recent Division Bench Judgment the learned Judges have dealt with the question of law, namely,” whether a tenant in respect of a vacant site, who denies title of the landlord, is entitled to the benefits of the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act, “ exhaustively. After carefully going through the recent Division Bench judgment, we are not able to persuade ourselves to take a different view. Therefore, we propose to set out the reasonings of the Division Bench judgment, with which we respectfully concur and thereafter answer the points raised in the Order of reference and also at the time of arguments by the learned counsel before us. At the risk of repetition, we may mention that the recent Division Bench has referred to number of judgments of this Court and also the Supreme Court, to answer the question negatively, and we feel, we need not again refer to the earlier decisions taking the same view, nor any discussion is necessary to hold that the judgments of the learned single Judges, taking a different view, are no longer good law, as the Division Bench judgment is binding on us. 30. 30. In Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990) 1 L.W. 46 , the learned judges, after referring to the Objects and Reasons stated in the Bill which preceded the City Tenants’ Protection Act, held as follows: ”Therefore, it is apparent that the legislature to confer certain benefits on the tenants who are put in such helpless condition, Sec.9 of the Act provides for compulsory sale by a landlord of land in the possession of the tenant from which the tenant is sought to be ejected in a suit filed for eviction. Therefore, we have to find out who is entitled to get benefit under Sec.9 of the Act. Sec.9 of the Act, categorically states that the ‘tenant’ as defined in the Act is entitled to the benefits conferred under the said provisions. Therefore we have to find out what the term ‘tenant’ means in the context of the provisions contained in this Act. Tenant in relation to any land means (i) a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied, and (ii) includes any such person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after termination of the tenancy agreement. Therefore, the definition clause of tenant postulates three classes of persons as tenants. The first class comprises what may be regarded as direct tenants, i.e., tenants of land liable to pay rent. The second class refers to a person deriving title from the tenant of the first class and the third one contemplates a person who continues in possession notwithstanding the fact that there has been reading of the above said definition makes it amply clear that a person before claiming the benefits of the Act as a tenant of any land must fulfil two requirements: Firstly, he must be a person liable to pay rent in respect of the said land, and Secondly, such a liability should be under a tenancy agreement express or implied. “It is only the tenant who answers these requirements would be entitled to the benefits of the Act even though he continues to be in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. “It is only the tenant who answers these requirements would be entitled to the benefits of the Act even though he continues to be in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. Though the definition found in Sec.2(4) of the Act is an inclusive definition counched in wide language, a combined reading of the subclauses (1) and (2) of the Sections makes it clear that only the person liable to pay rent which determines the question whether a person is tenant or not. It is no doubt true that the liability to pay rent may arise either under an express tenancy agreement or under an implied one. But in any case liability to pay the rent must be made out and agreed to between the parties. It is unnecessary to say that express tenancy agreement will cover cases during the currency of the tenancy agreement and on the other hand implied tenancy agreement will arise in cases subsequent, to the determination of the lease. To put it in other words, it will apply to a case where there was relationship of landlord and tenant upto the point of determination of tenancy. It is only in such cases, the statute comes to the rescue of such tenant and confers on him the benefits of the Act. At no stretch of imagination, it will apply to a case where the tenant denies the very agreement itself and claims title in himself. This question came to be decided by a Division Bench of this Court in Madhava Rao Naidu v. Sri Gangadeeswarar Temple, (1946)2 M.L.J. 285 : 59L.W. 579, wherein it was held that the Act defines a tenant as meaning a tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, every other person deriving title from him, and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of tenancy and that it is impossible to accept the argument that a person who claims under a person whose tenancy has been determined is a tenant and is entitled to further notice. In that case, the original tenant denied the landlord’s title and therefore he was entitled to terminate his tenancy which was done on notice given to the tenant. The appellant’s purchase of the right, title and interest of the original tenant took place two years later. In that case, the original tenant denied the landlord’s title and therefore he was entitled to terminate his tenancy which was done on notice given to the tenant. The appellant’s purchase of the right, title and interest of the original tenant took place two years later. Therefore, it was