Judgment : The Order of the Court was as follows : The plaintiffs are the appellants in this appeal against the dismissal of their suit O.S. No. 141 of 1977 of the file of Sub Court, Coimbatore. the said suit claimed damages to the extent of Rs. 15, 000/- for the defendant-respondents alleged negligence in placing a live electric wire near the fence of his (respondents) garden land and the consequent death of their (appellants) son, Murugan, aged 15 1/2 years due to electrocution thereof. 2. The relevant plaint averments may be summarised as follows :-The defendant is the owner of the garden land situated on the eastern side of the north-south road leading to Ettirnadai railway station. There is an electric motor and pumpset in the well in that land. In July, 1975, there were sugarcane crops in the said land. There is a barbed wire fence between the said road and the said land. Near this wire fence, the defendant had also placed a metal wire, which was connected to the electric main of his well. On 31-7-1975 at about 9.00 p.m., the above said Murugan was going on the said road, accompanied by one Marudachalam and one Kittusami to reach their lands. While they were passing along side the defendants land the said Murugan came in contact with the above said metal wire and as it was energised, he was electrocuted and died soon after in the defendants land itself. His death was due to the defendants wrongful act and negligence in placing the live wire near the road side. The defendant is liable under law to pay compensation to the plaintiffs for the loss caused to them due to the death of their son. Murugan was aged about 15 1/2 years at the time of his death and he was actively assisting the plaintiffs in their agricultural operations. They have suffered monetary loss of Rs. 60/- per month on account of his death. Besides, they have undergone mental pain and suffering and they are entitled to recover Rs. 15, 000/-as compensation. Hence, the suit. 3. The relevant averments in the written statement may be summarised as follows :The defendant denies that Murugan met with his death by coming into contact with the live wire near the above said fence on the night of 31-7-1975. 15, 000/-as compensation. Hence, the suit. 3. The relevant averments in the written statement may be summarised as follows :The defendant denies that Murugan met with his death by coming into contact with the live wire near the above said fence on the night of 31-7-1975. Actually on that night Murugan trespassed into the defendants land and attempted to commit theft of copper wires which were running from the electric service connection down to the motor in the well. Such theft of copper wires were frequent in that area at that time. When Murugan attempted to commit theft of the wire, he got electrocuted and thrown out and on hearing the noise of the victim, the defendant, who was in the garden shed rushed near the well and found Murugan lying there. He immediately informed the neighbours and the plaintiffs and reported the matter to the Police. But the Criminal Case that followed against the defendant as accused ended in his acquittal. The defendant has not committed any wilful act and negligence by energising the wire fence. Murugan was not an earning member. In any event, the amount claimed is excessive. 4. On the above pleadings, the material issues that were framed, are as follows :- .(1) Whether Murugan died on account of wrongful or negligent act of the defendant? .(2) If so what is the amount of compensation if any, to be awarded? 5. On the side of the plaintiffs, plaintiffs 1 and 2 examined themselves as P.Ws. 1 and 4 respectively and also examined the above referred Marudachalam and Kittusami as P. Ws. 2 and 3 respectively. Further, P.W. 5, the first cousin of P.W. 4 and brother-in-law of P.W. 1, was also examined. On the side of the defendant, the defendant examined himself as D. W. 1 and also examined D. W. 2, a neighbouring land owner and D.W. 3, another owner of a land with well, situated in that locality. 2 and 3 respectively. Further, P.W. 5, the first cousin of P.W. 4 and brother-in-law of P.W. 1, was also examined. On the side of the defendant, the defendant examined himself as D. W. 1 and also examined D. W. 2, a neighbouring land owner and D.W. 3, another owner of a land with well, situated in that locality. Further, on the side of the plaintiffs Ex.A.1 dated 11-5-1976, copy of the suit notice, Ex.A.2 dated 15-5-1976, the reply thereto and Ex.A.3 dated 10-2-1976, the certified copy of the deposition of one Chinnappan, who was examined as a witness in the criminal case, wherein the defendant was chargesheeted in relation to the above said accident, were marked on the side of the defendant Ex.B.1 dated 1-8-1975, the copy of the first information report in the above said criminal case, Ex.B. 2, dated 20-3-1976, the judgement in the above said criminal case, and Exs.B.3 to B.5 dated 4-2-1976, the certified copies of depositions of the 1st plaintiff, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 herein, in the above said criminal case, were marked. Taking into consideration, the above said evidence, both oral and documentary, the Court below found on the first of the above said two issues that Murugan met with his death only by coming into contact with the copper wire leading to switch box from the motor in the well and not on account of any wrongful or negligent act of the defendant. Therefore, it dismissed the suit, though on the other issue it held that in case Murugan died on account of the wrongful and negligent act of the defendant, the compensation payable could only be Rs. 7, 200/-. 