JUDGMENT Choudhary S. N. Mishra, J. In this first appeal the defendants are the appellants against the judgment and decree dated 30th August, 1980 passed by the 1st Additional Subordinate Judge, Motihari in Title Suit No. 196/23 of 1976/79 by which the learned Judge decreed the suit of the plaintiff 2. Plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of title with respect to the lands appertaining to plot no. 1535, 1641 and 1642 of khata no 51 measuring 2 kthas 3 dhurs in village koiria tola, P.S. Raxaul in the district of East Champaran and also for injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession of the plaintiffs over the land in question. Alternatively it was also prayed for recovery of possession and mean profits in case the plaintiffs are evicted by virtue of the order passed in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure. 3. Genealogical table as mentioned in schedule I of the plaint is being re produced below : Paran Mahto Thithar Mahto Ramtahal Mahto Ramdhyan Mahto Bagar Mahto = Most Dharohari Ramageya Mahto Muni Mahto Raja Mahto 4. According to the plaintiffs the land appertaining to the aforesaid khata no. 51 stands recorded in revisional-survey khatian in the name of Thithar Mahto. having one share and Munni and Raja having one share and after the partition plot no. 1535 area 2 kathas 3 dhurs was allotted to branch of Muni Mahto and Raja Mahto and in lieu thereof plot no. 1528 area 2 kathas 3 dhars was allotted to the branch of Thithar Mahto. Over and above a block of 13 kathas of land comprising plot no. 1638 to 1643, 6½ kathas from north was allotted to the branch of Raja Mahto and Munni Mahto and 6½ kathas from south was allotted to the branch of Thithar Mahto. 5. Ramdhyan Mahto, son of Thithar Mahto in the year 1924 mortgaged plot no.1528 to one Raja Ram Sah through a registered deed dated 28.8.1924, which was subsequently sold to one Ram Govind Ram. 6. Raja Mahto and Muni Mahto died issueless leaving behind their mother Dharohari, who inherited the estate of her aforesaid sons and came in possessions of the entire properties including the land in question. 7. According to the plaintiffs Most. Dharohari also mortgaged plot no. 6. Raja Mahto and Muni Mahto died issueless leaving behind their mother Dharohari, who inherited the estate of her aforesaid sons and came in possessions of the entire properties including the land in question. 7. According to the plaintiffs Most. Dharohari also mortgaged plot no. 1535 in 1924 along with other lands to Chhadhari Mahto father of the plaintiffs, who came in possession over the same. Since Most. Dharohari was in need of money, he executed another mortgage deed in the year 1926 in favour of Chhadhari Mahto aforesaid and subsequently sold the entire lands to him appertaining to plot no. 1638 to 1643 including the plot no. 1535 measuring 2 kathas 3 dhurs through the registered; sale deed dated 29.11.29. The plaintiffs therefore, allege that after the execution of the sale deed aforesaid nothing remained in possession of Most. Dharohari to be sold subsequently. Accordingly the plaintiffs allege that the sale deed of 1971 executed by the vendor of the defendants did not confer any title and possession over the suit land. According to the plaintiffs 6½ kathas of land which was allotted to the Thithar branch had also been sold to the plaintiffs by his son Ramdhyan Mahto in the year 1925. It is alleged that no doubt the plot no 1638 only is mentioned in the sale deed but taking into consideration the area and boundary mentioned therein clearly show that the southern portion measuring 6½ kathas comprising plot no. 1638 to 1643 were sold. The said mistake was subsequently rectified by Ramdhyan Mahto through the deed of rectification dated 1.1.31. Similar mistake was also occurred in the sale deed of 1929 executed by Most. Dharohari and subsequently Most. Dharohari executed a deed of rectification in the year 1944 wherein it has been stated that she had sold 6½ kathas of land from the north of the block comprising plot no, 1638 to 1643. 8. According to the plaintiffs their pucca tiled roof house as well as phus house stands on plot no. 1535 over which there was a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which was decided vide order dated 18.3.1974 against the plaintiffs and hence the plaintiffs had to file the suit for declaration of their title as stated above. 9. In substance the plaintiffs claim to have purchased the land in Question from Ramdhyan Mahto and Most. 9. In substance the plaintiffs claim to have purchased the land in Question from Ramdhyan Mahto and Most. Dharohari, on the basis or which they claim title and possessions over the said land. 10. The defendants have appeared and filed their written statements. Defendant nos.2 and 3 have filed their joint statement wherein they have admitted the partition between Thithar Mahto on the one hand and the Raja and Munni on the other but according to the defendants the entire lands appertaining to plot no. 1535, 1638 to 1643 including plot no. 1528 were entirely allotted to the branch of Thithar Mahto. They have also said in their written statement that partition of the land appertaining