JUDGMENT : M.L. Bhat, J. The Petitioner prays for writ of certiorari and mandamus. The order dated 11-7-89, impugned in this writ petition is prayed to be quashed. A direction is sought against the Respondents not to realise the amount of Rs. 6,36,201,50 which is alleged to have been embezzled by the Petitioner, by any coercive process; 2. The facts may be summed up as below: The Petitioner is said to have been appointed as Co-operative Supervisor by the Deputy Registrar on 15-4-69. Initially, he was posted at Bijnor. From Bijnor the Petitioner was transferred to Moradabad. From there he was posted at Budaun. On 30-7-81 the Petitioner is said to have been placed under suspension on the charge of embezzlement. The enquiry officer found that a sum of Rs. 49,517 81, was embezzled by the Petitioner. A charge sheet was prepared against the Petitioner. The enquiry report was not accepted. A further enquiry was ordered against the Petitioner in respect of the embezzlement at the same seed store, in respect of which the earlier charge was framed. An additional sum of Rs. 7060/- was said to have been embezzled by the Petitioner. A further charge-sheet was served on the Petitioner. The Petitioner was made liable to pay a sum of Rs. 56,771 81. The Petitioner was directed to deposit the same sum by an order dated 16-4-85. The Petitioner is said to have deposited Rs. 30,000/-on 18-5-85. The Petitioner was reinstated subject to his depositing a further sum of Rs. 10,000/- The balance amount was to be deposited by the Petitioner in four instalments. The Petitioner was to be taken in service and assigned the duties. However, it was made clear that except subsistence allowance, the Petitioner would not be paid any amount of salary. An adverse entry was to be recorded in his character roll. 3. The Petitioner is said to have been posted at Kariamai on 11-1-86, wherefrom the Petitioner was transferred to the office of the Assistant Registrar on 3-10-87. The Petitioner is said to have requested the District Assistant Registrar to depute some one to take over charge from the Petitioner which he could not hand over to any one and without which it was not possible to join on the post at new place. Between 5-11-87 to 8-11-87 there were holidays. The Petitioner had proceeded on leave thereafter from 9-11-87 to 12-11-87. Between 5-11-87 to 8-11-87 there were holidays. The Petitioner had proceeded on leave thereafter from 9-11-87 to 12-11-87. During this period the locks of the store were broken open by Sri Tungal Singh. On his return from leave, the Petitioner found that there was nothing in the store and lodged a report at Police Station Islamnagar. The Petitioner, thereafter, joined in the office of District Assistant Registrar and proceeded on leave. The Petitioner was informed on 16-10-88 about the contents of letter dated 29-9-88 that fresh charges in respect of the same period had been framed and the Petitioner was again placed under suspension. The Petitioner is said to have requested the authorities by his letter dated 20-10-88 to permit him to take inspection of the record of the Society so that he may be able to submit his reply to the charges levelled against him. No heed was paid to his request and the enquiry is said to have been conducted at the back of the Petitioner. The enquiry report was submitted to the Deputy Registrar Co-operative Societies, Bareilly for orders. On the Basis of the enquiry report an order was passed by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bareilly, whereby the Petitioner was removed from service and was directed to pay a sum of Rs. 6,36,201-50 4. The Petitioner submits that in the said enquiry the amount which the Petitioner had already deposited in pursuance of one previous enquiry was also made subject matter of the enquiry and that amount was also included in the sum shown in the impugned order for being recovered from the Petitioner. The Petitioner has deposited that amount and thereafter, he was reinstated but that amount could not be included in the amount shown in the impugned order. The Petitioner was held guilty in the enquiry which was conducted at his back and he was not supplied any paper to enable him to submit his reply. The enquiry was exparte. Even copy of the charge-sheet was not supplied to the Petitioner. No show cause notice, after submission of the enquiry report was issued to the Petitioner for removal. No action was taken on the complaint made by the Petitioner through the FIR regarding the breaking open the locks of the Society in his absence. The enquiry was exparte. Even copy of the charge-sheet was not supplied to the Petitioner. No show cause notice, after submission of the enquiry report was issued to the Petitioner for removal. No action was taken on the complaint made by the Petitioner through the FIR regarding the breaking open the locks of the Society in his absence. Police did not take any action on the report of the Petitioner to safeguard the interest of Sri Tungal Singh, ADO. (C). The enquiry report is said to have been false. 5. The Respondents have filed a counter affidavit. In their affidavit it is Mated that the writ petition is not maintainable because the Petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing an appeal against the impugned order under Regulation 70 of Co-operative Federal Authority Business Regulations, 1976 framed by U.P. Cooperative Union, vide gazette notification dated 13-2-76 It is stated that the Petitioner was found guilty of the misconduct and embezzlement. It is stated that the Petitioner was negligent in his duty and there were complaints for using public money for his use. Audit report also had proved that the Petitioner had embezzled a huge amount. A FIR was lodged against the Petitioner on 1-12-87 on the charges of embezzlement. It is stated that notice was issued to the Petitioner to defend himself but he did not respond the same. However, it is denied that there was breach of principles of natural justice. The Petitioner did not appear despite notices, before the enquiry committee and abstained from appearing before the enquiry officer. Thereafter, on the basis of enquiry report a decision was taken for issuing the impugned order, the charges against the Petitioner relate to different period. One period is between 1981 to 1985 and the other period between 1987 to 1989. It is stated that notice was sent to the Petitioner through registered post indicating the proposed punishment. Photostat copy of this notice is Annexure CA 1 and CA 2 to the counter affidavit 6. The Petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit also in which he has reiterated the assertions made by him in the writ petition and he refuted the contents of the counter affidavit in so far as these relate to the allegations levelled against him and has denied that the procedure for holding the enquiry and for his removal was followed. 