held that if Ponnuswami had in law any right in the land it would have been passed to the appellant but clearly he had none. It was in that context the above decision came to be rendered. When a similar question arose before Kailasam, J. (as he then was) the said Bench decision was relied on by one of the parties. But the learned judge felt that the question involved in the case before him required to be considered by a Bench and therefore, the matter was referred to a Bench. On reference, Veeraswami, J. (as he then was) and Kunhamed Kutti, J. constituting the Bench held in Veeraswami Naicker v. Alamelu Animal, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , as follows: ”Ouite apart from this decision, we are of the view that the lower appellate court took the right view of the scope of Sec.2(4), as it stood before the amendment in 1960. It is true that the third clause in the definition comprehends persons continuing in possession, though the tenancy has come to an end, for. A tenancy may come to an end for a number of reasons as for instance denial of landlord’s title. Such a denial under the ordinary law of transfer of property brings about forfeiture. The argument for the appellant before us is that even such a case will be within the actual words of the third category in the definition. But there is a fallacy in the argument. When a person, who continues, to be in possession after termination of tenancy, claims that he does so, as he is entitled to the property, as his own, it is obvious that there is hardly any room for such an owner to seek protection of his possession under the. provisions of the Act. Clearly the Act is not intended to protect such owners, for there is no need for it. We are of the view that such a case will not fall within the third category of persons entitled to protection under the Act. provisions of the Act. Clearly the Act is not intended to protect such owners, for there is no need for it. We are of the view that such a case will not fall within the third category of persons entitled to protection under the Act. On that view, the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs." Ramaprasada Rao, C.J., in Boologanathan v. Govindarajan, (1979)2 M.L.J. 47 , following the Division Bench decision in VeeraswamiNaicker v. Alamelu Ammal, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 , held as follows: "If once a tenant openly denies the title of lessor or pleads jus tertii then it automatically follows that he would not be considered as a tenant for any purpose whatsoever, as under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act by such open denial of title or by pleading justurtii there is a forfeiture of the tenancy and the relationship of landlord and tenant is snapped thereby. The fact that he remains in possession of the premises and pays, what according to him, is rent or is prepared or willing to pay such rent, could only, in the circumstances, be understood as money paid towards damages for use and occupation. Judicial possession, therefore, is the essence for the creation of the relationship of landlord and tenant. Once there is a snapping of the relationship by a voluntary Act of omission or commission on the part of the person in occupation as tenant then, he cannot inconsistently claim such a legal status under any provision of law." The learned judge answered the question whether the subsequent payment of rent would alter the situation. He has held that such a gesture on the part of the tenant would create the legal relationship of landlord and tenant as between the parties would be nothing but begging the question for the simple reason that a person cannot approbate and reprobate. It was also further held that once, there is such a denial of title, any relationship of landlord and tenant is automatically severed because of the presumption which arises under Seclll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act which forfeits the lease by reason of such denial of title, xxx xxx xxx While considering the present controversy, it is relevant to take note of the language used in Sec.2(4) of the Act. After having stated in subclause (i) of the Act that the term ‘tenant’ means a person liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied, the Act says that the said term includes in sub-clause (a) any person as is referred to in sub-clause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement (Emphasis Supplied). The language of sub-clause (ii)(a) makes it amply clear that the benefit conferred under this provision is restricted to a tenant who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement and not to any other tenant who denies the very agreement of tenancy itself. A combined reading of these two clauses would make it amply clear that a person who does not claim that there was an agreement of tenancy at the relevant point of time is not entitled to claim any benefit under this provision, xxxxxxxxx The judgment of Ramaswami, J. (as he then was) and other learned Judges who took a similar view proceeded on the basis that the provision contained in Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act would be attracted, where under the circumstances under Which the lease can be determined are set out. They were of the view that the denial of title is only one of the modes of determining a lease of immovable property and if there was a forfeiture by dental of title, the person in possession after such determination would also be a tenant within the meaning of Sec.2(4) of the Act and therefore such