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1992 DIGILAW 11 (GUJ)

ASHAR PLASTIC MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. STATE OF GUJARAT

1992-01-16

G.T.NANAVATI, Y.B.BHATT

body1992
JUDGMENT G. T. NANAVATI, J. - The petitioner is a partnership firm and it was constituted in May, 1982. It is the petitioner's case that, relying upon the Government resolutions announcing package of incentives for promotion of industries in rural and backward areas, it decided to establish a new industry at Morvi. For that purpose, it obtained and took possession of a plot of land in the industrial estate at Morvi on March 31, 1982. It also placed an order for machinery and paid Rs. 70,000 as advance money on June 16, 1982. Subsequently, it erected a building and purchased plant and machinery worth Rs. 3,90,279. In all, it made an investment of Rs. 4,56,411 and started commercial production on December 12, 1982. The products manufactured by the petitioner are box strappings, which are plastic strips used for packing. They contain 60 per cent polypropylene, 20 per cent low density polyethylene and 20 per cent high density polyethylene and other chemicals. It is the petitioner's case that it became entitled to the benefits of cash subsidy and sales tax deferment under the G.R. dated May 18, 1982, notwithstanding the subsequent G.R. dated May 19, 1982, which included the industry manufacturing all plastic products made from high density polyethylene in the list of excluded industries. It, therefore, applied to the Industries Commissioner for an eligibility certificate. The Industries Commissioner granted such a certificate on March 7, 1983. It was also paid cash subsidy on September 1, 1983, June 18, 1983 and January 27, 1984. On March 14, 1983, the petitioner applied to the Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, respondent No. 3, for a certificate of entitlement of sales tax deferment. Respondent No. 3, by his order, dated April 18, 1984, rejected that application, on the ground that the industry of the petitioner was one of the excluded industries and, therefore, not entitled to the incentive benefits. Against that order, the petitioner filed an appeal under section 65 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 before the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. That appeal was dismissed. It has, therefore, filed this petition. Against that order, the petitioner filed an appeal under section 65 of the Gujarat Sales Tax Act, 1969 before the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax. That appeal was dismissed. It has, therefore, filed this petition. Though various prayers have been made in the petition, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he was confining his challenge to the two orders passed by the sales tax authorities, whereby the Sales Tax Deferment Entitlement Certificate has been denied to the petitioner and that he was challenging the said orders by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel. As the cash subsidy given to the petitioner is also sought to be recovered from it, he has challenged the said action on the same ground. The contention raised on behalf of the petitioner is that as it established its industry in one of the specified areas and as it did so relying upon the assurance contained in the Government resolutions dated December 22, 1977, August 27, 1980, January 7, 1982 and March 18, 1982, the respondents cannot deprive it of the benefits available under those resolutions merely because subsequently, i.e., on September 15, 1982, the Government decided to exclude the industry manufacturing plastic products made from high density polyethylene from the benefits available under those resolutions. In support of his contention, the learned counsel drew our attention to the decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 5108 of 1984 decided on April 23, 1991 (Tata Metals and Strips Ltd. v. State of Gujarat [1992] 87 STC 447 (Guj)). In that case, after considering various decisions of the Supreme Court and particularly the decision in Molilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1979] 44 STC 42; AIR 1979 SC 621 , this Court has held that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by article 299 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondent did not dispute that, this is not the correct legal position. The learned counsel for the respondent did not dispute that, this is not the correct legal position. The controversy between the parties is whether the petitioner proves that it bona fide believed when it established the industry and made substantial investment that the sales tax incentives were available to an industry set-up for manufacturing plastic products made from high density polyethylene and that the steps taken by it for the purpose of establishing the industry for manufacturing such articles were the result of the promise made by the Government in that behalf. In the petition, what the petitioner has stated is that the incentives, which were published by the Government, were : (i) grant of cash subsidy; (ii) exemption from payment of sales tax; and (iii) interest-free sales tax loan scheme. The petitioner has referred to the resolution dated December 22, 1977, whereby the Government had declared the new industries scheme for cash subsidy for industrial units to be set-up in developing areas and the scheme for sales tax exemption and grant of loan in respect of amount of sales tax paid on sales of finished products. It has then referred to the resolution dated