6. Though in the plaint it is not alleged that the above said Murugan trespassed into the defendants land, P.W. 2 admitted that Murugan trespassed into the defendants land, after crossing the above said fence, in order to steal sugarcane from out of the sugarcane crops raised on the defendants land. So, initially I put the question to the learned Counsel for the appellants whether compensation could be claimed at all by the plaintiffs in such a situation even assuming that their son Murugan came in contact with a live wire on the defendants land and died as a result thereof. Then, the learned Counsel drew my attention to the decisions in State of Punjab v. Mst. Then, the learned Counsel drew my attention to the decisions in State of Punjab v. Mst. Champa, 1971 AIR(PandH) 373, Cherubin Gregary v. State of Bihar, British Railway Board v. Harrington, Donoghue v. Stevenson, V. Krishnappa Naidu v. Union of India, 1976 AIR (Mad) 95 and Ramanuja Mudali v. M. Gangan 1984 AIR(Mad) 103 to support his contention that compensation could be claimed in such a situation. The law on this aspect is made clear in the above referred to 7. No doubt, the Supreme Court decision referred to above arose in a criminal case under Section 304, I.P.C. The facts therein are shortly as follows : The owner of a land fixed live naked electric wire across the passage to his latrine to dissuade trespassers. A trespasser got a shock due to contact with the said wire and he died. In that context, the Supreme Court confirmed the conviction of the said owner under Section 304-A, I.P.C. The learned counsel for the appellants relied on the following observation of the Supreme Court in the said decision :- "A trespasser is not an outlaw, a caput lupinem. The mere fact that the person entering a land is a trespasser does not entitle the owner or occupier to inflict on him personal injury by direct violence and the same principle would govern the infliction of injury by indirectly doing something on the land the effect of which he must know was likely to cause serious injury to the trespasser. Thus in England it has been held that one who sets spring guns to shoot at trespassers is guilty of a tort and that the person injured is entitled to recover. Thus in England it has been held that one who sets spring guns to shoot at trespassers is guilty of a tort and that the person injured is entitled to recover. The laying of such a trap, and there is little difference between the spring-gun which was the trap with which the English Courts had to deal and the naked live wire in the present case, is in truth "an arrangement to shoot a man without personally firing a shot." It is, no doubt, true that the trespasser enters the property at his own risk and the occupier owes no duty to take any reasonable care for his protection, but at the same time the occupier is not entitled to do wilfully acts such as set a trap or set a naked live wire with the deliberate intention of causing harm to trespassers or in reckless disregard of the presence of the trespassers." (Emphasis supplied). [Not found in judgement - Ed.] 8. The above referred to 1976 AIR(Mad) 95 was no doubt a case of tort, where damages were claimed on the basis of the alleged negligence by the railway. There, in the railway level crossing, gates, gongs and red lights on both sides were provided to warn the public. A taxi driver entered the level crossing when the gates were due to be closed and there was sufficient warning from ringing of gongs and the red lights on. While the rear portion of the taxi had not crossed the streamline, the train, without any warning, came and dashed against the taxi, As a result of the said impact, two passengers and the driver of the taxi were injured and the taxi was severely damaged. A suit was laid by the owner of the taxi for damages. According to the plaintiff, the accident was entirely due to the gross negligence of the defendant railway. In that context it was held the taxi driver was neither an invitee nor a licensee, but was a trespasser within the railway crossing, the site of which belongs to the said railway and the taxi owner was held to be not having any cause of action against the railway. In that context it was held the taxi driver was neither an invitee nor a licensee, but was a trespasser within the railway crossing, the site of which belongs to the said railway and the taxi owner was held to be not having any cause of action against the railway. In such a situation, the Division Bench of this Court observed thus :- "When the gates are opened and no warning is given, the public are permitted to cross the level-crossing i.e. to pass through the land belonging to the Railway within the level-crossing and to that extent they fall under the category of "licensees" during such periods. But, the moment the public come to know or have reason to believe about the approach of any train or engine -whatever may be the source through which they acquire such knowledge, for example, the ringing of the gongs or the burning of the red-lights, the warning given by the gateman, etc. they are expressly prohibited under S. 124 of the Railways Act from crossing the level-crossing. In such contingencies they would fall under the category of trespassers. So, the duty of the occupier (Railway) to the invitee or licensee does not at all arise in this case." The above referred to 1984 AIR (Mad) 103 is a case where a person, while passing through the land of the defendant at 10.00 p.m. received shock from the live electric wire laid therein by the defendant for the protection of his land and sustained injuries. No light was available in the neighbourhood. Live wire was found inside the defendants land and no visible warning or notice regarding it was there. In that context it was held that the injured was entitled to receive damages. 