a tenant would be entitled to all the rights, as if he was a contractual tenant himself, as the definition of tenant in Sec.2(4) of the Act also includes a person, who continues to be in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. Their view was mainly based on the decision of the Supreme Court referred to above, where under the Supreme Court considered the position of a statutory tenant and his right to property. In that case distinction was sought to be made between the rights of a contractual tenant and the rights of the tenant whose contractual tenancy was determined but who is protected against eviction by the statute. As already pointed, the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that every tenancy has its origin in contract. In that case distinction was sought to be made between the rights of a contractual tenant and the rights of the tenant whose contractual tenancy was determined but who is protected against eviction by the statute. As already pointed, the Supreme Court proceeded on the basis that every tenancy has its origin in contract. It is significant to note that the definition of “tenant” refers to a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy and under the Act such a person is treated as a statutory tenant and he is protected from eviction. At this stage, we can have a look at the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. There the definition of ‘tenant’ is a person by whom or whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouses etc. It also includes a person continuing in possession after the determination of the tenancy in his favour but it does not include a sub-tenant and certain other categories of tenant. Sec.10(2)(vii) of the said Act states that a landlord can seek for eviction of his tenant, who has denied the title of the landlord or claim a right of permanent tenancy and that such denial or claim was not bona fide. Therefore under that Act if the denial of title is not bona fide, the tenant can be straightaway evicted and on the other hand, if the denial of title is bona fide, then the Rent Controller cannot have jurisdiction and only a regular suit for eviction can be filed under ordinary law. Therefore, we find that protection is not given to the tenant who denies the title of the landlord. Now, let us recapitulate the preamble of the Act above referred to. The Act in question is intended to give protection against the eviction of tenants who have constructed buildings on others’ land so long as they pay fair rent for their lands. Therefore, the basic requirement for invoking the provisions of the Act is that ownership and tenancy rights must vest in different persons. Once a person claims ownership in himself, the question of tenancy does not arise for consideration. We have already referred to the definition of tenant under Sec.2(4) of the Act, wherein it is specifically mentioned that the benefit would accrue only to a tenant whose tenancy agreement is determined. Once a person claims ownership in himself, the question of tenancy does not arise for consideration. We have already referred to the definition of tenant under Sec.2(4) of the Act, wherein it is specifically mentioned that the benefit would accrue only to a tenant whose tenancy agreement is determined. A cumulative effect of the provisions would lead to the inference that protection is available only to the statutory tenants whose possession is protected under the provisions of a statute. We are unable to find any provision in the Act to consider the tenant who has denied the title as a statutory tenant. We have come to the conclusion from the preamble and the definition of “tenant” found in the Act that the benefit is intended to be given only to certain class of tenants who claim right under a tenancy agreement and not to the persons who claim to be owners or set up title on others. In this connection, it is unnecessary to enter into discussion about the provisions contained in Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. Sec.13 of the present Act in question speaks in clear terms that the Transfer of Property Act shall to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been repealed or modified. Therefore, there is no difficulty in construing the word tenant without reference to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. It is worthwhile remembering that such Acts are intended to meet the broad needs of the Society and the scope of such Acts cannot be extended beyond the object. Even otherwise, it is highly inequitable to thrust the rights of tenancy on a person who does not want to claim to be a tenant and such a course would be revolting to the canons of justice and fair play. As Kader, J., has rightly pointed out in the decision referred to above, such a person would be estopped from claiming any rights under the Act. There is one another aspect which was not brought out at the time of argument by the learned counsel appearing for both parties in these cases. As Kader, J., has rightly pointed out in the decision referred to above, such a person would be estopped from claiming any rights under the Act. There is one another aspect which was not brought out at the time of argument by the learned counsel appearing for both parties in these cases. On a careful consideration we find that there is considerable doubt as to the applicability of the decision in Damadilal v. Parashram, A.I.R 1976 S.C. 2229, in view of the later decision of the Supreme Court differed from the view expressed in two earlier cases. In Anand Nivas (P.) