R. R. K. TRIVEDI, J. We have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and learned Standing Counsel. 2. In this petition, petitioners have questioned the legality of the order dated 29. 7. 1992 passed by Judicial Magistrate, Roorkee, by which he was directed the S. H. O. Jhabrera, district Hardwar to register a case under Sees. 167/218/219/466/467/468/471/477-A/474 read with Section 120-B, I. P. C. and to investigate the offences and to submit his report to the Court. This order has been passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code ). 3. The facts giving rise to the aforesaid order are that respondent No. 2 Brahma Singh filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate, which has been filed as An-nexure-I to this petition, under Section 156 (3) of the Code with the prayer that the S. H. O. Jhabrera be directed to register the case at the police station and to investigate the offence. In the application he has stated that he attempted to lodge a F. I. R. and with this purpose he went to the police station Jhabrera but the police being in collusion refused to record his report. His grievance, as stated in the application, appears to be that he is an hand icapped person. Agricultural land viz. plot No. 102 with area 1. 321 acres is recorded in his name in Khata No. 61. It has been alleged by him that the petitioners in collusion with the consolidation staff forged a parvana Amaldaramad purporting to have been issued under Section 34/35 of the Land Revenue Act from the Court of Tkhsildar, Roorkee, bearing case No. 419 of 1991, dated 30. 9. 91. On the basis of this forged parvana Amaldaramad, petitioners got their names recorded and thereafter on 13. 5. 1992, the Parvana Amal daramad was returned to the Tkhsildar after compliance. The Tkhsildar, however, enquired into the matter and it has been found that no such Parvana was issued either from his Court or from any Court of Naib-Tkhsildar. The Tahsildar intimated to the consolidation authorities that Parvana Amaldaramad was forged and any entry made on the basis of the same should be corrected. The Tkhsildar, however, enquired into the matter and it has been found that no such Parvana was issued either from his Court or from any Court of Naib-Tkhsildar. The Tahsildar intimated to the consolidation authorities that Parvana Amaldaramad was forged and any entry made on the basis of the same should be corrected. On these allegations it has been stated that the petitioners have knowingly forged the document and used the same as genuine for depriving the respon dent No. 2 of his property and for wrongful gain fraudulently and they are liable to be prosecuted for the offences mentioned above. On receipt of this application the learned Magistrate passed the impugned order. 4. We have heard Shri Devendra Swarup, learned Counsel for the petitioners and also persued the impugned order. Learned Counsel for petitioners assailed the order on the grounds that the learned Magistrate though could direct investigation by police under Section 156 (3) of the Code, however, he could not direct to register the case. Learned Counsel for petitioners has placed reliance on a case Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana 1990 (1) Crimes 600. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also relied on a Full Bench judgement of this Court Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P. 1989 (26) ACC181. It has been further submitted that learned Magistrate was net justified in recording a finding after noticing the state ment of the complainant, respondent No. 2, as no statement on oath was recorded. 6. Lastly, it has been submitted that cognizance could not be taken without proceeding further and witout recording the statements on oath under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code. Learned Counsel further submitted that the learned Magistrate ought to have treated the application filed by respondent No. 2 as a complaint and should have adopted the procedure provided under Chapter XV of the Code. 7. We have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for petitioners and in our opinion none of the submissions made by the learned Counsel can be accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. A perusal of the application moved by respondent No. 2 clearly shows that his grievance before the learned Magistrate was against the police as on being approached, his report was not recorded under Section 154 of the Code. A perusal of the application moved by respondent No. 2 clearly shows that his grievance before the learned Magistrate was against the police as on being approached, his report was not recorded under Section 154 of the Code. After stating the injustice caused to him he prayed before the learned Magistrate that police be directed to register his case and investigate the same. The contention of the learned Counsel for petitioners that the application moved by the respondent No. 2 was a complaint thus is not correct. As it was not a complaint, there was no occasion for the learned Magistrate to adopt the procedure provided under Chapter XV of the Code. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioners seriously questioned the power of the learned Magistrate while directing investigation under Section 156 (3) of the Code, to register the case. Learned Counsel placed reliance on the case of Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana mentioned above. We have already found that the application moved by respondent No. 2 could not be termed as a complaint in view of the relief sought and the allegations made therein. Respondent No. 2 did not pray the Court to punish the petitioners. He only prayed for a direction to the police to register the case and investigate the offences. The case relied on by the learned Counsel is distinguishable as it had arises out of a complaint case. 9. Further, in case of Raghubir Singh reliance has been placed on two earlier cases decided by the same Court wherein it was held that the learned Magistrate in terms of Section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, can send the complaint to the police for investigation and not for registration of the case. It has been further observed that view taken in those cases is based on observations of Honble Supreme Court in case: Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and others v. Narayana Reddy and others, 1976 A. C. C. 230 (S. C. ). 