9. On the other hand, on this aspect, the learned Counsel for the respondent brought to my notice the decision in Farrington v. Munisami, 1950 AIR(Mad) 58. Live wire was found inside the defendants land and no visible warning or notice regarding it was there. In that context it was held that the injured was entitled to receive damages. 9. On the other hand, on this aspect, the learned Counsel for the respondent brought to my notice the decision in Farrington v. Munisami, 1950 AIR(Mad) 58. There it has been held that the owner of the land is entitled to protect his land and crops growing thereon against the trespassers and that the only exceptions to the general law that a person is under no duty towards a trespasser are; (i) that he cannot do something which is dangerous to a trespasser if he knows or has reason to believe that the trespasser is already on, or may be on, his property and (ii) that he cannot do anything to lure on to his land and kill animals which would keep outside his land but for the allurement. There, in order to protect the crop against the pigs, the defendant had laid traps on his land. But, a cow of his neighbour, the plaintiff therein strayed into the said defendants land and had falled into the said trap and had been killed. There was no evidence that the defendant knew of the existence of the plaintiffs cow. Hence, the suit filed by the plaintiff claiming damages for the loss of the cow was dismissed. 10. All the above referred to cases turned on their respective facts. But the facts in the present case cannot be said to be similar to the facts in any of the above said cases. In the above referred to 1984 AIR(Mad) 103 it was found on fact that the live electric wire was laid by the defendant therein for the protection of his land. In the above referred to also, it was found on facts that the defendant fixed live electric wire across the passage to his latrine with a view to dissuade trespassers from using his latrine. In the present case, first of all it has to be seen whether the defendant has placed a live wire as pleaded by the plaintiff. In the other decision, 1976 AIR(Mad) 95 referred to above, the plaintiffs driver was found to be negligent in crossing the railway crossing and hence the plaintiff was held to be not entitled to compensation from the defendant-railway. In the other decision, 1976 AIR(Mad) 95 referred to above, the plaintiffs driver was found to be negligent in crossing the railway crossing and hence the plaintiff was held to be not entitled to compensation from the defendant-railway. In the present case, Murugan not only admittedly trespassed into the defendants land, but according to P.W. 2 himself, he so went into the defendants land only to steal sugarcane grown there. So, admittedly Murugan trespassed into defendants land with intention of stealing. No doubt this intention according to P. W. 2, is to steal sugarcane (and that too at the odd hour of 9.30 p.m.), but, according to D.W. 1, the defendant is to steal copper wire. Anyway, it is not disputed that Murugan had a criminal intention to steal when he so trespassed. This fact could even go to probabilise the case of the defendant. 11. At any rate, the principle that emerges from all the above referred to decisions has been well stated in the above referred to, that is, if the plaintiff proves that the defendant, with deliberate intention or reckless disregard, has kept a dangerous article on his land as a trap, then the defendant will be liable, if any injury or loss of life takes place in view of the victim falling into the trap, even though the victim may be a trespasser on the defendants land. But, in the present case, there is neither plea nor evidence that the defendant had any such deliberate intention, though the death is admittedly due to electrocution. But, it has to be seen whether there is any such reckless disregard on the part of the defendant. The death of Murugan was admittedly due to electrocution. The version of the plaintiffs is that the electrocution took place near the fence on the defendants land since according to the plaintiffs, the defendant has placed a live wire there. The version of the defendant is that the said Murugan trespassed into his land, in order to steal copper wire, which was running from the service connection down to the motor in the well and that in committing the theft of the wire Murugan, due to negligence, has not taken precaution of shutting down electricity and as a result got electrocuted and died subsequently. 12. 