Amal Chandra Dutta v. Union Of India (UOI) — 1992 DIGILAW 1128 (ALL)

JUDGMENT : B.L. Yadav, J. These analogous Civil Revisions filed u/s 115 of the CPC (for short the Code) and a Review Application in Civil Revision No. 299 of 1990 involve similar questions of law in suit no, 287 of 1981 filed by the Plaintiff applicant against the Union of India and others and it is convenient to dispose them of by a common judgment. Civil Revision No. 119 of 1983 shall, however, be the leading case. 2. Plaintiff applicant filed suit for damages with a relief that a decree for a sum of Rs.4,33.530/- be passed against the Defendants 1 to 5 jointly and severally with pendente lite and future interest etc. with the allegations that the Plaintiff was manufacturer of drugs on the ground floor of Ram Kotbi, Tagore Villa, Alam Bazar, CaIcutta-35, wherein he was carrying on his business upto the November 1987 and after that period he was disturbed by the Border Security Security Force. Government of India, his factory competently smashed forcibly, his business destroyed absolutely and he was thrown out illegally and the said building and land was purchased by the Government of India from the landlord of the premises. The Plaintiff has filed an application as an indigent person in 1975 in a suit for compensation and damages etc. the same was converted to Suit No. 287 of 1981. 3. The plaint allegations were not replied by the Defendants Union of India for about 8 (eight) months and Plaintiff had also filed an application for inspection and production of the documents relied upon by the Defendant As the plaint allegations were not replied by the Defendants for about 8 months hence according to Plaintiff suit must have been decreed under Order 27 Rule 5 read with Order 8 (Eight) Rule 10 of the Code The Defendants did not file the documents on which the defence was based and non filing of the same according to Plaintiff would mean as if there was no defence. It was also alleged by the Plaintiff that Order 10 Rule 2 statement must have been recorded as these statements were not recorded hence issues framed were illegal. 4. A writ petition No. 13808 of 1988 A.C. Dutta v. Union of India and Anr. It was also alleged by the Plaintiff that Order 10 Rule 2 statement must have been recorded as these statements were not recorded hence issues framed were illegal. 4. A writ petition No. 13808 of 1988 A.C. Dutta v. Union of India and Anr. was filed by the Plaintiff applicant before a Division Bench of this Court and the same was dismissed on 1-8-89 with the observations that as the objection has been filed by the Defendants to the application of the Plaintiff to decree the suit and the matter is still pending before the courts below hence it was not fit case for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. As regards the review petition, Plaintiff has filed civil revision No. 299 of 1990 against the order dated 7th February, 1990 passed by Xth Additional District Judge Allahabad rejecting the prayer of the Plaintiff for examining the Defendant under Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code. That revision was dismissed by the Order dated 10th April 1990 passed by Hon'ble K.C. Agrawal, J. (as his lordship then was) Against that order review petition has been filed. 6. Sri A.C. Dutta appeared in person and was heard at considerable length on so many dates. He cited a number of cases in the revisions arid review petition. It is however, not necessary to refer to all the cases, but those cases having bearing on the subject would certainly be discussed. 7. It appears convenient to take up the review petition first. Sri A.C. Dutta urged that the provisions of Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code are mandatory and the Court was bound to examine the Defendants with a view to elucidating matters in the suit. 8. No doubt the expressions 'shall' and 'May' both have been used under Order 10 Rule 2(a)(b) and Sub-rule 2 & 3 of Rule 2, of the Code. The 'shall' and 'May' expressions have often been subject to constant and conflicting interpretation. 'Shall' is mandatory whereas 'may' is permissive or enabling. 8. No doubt the expressions 'shall' and 'May' both have been used under Order 10 Rule 2(a)(b) and Sub-rule 2 & 3 of Rule 2, of the Code. The 'shall' and 'May' expressions have often been subject to constant and conflicting interpretation. 'Shall' is mandatory whereas 'may' is permissive or enabling. But in reference to context expression 'may' may be read as shall and must convey mandatory meaning, but where the Legislature was conscious in using both the expressions in same sequence or in same rule or section in that event there would be no justification to determine as to whether expression 'shall' used by the Legislature is mandatory and whether expression 'may' is permissive or mandatory. In my opinion in case both the expressions 'shall' and 'may' have been used in that event the collective wisdom of the Legislature is accepted to be final and expression 'shall' conveys the mandatory sense whereas the expression 'may' conveys only the permissive sense. In the present case as under Rule 2(1)(a) of Order 10 of the Code, it has been provided that the Court shall with a view to elucidating matters in controversy in the suit, examine orally such of the parties to the suit appearing in person or present in Court, as it deems fit. It is obligatory on the Court to examine party only when it wants to elucidate matters in controversy. In case the Court does not think it necessary to elucidate matters in controversy, in that event it shall not be obligatory for the court to examine party or the Defendant In the present case court did not examine the Defendant under Order 10 Rule 2 as it did not consider necessary to elucidate the matters in controversy It is discretionary for the court either to examine the party or not examine In other words procedural safeguards must be commensurate with the sweep of the powers. Wider the power greater the need for the restraint in its exercise. In the present case even though under Order 10 Rule 2 wide powers have been given to the courts to examine the Defendants for elucidating matters in controversy but the same has to be exercised with restraint particularly keeping in view the necessity for elucidating matters in controversy. See Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 611 . 