August 27, 1980, whereby the earlier resolution dated December 22, 1977 with respect to the sales tax benefits was replaced and a new scheme of sales tax incentives was brought into force with effect from June 1, 1980 for a period of five years. It is then stated that, under the resolution, 15 industries were excluded from the benefit of the sales tax incentive scheme. It is then stated that, by the resolution dated January 7, 1982, the Government published a comprehensive list of industries, which were excluded from the benefits of the sales tax incentives. It is then stated that : ".... Thereafter, again on March 18, 1982, the Finance Department of the respondent No. 1 passed resolution No. GST-1082-1365-TH dated March 18, 1982, thereunder the detailed procedure was provided in respect of the sales tax deferment incentives and for that purpose, excluded from the purview of the scheme, 14 industries. ..." From these averments made in the petition, it becomes clear, according to the petitioner, that it was induced to set-up a new industry at Morvi, because of the incentives declared by the said resolutions. ..." From these averments made in the petition, it becomes clear, according to the petitioner, that it was induced to set-up a new industry at Morvi, because of the incentives declared by the said resolutions. It is also significant to note that the petitioner itself regarded the resolution dated March 18, 1982 as a resolution providing for a detailed procedure for the sales tax deferment incentive scheme. The petitioner has nowhere specifically stated that, as a result of the resolution, dated March 18, 1982, it was misled and bona fide believed that notwithstanding the resolution dated January 7, 1982, it would become entitled to the benefits of the resolutions dated December 22, 1977 and March 18, 1982 and that it would not have altered its position if the benefits of cash subsidy and sales tax deferment benefit were not to be extended to the petitioner. So far as the resolution dated March 18, 1982 is concerned, though it has reiterated the criteria regarding eligibility and the extent of benefit available under the resolution dated August 27, 1980 and specified the conditions, subject to which the benefits were to be made available, it did not replace the scheme declared by the G.R. dated August 27, 1980. It is not so specifically stated in the G.R. dated March 18, 1982 and there is nothing in it on the basis of which we can say that the earlier scheme declared by the G.R. dated August 27, 1980 was withdrawn and that a new scheme was declared by the Government. The scheme declared by the G.R. dated August 27, 1980, was to remain in force for a period of five years from June 1, 1980. The resolution dated March 18, 1982 also pertains to the same period and that is a clear indication of the fact that by the resolution dated March 18, 1982, the Government merely provided a detailed procedure in respect of the scheme declared by the resolution dated August 27, 1980. It appears that, while defining the phrase "new industry", the State Government lost sight of its own resolution, dated January 7, 1982 and, therefore, specified only 14 industries as not included within the definition of that phrase. To correct that mistake, it passed the resolution dated September 15, 1982. It appears that, while defining the phrase "new industry", the State Government lost sight of its own resolution, dated January 7, 1982 and, therefore, specified only 14 industries as not included within the definition of that phrase. To correct that mistake, it passed the resolution dated September 15, 1982. Even though this mistake was committed by the Government, it cannot induce us to believe that the representation, which was made, or the promise, which was given by the Government resolution dated March 18, 1982, was that only 14 industries specified in that Resolution were excluded from the purview of the scheme. Resolution dated January 7, 1982 was applicable to all incentive schemes and it was clearly stated therein that, after reviewing the whole position, the Government had prepared a comprehensive list of industries, which were not to be regarded as eligible for the incentives contained in the resolutions referred to in the said resolution. It was clearly stated therein that the industries mentioned in annexure I to that resolution were not to be regarded as eligible for any of the incentives. Thus, by that resolution, it was clearly made known that the benefits available under the resolution dated August 27, 1980 were not to be available to the industries mentioned in annexure I to that resolution. As stated earlier, by the resolution dated March 18, 1982, the scheme relating to the sales tax incentives declared by the resolution dated August 27, 1980, was not replaced or even modified. Merely because while defining the expression "new industry" some industries covered by the resolution dated January 7, 1982 were not shown as excluded industries, it will not follow therefrom that the Government had changed its policy and made a new representation or given a new promise, that the said incentives were to be given to all industries except those which were referred to in annexure I of the said resolution dated March 18, 1982. What was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that in the resolution dated September 15, 1982, the Government itself had stated that by its resolution dated March 18, 1982, it had declared the scheme relating to sales tax deferment incentives and that by the said resolution, it was again