7. The Petitioner has filed rejoinder affidavit also in which he has reiterated the assertions made by him in the writ petition and he refuted the contents of the counter affidavit in so far as these relate to the allegations levelled against him and has denied that the procedure for holding the enquiry and for his removal was followed. 7. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties at great length. An objection raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondents about the non-maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy is taken up first. It is contended that an appeal against the impugned order is prescribed Therefore, the writ petition is not maintainable. The Petitioner should have exhausted the alternative remedy first. On the basis of Full Bench authority of this Court, Chandrama Singh v. Managing Director, U.P. Cooperative Union, Lucknow 1991 (2) UP LB EC 898, it was argued that in a writ petition where it is complained that Section 25F of the Central Industrial Disputes Act or Section 6N of the State Act has been violated, a remedy is provided u/s 10 of the Central Act and Section 4-K of the State Act. Consequently writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be invoked. Another authority Raghunath Prasad v. The State of U.P. 1986 UP LB EC 1355, was cited, wherein it was held that an appeal under Regulation 70 of the Business Regulation is the proper remedy. Whether order of termination of service was punitive or simplicitor, writ was not maintainable. Another authority which was relied upon by the Respondents is Ram Chandra Dixit v. Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies 1980 UP LB EC 325. The remedy, which a dismissed employee was required to follow, was held to be an appeal and not the writ petition. 8. Mr. Dubey has relied on Parmeshwar Dayal Shukla v. The Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies U.P. Allahabad 1982 UPLBEC 398, in which it was held that Federal Authority was an authority within the meaning of Article 12. Its orders are amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Regulation 70 framed under the Cooperative Societies Act was held not to stand in the way of the Petitioner in that case and, order even if appeal able, the bar of alternative remedy would not operate against the maintainability of the writ petition. Its orders are amenable to writ jurisdiction. The Regulation 70 framed under the Cooperative Societies Act was held not to stand in the way of the Petitioner in that case and, order even if appeal able, the bar of alternative remedy would not operate against the maintainability of the writ petition. In Jai Kishun v. U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd. Lucknow 1989 (2) UP LB EC 144, (Lucknow Bench), it has been held that jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is a different kind of jurisdiction The alternative remedy is not an absolute bar in exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The exercise of the jurisdiction by the High Court would depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case. If the jurisdiction is invoked on the basis of a right which is created by Statute framed under the Industrial Disputes Act, then it will be appropriate that the workman is directed to follow the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act. Bar of exhaustion of alternative remedy would not operate in all cases before the High Court when it proposes to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. Learned Counsel for the parties were heard on merits also but before adverting to the merits, it is necessary to decide the preliminary objection. Bar of exhaustion of alternative remedy would not operate so far this case is concerned. On consideration of the various authorities which were cited at the Bar and provisions of law that the Petitioner's writ petition cannot be thrown out because he has not invoked the appellate jurisdiction against the order of termination of his service from the post. The punishment imposed on the Petitioner is said to have been passed in violation of principle of natural justice and against the provisions of law. If the Petitioner succeeds in proving that he was punished at his back without affording any opportunity to him, his petition cannot be thrown out summerily on the ground of bar of alternative remedy. The Court insists for resorting to alternative remedy because it is prudent to do so. There is no absolute bar on the High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction in appropriate oases. The Court insists for resorting to alternative remedy because it is prudent to do so. There is no absolute bar on the High Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction in appropriate oases. The necessity to follow the alternative remedy is a rule of prudence and not a statutory rule to oust the jurisdiction of the High Court. The alternative remedy must be efficacious and it is not so the High Court will not non-suit a litigant who has invoked its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was contended by learned Counsel for the Respondents that the Respondents are the Federal Authority and there is a Regional Committee which is competent to hear the appeal. Under Regulation 70 the Petitioner's remedy was by way of appeal and not a writ petition. This argument is not to be accepted for the reasons that it overlooks exceptions to the bar of exhaustion of alternative remedy. If the action complained of is void-ab-initio or against the principles of natural justice, bar of exhaustion of alternative remedy is not to operate. Therefore, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the Respondents about the non-maintainability of the writ is overruled. 