JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J. - Landlord's application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act No. 13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act No. 13 of 1972) in respect of premises No. 124/323-B, Govind Nagar, Kanpur was allowed by the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 26-3-1986 passed in case No. 123 of 1982. Petitioner failed an appeal against the said order which was dismissed by the learned 5th Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar vide judgment and order dated 23-3-1992. 2. The landlord respondent No. 3 moved the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for the release of the premises in dispute in his favour, inter alia, on the ground that he having retired from service of the State of Madhya Pradesh wanted the tenanted premises for being occupied by himself and by members of his family with a view to settle permanently at Kanpur for the rest of his life along with his family members and for that purpose he required the accommodation in question. According to the landlord\respondent his family consisted of himself, his brother's wife Smt. Lakshmi Devi Shukla, his son Shi R.N. Shukla, daughter-in-law Smt. Kusum Shukla and three grand children Km. Seema Shukla, Shubhang Shukla and Hemang Shukla. It was alleged that landlord's Bhabhi Smt. Lakshami Devi being deserted by her husband had been residing with the landlord for the last fifteen years. It was further alleged by the landlord that his daughter Smt. Daya wife of Govind Prasad Misra and her three children frequently used to come and reside with him and that the part of the building already in his occupation is not sufficient to meet his and his family's genuine requirement. The respondent/landlord accordingly claimed release of the premises in question on the ground that it was bonafide required for occupation by himselt and the members of his family. 3. The petitioner filed written-statement and opposed the release application inter alia, on the ground that Smt. Lakshmi Devi was neither residing with the landlord nor was she member of his family and so her need, if any, was not to be taken as the need of the landlord which, according to the petitioner, was not genuine and bonafide. 3. The petitioner filed written-statement and opposed the release application inter alia, on the ground that Smt. Lakshmi Devi was neither residing with the landlord nor was she member of his family and so her need, if any, was not to be taken as the need of the landlord which, according to the petitioner, was not genuine and bonafide. It was also alleged that in case the premises was realised he would suffer greater hardship than the hardship the landlord might suffer in the event of release being refused. 4. The Prescribed Authority allowed the release application vide order dated 26-3-86 holding that the provisions of Section 21(1A) of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were attracted to the facts of the case in as much as the landlord having retired form service as Sahayak Sachiv, Madhyamik Shiksha Mandal, Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal had to vacate the tenanted premises in his occupation at Bhopal. It was for this reason that the Prescribed Authority held that the need of the landlord was a bonafide one. As regards the question of comparative hardship the Prescribed Authority recorded no categorical finding on it but it held that since the respondents/landlord had already vacated the tenanted premises in his occupation at Bhopal after his retirement, his need for the premises in question was imminently urgent and bona fine. 5. The Appellate Court reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority on the question of applicability of the provisions of Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and held that on the facts of the case the provisions of the said sub-section were not attracted but then it proceeded to examine in the light of Section 21(1)(a) and held that the need of the landlord for the premises in question was genuine and accordingly it dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner. It may be pertinent to mention here that in arriving at the conclusion that the need of the landlord was bonafide and genuine, the Appellate Court did take the need of Smt. Lakshmi Devi into account and held that the landlord required at least one room for her. 6. I have heard Sri Navin Sinha for the petitioner and Sri S.C. Tripathi for the respondent/landlord. 7. 6. I have heard Sri Navin Sinha for the petitioner and Sri S.C. Tripathi for the respondent/landlord. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended before me that the finding of the ower Appellate Court about the need of the respondent/landlord for the accommodation in question being genuine and bonafide is vitiated for the reason that it has taken into account the need of Smt. Lakshmi Devi who is not a family member of the landlord within the meaning of the term 'family' defined in the Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Appellate Court having recorded categorical finding that both the sons of the respondent/landlord and their family members reside in Bhopal being employed there and having reversed the finding of the Prescribed Authority that Sub-section (1-A) of Section 21 of the Act was attracted to the facts of the case, was not justified in dismissing the appeal. 8. Learned Counsel for the respondent/landlord refuted the submissions made by the learned Counsel or the petitioner and submitted that the need of the landlord's brother's wife Smt. Lakshmi Devi was rightly considered in view of the fact that she having been deserted by her husband was living with the landlord as his defendant since the last about 15 years. 9. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties. I consider it necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions before discussing the case law and recording my own conclusion on the points arising for consideration in this petition. 10. Section 21(1)(a) of the Act provides that the Prescribed Authority may order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or part thereof if it is satisfied that the building or part thereof is bonafide required, either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction, by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purpose or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee or a public charitable trust for the objects of trust. The factors relevant for the purposes are enumerated in Rule 6 of the Rules made under the Act. The factors relevant for the purposes are enumerated in Rule 6 of the Rules made under the Act. The word 'family' is defined in Section 3(g) of the Act as under : "3(g) "family" in relation to a landlord or tenant of a building means, his or her - (i) spouse, (ii) male lineal descendants, (iii) such parents, grand-parents and any unmarried or widowed or divorced or judicially separated daughter of a male lineal descendant, as may have been normally residing with him or her, and includes, in relation to a landlord, any female having a legal right of residence in that building." 11. After noting down the related provisions under the Act and the Rules made thereunder, I further consider it to be useful to refer to certain cases on the point. 12. In Smt. Satya Misra and others v. IInd Additional District Judge, and others, 978 UPRCC Supplement 738, K.C. Agarwala, J. (as he then was) while interpreting the expression "for occupation by himself" held as under : "The expression "for occupation by himself" does not mean that the landlord should live in isolation. If the state of health of a landlord or his age is such that he cannot live alone and would need the company or assistance of any other person, then the need of such other person whose assistance, he needs, would also be covered by this phrase. Similarly, if the landlord, is invalid, an accommodation required for a helper may also be considered as a need of the landlord......................A distinction has, therefore, to be maintained between two classes of cases where a landlord does not need the assistance of man but still he wants to keep some one with him, in such a case the need for occupation would not be that of the landlord but of that other person. But where, as here, the landlord keeps his daughter and her son-in-law to look after his business and for his help, it will have to be held that the requirement of these persons to have an accommodation to live with the landlord is bonafide need of the landlord himself." 13. But where, as here, the landlord keeps his daughter and her son-in-law to look after his business and for his help, it will have to be held that the requirement of these persons to have an accommodation to live with the landlord is bonafide need of the landlord himself." 13. In Mishri Lal v. Special Judge/Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1988(2) ARC 430, while interpreting the expression "for occupation by himself" used in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, R.K. Gulati, J. has observed as under : "It has consistently been held that the said phrase cannot be construed very narrowly to mean that the landlord should live in isolation or by himself only. In other words the expression within its ambit includes the personal requirement of a landlord. It may include landlord's servant, some other person who look after him and take care and whose company and assistance is or has become necessary though technically they may not be members of his family as defined in the Act. Thus needs for such others, whose assistance is required to the landlord although they may not be included in the term 'family' in this Act is the own need of the landlord." 14. In Thakur Deen v. Hero Devi, 1984 ALJ 787 : 1984(2) ARC 117, B.N. Sapru, J. observed as under : "A son is undoubtedly a member of the family of the landlady. The crucial words are "for occupation by himself or any member of his family". The word 'occupation' in the context in which it is placed in Section 21(1)(a), means occupation by the landlord or the members of his family alone with those persons who would normally reside with him. It does not mean that a landlord, must need the accommodation for his occupation alone in the sense that he cannot bring with him any other person who would normally live with him." xx xx xx xx "In the circumstances, in this view of the law, it cannot be held that the authorities below committed any manifest error of law in holding that the landlady's need included the need of the sons and the daughters-in-law to be accommodated in the building in question." 