12. The plea in the plaint is only as follows :- "Near this wire fence he had also placed a metal wire which was connected to the electric main of his well . While they were passing along side the defendants lands the plaintiffs son Murugan came in contact with the metal wire referred to and as it was the energized the plaintiffs son was electrocuted and died soon after in the defendants land itself. The death of the plaintiffs son Murugan is due to the defendants wrongful act and negligence in placing the live wire near the road side." (Underlining is mine) *[Underlining not found in judgement - Ed.] The defendant has denied this, as already stated. Further, it must be noted that the plaint does not say that the defendant placed the live wire as a trap. If really it is so, the neighbouring land owners would have known it and the plaintiffs could have examined any one of such neighbouring owners. But, they did not examine any such independent witnesses. Further, P.W. 5 stated as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted) None of such women folk has also been examined. All the persons who have been examined on the side of the plaintiffs are very close relatives of the plaintiffs. P.W. 3 is the sisters son of P. W. 1, and P.W. 1s daughter is married to P. W. 3s brother P. W. 2 is the uncles son of P.W. 3, P.W. 5, is P.W. 1s brother-in-law and the 2nd plaintiff is P.W. 5s uncles daughter. So, there is absolutely no independent witness on the side of the plaintiffs regarding the alleged placing of live wire by the defendant near the above said fence either as a trap or otherwise. So, I do not think that the plaintiffs have established that the defendant has placed live wire near the fence, as contended by the plaintiffs. 13. Further, the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3 is also not believable. The relevant evidence of P.W. 2 is as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted) First of all, the version that after the electrocution, Murugan did not shout, cannot be believed. Further, it was elicited from the same witness that in the criminal case he deposed that Murugan shouted at that time for 15 minutes. 2 and 3 is also not believable. The relevant evidence of P.W. 2 is as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted) First of all, the version that after the electrocution, Murugan did not shout, cannot be believed. Further, it was elicited from the same witness that in the criminal case he deposed that Murugan shouted at that time for 15 minutes. Further, it is difficult to believe that when such electrocution took place, no body came from the neighbouring houses, even though admittedly there were very many houses nearby as also deposed by P. W. 3. Further, it is difficult to believe that at that odd hour of 9.30 p.m., Murugan would have thought of entering into the defendants land for just stealing and eating some sugarcane. Further, P.W. 2, admitted that in the criminal case he deposed that the electrocution took place at the time when he actually crossed the fence itself. Thus, there is variance between the evidence given in the criminal case and in the present case. On the other hand, P.W. 3, deposed that Murugan shouted when he was electrocuted. P.W. 3s relevant evidence is as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted.) So, here again, there is variance between P.W. 2 and P.W. 3, Later, P.W. 3, also deposed as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted.) The above said evidence that despite the fact that there were so many houses nearby, no body came to the scene of occurrence despite the shouting for 5 or 10 minutes by the victim, is totally unbelievable. So, on the whole, P.Ws. 2 and 3 cannot be believed at all. 14. That apart, one other important factor is that though the above said accident took place on 31-7-1975, the suit notice, Ex.A.1, was sent only on 11-5-1976, that is nearly a year after. To this long delay, there is no proper explanation except P.W. 1 stating as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted) If really compensation was not given despite demand, the plaintiffs would have issued the suit notice long prior to Ex.A.1 date. Further, P.W. 5 even stated as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted) If that is so, he would have sent the suit notice very soon after the accident. Further, P.W. 5 even stated as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted) If that is so, he would have sent the suit notice very soon after the accident. Further P.W. 5 also deposed as follows :- (Vernacular matter omitted) So, even P. W. 5, the neighbour did not assert that Murugan did not die at the time when he was attempting to steal copper wires. No doubt, the learned counsel for the appellants sought to build up an argument on the case set up by the defendant, viz., that Murugan got electrocuted when he attempted to steal copper wires. In other words, the learned counsel points out that if really that was the case, the injury would have been in his palm or hand. But, admittedly he got the injuries only in his left buttock and in the right leg near the knee joint as per Ex.B.2 (the judgement in the Criminal Case acquitting the defendant). But, I feel that even assuming there is some weakness in the case set up by the defendant, on that alone, the plaintiff cannot succeed. The plaintiffs have to establish their case, which they had not done. Further, in the light of the above detailed evidence, the observations is paragraph 3 of the decision in Navotam Singh v. State of Punjab, will no way support the argument of the appellants counsel, but rather it would support that of the respondents Counsel. 15. In the result, there is no merit in this appeal and hence it is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.