9. See Ranjit Thakur Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1987) 4 SCC 611 . 9. As the matter was argued by the Plaintiff and the Civil Revision No. 2299 of 1990 was dismissed on 10-4-1990 by Hon'ble K.C. Agarwal, J. (as his lordship then was) there is neither propriety, nor justification nor any ground has been made out to review that order consequently the review petition fails and is dismissed. 10. In other analogous Revisions somewhat similar controversy is involved broadly speaking the dispute is about the verification of the pleadings and its denial, particularly by Defendant No. 3 in his written statement as required by Order 6 Rule 15. The case of the Plaintiff is that the Defendant No. 3 has verified the written statement on the basis of documents without any detail, whereas those documents are relevant. As a matter of fact, those documents pertain to the sale and purchase of the disputed building. The verification of pleadings, particularly its denial according to the Plaintiff applicant, was not specific, rather the same was evasive denial, hence the same may be taken to be an admission on the part of Defendant No. 3 and on that point alone as Defendant No. 3 has admitted the plaint case, the suit may be decreed (as provided under Order 8 Rules 3, 4 and 5). 11. The next controversy was about discovery on oath of the documents and inspection and interrogatories as contained under Order 11 of the Code. The Plaintiff has made application to the court for an order directing the Defendants to make discovery on oath of the documents which are in their possession relating to the matter in question. In other words, the Plaintiff made an application under Order 11 Rule 12 that the Defendant No. 3 may be directed to furnish before the court those documents on the basis of which the verification of pleadings was made. But that application was contested and some of the documents were claimed to be privileged. The court by its order dated 5-4-84 directed for production of non-privileged document. According to the Plaintiff the Defendants must have produced the documentary evidence on which they intended to rely and which has not already been filed in the court (Order 13 Rule 1). 12. The court by its order dated 5-4-84 directed for production of non-privileged document. According to the Plaintiff the Defendants must have produced the documentary evidence on which they intended to rely and which has not already been filed in the court (Order 13 Rule 1). 12. On behalf of Defendant No. 3, however, it was urged that the details of documents were not given in the written statement. Just in the verification clause, it was stated that the averments were based on record. On behalf of the Plaintiff, however, an application for similar prayer (311-C) was made, but the same has been earlier rejected. For the similar prayer, however, a subsequent application is not maintainable. Those documents, however, which were required by the Plaintiff applicant to be filed, were not the documents relating to any matter in question in the suit. 13. On behalf of the Plaintiff, however, it was urged that the documents sought to be produced were relevant in the matter in question in the suit and in respect of those documents no privilege can be claimed by the Defendant No. 3. It was also urged that non-production of the best evidence in possession of Defendant No. 3 would lead the court to draw an inference against him in view of Section 114 Illustration (J) of the Evidence Act. 14. Sri A.C. Dutta argued the matter in person on a number of dates at considerable length and placed reliance on a number of cases including Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar Vs. Mahomed Haji Latif and Others, AIR 1968 SC 1413 ; Karamshi Jethabhai Somayya Vs. The State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1714 ; Tek Bahadur Bhujil Vs. Debi Singh Bhujil and Others, AIR 1966 SC 292 ; Vinod Kumar Arora Vs. Surjit Kaur, (1987) 3 SCC 711 ; Ram Sarup Gupta (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Bishun Narain Inter College and Others, (1987) 2 SCC 555 ; Jahuri Sah and Others Vs. Dwarka Prasad Jhunjhunwala and Others, AIR 1967 SC 109 ; Pandu Dhondi Yerudkar and Another Vs. Ananda Krishna Patil, AIR 1966 SC 153 ; Krishna Kumar Sinha v Kayasth Pathshala AIR 1966 All 570 and Ram Singh and Others Vs. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3 . The submission made on behalf of the plaintiff applicant was refuted by the other side. 15. Ananda Krishna Patil, AIR 1966 SC 153 ; Krishna Kumar Sinha v Kayasth Pathshala AIR 1966 All 570 and Ram Singh and Others Vs. Ram Singh, AIR 1986 SC 3 . The submission made on behalf of the plaintiff applicant was refuted by the other side. 15. In order to appreciate the first part of the controversy the provisions of Order 6 Rule 2 may be read along with the provisions of Order 8 Rules 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Code. Before proceeding further it is to be emphasised that the interpretation of several procedures and provisions as contained under the Code are involved. The principles of interpretation of the procedural provisions are slightly different than other substantive provisions, inasmuch as the procedural provisions are not ends in themselves, rather they are steps to achieve the broader goal to justice. The procedure is just a tool to lead to a correct conclusion and to have justice. The interpretation of the procedural provisions have to be justice oriented. The interpretation is not to be made in a pedantic manner. What is the pith and substance and the object of the Legislature has to be ascertained In other words the rules of procedure are not by themselves the end, but they are means to achieve the ends of justice. The rules are not hurdles to the pathway to justice. "The construction of rules of procedure which permits justice and prevents its miscarriage by enabling the court to do justice in myriad situation, all of which could not have envisaged, acting within the limits of permissible construction, must be preferred to that which is rigid and negatives the cause of justice. The reason is obvious. The procedure is meant to sub-serve and not rule the cause of justice Owners and Parties Interested in Owners and Parties interested in M.V. "ValiPero" Vs. Fernandeo Lopez and Others, (1989) 4 SCC 671 . 