amending that scheme. What was urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that in the resolution dated September 15, 1982, the Government itself had stated that by its resolution dated March 18, 1982, it had declared the scheme relating to sales tax deferment incentives and that by the said resolution, it was again amending that scheme. That would mean that, after March 18, 1982, the scheme which was in force, was the scheme which was declared by that resolution and not the scheme declared by the resolution dated August 27, 1980. As pointed out earlier, no new scheme was declared by the resolution, dated March 18, 1982. It merely prescribed the conditions and procedure contemplated by the resolution, dated August 27, 1980. Therefore, even though the resolution dated September 15, 1982 does not refer to the resolution dated August 27, 1980, it is not possible to accept the contention that, after the passing of the resolution, dated March 18, 1982, the previous resolutions dated August 27, 1980 and January 7, 1982 were no longer in the field. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that the Government had not given any promise or assurance on March 18, 1982 that sales tax incentives were to be available to all industries, except the 14 industries, which were mentioned in that resolution. In our opinion, by the resolution dated January 7, 1982, it was specifically made clear by the Government that neither the benefit of cash subsidy nor sales tax incentives were to be available to the industries mentioned in that resolution. On this ground alone, this petition must fail. Even on facts, the petitioner has no case. Except stating that the petitioner had obtained a plot of land and placed an order for machinery and paid an advance of Rs. 70,000 towards the same, the petitioner has not produced any material to show that it had decided to establish the new industry because of such representation and that it would not have set-up the industry if it had known that the benefits of cash subsidy and sales tax deferment were not to be available to it. If the petitioner had really decided to set-up an industry in view of the Government resolution as stated in the petition, it would have surely enquired whether resolution dated January 7, 1982, was effective after the passing of the resolution dated March 18, 1982. If the petitioner had really decided to set-up an industry in view of the Government resolution as stated in the petition, it would have surely enquired whether resolution dated January 7, 1982, was effective after the passing of the resolution dated March 18, 1982. The entrepreneur, who bona fide wanted to take advantage of the incentives shown by the Government, would have surely considered all the resolutions and at once, he would have been put on guard that because of the resolution dated January 7, 1982, it was quite likely that the benefit would be denied to those industries, which were mentioned in that resolution. Admittedly, no enquiry whatsoever was made nor any clarification sought by the petitioner before setting up the industry for manufacturing plastic products from high density polyethylene. It appears that, the petitioner had independently decided to establish the industry and then finding that it was satisfying all the conditions laid down in the resolution dated March 18, 1982, applied for the benefits available under the resolution dated August 27, 1980 and has, now, unreasonably invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel. It was lastly urged that, as the Industries Commissioner, who was the competent authority under the scheme, had granted the eligibility certificate, the petitioner became entitled to the benefit of cash subsidy as also the sales tax deferment and the Government cannot, now, deny those benefits to the petitioner. It should not be forgotten that the provision for issuing an eligibility certificate by the Industries Commissioner was a part of the scheme framed by the Government in its administrative capacity. Obviously, it did not have binding effect either on the Government, which framed the scheme, or on the Commissioner of Sales Tax, who had to exercise his powers under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act. Even though the Industries Commissioner was expected to issue the eligibility certificate after holding a detailed enquiry, the certificate issued by him did not have binding effect. If the Government, after giving cash subsidy, found that the cash subsidy was wrongly given, inasmuch as the industry, to which it was given, was not entitled to it, it was certainly open to the Government to recover the said amount. If the Government, after giving cash subsidy, found that the cash subsidy was wrongly given, inasmuch as the industry, to which it was given, was not entitled to it, it was certainly open to the Government to recover the said amount. So also, it was open to the Sales Tax Commissioner to refuse to issue certificate for sales tax deferment if he found that the industry, in whose favour the eligibility certificate was given, was really not entitled to that benefit under the scheme. A certificate issued by an Industries Commissioner in his administrative capacity cannot have the effect of depriving the sales tax authorities of their powers or absolving them from performing their duties under the Gujarat Sales Tax Act. Therefore, this contention also cannot be accepted. In the result, this petition fails. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. Ad interim relief stands vacated. Petition dismissed.