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyani Pedhi and in J.C.Chatterjee v, S.K. Tandon, the Supreme Court considered the provisions in Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 as amended in 1959. In AnandNivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyani Pedhi’s case, three learned Judges constituting the Bench in the Supreme Court, viz., Sarkar, J., Hidayathullah, J., (as he then was) and Shah, J., (as he then was) heard the appeal. In that case, Hidayathullah, J. (as he then was) held that a statutory tenant meaning a tenant whose tenancy has determined but who continues in possession has no power of subletting Sarkar, J. dissented. It was clearly held therein that the personal right of occupation of a statutory tenant is incapable of being transferred or assigned, and he having no interest in the property there is no estate on which sub-letting may operate. In Damadilal v. Parashram, A.I.R. 1976S.C. 2229, the Supreme Court differed from the said view. xxx xxx xxx Therefore, we hold that the two decisions rendered by two different Benches of this Court in Madhava Rao Naidu v. Sri Gangadeswarar Temple, and Veeraswami Naicker v. Alamelu Ammal, are still good law and we are bound by the same. Consequently, we hold that the benefits under the Act can be given only to certain class of tenants who claims right under a tenancy agreement and not to the persons who claim to be the owners of the properties or set up title in others. All the decisions of the learned single Judges, which have taken a different view are no longer good law." [Paras. All the decisions of the learned single Judges, which have taken a different view are no longer good law." [Paras. 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 24 and 28] As we respectfully agree with the reasonings and conclusions, we refrain from repeating the same reasons, except to add some more reasons by looking at the issue from different angles. .31. Mr.O.V.Baluswami, learned counsel appearing for the appellant (defendant in the suit), submitted that there is no provision in the City Tenants’ Protection Act similar to the one in the Rent Control Act, making denial of title of the landlord by the tenant as a ground for eviction. Therefore, by reason of denial of title, the benefit conferred under the Act cannot be taken away. He also submitted that in any event, in the absence of a notice under Seclll(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, it cannot be taken that there was determination of tenancy, to enable the landlord to pray for the relief of possession. He also submitted that in view of definition of "tenant" in the City Tenants’ Protection Act, particularly, in the light of Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act, assuming without admitting that there was forfeiture on account of denial of title, still, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the tenant would continue as a statutory tenant and the benefits conferred on the tenant also would continue to be available to him. 32. Mr.T.R.Mani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the reason, contending contra, submitted that admittedly notice under Sec.106 read with Sec.111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act has been given, terminating the tenancy and, therefore, there is no need or necessity to issue a separate notice under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. He also submitted that it is not necessary that a separate provision must find a place in the the City Tenants’ Protection Act, making denial of title of land as a ground for eviction. He further submitted that on a correct interpretation of Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act, benefits provided under the City Tenants’ Protection Act will not be available to those tenants who suffers forfeiture by reason of denial of title of the landlord. 33. Apart from the above submissions, both sides have cited number of decisions which are referred to in the recent Division Bench judgment. 33. Apart from the above submissions, both sides have cited number of decisions which are referred to in the recent Division Bench judgment. The learned single judge, in the order of Reference, has taken the view that notice under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary, and that the ratios laid down by the earlier two Division Bench judgments and also the recent Division Bench judgment are not correct. With respect, we are unable to share the view of Bellie, J., when the learned says that the ratios laid down by the Division Bench are not correct. .34. Bellie, J., also seems to be of the view that in the light of the language employed in Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act, not withstanding the forfeiture suffered by the tenant, he continues to be a tenant, for the purpose of claiming the rights and benefits provided under the Act. On this aspect, the learned Judge, to a certain extent, has criticised the Division Bench Judgment in Veeraswami Naicker v. Alamelu Ammal, (1965)2 M.L.J. 188 . To justify the view taken by the learned judge, it has been stated that though a tenant claims title to the property in himself against the landlord, that does not prevent him from getting alternative or lessor relief in the event of his not establishing the title in himself. It also appears that Bellie, J., was of the view that the decisions of the learned single judges reported in R.Govindaswami v. Bhoopalan, (1977)2 M.L.J. 206 , and Nachimuthu Mudaliar v. Ponnusamy, 