16. In certain circumstances, according to facts the procedural provisions are not to be taken as static vehicle of ideas and concepts. As the concepts and ideas change, similarly the meaning to be assigned to those procedural provisions must also change, but must be consistent with the aims and objects of the legislature. It is well known that law does not operative in vaccume. As the concepts and ideas change, similarly the meaning to be assigned to those procedural provisions must also change, but must be consistent with the aims and objects of the legislature. It is well known that law does not operative in vaccume. In other words it cannot be taken to be just like an antique to be taken down, instead admire and put back on the shelve. But It has to be taken as it was to be an instrument possessed by a society for the healthy growth and development of the society. 17. The pleadings have to be precise but must contain material facts in it on which the party pleadings relies and in the negative it shall not contain facts which are only evidence by which such material facts are to be proved. Reading the provisions of Rules 3, 4, 5 of Order 8 of the Code together, it leads to only one irresistible inference that what the legislature intends, and those provisions are that in case a Defendant denies the allegations in the plaint, he must do so positively and specifically. The denial need not be value and evasive. Under Rule 5, however, the consequences of not having denied the particular statement or fact in the plaint has been stated. In case a particular fact stated in the plaint is not denied by the Defendant in the written statement specifically and unequivocally or be necessary implication, it shall be assumed as if the Defendant denying the plaint allegation has admitted those allegations in the plaint. What is to be borne in mind is that there is a Proviso added to Rule 5. A proviso has to be read and considered in the relation to a particular matter to which it is added as a proviso. In case the proviso would not have been there the scope of meaning to be assigned to the proviso could have been read in the main provision of Order 8 Rule 5 of the code itself. 18. In certain cases the proviso is added just to explain the meaning of the main provision or to curtail the meaning of the main provision, or in other words to control the construction of the main provision. No doubt, the provisions containing proviso with certain other provisions must be read and considered as a whole. 18. In certain cases the proviso is added just to explain the meaning of the main provision or to curtail the meaning of the main provision, or in other words to control the construction of the main provision. No doubt, the provisions containing proviso with certain other provisions must be read and considered as a whole. To be more precise it has been provided under Rule 5(1) that in case an allegation in the plaint is not specifically denied or by necessary implication it has not been stated to be not admitted, in that event it shall be deemed as if the same has been admitted by the Defendant except in the cases where it is against a person in disability In other words, the rule of admission by non-denial does not apply where the Defendant is a person under disability such as minor. The proviso added to Rule 5 of or 8, thereafter indicates that normally in such cases where the allegations in the plaint were not denied specifically, in that event such allegations in the plaint were to be deemed as if they have been admitted by the Defendant. The fact admitted need not be proved. To put it differently the Plaintiff would not have been required to lead evidence to prove those facts alleged in the plaint which have not been specifically denied by the Defendant. In a case of admission by implication as contemplated by Rule 5(1) of Order 8, the rigour of the rule has been modified or softened by the proviso, which in substance is equal to proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act under which the Court may use discretion requiring any fact so admitted to be proved by other evidence. The legislature has, thus, highlighted that in the matters of admission by implication, it is the judicial discretion of the Court which shall prevail, either to decide the case on the basis of such admission by implication or where the circumstances would justify, to direct the Plaintiff to lead evidence to prove by such evidence other than such admission by implication. 19. 19. The proviso has been added with a view to do justice that in our country considering the social circumstances where the majority population lives in villages and not very must conversant with the technicalities of law or the pleadings as contained under the Code, in that event discretion has been given to the court that even though certain allegations in the plaint have not been specifically denied, rather technically the same is to be deemed as if admitted, it is within the discretion of the Court to direct the Plaintiff to prove those facts which have not been specifically denied by leading positive evidence in his possession In this way the proviso has substantially obliterated the rigour and effect of the main provision under Rule 5(1) of Order 8, which states that if a fact alleged in the plaint has not been specifically denied, in that event it has to be deemed as an admission by implication. This is the basis for the principles enunciated by the apex court of the country including certain decisions of the Privy Council that the pleadings in this country have not to be considered technically, mechanically or in a pedantic manner (See 1987 SC 1242).p 20. In other words, the proviso to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order 8 of the Code makes it crystal clear that failure of the Defendant to deny the allegations in the plaint specifically does not necessarily mean that the Plaintiff need not to prove such allegations. The court can in its judicial discretion, require of such allegations and not rely on such admission by implication as sacrosant. 