10. It has been further observed that view taken in those cases is based on observations of Honble Supreme Court in case: Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy and others v. Narayana Reddy and others, 1976 A. C. C. 230 (S. C. ). 10. We have gone through the judgment of Honble Supreme Court in the case of Devarapalli Lakshminarayan Reddy and in our opinion, there is nothing in the judgment of Honble Supreme Court on which basis it could be said that while directing the police to investigate into an offence under Section 156 (3) of the Code, registration of the case could not be directed, on the other hand, Honble Supreme Court in para 17 of the judgment has observed that an order under sub-section (3) of Section 156 is in the nature of peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (1 ). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet under Section 173, para 17 of the judgment can be gainfully quoted below: "17. Section 156 (3) occurs in Chapter XII, under the caption "information to the police and their powers to investigate", while Section 202 is in Chapter XV which bears the heading "of complaints to Magistrate". The power to order police investigation under Section 156 (3) is different from the power to direct investigation conferred by Section 202 (1 ). The two operate in distinct spheres at different stages. The first is exercisable at the pre-cognizance stage, the second at the post cognizance stage when the Magistrate is in seizing of the case. That is to say in the case of a cognizable offence, the power under Section 156 (3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before he takes cognizance of the offence under Section 190 (1) (a ). But if he once takes such cognizance and embarks upon the procedure in Chapter XV, he is not competent to switch back to the pre-cognizance stage and aviil of Section 156 (3 ). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156 is in the nature of peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (3 ). It may be noted further that an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 156 is in the nature of peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (3 ). Such an investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence under Section 156 and ends with a report or charge-sheet under Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 comes in at a stage when some evidence has been collected by the Magistrate in proceedings under Chapter XV, but the same is deemed insufficient to take a decision as to the next step in the prescribed procedure. In such a situation, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 202 to direct, within the limits circumscribed by that section, an investiga tion "for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding". Thus, the object of an investigation under Section 202 is not to initiate a fresh case on police report but to assist the Magistrate in completing proceedings, already instituted upon a complaint before him. " In the instant case, the Magistrate has only applied his mind for satisfaction that the facts alleged disclosed cognizable offences and required to be investigated by the police. It cannot be said in any manner that the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the case merely because he also heard respondent No. 2 orally in support of the application. The satisfaction thus reached was not for purpose of taking cognizance of the offence but for passing an order under Section 156 (3) of the Code directing the police to investigate the matter. 11. Now the question arises whether an order under Section 156 (3) of the Code could be for registering the case also. In our opinion, there is no provision anywhere in the Code from which an inference could be drawn that from a peremptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Section 156 (1) the case could not be registered under Section 154. It cannot be denied that the investigation of the case is an executive action and its supervision lies with the State. While investigating into the offence under Section 156 (1) under the orders of 156 (3) police does not act as a delegate of the Magistrate. It cannot be denied that the investigation of the case is an executive action and its supervision lies with the State. While investigating into the offence under Section 156 (1) under the orders of 156 (3) police does not act as a delegate of the Magistrate. The investigation thus carried out is not an investigation by or on behalf of the Magistrate. The observations of Honble Supreme Court in case Nirmaljeet Singh Hpon v. State of West Bengal 1973 A. C. C. 181 (S. C.) while repelling the argument" that the investigation by the police under the orders passed under Section 156 (3) of the Code was part of the proceeding of the Court" can be gainfully quoted here: ". . . Such a proposition does not appear to be correct. Firstly, the Police authorities have under Sections 154 and 156 of the Code of statutory right to investigate into a cognizable offence without requiring any sanction from a judicial authority of King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad,71 Ind. App. 203 : AIR 1945 Pc 18 and even the High Court has no inherent power under Section 561-A of the Code to interfere with the exercise of that statutory power. It is true that the Chief Presidency Magistrate had under Section 156 (3) ordered in the present case an investigation by the police. But, once that was done, the inquiry by the police was of the same nature and character as the one which the police had power to conduct under sub-sections (1) and (2) of that Section. Indeed sub-section (3) expressly states that an investigation ordered by a Magistrate would be an investigation" as above mentioned" i. e. an investigation made by a police officer in his statutory right under sub-section (1) and (2 ). That being so, once an investigation by the Police is ordered by a Magistrate, the Magistrate cannot place any limitations on or direct the officer conducting it as to how to conduct it. Secondly, it is well settled that before a Magistrate can be said to have taken cognizance of an offence under Section 190 (1) (a) of the Code, he must have not only applied his mind to the contents of the complaint presented before him, but must have done so for the purpose of proceeding under sec. 200 and the provisions following that Section. 