to plot no. 1638 to 1643 in the manner, as alleged, by the plaintiffs is not correct and on the face of it is wrong since the plot no. 1638 is just adjacent south of plot no. 1639 to ]643. The defendants, no doubt, admit in their written statement that Most. Dharohari succeeded the estate left by her deceased sons Raja and Munni but according to the defendants she never inherited the suit land rather it remained in the branch of Thithar Mahto till It was sold by Ramageya, who is non-else than a grand son of Thithar Mahto and son or Ramdhyan Mahto, to the father of Defendant no.1 through registered sale deed dated 26.11.71. It was stoutly denied by the defendants that plot no. 1535 was ever transferred to the plaintiffs under any mortgage deed or through any sale deed. It was alleged that Most. Dharohari never sold any portion of plot no. 1535, 1638 to 1643 through alleged sale deed of 1929. Since the father of the plaintiffs Chhadhari Mahto had already purchased the entire plot no. 1638 from son of Thithar Mahto and. Therefore, he could not have taken the same plot twice from Most Dharohari through the alleged sale deed of 1929. 11. As regards sale deed executed by Ramdhyan Mahto in the year 1925. Chhadhari Mahto had wrongly mentioned more area than that he had actually purchased and the alleged rectification through a khista chitti of the year 1931 is forged and fabricated. The defendants alleged that no title would pass under such a forged & fictitious document. 11. As regards sale deed executed by Ramdhyan Mahto in the year 1925. Chhadhari Mahto had wrongly mentioned more area than that he had actually purchased and the alleged rectification through a khista chitti of the year 1931 is forged and fabricated. The defendants alleged that no title would pass under such a forged & fictitious document. Similarly the deed of rectification executed by Most Dharohari in the year 1944 is also a collusive one which was brought into existence without the knowledge of Most. Dharohari. The defendants finally supports the findings of the learned Magistrate in a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure aforesaid which was Subsequently confirmed by the High Court in Cr. Revision No. 739/1974. The defendants relied upon the jamabandi record of Bettiah Raj which also according to the defendants. falsify the case of the plaintiffs. 12. The defendants further alleged in their written statement that after the death of Raja and Munni. Most. Dharohari started living with Ramdhyan Mahto and later on she orally surrendered her entire properties to Ramdhyan Mahto and thus the entire properties of both the branches namely Thithar Mahto on the one hand and Raja and Munni on the other came in the hands of Ramdhyan Mahto. Most. Dharohari, later on executed a deed of gift, in favour of Ramageya on 21.5.35. The defendants, therefore alleged that the documents said to have been executed by Most. Dharohari right from 1925 to 1944 in favour of Chhadhari Mahto, father of the plaintiffs are illegal and collusive and cannot confer any title to any title to the plaintiffs. 13. The defendants, in the circumstances, claim to have purchased plot no. 1535 measuring an area of 2 kathas and 3 dhurs through a. registered sale deed dated 26.4.1971, from Ramageya in the name of Mathura Prasad, who is father of defendant no. 1 and on the basis of the aforesaid sale deed the defendants came in possession and paying rent receipts till date after having mutated the same in the Government records. 14. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the following issues: "(i) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs have any cause of action for the suit ? (iii) Is the suit barred by the principles of estoppel acquiescence, waiver and adverse possession? 14. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings of the parties the trial court framed the following issues: "(i) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs have any cause of action for the suit ? (iii) Is the suit barred by the principles of estoppel acquiescence, waiver and adverse possession? (iv) Whether the plaintiffs have title to the suit property? (v) What reliefs, if any, plaintiffs are entitled ?" 15. Thus from the pleadings it appears that while the plaintiffs based their title over the suit land on the basis of the purchase from Most. Dharohari whereas the defendants asserts their right over the land in question, on the basis of purchase through a registered sale deed dated 26.4.1971 executed by Ramageya, son of Ramdhyan Mahto. 16. The court below, after going through the evidence, both oral and documentary adduced by the parties came to the conclusion that plot no. 1535 having already sold to Chhadhari Mahto through the registered sale deed of 1929 and. Therefore, Ramageya grand son of Thithar Mahto, and son of Ramdhyan Mahto, could not have sold the same land to Mathura Prasad, father of defendant no. 1 in the year 1971 and accordingly held that the defendants appellants did not derive any title over the suit land bearing plot no. 1535. On the contrary the plaintiffs have a better title on the basis of the purchase through a registered sale deed of 1929. 