21. There may be so many weighing factors with the court to direct the Plaintiff to prove allegations in the plaint which were not specifically denied by the Defendant in his written statement. The Defendants failure to deny the allegations in the plaint specifically may be on account of ambiguous and unsatisfactory averments. In certain cases the implied admission may be made collusively or with a view to avoid the public policy. The discretion of the court in view of the proviso added would be exercised judiciously. The concept of justice has been stated in the Institute of Justenian. "JUSTITEA EST CONSTOMS ET PERPETUA VOLUNTIVS JUS SUUM CUIQUE TRIBUENDI" which means justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render everyone his due. 22. The discretion of the court in view of the proviso added would be exercised judiciously. The concept of justice has been stated in the Institute of Justenian. "JUSTITEA EST CONSTOMS ET PERPETUA VOLUNTIVS JUS SUUM CUIQUE TRIBUENDI" which means justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render everyone his due. 22. In the present case even assuming that Defendant No. 23 has not traversed the allegations in certain paras specifically, nevertheless it is open to the court to require the Plaintiff to prove such facts otherwise than by such admission by implication. No benefit can be given to Plaintiff at present on account of non denial of certain allegations of fact in the plaint specifically It is for the Court, however, to rely on such admission by implication or to direct the Plaintiff to prove it otherwise than by such admission, "Earlier the Plaintiff's similar application has already been dismissed as observed in the impugned order. There would be no justification accordingly to grant any relief. 23. The main thrust of the argument of Sri A.C. Dutta that no denial of certain averments in the plaint specifically by Defendant No. 23 and non filing of written statement in view of Rule 10 of Order 8 of the Code and other relevant provisions itself was sufficient for decretal of the suit straight away, is to be rejected. As a matter of fact, a combined reading of Order 8 Rules 3, 4, 5 and 10 and other relevant provisions of the Code do not provide that the suit can be decreed straight away only on account of fact that certain averments in the plaint were not traversed specifically or no written statement was filed within time permitted or fixed by the Court. 24. In Modula India Vs. Kamakshya Singh Deo, (1988) 4 SCC 619 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court under para 23 page 642 has observed as follows: Rules 1, 5 and 10 of this Order VIII have been recently amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. We find nothing in these rules which will support the contention urged on behalf of the Respondents. Rule 1 merely requires that the Defendant should present a written statement of his defence within the time permitted by the Court. We find nothing in these rules which will support the contention urged on behalf of the Respondents. Rule 1 merely requires that the Defendant should present a written statement of his defence within the time permitted by the Court. Under Rule 5(2), where the Defendant has not filed a pleading it shall be lawful for the court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint except against a person under disability but the court may in its discretion require any such fact to be proved Again under Rule 10 when any party from whom a written statement is required fails to present the same within the time permitted or fixed by the court, the court "shall pronounce judgment against him or make such order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit." It will be seen that these rules are only permissive in nature. They enable the court in an appropriate case to pronounce a decree straight away on the basis of the plaint and the averments contained therein. Though the present language of Rule 10 says that the court 'shall' pronounce judgment against him, it is obvious from the language of the rule that there is still an option with the court either to pronounce judgment on the basis of the plaint against the Defendant or to make such other appropriate order as the court may think fit. Therefore, there is nothing in these rules, which makes it mandatory for the court to pass a decree in favour of the Plaintiff straight away because a written statement has not been filed. Reference was made before us to Sub-rule (1) of Rule 5. This sub-rule, however, has application only in a case where a pleading is filed but does not contain a specific or implicit denial of the averments contained in the plaint or other document to which it is a reply. Rule 5(1) cannot be made use of to sustain the contention that where there is no written statement the court is bound to accept the statements contained in the plaint and pass a decree straight way. Rule 5(1) cannot be made use of to sustain the contention that where there is no written statement the court is bound to accept the statements contained in the plaint and pass a decree straight way. These provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, far from supporting the contentions of the Plaintiff that a decree on the basis of the plaint should follow a failure to file the written statement, rather indicate a contrary position, namely, that even in such cases, it is a matter for the court to exercise a discretion as to the manner in which the further proceedings should