JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwala, J. 1. This is a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by Prabhat Sahkari Avas Samiti Limited, through its President Uma Shankar Pandey challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 28-3 1987 and 31-12-1987 At the admission stage, counsel put in appearance on behalf of the respondents and have opposed the writ petition. We have consequently heard Sri S. P. Gupta on behalf of the petitioner and Sri R. P. Goel, Addl, Advocate General, on behalf of the respondents as well as learned counsel for the respondent no. 7. The Addl. Advocate General has raised a preliminary objection that the petition is not maintainable and consequently; liable to be dismissed in limine. 2. The facts which have given rise to the present petition are briefly as follows: The properly in dispute is premises no. 24 Muir Road, Allahabad. One Lalji Tandon, respondent no. 7, is admittedly the lessee of the land as well as the owner and landlord of the bungalow situate in the said premises. On 15-4-1986, the petitioner Society entered into an agreement of sale with respondent no. 7, Lalji Tandon by virtue of which Lalji Tandon agreed to sell and the petitioner agreed to purchase the property in dispute for a consideration of Rs, 43,00,020/- on the terms mentioned in the said agreement. Clause 2 of the agreement recited that the petitioner had already paid a sum of Rs. One Lakh, and he has further paid a sum of Rs. 1,25,000/- at the time of the registration of the agreement Clause 3 of the agreement provided that the petitioner will pay the second instalment of Rs. ten lakh within three months from the date of the agreement. The third instalment of Rs. ten lakh was to be paid within three months after the payment of the second instalment and the payment of forth instalment of Rs. ten lakh was to be paid within three month of the payment of the third Instalment. The balance sale consideration of Rs. 10,75,020/- was to be paid within three months of the fourth instalment. The agreement in fact was that the total sale consideration was to be paid within one year of the agreement. 3. It is not disputed that the petitioner only paid a sum of Rs. The balance sale consideration of Rs. 10,75,020/- was to be paid within three months of the fourth instalment. The agreement in fact was that the total sale consideration was to be paid within one year of the agreement. 3. It is not disputed that the petitioner only paid a sum of Rs. 2,25,000/- as per clause 2 of the agreement but did not pay any further instalment as stipulated in the agreement. 4. On 28-3-1987, the State Government issued a notification under Section 4 sub-clause (1) of the Land Acquisition Act for the public purpose of establishing a residential colony under the planned development scheme by the Allahabad Development Authority, Allahabad. By the said notification, the State of U. P. further directed that the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act shall not be applicable in view of the urgency of the matter as the land is being acquired for a housing colony which was urgently required in the city of Allahabad. This notification was subsequently followed by a notification under Section 6 of the Act on 31-12-1987. The notifications under the Land Acquisition Act were challenged by Lalji Tandon the lessee of the land and owner of the bungalow by way of, first, making representations before the State Government and, thereafter, by filing writ petition no. 7348 of 1988 Lalji Tandon v. District Magistrate and others in which this Court stayed the eviction of Lalji Tandon in pursuance of the notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. Prior to the filing of the above mentioned writ petition, the lease of the land in question had expired on 10-5-1987. The Secretary, Board of Revenue, U. P. directed the District Magistrate, Allahabad to renew the lease in favour of Lalji Tandon vide his order dated 31-12-1987. Since this lease was not renewed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad, Lalji Tandon filed another writ petition in this Court being writ petition no. 1551 of 1990 for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to renew the lease in his favour in respect of the disputed plot. Since this lease was not renewed by the District Magistrate, Allahabad, Lalji Tandon filed another writ petition in this Court being writ petition no. 1551 of 1990 for a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to renew the lease in his favour in respect of the disputed plot. This petition was ultimately heard by a Bench of this Court which allowed the same on 30-7-1991 and issued a writ of mandamus to the respondents of the said petition to renew the lease in respect of the land In dispute within a period of three months from the date of the presentation of a certified copy of the order of the High Court. 5. It appears that the respondents authorities in order to expedite the construction of the housing colony and in order to avoid further litigation, entered Into a mutual settlement with Lalji Tandon and consequently, Lalji Tandon filed an application in writ petition no. 7348 of 1988 where in he had challenged the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for withdrawal of the said writ petition on the ground that the parties have settled the matter out of Court. When this application came up for hearing before the said Court, the petitioner also moved an application for being impleaded in the petition. The application of the petitioner was rejected and Lalji Tandon was permitted to withdraw the petition. This order was passed on 24-7-1992. During the course of these proceedings, the petitioner Original Suit No. 535 of 1991 in the Court of Civil Judge, Allahabad for a mandatory injunction directing Lalji Tandon and others to get the lease renewed as per the Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court and to get delivery of possession of the property from the Collector, Allahabad and a further injunction was sought not to transfer the property in favour of District development authorities. In this suit, the application for interim injunction was also moved. The Civil Judge, Allahabad categorically recorded a finding that the petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the agreement of sale, the agreement of sale has not created any interest in his favour in the disputed property and the plaintiff has failed to establish any prima facie case to entitle him to get any injunction. The Civil Judge, Allahabad categorically recorded a finding that the petitioner failed to comply with the terms of the agreement of sale, the agreement of sale has not created any interest in his favour in the disputed property and the plaintiff has failed to establish any prima facie case to entitle him to get any injunction. The injunction was further refused on the ground that no relief has been claimed for specific performance of the contract. The petitioner, having failed in his attempts to delay the proceedings for acquisition, has now filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the notifications mentioned above almost after five years of the issue of the notifications. 