15. In Rani Chaturvedi v. Shiv Narain and others, 1979 ARC 479, S.D. Agrawala, J. while applying the proposition laid down in the case of Smt. Satya Misra (supra), held as under : "Section 21(1)(a) of the Act gives right to the landlord to apply for release of a building under occupation of the tenant if the landlord requires the building for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The landlord can apply for 'occupation by himself' or 'for occupation by any member of his family'. In case an application is made for occupation by, any member of his family, then alone the member of family will be only such a person who comes within the definition of the word 'family' as provided by Section 3(g) of the Act. If, however, the landlord requires the building for occupation by himself, then the question of applicability of the definition of the word 'family' as used in Section 3(g) does not arise. The Court has to examine the own need of the landlord and in such a case the fact that the relations of the landlord are permanently residing with the landlord, would be a relevant consideration for the Court to consider while examining the case of the landlord" Following his own decision in case of Smt. Rani Chaturvedi (supra), S.D. Agrawala, J. held in the case of Smt. Kamla Ahuja v. Vth Addl. Distt. Judge, Meerut and other, 1991 A.R.C. 371 at page 375, as under : "In Smt. Rani Chaturvedi v. Shiv Narain and other, I have taken a view that even a person may not come in the definition of the word 'family' defined in the Act but if such relation is staying with the landlord permanently, the need of the landlord will be there to accommodate that person and therefore, while considering the need of the landlady, in the instant case the need of the mother-in-law of the landlady had also to be considered". 16. Man is not machine-made and he is also not made of flesh and bones alone. Sentiments and emotions are equally important constituents of human frame. 16. Man is not machine-made and he is also not made of flesh and bones alone. Sentiments and emotions are equally important constituents of human frame. Further, the man is essentially a social being and, therefore, the social milleu a man lives in and the value system he adopts to be guided with are bound to have an impact upon his activities which in their turn necessarily influence the needs and requirements of his life. Accordingly having given my in depth consideration to the question as to what requirements of a landlord for his personal occupation of the building should be treated as requirements valid in law for the purpose of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, I am of the opinion that a landlord may require the building or part thereof not only to meet his personal physical requirements of a comfortable and dignified living befitting his status but, subject to the Statutory destruction such as the one contained in clause (1) of the third proviso to Section 21(1) and the one contemplated by the fourth proviso, he may also legitimately require the building or part thereof for personal occupation in other to meet his moral, social and philanthropic needs, requirements duties and obligations. 17. Moral and social factors are also relevant besides the factors enumerated in Rule 16 of the Rules for the purpose of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act in considering the requirements of personal occupation for purposes of residence by the landlord or any member of his family. Social rules and moral principles governing human conduct are, to my mind, irrevocably linked with progress in life. The Legislature, therefore, must not have intended to exclude such requirements for personal occupation from the purview of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 18. If a landlord moved by social rules and moral principles, sentiments of love and affection sympathy and compassion, permanently accommodates with him a person related to him by marriage or birth, directly or indirectly, who is in distress, the need of occupation for the purposes of residence of such a person may be taken as the need of the landlord himself notwithstanding the fact that such person is not a member of the landlord's family within the meaning of the term as defined in Section 3(g) and the landlord also does not require such person for any assistance, personal or professional. Reason being the fulfilment of landlord's social and moral need. In fact by doing so the landlord not only saves himself from social condemnation but he also earns praise among those who know him for his act of material and moral generosity towards a needy relative. This in my opinion would provide sufficient and legitimate justification for the need of occupation by such person for the purpose of residence being treated as the need of landlord himself. 19. The section so construed would go a long way towards achieving true justice that is to say the justice which is one with perfect harmony, perfect equilibrium and perfect order. I am of the view that justice, if not properly tempered and harmonised in the manner stated above, may wreck the very moral fibers of the people which may cause more harm than the good intended to be achieved by the Act. I must, however, hasten to add that a landlord's need for accommodation in respect of his moral and social duties and obligation should be very scrupulously and strictly construed and the landlord must also be made to sacrifice to some extent, his own personal needs for in my opinion it is necessary so to do while considering the landlord's needs involving elements of material and moral generosity as otherwise conceptual profundity of the expression "occupation by himself or any member of his family" used in the section would get diluted to and extent of conversion of bonafide' into 'mala fide' and further, too liberal a construction of this type of need of the landlord may attract the provision Section 12 of the Act which inter alia provides that if a landlord allows a building or part thereof to be occupied by a person who is not member of his family, the building or part thereof, as the case may be, in exclusive occupation