take place. We, therefore, d^ not think that the terms of Order VIII in any way conflict with the conclusion reached by us. 25. It is accordingly evident that even if there is no written statement filed within the time allowed, the court is not bound to accept the statement contained in the plaint and pass a decree straightway. Similarly even if certain averments in the plaint are not traversed that may mean an admission by implication. But that itself would not entitled the Plaintiff to have a decree passed in his favour. Even in such cases it is a matter for the Court to exercise discretion as to the manner in which the further proceedings could take place 26. It is pertinent in connection in the exercise of discretion, and it would not be inapt to refer to Douglas, J. in U.S. v. Wounderlick 1951 342 US SCR 98 : 96 Layers Edn. 113, as follows: Where it is freed man from unlimited discretion with some ruler.... where discretion is absolute roan has always suffered. Lord Mainsfield in John Wilkes (1770 98 ER 327 stated as under: Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not humor, it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. The discretion accordingly has to be exercised in a judicial way guided by well known principles of law. 27. Gopal Krishnaji Khethkar v. Mohd. Lord Mainsfield in John Wilkes (1770 98 ER 327 stated as under: Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not humor, it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. The discretion accordingly has to be exercised in a judicial way guided by well known principles of law. 27. Gopal Krishnaji Khethkar v. Mohd. Haji Latif (supra), was a case pertaining to the interpretation of Section 114(g) and Section 103 of the Evidence Act where it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a party in possession of a best evidence which would throw light on the issue in controversy, in case he withholds that evidence, the court ought to draw an adverse inference against him notwithstanding that onus of proof does not He on him. A party need no rely on abstract doctrine of onus of proof or on the facts that he was not called upon to produce it. In the present case, however, Defendant No. 23 did not produce requisite document, hence adverse inference can be drawn against him, but that would be at the stage when the evidence is led in view of the issues framed and not prior to that. 28. In Kararoshee Jethabhai Somayya v. State of Bombay (Supra), while interpreting the scope of Order 13 Rule 1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that while it was the duty of the private party to a case to place all the relevant matters material before the Court, a higher responsibility rests on the Government not to withhold such document from the Court. In the present case if on behalf of the Defendant the document which were relevant, are not produced the court can draw an inference or ascertain liability at the proper stage. 29. In Tek Bahadur Bhujal v. Devi Singh Bhujal (Supra), it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court under para 8 that in view of the absence of any such specific pleas, issues and evidence we are not prepared to accept the contentions for the Appellant that Respondent No. 1 could not nave been a member of the family consisting of the Appellant, his brother and mother merely on the ground that he was the Appellants uterine brother. In that case no such specific plea was taken by the Defendant where the Plaintiff alleged in the plaint that he the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 were bothers and belonged to the same joint family centering round their common mother no issue was framed on the point no any evidence was led. In the present case issues have been framed and there is no objection to the issues framed and in case there is any grievance of the applicant about the improper framing of issues, that can be looked into according to the pleadings and well known rules of framing issues contained under Order 14 Rules 1 & 2 of The Code The evidence is still to be led, hence that case is of no assistance to the applicant. 30. Ram Swaroop Gupta v. Bishun Narain Inter College (Supra), was a case where the object and purpose of the pleadings was highlighted to the effect that it was to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet in other words, in order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state essentially material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. At the same time the pleadings should receive liberal construction and no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice. Just on the basis of technicalities the pleadings need not be looked into rather a liberal construction has to be placed. This case, therefore, is also of no assistance to the applicant. 31. Jahoor Shah v. Dwarka Prasad Jhunjhunwala, (Supra), was a case where it was emphasised while appreciating the scope of Order 8 Rule 5 that Order 8 Rule 5 provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint if not denied specifically or by necessary implication or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the Defendant shall be taken to be admitted, to say that the Defendant has no knowledge of a fact pleaded by the Plaintiff’s not amount to a denial of the existence of that fact, not even an implied denial and no specific issue on the question of adoption was raised. Hence the High Court has taken a view that as there was no plea taken by the Defendant nor the same was dented specifically, hence no issue was framed one not nor there was any evidence led. Hence the High Court has taken a view that as there was no plea taken by the Defendant nor the same was dented specifically, hence no issue was framed one not nor there was any evidence led. In the present case issues have been famed and evidence shall be led at the proper stage and in that connection stated earlier, the cope of admission by Implication would be considered by the court below. The facts of the present case, however, are Afferent, inasmuch as here the issues have been framed. 