6. Section 54 of the Transfer of property Act clearly provides that a contract of the sale of immovable property does not by itself create any interest in or charge on such property. In Satyabrata Ghose v. Mugneeram Bangur and Co. AIR 1954 SC 44 , this section came up for interpretation before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that according to the Indian law, which is embodied in section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a contract for sale to land does not of itself create any interest in the property which is the subject matter of the contract. The obligations of the parties to a contract for sale of land are, therefore, the same as in other ordinary contracts and consequently the doctrine of frustration applicable to contracts for sale of land in India. In the present, case admittedly, the petitioner has not paid the second, third, fourth and the last instalments. In the circumstances, prima facie, even the terms of the agreement have not been complied with by the petitioner. The petitioner availed of the alternative remedy by way of filing the suit before the Civil Judge in which he did not succeed. In our opinion, the petitioner has no right or interest in the property. He has no right to challenge the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 7. The petitioner availed of the alternative remedy by way of filing the suit before the Civil Judge in which he did not succeed. In our opinion, the petitioner has no right or interest in the property. He has no right to challenge the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 7. Judicial notice has to be taken of the fact that practically in all acquisitions under the Land Acquisition Act, as soon as the authorities take steps to send a proposal for the acquisition of the land, the owners enter into agreement of sale with the third parties The agreements are also entered into after the issue of the notifications under section 4 and 6 of the Act in order to put impediments in the way of the acquisition of the land sought to be acquired for public purposes. In case, persons, who have entered into agreements of sale who have no interest in the property are permitted to challenge acquisition proceedings no welfare scheme can ever come into existence as there is all likelihood of unending litigation taking place by way of challenge of acquisition proceedings. Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act provides a guideline as to who can object to the acquisition of land viz. a person interested in the land. If a person has no legal interest in the land he cannot file objections. 8. In the instant case, the petitioner has no interest in the land, he has only entered into an agreement of sale. He even did not fulfil the terms of agreement. He availed of the alternative remedy by way of filing a suit and failed. IN case the petitioner has suffered any loss, he can always file a suit for damages against Lalji Tandon, the owner. IN the circumstances, the petition, in our opinion, is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed in limine. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that the preliminary objection taken by the Addl. Advocate General is not sustainable and the petitioner has the locus standi to file the petition. In support of his submission, he has relied upon two authorities of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has, however, contended that the preliminary objection taken by the Addl. Advocate General is not sustainable and the petitioner has the locus standi to file the petition. In support of his submission, he has relied upon two authorities of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The first case relied upon is a decision in J. M. Desai v. Roshan Kumar, AIR 1976 SC 578 , and the second case relied upon is the decision in S. P. Gupta v. President of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 . In the case of J. M. Desai referred to above, the question before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether a no objection certificate granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1954 in favour of a proprietor of a cinema can be challenged by a rival in the trade. After analysing the law of locus standi, the Supreme Court held that a 'person aggrieved' has a right to approach the Court for a writ of certiorari. The tests laid down by the Supreme Court have been stated in paragraph 38 of the said judgment "To distinguish such applicants from 'strangers' among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above, These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are; whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed ? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sence, that has interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of ? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person, against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something ? Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public ? Was he entitled to object and he heard by the authority before it took the impugned action ? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority ? Was he entitled to object and he heard by the authority before it took the impugned action ? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority ? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community ? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals ?" 9. After laying down the principle, the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the act and rules which applied to the case and it clearly laid down that the Bombay Cinema Registration Act and Rules only regulate the exercise of private rights of an individual to carry on a particular business on his property, In this context the expression "person aggrieved" must receive a strict construction. It was held that rival in the trade did not have a legal right under the statutory provisions or under the general law which have been subjected or threatened with injury. The main test laid down by the Supreme Court is as to whether a person's legal rights have been infringed or he has suffered a legal wrong or injury in the sense that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority complained of. 10. In the instant case, the petitioner is only a person in whose favour agreement of sale took place. He has no legal interest IN the property which was sought to be acquired. He did not file any objection for the last five years to the acquisition. IN the circumstances, it cannot be said that any legal right in regard to the property sought to be acquired have been affected to entitle him to challenge the notifications under the Land Acquisition Act. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel is the Judges' case where the question was whether a lawyer has interest and locus standi to file a petition. The second case relied upon by the learned counsel is the Judges' case where the question was whether a lawyer has interest and locus standi to file a petition. In this case, the question which came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was that in what circumstances a person can file a public interest litigation which is a litigation undertaken for the purpose of redressing public injury, enforcing public duty, protecting social, collective, diffused, rights and interests or vindicating public interest, any citizen who is acting bona fide and who has sufficient interest has to be accorded standing. In our opinion, this principle is not applicable to the present case where a person is seeking only to enforce private rights. It is not a case where a petition is sought to be filed for the purpose of redressing any public injury. 11. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the preliminary objection raised by the Addl. Advocate General is sustainable IN law. 12. The petition is not maintainable and is consequently dismissed in limine. Petition dismissed.