1. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 13.f2.84 passed by the Second Asstt. District Judge, Silchar in Title Appeal No. 47 of 1982, reversing the judgment and decree dated 20.1.82 passed by the Munsiff at Hailakandi in Title Suit No. 68/80. 2. The only point raised before this Court is - "whether the appellate court was justified in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit on the ground of want of cause of action." 3. The appellant as plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of the Second Munsiff, Hailakandi (TS 68/80). His case was that the land of third Schedule of the plaint belonged to him. He purchased the land and he was in possession of the said land. First to third respondents dispossessed the appellant from the land described in Schedule-IV, which is part of Schedule -in. Thereafter, he brought the suit for eviction of the Respondent and for recovery of khas possession of the suit land. The first to third respondents appeared and contested the suit by filing written statement. They denied all the allegations and averments made in the plaint. As many as seven issues were framed in the suit. The Second Munsiff, Hailakandi, after recording the evidence of witness decreed the suit with costs. In issue No. 5 the Munsiff held that the appellant was able to prove his right, title and interest over the suit land. 4. Against this judgment and decree, the first to third respondents preferred an appeal (TA 47/82) in the Court of the Second Asstt. District Judge, Cachar, Silchar. The Asstt. District Judge allowed the appeal with cost, holding that the plaintiff-appellant failed to prove that he had cause of action to bring the suit. While deciding the Issue Nos. 1 and 3, the Asstt. District Judge observed that the plaintiffs and defendants were in enjoyment of their right since 1956 or so, and therefore, it could be presumed that they were having their boundaries of land well demarcated. The Asstt. District Judge further observed that the first defendant sold out his land to the plaintiff vide Exhibit 2. But the plaintiff could not give any substantial and assertive evidence to show the encroachment or dispossession after 1961. He also found the paragraph 6 of the plaint was vague and inconclusive, where the plaintiff stated that he was dispossessed gradually on different dates. But the plaintiff could not give any substantial and assertive evidence to show the encroachment or dispossession after 1961. He also found the paragraph 6 of the plaint was vague and inconclusive, where the plaintiff stated that he was dispossessed gradually on different dates. The Asstt District Judge observed thus :- "A suit for recovery of khas possession is permissive only under Articles 64/65 of the Limitation Act within 12 years from the date of dispossession or adverse possession as the case may be. Here, the plaintiff has failed to give the date of dispossession in order to calculate out whether the suit is within time. Therefore, the pleading is not sufficient to disclose cause of action in favour of the plaintiff." 5. On the basis of this observation, the Asstt. District Judge found that there was no cause of action for the suit and the suit could not be decreed on the basis of such pleadings and evidence. Both the Courts have held that the plaintiff had right, title and interest over the suit land and the suit was filed for recovery of possession. In a suit for recovery of immovable properties based on title, Article 65 of the Limitation Act is applicable. Under the said Article a suit can be brought within 12 years from the date of when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse. So long the possession of the defendants is not adverse, the time will not run. 6. He the instant case, the defendant had not set out any plea of adverse possession. That being the position, the question of dispossession or discontinuance of possession does not arise. Therefore, the Asstt. District Judge erred in law by holding that there was no cause of action in view of the failure of the plaintiff to give specific date of dispossession. The suit having been filed on the basis of title, the question of limitation being run from the date of dispossession does not arise. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that in a suit for recovery of possession based on title, the suit cannot be decreed for recovery of possession, if the plaintiff fails to seek declaration. The suit having been filed on the basis of title, the question of limitation being run from the date of dispossession does not arise. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that in a suit for recovery of possession based on title, the suit cannot be decreed for recovery of possession, if the plaintiff fails to seek declaration. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act provides that any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right, as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the Court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and .the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief. To invoke Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act the first plaintiff is required to establish his right (title) and thereafter he can institute a suit against the defendant denying, or interested to deny his title or right. That being so, the question of seeking declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act does not arise in a case where the defendants neither denies nor interested to deny the right of the plaintiff in any property. In the absence of such denial, a person may file a suit for recovery of possession of immovable property without seeking any declaration, such suit can be brought under Section 5 of the Specific Limitation Act. Under the s aid section, a person entitled to the possession of specific may able property may recover it in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. That being the position, I find no force in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the respondents. 8. In view of the above, I find sufficient force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant and accordingly I allow the appeal and set aside the judgment dated 13.12.84 passed by the Second Asstt. District Judge, Cachar, Silchar, in Title Appeal No. 47/82 and restore the judgment and decree dated 20.1.82 passed by the Munsiff No. 2 Hailakandi in Title Suit No. 68/80. 9. In the result, the appeal is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.