93 L.W. 814, Madhava Rao Naidu v. Sri Gangadeswarar Temple, (1946)2M.L.J. 285:59 L.W. 579, are good law notwithstanding the fact that a Division Bench in Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar, (1990)1 L.W.46, has expressly held that those two decisions are not good law. 35. We will first dispose of the issue whether a separate notice under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is necessary. We have already seen that in this case, a notice under Sec.106 read with 111(h) of the Transfer of Property Act has been issued, terminating the tenancy. A notice under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is required 6nly when the tenancy is subsisting. This is because, it cannot be disputed that a tenancy can be determined by issuing a notice in accordance with Sec.106 read with Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. A notice under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act is required 6nly when the tenancy is subsisting. This is because, it cannot be disputed that a tenancy can be determined by issuing a notice in accordance with Sec.106 read with Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. We can also derive support to our view from the language of Seclll(g) itself. A careful reading of the said Section would suggest that a separate notice under that section is necessary only if the lease had not been otherwise determined. On this issue, Srinivasan, J., in Subbaroyan and another v. Devadas Nadar, S.A.No.l459 of 1985 judgment dated 20.9.1990 has taken the same view as taken by us above. After referring to an earlier judgment, the learned judge has observed as follows: “Without a termination of the tenancy, a proceeding for eviction cannot be instituted on the basis of mere denial without a notice under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act. But in cases where there is a termination of tenancy by a notice under Seclll(h) of the Transfer of Property Act, there is no question of issuing a further notice under Seclll (g) of the Transfer of Property Act.” We hold that above observation lays down the correct position of law. 36. Coming to the other point, namely, that there is no provision in the City Tenants’ Protection Act similar to the one under the Rent Control Act, to enable the landlord to evict the tenant on the basis of denial of title, we hold that the argument was based on a misconception. Once he suffers forfeiture, he loses the character of tenant and consequently the rights/protection afforded under the Act will cease to have any application, and therefore, there is no need to provide a separate section under the Act, to enable the landlord to evict the tenant on the basis of denial of title. 37. Now, let us consider the scope of definition of Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the said Act reads as follows: “2. Definitions: In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context: .(1) to (3-A) xxx xxx .(4) ‘Tenant’ in relation to any land- (i)xxxxx (ii)includes..... 37. Now, let us consider the scope of definition of Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the said Act reads as follows: “2. Definitions: In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context: .(1) to (3-A) xxx xxx .(4) ‘Tenant’ in relation to any land- (i)xxxxx (ii)includes..... (a) any such person as is referred to in subclause (i) who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement.” Undoubtedly, the earlier Division Bench judgments have consistently taken the view that Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act will not apply to a tenant who suffers forfeiture. The recent Division Bench has also taken into account the objects and Reasons and also the preamble to the Act before coming to a conclusion that the benefit of Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act will not be available to a tenant, who suffers forfeiture. In addition to reasons given there, we would like to state the following: Sec.2 of the City Tenants’ Protection Act, while giving definitions to certain words appearing in the statute, expressly states that the definitions as given in Sec.2 will apply unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context. Therefore, if the context requires to read the word “Tenant” in a different manner, there is nothing wrong in doing so. It cannot be disputed that if in the context it will be repugnant to hold that a particular person is a “tenant”, as defined in Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act, then the Section must be construed in a manner which will be in harmony with the settled principles of law and equity. Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) states that a tenant is said to include a person who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. Obviously, it can apply only to cases of determination of the tenancy agreement otherwise than by forfeiture. (emphasis supplied). Under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenancy is forfeited. Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with various modes of determination of lease. So far as the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, it makes no difference, whether a lease is determined under one sub-clause or other. (emphasis supplied). Under Sec.111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenancy is forfeited. Sec.111 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with various modes of determination of lease. So far as the Transfer of Property Act is concerned, it makes no difference, whether a lease is determined under one sub-clause or other. But, for purposes of the City Tenants’ Protection Act, which is a special Statute intended to confer benefits on tenants who are continuing in possession in the hope of being able to do so till they pay fair rent to the landlord, a case of forfeiture of tenancy will be on entirely a different plane. It will be absurd to contemplate that a man who is deprived of his tenancy by reason of forfeiture because of his denial of title, will be entitled to claim that he is retaining the character of a tenant for the purpose of the said Act. Basically, such an interpretation will be against all notions of justice and equity. The Act never intended to confer benefits on such persons who having entered a land under a tenancy, choose to deny the same or set up independent title. Therefore, it is clear that when the Section uses the expression "a person is liable to pay rent in respect of such land under a tenancy agreement express or implied, including one who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement, it can only apply to a person who acknowledges his liability to pay the rent and is willing to pay rent even though the landlord may not be willing to accept the same. Under the Transfer of Property Act, if a person continues in possession after the determination of the tenancy, he is not entitled to any right unless there is a holding over under Sec.116 of the Act. In order that Sec.116 applies, the lessor should accept the rent or otherwise assent to the lessee continuing in possession. There may be several cases in which the lessor may not be willing to accept rent or assent to the lessee’s continuing in possession, though the lessee may be willing to pay the rent and will be anxious to continue as a tenant and be in possession. There may be several cases in which the lessor may not be willing to accept rent or assent to the lessee’s continuing in possession, though the lessee may be willing to pay the rent and will be anxious to continue as a tenant and be in possession. It is only to benefit such persons who are desirous of continuing the relationship of landlord and tenant, the Section includes "the persons who continue in possession after determination of the tenancy agreement", in the definition of ‘tenant’. If a person claims that he has got an agreement for sale in his favour and his possession is under the agreement and he is not liable to pay rent as a tenant, he cannot claim that he is a ‘tenant’ under Sec.2(4) of the City Tenants’ Protection Act. We may add that the above view expressed is only adding to the reasons already given by the Division Benches with which, we have already expressed, we are in agreement. Therefore, we are unable to share the view of Bellie, J., that Sec.2(4)(ii)(a) of the Act enables the tenant to claim the benefits/rights conferred on the tenants under the Act notwithstanding the denial of title by a tenant setting up title in himself. Likewise, we are unable to share the view of Bellie, J., that a tenant who has denied the title of landlord and ultimately failed to substantiate his claim, can be given alternatively a lesser claim of the benefits provided under the Act. For, once by reason of forfeiture, the relationship of landlord and tenant is severed, the question of providing benefits under the Act cannot arise. It goes without saying that the decisions of the two learned single Judges reported in R.Govindaswami v. Bhoopalan, (1977)2 M.L.J. 206 , Nachimuthu Mudaliar v. Ponnusamy, (1980)1 M.L.J. 529: 93 L.W. 874, are no longer good law as rightly held in Bhargavakula Nainargal Sangam, Thiruvannamalai v. Arunachala Udayar,. (1990)1 L.W. 46 . 38. In the result, we answer the question referred to us in the negative, holding that a tenant who has denied the title of the landlord, is not entitled to claim the benefits under the City Tenants Protection Act. The same answer applies to the second part of the Reference as well. 39. In the order of Reference, the learned Judge has directed the Office to post the appeals before him for final disposal. The same answer applies to the second part of the Reference as well. 39. In the order of Reference, the learned Judge has directed the Office to post the appeals before him for final disposal. The Office will do accordingly. These appeals coming on for further hearing in the presence of The Honourable Mr.Justice Bellie, on Monday the 3rd day of February, 1992 upon perusing the order of the Bench, dated 111. 1991 made herein and having stood over for consideration till this day. Now the Division Bench upon the reference made by me on the question whether a tenant, who has denied the title of the landlord or as in the case a tenant who has denied the relationship between the parties as landlord and tenant since the landlord has agreed to sell the land to the tenant, is entitled to the benefits under the City Tenants’ Protection Act, has held that a tenant who has denied the title of the landlord is not entitled to the benefits of the Act and the tenant in the present case also who has denied the relationship between the parties on the ground that the landlord has agreed to sell the land to the tenant is not entitled to the benefits of the Act. Though, with great respect, I am unable to agree with this finding of the Division Bench, I am bound by that decision. No further consideration arises. 40. The result is, both the appeal and the AAO are dismissed. Considering the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs in both of them.