17. Coming to the question of possession, the court below has held in paragraph 18 of the judgment, after detail discussion of both oral and documentary evidence, that the plaintiffs are in possession of the suit land right from 1924 on the basis of a mortgage deeds executed by Most. Dharohari in favour of Chhadhari Mahto, who is the father of the plaintiffs and they continued in possessions after its purchase through a registered sale deed in the year 1929. On the contrary the defendants appellants never came in possession on the basis of the alleged purchase in the year 1971. 18. So far the question of title with respect to plot no. On the contrary the defendants appellants never came in possession on the basis of the alleged purchase in the year 1971. 18. So far the question of title with respect to plot no. 1641 and 1642 is concerned, the court below after having detailed discussion of both oral and documentary evidence come to a finding in paragraph 24 of the judgment to the effect that the plaintiffs have Indefeasible title to the entire block of 13 kathas covering plot no. 1638 to 1643. 19. While concluding the judgment, the court below recorded its finding in paragraph 35 as follows ; "In view of the oral and documentary evidence discussed above I hold without any manner of doubt that the plaintiffs have tide to the suit properties and they are coming in possession thereof since long. The defendants or their vendor had neither title nor possession over the suit property even for 8 day. Thus this issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs." 20. The other formal issues have, however, not been seriously pressed by the defendants appellants in the court below and accordingly on the basis of the aforesaid findings the suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence this appeal. 21. It may be stated here that although the name of the lawyer, who has filed vakalatnama, on behalfs of plaintiffs respondents, did appear in the cause list but he could not appear at any point of time during the course of hearing which continued for three days. When the counsel appearing for the appellants concluded his argument, I sent for a lawyer who had filed power on behalf of the plaintiffs respondents, came and informed the court expressing his inability to appear in the case since the entire file has been taken away by the client and inspite of the repeated reminders, they have not responded till date. Accordingly the appeal was heard ex-parte in absence of the lawyer of plaintiffs respondents. Subsequently, on 23.1.1992. a petition was filed on behalf of the plaintiff respondents explaining the circumstances under which their counsel did not appear at the time of hearing of the appeal with a prayer to allow their counsel to appear and argue in the case before passing of the judgment. After having heard the counsel, the prayer was allowed and, accordingly learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents was heard thereafter. 22. After having heard the counsel, the prayer was allowed and, accordingly learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondents was heard thereafter. 22. The principal and, in fact, the only argument of Mr. Prameshwar Prasad, learned, counsel appearing for the appellants is that Most. Dharohari who inherited the estate of her deceased husband could not have transferred the property in favour of Chhadhari Mahto, the father of the plaintiffs in the year 1929 being a limited owner of the estate left by her deceased husband. 23. It may be mentioned here that the issue raised by the learned counsel for the appellant was neither pleaded nor raised in the court below but for the first time this issue was raised in this Court which was allowed being a pure question of law. 24. Mr. Prasad, in course of his argument. formulated the following two points for consideration; firstly whether a Hindu widow inheriting the property from her deceased husband could alienate prior to coming into force the Hindu Succession Act 1956 and secondly, if there is any transfer made earlier which requires rectification by other subsequent deed, which deed will be deemed to be the actual deed of transfer. 25. Mr. Prasad while developing his argument has drawn my attention to the sale deed (Ext. 2B) executed by Most. Dharohari in favour of Chhadhari Mahto in the year 1929 and submitted that, apart from the facts, that she being a limited owner of the estate of her deceased husband could not have transferred the property through the alleged sale deed (Ext. 2B) aforesaid. The recital of the alleged sale deed will itself show that it was executed without any consideration and for legal necessity. 26. Learned counsel further submitted that the Ext. 2A dated 24.3.1944 in fact a sale deed and not a deed of rectification as alleged by the plaintiffs. He further submitted that when Most. Dharohari had already executed the deed of gift dated 21.5.1935 (Ext. 23) in favour of Ramageya, there was no question of executing the sale deed dated 24.3.1944 (Ext. 2A) in favour of Chhadhari Mahto. Similarly, learned counsel also submitted that according to the plaintiffs themselves Ramdhyan Mahto executed sale deed dated 29.5.1925 (Ext. 2C) in favour of Chhadhari Mahto then there is no substance in executing the another sale deed dated 1.1.31 (Ext. 19) subsequently wits respect to the said land. 27. 