32. In Pandu Dhondi Yerudkar v. Ananda Krishna Patil (supra), the scope of Order 14 Rule 1 was considered and it was pointed out that when a vague plea is made by the Defendant the court should hesitate to frame an issue on such a vague plea. In the present case there is no dispute about the issues being framed and in case there is any such thing the same can be corrected or modified. Hence the aforesaid case is also of no assistance to the applicant. 33. Krishna Kumar Singh v. Kayastha Pathshala (supra), was a case where the scope of Section 114 illustration (g) read with Section 64 of the Evidence Act was considered by a Division Bench of this Court to the effect That non production of best evidence would lead to adverse inference and in case that was a documentary evidence, oral evidence cannot be accepted. In the present case stage for leading evidence is subsequent to the present stage and at that stage in case the documents necessary was withheld by the Defendant, opposite party, an adverse inference can be drawn. 34. Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh (supra), was a case where the scope of Order 8 Rule 5 CPC was considered under para 183 at page 48 and there was no denial at all about the plea taken in the plaint or the election petition, much less specific denial of the allegations in the written statement of the Respondent, even though it was a material fact which ought to have been denied specifically if it was not admitted. In the present case it has been denied but not specifically. Hence the above case is also of no assistance to the applicant. 35. In the present case it has been denied but not specifically. Hence the above case is also of no assistance to the applicant. 35. The Plaintiff applicant has moved certain other applications including application 378-C under Order 11 Rule 12 of the Code for discovery of document in possession of Defendant No. 3. The prayer was for directing the Defendant to make discovery on oath of the documents which are in his possession and which was the basis for verification of the written statement. In other words, the Plaintiff wanted that Defendant No. 3 may be compelled to disclose the documents in his possession or power, on the basis of which he verified pertain contents of the written statement to be based on record. But the object of Rule 12 of Order 11 was that all the material documents in possession of the Defendants may be disclosed by putting him on oath. This was also with a view to facilitate enquiry of the trial so that material documents in possession of the other side may be obtained. But the provisions of Rule 12 are not absolute. They are held by proviso to curtail the meaning which otherwise would have been contained in the main provision. The proviso is that the discovery sought for by the Plaintiff shall not be ordered when and so far as the Court shall be of opinion that it is not necessary either for disposing fairly of the suit or for saving costs. In the present case also the application filed by the Plaintiffs has been rejected on the ground that the documents were not necessary for the disposal of the suit. In other words, the discretion has been given to the court with the adding of the proviso that an application for inspection has been made to the court and before the discretion is to be exercised judicially, however, in order to ascertain that the documents were relevant for the disposal of the suit. The Legislature was conscious in enacting the provision so that the provision for inspection of the documents may not be misused. 36. Similarly other applications have been filed including application 381-C for granting leave to the Plaintiff to deliver interrogatories for the examination of Defendant No. 3. The Legislature was conscious in enacting the provision so that the provision for inspection of the documents may not be misused. 36. Similarly other applications have been filed including application 381-C for granting leave to the Plaintiff to deliver interrogatories for the examination of Defendant No. 3. These application were under Order 11 Rule 1 of the Code, which is the stage after the issues have been framed and the suit is ripe for trial. In brief, the psychology of every party to a suit is to know the details of the material facts, information’s and documents of the other side This is with a view to strengthen one's case or to demolish the case of the other side. 37. The object of serving interrogatories is to elicit better and additional materials for better preparation of a case before it is brought to trials similarly discovery of documents is also sought for. Even though for further and better particulars of pleading the court has ample powers under Order 6 Rule 5 and under Order 8 Rule 9 of the. Code Similarly Order 10 Rule 2 of the Code has also similar object of clarification of pleadings and ascertaining the actual dispute between the parties. Under the provisions of Order 14 Rules 1 & 2 of the Code at the time of framing of the issues, it is the duty of the Court after reading pleadings of either party and after examining the parties to ascertain on what questions of law and fact the parties are at variance so that issues may be framed on these points. Apart from these provisions the Legislature has provided additional power to the court u/s 30 to pass an order suo moto, or otherwise as may appear to be just and proper with regard to delivery and answering of interrogatories the admission of documents and of facts and discovery, inspection and return of documents and to issue summons to persons whose attendance is required either to give evidence or furnish documents. A number of questions are put to be answered by Defendant. These questions are the interrogatories. An affidavit was also filed in support of the application. These interrogatories contain legal questions. The first interrogatory was in respect of intention of the Defendant No. 3 to purchase the property in question. The second was collusion of the officers with Defendant not 1. These questions are the interrogatories. An affidavit was also