200 and the provisions following that Section. But where he has applied his mind only for ordering an investigation under Section 156 (3) or issuing a warrant for purposes of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. (See Chari v. State of U. P. , 1951 SCR 312 p. 320-321 also vomwna Singh v. Bhadai Sah, AIR 1951 SC 207 ; 1964 (5) SCR 37 ; AIR 1964 SC 1541 . The Chief Presidency Magistrate having not even taken cognizance of the offence but having applied his mind for the purpose only of directing a police investigation, under see. 156 (3), no proceeding could be said to have commenced before him, of which the inquiry by the Police could be said to be part and parcel. Further, it cannot be said that the police officer acting under Section 156 (3) was a delegate of the Chief Presidency Magistrate or that the investigation by him was an investigation by or on behalf of the Magistrate. Production of the receipt by Hoon in the course of such an investigation was therefore not production in a proceeding before the Chief Presidency Magistrate so as to attract the ban under Section 195 (1) (c ). The first limb of Mr. Chaglas argument therefore cannot be accepted. " From the observations of Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases it is clear that the police has to investigate the offence in the same manner as if the offence was actually reported to the police under Section 154 (1) of the Code. It is not that the proceedings are still pending before the Magistrate in one way or the other. The Officer-in-charge of a police station is under a statutory obligation to reduce in writing any information given to him in writing. In the facts of the present case if the report disclosing the cognizable offence has been received from the Magistrate with an order under Section 156 (3) of the Code, the person giving information is not changed. The informant con tinued to be respondent No. 2 and the police was bound to register the offence in the book contemplated under Section 154 (1) of the Code. The informant con tinued to be respondent No. 2 and the police was bound to register the offence in the book contemplated under Section 154 (1) of the Code. After a close scrutiny of the provisions contained in Chapter XII of the Code it could be said that while investigating into an offence under the orders under Section 156 (3) of the Code, the officer-in- charge of the police station was obliged to register the case in the book meant for the same. In our opinion, even if there was no direction by the Magistrate to register the case, the officer-in-charge of the police station is under a legal obligation to register the case for the purpose of investigation in the same way as if it was reported to him under Section 154 (1 ). Thus, the objection of the learned Counsel that the registration of the case in the police station could not be directed by the learned Magistrate is not correct and we express our respect ful disagreement to the case of Raghubir Singh aforesaid relied on by the learned Counsel for petitioners. We would like to clarify it here that the position may be different when the investigation is ordered by the Magistrate under Section 202 of the Code which is in the process of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding further. Under Section 202 the proceedings before fhe Court remain pending but the position under Section 156 (3) is entirely different where the investigation by the Police is Magistrate. 12. We have also perused the Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Lal Yadav v. State of U. P (supra) mentioned and in our opinion, this judgment does not help the petitioners in any manner. 13. A comparison of Section 154 (3) and 156 (3) of the Code will also be relevant for appreciating and resolving the controvery in the present case. The Legislature under Section 154 (3) of the Code has given power to the Superintendent of Police to order investigation on being approached by a person aggrieved by refusal to record the informa tion. The Superintendent of Police on being satisfied that information disclosed the commission of cognizable offence could investigate into the offence himself or could depute any police officer. Under Section 156 (3) the only thing mentioned is that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 Cr. The Superintendent of Police on being satisfied that information disclosed the commission of cognizable offence could investigate into the offence himself or could depute any police officer. Under Section 156 (3) the only thing mentioned is that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 Cr. P. C. can direct Investigation which means that a Magistrate should be competent to take congizance of the offence under Section 190 and if he comes across any information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence, he could direct investigation. The information may reach him in any manner, including through a person aggrieved by refusal on the part of an officer-in-charge of the police station to record the information as in the present case. The power of the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156 (3) isthus much wider than the Superintendent of Police contemplated under Section 154 (3) for directing investigation. But, in all such cases, recording of information in the book kept in the police station or registration of the case is necessary step for investigation of the case under Section 156 (2) and 157, Cr. P. C. when the investigation is directed either under Section 154 (3) or 156 (3), the informant remains the same. The report or information comes to the officer-in-charge of the police station with the command of the higher authority or the learned Magistrate to compel such officer to investigate into the offence. The legislative intent behind both the aforesaid provisions appears to be to provide protection to the public and a special care in respect of the victims of cognizable offences and not to leave the investigation of such offences at the whim and sweet-will of the officer-in-charge of the police station. 14. For the reasons recorded above, in our opinion, this petition has no force and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. .