2A) in favour of Chhadhari Mahto. Similarly, learned counsel also submitted that according to the plaintiffs themselves Ramdhyan Mahto executed sale deed dated 29.5.1925 (Ext. 2C) in favour of Chhadhari Mahto then there is no substance in executing the another sale deed dated 1.1.31 (Ext. 19) subsequently wits respect to the said land. 27. In substance that attack of Mr. Prasad on the sale deed of 1929 (Ext. 28) as well as Ext. 2A dated 24.3.1944 was two fault, firstly that in any event It could not be regarded as valid and effective as against the reversioners on the death of the widow and secondly on the usual ground that the same was executed by practising of fraud by the father of the plaintiffs and that, too, without consideration and or for any legal necessity. 28. The learned counsel further challenged the finding of the court below on the question of possession recorded in paragraph 18 of the judgment. According to the learned counsel, the evidence of D.W. 1 Lakhpat, D.W. 9 Shiv Shankar, D.W. 13 Ramagya and D.W.14 Amla Prasad fully supports the possession of the vendor of the defendants and thereafter the defendants from the date of purchase. The learned counsel also relied upon the evidence of P.W. 9 Harihar Mahto and P.W. 19 Sadho, who are the plaintiffs in support of possession of the vendor of defendants. 29. Mr. Goose, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondents, on the other hand, bas raised three fold submissions by way of reply to the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants, firstly, that the vendor of the defendants has not challenged various transactions made by Mostt. Dharohari at any point of time during her life time and, therefore, the defendants cannot be allowed to challenge the said transfer made by Mostt. Dharohari at this belated stage. The second submission of the learned counsel is that the reversioner has not challenged the said transfers by Mostt. Dharohari within twelve years from her death and lastly, the learned counsel submitted that in any view of the matter, the said transactions made by Mostt. Dharohari for legal necessity, the same cannot be challenged subsequently. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the provisions of section 209 of the Hindu Law, which rum as follows :- “209. Dharohari within twelve years from her death and lastly, the learned counsel submitted that in any view of the matter, the said transactions made by Mostt. Dharohari for legal necessity, the same cannot be challenged subsequently. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the provisions of section 209 of the Hindu Law, which rum as follows :- “209. Reversioner's suit for possession and limitation.-A suit by reversioners, entitled to succeed to the estate on the death of a widow or other limited heir, for possession of immovable property from an alienee from her must be brought within twelve years from her death..........” 30. The learned counsel has also referred Article 65 (b) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes twelve years limitation which reads thus- "65. For possession Twelve When the pos of immovable pro- years session of the perty or any interest defendant be therein based on comes adverse title. to the plaintiff. Explanation. -For the purposes of this article,- (a) XX XX (b) Where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of immovable Property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies ; (c) XX XX 31. Relying upon the aforesaid provisions, learned counsel submitted that the reversioner have not brought the suit challenging the transfers made by Mostt. Dharohari right from 1929 during her life time nor within 12 years of the death of the widow, the reversioners and/or the defendants cannot be permitted to challenge the said transfers made by Mostt. Dharohari. 32. The learned counsel drew my attention to the evidence of D.W. 1, who has stated in paragraph 7 of his evidence that Mostt. Dharohari died 15 to 20 years ago. D.W. 12 has ago stated that she died 20 years ago. The evidence of P.Ws.8 and 9 also supports the aforesaid statements in this regard, who have stated in their evidence that she died 25 to 26 years ago. In this context, learned counsel relied upon the various documents executed by Mostt. Dharohari in favour of the plaintiff's father right from the year 1919 upto 1926 and also the subsequent sale deeds executed by hell firstly in the year 1929 (Ext. 2B) and subsequently in the year 1944 (Ext. In this context, learned counsel relied upon the various documents executed by Mostt. Dharohari in favour of the plaintiff's father right from the year 1919 upto 1926 and also the subsequent sale deeds executed by hell firstly in the year 1929 (Ext. 2B) and subsequently in the year 1944 (Ext. 2A) and relying upon those documents, he further submitted that the reversioners did not challenge any of those transfers during her life time nor within twelve years from her death, as contemplated under Section 209 of the Hindu Law read with Article 65 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel further submitted that the Hindu widow is entitled to alienate the property left by her deceased husband for legal necessity even before coming into force of the Hindu Women's right to Property Act, 1937 and. accordingly, he submitted that' the sale-deed (Ext. 2B) executed in favour of the plaintiffs is for legal necessity and, therefore, the said transfer cannot be challenged by the reversioners and/or their purchasers. In the Instant case, the defendants are the purchasers from one of the reversioners, D.W. 13 Ramagya son of Ramdhyan. 