filed in support of the application. These interrogatories contain legal questions. The first interrogatory was in respect of intention of the Defendant No. 3 to purchase the property in question. The second was collusion of the officers with Defendant not 1. The third was report of the officer of the land acquisition department. The fourth was pertaining to forceful occupation of a portion of the building from the Plaintiff. The fifth was keeping silence by the Border Security Force inspite of certain letters addressed by the Plaintiff and not answering these questions. The sixth was in respect of keeping silence by the Border Security Force inspite of the receipt of information. The seventh was the; description of the business of Plaintiff. The eight was the quantum of damage and the ninth was the nature, number and the contents of documents on which the written statement of Defendant No. 3 was based. However, these interrogatories were not allowed on the ground that they are not material for the disposal of the suit as was the provision contained in the proviso. 38. Similarly another application under Order 11 Rule 2 (Order Eleven Rule 200) was also filed for inspection of documents in possession of the Defendants, but the same has also been rejected on the ground that it was not a document pertaining to the matter in question Some other reasons have also been assigned for rejecting the application of the Plaintiff. The material reason was that there was no provision for compelling the Defendants to produce the documents in his possession. Certainly the Defendant was bound to produce the documents, but only within the meaning of Order 8 Rule 8-A which was the newly added provision after the CPC Amendment Act, 1976 where the counter claim or set off was set up and pleaded by the Defendants and some reliefs were claimed by him. In case some relief would have been claimed by Defendant No. 3, in that event the documents which were the basis of written statement for claiming set off, must be produced. In case that was not produced at that stage, then it could not have been produced subsequently without leave of the court, no it can be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. In case that was not produced at that stage, then it could not have been produced subsequently without leave of the court, no it can be received in evidence on his behalf at the hearing of the suit. But Sub-rule (3) of Rule 8-A was in the form of a proviso which provides that nothing under Sub-rule 1 and Sub-rule 2 of Rule 8-A would apply in case a document was produced for cross examination of the Plaintiff's witnesses or in answer to any case set up by the Plaintiff subsequent to the filing of the plaint In the present case nothing has been stated in the application for inspection claiming a relief in respect of counter claim or a plea of set off was taken. In case the interrogatories or the inspection of documents sought for, have not been allowed, no prejudice is caused to the Plaintiff, inasmuch as at the stage of cross examination he can put questions to the Defendants No. 3 or his witnesses. As the documents were not material for the disposal of suit, the application filed by the Plaintiff has correctly been rejected. Some other applications were also filed with a view to have discovery on oath of the documents in possession of Defendant No. 3, particularly on the basis of which the written statement was verified. That applications were also rejected on the ground that the details of documents were not given. The discovery in respect of those documents was also not relevant to the matter in question. 39. In Arun Kumar Sinha Vs. The State of West Bengal, (1973) 4 SCC 54 , it was held that the discovery can be allowed if the document were relevant for throwing light on the matter in controversy and further the documents which will throw light on the matter in controversy was material, even though it may not be legally admissible in evidence. In the present case, however, nothing has been shown in view of the ratio in the case of M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapoor (supra), so that discovery of documents could have been allowed. Consequently there is no justification to accept the submission made on behalf of the Plaintiff. 40. In the present case, however, nothing has been shown in view of the ratio in the case of M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapoor (supra), so that discovery of documents could have been allowed. Consequently there is no justification to accept the submission made on behalf of the Plaintiff. 40. The material question is as to whether the High Court has jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code where verification of the pleadings has not been correctly made as urged on behalf of the applicant, or where the discovery and inspection of documents have not been allowed or the application in connection with the interrogatories of the Defendants has not been accepted or leave of the court has not been granted. These are the matters within the judicial discretion of the court. The Court has jurisdiction to dispose of these applications one way or the other. It was not emphasised by Sri A.C. Dutta that the court below has no jurisdiction at all. There are stringle of authorities in respect of jurisdiction of the High Court u/s 115 of the Code. Even assuming, though not conceding, that the orders for discovery inspection pertaining to interrogatories or verification etc., were incorrect in that event also as these are discretionary matters, there shall be no jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code for interference. In M.L. Seth v. R.P. Kapoor (supra), it was specifically held that in such matters if the applications are rejected, the High Court would not be justified in interfering with it. In case the High Court did interfere that would mean to interference with the discretion exercised by the IVth Addl Distt. Judge in disposing of the applications it is well known that jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code is