of such person may be deemed to be vacant. The authorities under the Act must, therefore scrupulously examine that the professed need of the landlord is bonafide and genuine and must see whether the person for whom he needs an extra accommodation, is permanently residing with him not as separate unit but as a number of his family in the sense of the term used in common parlance. The authorities under the Act must, therefore scrupulously examine that the professed need of the landlord is bonafide and genuine and must see whether the person for whom he needs an extra accommodation, is permanently residing with him not as separate unit but as a number of his family in the sense of the term used in common parlance. This in my opinion is the broad principle according to which the need of a person being not a member of the landlord's family and also not being required by him for any personal or professional assistance may be treated as the need of the landlord himself for the purposes of Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. 20. Now coming to the facts of the present case, I find that the learned Additional Distt. Judge found as a fact that the landlord being retired as Sahayak Sachiv, Madhyamik Shiksha Mandal, Madhya Pradesh needs one bed room for himself, one bed room for his 'Bhabhi', one drawing room and one guest-room to meet his requirements befitting his social status. Learned Additional Distt. Judge further held that although according to landlord he has got only one 'duchhatti room' but even if the tenant's case that the landlord has got two rooms, be accepted, his requirement may be satisfied only if the two bed-rooms in occupation of the tenant were released in favour of the landlord. 21. But while coming to the aforesaid conclusion the learned Additional District Judge altogether failed to examine the circumstances in which Smt. Lakshmi Devi is said to have been deserted by her husband and residing with the landlord for the last more than fifteen years as alleged by him No categorical finding has been recorded that her desertion is permanent and that she has been residing with the landlord permanently as alleged by him. Whether the version of the landlord or that of the tenant on the point was correct, could be ascertained only if the circumstances of the alleged desertion are critically and scrupulously examined. The learned Additional Distt. Whether the version of the landlord or that of the tenant on the point was correct, could be ascertained only if the circumstances of the alleged desertion are critically and scrupulously examined. The learned Additional Distt. Judge seems to have proceeded to examine the question with an assumption that Smt. Lakshmi Devi had been deserted by her husband as would be clear from the observation : "Jahan tak Bhawan Swami ki Bhabhi, Lakshmi Devi ka prashan hai, wah uskey pariwar ki sadasya nahin hai, lekin chunki uskey Pati ney usko chhor diya hai aur wah prarthi key sath rahti hai, isliyey wah usper asharrit hai." It was not enough for the appellate Court to say only this that, "yeh aisa tathya hai jiske sambandh me Hindu samaj ka koi vyakti jhuth nahin bolega," particularly when both the parties are Hindus. The finding on the point is, in my opinion, a fallacious and pretentious one arrived without considering and examining the question in correct perspective. Such a finding can be termed as perverse and as such it is liable to be successfully assailed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 22. Learned Additional Distt. Judge also failed to examine the alternative as is whether the requirement of landlord can be satisfied my releasing only one of the two bed-room in occupation of the tenant/petitioner and the question as to whether the needs of the tenant would be adequately met by releasing one of the two bed-rooms in his occupation particularly in view of Rule 16(1)(d) of the Rules which provides that when the tenant's need would be adequately met by leaving with him a part of the building under his tenancy and the landlord's need would be served by releasing the other part, the Prescribed Authority shall release only latter part of the landlord. Learned Addl. Distt. Judge ought to have also considered the necessity and desirability of the landlord to have a separate guest-room in addition to a drawing room. It has been found as a fact that the two sons of the landlord are employed in Madhya Pradesh and they as also the married daughter of the landlord are expected to pay their visits to the landlord only occasionally. It cannot be gainsaid that on such occasional visits, they may be accommodated in the drawing-room and the other two rooms in occupation of the landlord and Smt. Lakshmi Devi. It cannot be gainsaid that on such occasional visits, they may be accommodated in the drawing-room and the other two rooms in occupation of the landlord and Smt. Lakshmi Devi. This of course depends upon the size of the rooms. Accordingly the question requires reconsideration by the appellate authority in correct perspective as discussed above. 23. In view of the above discussion the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The judgment and order dated 30-5-92 passed by the learned Additional District Judge in Rent Appeal No. 76 of 1986, Chandra Pal Singh v. Amar Nath, is quashed. The appellate authority is directed to readmit the appeal to its number and decide it in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment, if possible, within four months from the date of presentation of a certified copy of the judgment before it. 24. The parties shall bear their own costs.