33. Mr. Prasad in rely to the submissions made by Mr. Ghose has contended that since the vendor of the defendants was in possession of the property In question and, therefore, there was no necessity of challenging the alleged transfer by Mostt. Dharohari within twelve years of her death. He relied on Exhibit-3, a mortgage deed Jointly executed by Mostt. Dharohari and Ramdhyan, father of vendor of the defendant in the year 1919. He also relied on Exhibit 20, a sale deed dated 29.5.1925 executed by Ramdhyan father of Ramagya with respect to the land of his half share. He also relied upon the sale-deed of 1944 (Ext. 2A) which also suggests joint possession. The learned counsel further submitted that the vendor of the defendants was in possession over the property in question and, therefore, the question of limitation as envisaged under Article 65 of the Limitation Act will not be attracted. 34. The first point contended by Mr. Prasad in support of this appeal Seems to be well founded. The proposition of law is well established by now by this Court as well as by the Apex Court of the country. 35. 34. The first point contended by Mr. Prasad in support of this appeal Seems to be well founded. The proposition of law is well established by now by this Court as well as by the Apex Court of the country. 35. The question which falls for consideration in this appeal is whether plaintiffs got any title by virtue of the aforesaid sale deed (Ext. 2B) executed by Mostt. Dharohari in the year 1929 being a limited owner of the estate of her deceased husband. 36. In support of his argument, Mr. Prasad had submitted that according to PW 9, Harihar Mahto, Mostt. Dharohari died issueless sometimes in the year 1945 and after the death the property devolved upon the reversioners who sold the land in question to the father of defendant no. 1 through a registered sale deed dated 26.11.1971 (Ext 2), on the basis of which the defendants acquired a valid title over the land in question 37. The learned counsel in support of his argument relied upon a decision in the case of the Collector of Masulipatam vs. Cavaly Vencata Narrainapah reported in 8 Moors Indian Appeal page-529. The question for consideration before their Lordships, inter alia, was Power of Hindu Widow regarding disposition of the property left by her deceased husband. 38. While deciding that question their Lordships have held that if there is any collateral heir of the deceased husband, the widow is precluded from transferring the property except for religious or charitable purpose, for the salvation of the soul of the deceased husband and for legal necessity. 39. The learned counsel has further relied upon a decisions in Kalawatibai vs. Soiry bai & ors. reported in 1991 BBCJ, page-155 (S.C). He relied upon the proposition of law as set out in paragraph-12 of the said judgment, which is quoted below: "Limited owner commonly means a person with restricted rights as opposed to full owner with absolute rights. In relation to property absolute, complete or full ownership comprises various constituents such as the right to possess, actual or constructive, power to enjoy, that is to determine manner of use extending even to destroying, right to alienate, transfer or dispose of etc. Any restriction or 'limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership for instance restriction on enjoyment of property or its alienation. Any restriction or 'limitation on exercise of these rights may result in limited or qualified ownership for instance restriction on enjoyment of property or its alienation. Such restriction or limitation may arise by operation of law or by deed or instrument. The limited ownership of female Hindu in Hindu Law arose as a matter of law A Hindu widow, according to different schools, Banaras, Bengal or Mithila and even in Bombay inherited or succeeded to property whether of male or female as a limited owner and held a limited estate only. Nature of such estate was explained by the Privy Council in Janki Ammal v. Narayanaswami, 1916 p 43 I.A p207 to be, "he. right is of the nature of a right to property, her powers in that character are limited." In Jaisri v Raj Diwan Dubey, 1961(2) SCR 559 it was observed by this Court that "when a widow succeeds as heir to her husband the ownership in the property both legal and beneficial vests in her". And the restriction on her power to alienate except for legal 'necessity is imposed. "not for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of estate". Thus a Hindu widow prior to 1956 held the property fully with right to