limited one. As long back as in 1884 in Reja Amir Hasen Khan v. Sri Bux Singh (1884) 11 Ind. App 237 (PC), it was observed in connection with Section 622 of the Old Code which was equivalent of Section 115 of the Present Code and it was held that the question was whether the judges of the subordinate courts acted illegally or with material irregularity. App 237 (PC), it was observed in connection with Section 622 of the Old Code which was equivalent of Section 115 of the Present Code and it was held that the question was whether the judges of the subordinate courts acted illegally or with material irregularity. As the judges of the subordinate court have jurisdiction to decide the question which was before them, and they did decide the same, whether those questions were rightly decided or wrongly decided, it can not be said that they exercised their jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 41. In Bal Krishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyer (1984) Ind. App 267. It was held that present Section 115 applies to jurisdiction alone. Other Irregularities exercise or non exercise of jurisdiction or illegal assumption of it. The section is not attracted against the conclusion of law or fact in which question of jurisdiction is not involved. 42. In Manindra Land & Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerji AIR 5964 SC 1336 and in Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed Vs. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai, AIR 1964 SC 1341 , the ratio was that the distinction has to be drawn between the errors committed by the subordinate court in deciding the questions of law which have relation ot concern with the question of jurisdiction of such court and the errors of law which have no such relation or connection. See Pandurang Dhoni Chougule Vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav, (supra). 43. In M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapoor (supra), under para 12 it was held as follows: The trial court has jurisdiction to pass the order for discovery. Even if lack of jurisdiction is assumed to result from every material error of law even an error of law within the jurisdiction in the primitive sense of the term we do not think the order was vitiated by any error of law. Ultimately it was held in that case that the High Court by interference with the orders passed in connection with discovery etc. has exceeded its jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code. 44. In Manick Chandra Nandy Vs. Debdas Nandy and Others, (1986) 1 SCC 512 , it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code is confined to question of jurisdiction only and it does not pertain to correctness of the decision reached by the Subordinate Court. 44. In Manick Chandra Nandy Vs. Debdas Nandy and Others, (1986) 1 SCC 512 , it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code is confined to question of jurisdiction only and it does not pertain to correctness of the decision reached by the Subordinate Court. Even in matters of deciding jurisdictional question of law the High Court cannot function as a court of first appeal. In the instant case the orders passed by the Additional District Judge were discretionary in nature either in respect of discovery or verification of the pleadings etc. it cannot be said that those orders were passed without any jurisdiction. As the impugned orders in these Revisions etc. were wholly within jurisdiction of the Additional District Judge. Consequently there is no justification for interference u/s 115 of the Code. 45. In view of the premises aforesaid and applying the Aristotalean and Beconian reasonings and being conscious about the important limited jurisdiction u/s 115 of the Code, I am of the view that all the revision applications including the review application deserve to be dismissed and as such they are accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 46. Before I part with these cases the fact worth mentioning is that the judgment in these revisions was reserved and before it could be delivered in open court an application in all the civil revisions was filed to treat these civil revisions as separate writ petitions. But this prayer contained in the application may be stated to be rejected. There are so many revisions which were filed against the order rejecting application for discovery, inspection and verification of pleadings etc. which were maintainable u/s 115 of the Code and those revisions have been argued by the Petitioner himself and judgment was reserved. The revisions were to be decided on merits. There is no justification to convert these revisions into writ petitions. The reasons for this are more than one. Every writ petition requires Rs. 100/- as court fee and separate applications must have been filed for every revision. But just one application has been filed in all the revisions. Apart from that the reasons to treat the civil revisions as writ petitions are entirely different. The reasons for this are more than one. Every writ petition requires Rs. 100/- as court fee and separate applications must have been filed for every revision. But just one application has been filed in all the revisions. Apart from that the reasons to treat the civil revisions as writ petitions are entirely different. There is no justification nor the propriety requires that when the judgment is to be delivered and signed in open court the revisions may be converted into writ petitions. The reasons weighing in the mind of the applicant may be any, but under the facts and circumstances of the case it is not justified, nor any ground has been made out to convert these civil revisions into writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. Consequently the lone application to treat all these civil revisions to be writ petitions, is hereby dismissed. 47. The matter has dragged on for too long. What is required is expedition. Consequently, the trial court is directed to dispose of the suit within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this order is furnished before it.