10. The falisity or otherwise of the charges as argued by learned Counsel for the parties cannot be gone into by this Court in its writ jurisdiction. The Petitioner's case is that the charges were not properly enquired into. Learned Counsel for the Respondents tried to show that the registered notices were sent to the Petitioner but he did not appear during the enquiry. There is an affidavit against affidavit The contention of learned Counsel for the Respondents could not be believed if he would have taken this Court into confidence by placing relevant documents on record showing that the notices to the Petitioner were issued by registered post. The Respondents could have produced postal receipts or acknowledgement from and even despatch register of the department in which entry to this effect was to be made. It was necessary that the person who had allegedly posted the registered notices should have filed an affidavit stating that he had done the needful and if the Petitioner did not appear before the enquiry officer then it could be presumed that he had not appeared despite receipt of registered notice. It was necessary that the person who had allegedly posted the registered notices should have filed an affidavit stating that he had done the needful and if the Petitioner did not appear before the enquiry officer then it could be presumed that he had not appeared despite receipt of registered notice. There is presumption that registered letter must have reached its destination in due course of time but there is no presumption that registered notices must have been posted and despatched That was to be proved by filing affidavit or by some other proof which was in possession of the Respondents. Therefore, I am not inclined to accept the version of the Respondents that the registered notices were sent to the Petitioner and be did not appear despite receipt of the registered notices during the enquiry. The result is that the enquiry conducted against the Petitioner was in violation of principles of natural justice at this back and without affording an opportunity to the Petitioner to explain the charges levelled against him. The Petitioner had demanded copies as also permission to inspect the record when enquiry was set up. It is not known why he was not given the requisite materials to enable him to defend himself in the enquiry. Therefore, the enquiry is held to be conducted in flagrant violation of principles of natural justice The enquiry report, which is the basis of the impugned order, is therefore, vitiated and is void-ab-initio as against the Petitioner. 11. After a same enquiry was conducted, it was incumbent on the Respondents to follow the procedure laid down in Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. If the said procedure is not followed the punishment which is imposed on the Petitioner, cannot be sustained. A very feeble attempt has been made that the procedure was followed in punishing the Petitioner. This fact is tried to be evidenced by Annexure CA 4 to the counter affidavit. There is no proof that Annexure C. A. 4 dated 10-4-89 was posted and despatched from the office of the Respondents to the Petitioner, nor is there any supporting evidence in the form of postal receipts and acknowledgement from which would indicate that the notices were really sent by post to the Petitioner. In absence of such proof it is not possible to hold that the show cause notice for proposed punishment was served on the Petitioner. In absence of such proof it is not possible to hold that the show cause notice for proposed punishment was served on the Petitioner. The Petitioner has relied on an authority of Supreme Court in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 . The Supreme Court held that: Article 311(2)(after forty second amendment). Disciplinary proceedings--inquiry report proposing punishment--Reasonable opportunity-Concept of--Non supply of report to the delinquent-effect of held that the delinquent-is entitled to copy of such report and will also be entitled to make a representation against it-Non furnishing of report would amount to violation of rules of natural justice. The forty-second Amendment has not brought about any change in this regard. 12. Assuming not deciding that the show cause notice as required under Article 311(2) was sent to the Petitioner, but admittedly he was not given copy of the enquiry report. No supply of the copy of the enquiry report would prevent him from making effective representation. It is absolutely necessary that the Petitioner should have been supplied with the copy of the enquiry report. This requirement cannot be dispensed with The punishment, therefore, imposed on the Petitioner cannot be sustained. 13. The Petitioner's case is that the amount which he had deposited already when he was reinstated earlier, is again sought to be recovered, does not seem to be without substance. As such the order of recovery also cannot be sustained because it is made without enquiry and the amount shown in the recovery order includes the amount which the Petitioner had already deposited. The matter has been dealt with in casual manner by the Respondents. 14. For the reasons stated above this writ petition has to succeed and the Petitioner is entitled to the relief’s prayed for by him. Accordingly this writ petition is allowed The impugned order dated 11-7-89 contained in Annexure-7 to the writ petition is hereby quashed. The Respondents are directed not to act on the impugned order and that the sane as non est. No recovery shall be ordered on the basis of the impugned order. However, if the Respondents purpose to hold a fresh enquiry against the Petitioner this judgment will not stand in their way in holding a proper enquiry in accordance with law and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. No recovery shall be ordered on the basis of the impugned order. However, if the Respondents purpose to hold a fresh enquiry against the Petitioner this judgment will not stand in their way in holding a proper enquiry in accordance with law and in accordance with the principles of natural justice. The Petitioner is entitled to all benefits which are admissible to him under rules. 15. There will be no order as to costs.