enjoy or even destroy or dispose it of or alienate it but such destruction or alienation should have been impressed with legal necessity or for religious or charitable purposes or for spiritual welfare of the husband. Necessary consequences that flowed from an alienation for legal necessity was that the property vested in the transferee of alienee, and the reversioners were precluded from assailing its validity. In Kamala Devi v. Bachu Lal Gupta, 1957 SCR 453 this Court after reviewing various authorities extended this principle to female donee. A gift made within reasonable limits, in favour of daughter even two years after the marriage but in pursuance of promise made at time of the marriage was upheld and the reversioners claim was repelled on permissible alienation under Hindu Law. But what right or title is acquired by the alienee if transfer is against legal necessity or contrary to law? The authorities appear to be at one that such transfer being not void but voidable could be avoided by reversioners including govt. taking by escheat (Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata 1861 8 M.I.A. 529). But the widow was held bound by transfer.” 40. The authorities appear to be at one that such transfer being not void but voidable could be avoided by reversioners including govt. taking by escheat (Collector of Masulipatam v. Cavaly Vencata 1861 8 M.I.A. 529). But the widow was held bound by transfer.” 40. It is well established principle of law by now that under the Hindu Law, as it was before coming into force of 1956 Act, any transfer by a Hindu widow who has inherited the estate of her deceased husband could be challenged if It is made for the purposes other than required under the law namely for religious or charitable purposes, or for salvation of the soul of the deceased husband and or for legal necessity beyond that my transfer by the widow can be challenged by the reversioners after the death of the widow. Even after coming of Hindu Womens Right to Property Act, 1937 position have not improved very much except creating a limited interest in the widow. The Act, 1937, therefore, will not come in aid of the plaintiffs whatsoever. 41. I have gone through the alleged sale deed of 1929 (Ext. 2B) recital whereof will not conclusively prove that consideration money had passed and or the document was executed for any legal necessity permitted by law and in that view of the matter the plaintiffs could not claim to have acquired any title to the property under the sale deed aforesaid (Ext. 2B). 42. As regards submissions made by Mr. Ghose that the reversioners not having challnged any of the transfers made by Mostt. Dharohari right from the year, 1919, they cannot be allowed to do so at this belated stage-seems to be misconceived. The reversioners are not supposed to institute a suit during the life time of the widow in case of alienation by her even for the purpose other than legal necessity. The reversioners can very well wait till the death of the widow and it is only, thereafter, that they can file a suit for possession of the alienated property on the ground of alienation being a nullity. 43. The other submission of Mr. Ghose that the reversioners having not challenged the transfers made by the widow within twelve years from her death is equally misconceived in the facts and circumstances of this case. 43. The other submission of Mr. Ghose that the reversioners having not challenged the transfers made by the widow within twelve years from her death is equally misconceived in the facts and circumstances of this case. The documents, which have already been discussed above, clearly suggest that the reversioner was in possession of the property till he transferred the same to the defendant through a registered sale-deed. In that view of the matter, the question of filing of the suit by the reversioner within twelve years from the death of the widow as envisaged under Article 65 of the Limitation Act will not arise in this case at all. 44. The last submission of Mr. Ghose that the alleged transfer through the sale-deed (Ext. 2B) is for legal necessary and, therefore, the same cannot be challenged, is not supported either by averments made in the sale-deed (Ext. 2B) of 1929 or in the sale-deed (Ext. 2A) or 1944. 45. In view of the decisions referred to above and also on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs It is thus clear that alienee from a Hindu widow prior to 1956 did not acquire any valid right and title over the land in question since that transfer was made for the purpose other then that what was required by law. 46. In view of the finding aforesaid it is not necessary to go into other issues either raised or examined by the court below. 47. In the result, I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the court below. It is further declared that the alleged sale deed (Ext. 2B & 2A) executed by Mostt. Dharohari in favour of plaintiffs is inoperative and in-effective after the death of Mostt. Dharohari and will not confer any title upon the plaintiffs by virtue of the aforesaid sale deeds. 48. In the facts and circumstances of the case there will be no order as to cost. Appeal allowed.