JUDGMENT M.L. Bhat, J. - The petitioner was appointed as a constable in Armed Police on 2.8.1974. His services seem to have been terminated on 29-7- 1978. The termination order says that the petitioner's services were no longer required. The termination order of the petitioner's services is by way of punishment, hence he challenges the same through the medium of this writ petition. The petitioner has unsuccessfully challenged the termination order before the U.P. Public Services Tribunal. After having failed there he has filed this petition. The U.P. Public Service Tribunal has refused to review its own order when the petitioner sought a review of the said order. 2. After the petitioner's selection he was to remain on probation for a period of two years. This is in terms of Regulations 541 (Chapter XXXVII) of the Police Regulations. If at the end of probation his conduct has been satis factory and if he has been approved by the Deputy Inspector General of Police for service in the force, the Superintendent of Police would confirm him in his appointment. In any case in which either during or at the end of the period of probation, the Superintendent of Police was of the opinion that a recruit is unlikely to make a good police officer he may dispense with his service. Before however this is done the recruit must be supplied with specific complaints and grounds on which it is proposed to discharge him and then he should be called upon to show cause as to why he should not be discharged. The recruit's representation filed by him in his reply is to be dulconsidered before passing the order of discharge. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has remained on probation for more than four years, therefore, he will be deemed to have been confirmed after two years of probation, which he is said to have completed in 1976. However, this argument does not seem to be correct because after the expiry of period of probation a recruit will not be automatically confirmed without an express order from the competent authority. The probation period in this case was continued beyond the initial period of probation. He would not enjoy the status of confirmed official. However, this argument does not seem to be correct because after the expiry of period of probation a recruit will not be automatically confirmed without an express order from the competent authority. The probation period in this case was continued beyond the initial period of probation. He would not enjoy the status of confirmed official. His probation period seems to have been extended which could be done and he cannot claim automatic confirmation after two years of his initial probation. Therefore, the petitioner has not become a confirmed recruit. He continued to be a probationer. 4. It was next argued that the impugned order of termination of the petitioner's services is by way of punishment. Reliance is placed on the written statement filed by the respondents before the Tribunal in reply to the petitioner's claim petition. A copy of the same is placed on the record of this writ petition as Annexure 3. The respondents had stated in para 9 of the written statement filed by them before the Tribunal as under: "9. That only this much is admitted that juniors to the petitioner are still in employment. It is further stated that the petitioner's services were terminated on account of negligence of duties and absence without proper sanction. Being a temporary servant reasons of his termination were not mentioned. No junior having bad record is kept in service whose services were temporary". 5. In para 3 of the written statement it is stated that the petitioner's conduct was not found upto the mark as he several times was punished for absenting himself without any prior sanctioned leave or permission. In reply to the contents of the writ petition also the respondents have stated that on overall assessment the petitioner's work and conduct was not found satisfactory and he was deemed not fit to be retained in the police force in public interest. 6. The Tribunal has decided the matter in a III very slipshod manner. It has held that the provisions of Regulation 541 of the Police Regulations were not violated. The impugned order of termination of the petitioner's services was not punitive and it has not considered the effect of the reply given by the respondents in para 9 of the written statement filed by them before the Tribunal. 7. The termination of the petitioner's services does not appear to be termination simpliciter. The impugned order of termination of the petitioner's services was not punitive and it has not considered the effect of the reply given by the respondents in para 9 of the written statement filed by them before the Tribunal. 7. The termination of the petitioner's services does not appear to be termination simpliciter. Para 9 of the written statement read with para 3 of the written statement makes it abundantly clear that the petitioner's services have been terminated by way of punishment. Even in the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent in reply to the writ petition it is stated in para 5 of the counter-affidavit that after an overall assessment his work and conduct was not found satisfactory and he was deemed not fit to be retained in police service in public interest. This reply would suggest that he was unfit as a Police Officer. If that be so, his case was governed under Regulation 541 (2) of the Police Regulations. It was required to supply him specific complaints and grounds on which it was proposed to discharge him then he should have been called upon to show cause as to why he should not be discharged. His explanation was to be considered before passing the order of discharge, which in the present case has not been done. 8. The impugned order cannot be termed to be an order which does not cast stigma on the petitioner. He is found unfit to serve in the police force and is removed in public interest on that ground according to the respondents. They cannot in the same breath say that the order of termination was simpliciter order of the termination, which could be passed in respect of the petitioner. If the order did not cast any stigma against the petitioner and did not visit him with penal consequences the contention of the respondents could probably be accepted. From the combined reading of the impugned order, the reply filed by the respondents before the Tribunal in reply to the petitioner's claim petition and the contents of the counter-affidavit filed in this Court in reply to the writ petition, it is abundantly clear that the order of termination is founded on allegations of misconduct and the petitioner having been found unfit to be retained in police force. Therefore, the innocent language used in the impugned order is simply a camouflage and in fact the petitioner's services are terminated by way of punishment. 9. I have, on consideration of some authorities, held in writ petition No. 5219 of 1982 that the Court has the right to lift the veil from the order of termination of services and determine its true character. If it is an order of termination simpliciter, then the probationer or temporary Government employee cannot seek protection of Article 311 (2) or any other provisions of law which require affording of an opportunity of being heard before the termination order is passed. But if the order is by way of punishment though framed in an innocent language, it would attract the provision of Article 311 (2) even in case of a temporary Government employee or in respect of a probationer. 10. In the present case the petitioner had right to be heard under the Police Regulations. Regulation 541(2) makes it imperative for the respondents to follow a procedure before an order of discharge is passed. That procedure also has not been followed by the respondents and the petitioner's services have been terminated without affording him an opportunity of being heard on the ground that the order of termination is simpliciter. On facts it has been found that the order of termination of the petitioner's services is punitive and issued by way of punishment. Therefore, the contention of the respondents that no opportunity was to be given to the petitioner is not sustainable. 11. The petitioner has relied on the case of Smt. Rajinder Kaur v. Punjab State & Ors. AIR 1986 SC 1970. One Rajinder Kaur was appointed as Lady Constable in Hoshiarpur District on 7.5.1979. After completion of training she was posted in March, 1980 in the Police Lines, Hoshiarpur. The Superintendent of Police, Hoshiarpur discharged her from service by an order dated 9.9.1980 under the Punjab Police Rules of 1934. The said order was upheld by a single bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and confirmed on appeal by the Division Bench of the said High Court. The petitioner came in special leave petition to the supreme Court. The said order was upheld by a single bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and confirmed on appeal by the Division Bench of the said High Court. The petitioner came in special leave petition to the supreme Court. On consideration of facts the Supreme Court held that though the impugned order of discharge was passed in innocuous terms', that was the mere camouflage for an order of dismissal of service on the ground of misconduct. Therefore, it attracted the provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The impugned order of discharge of her services was quashed. The allegation about the Lady Constable was that she had spent two nights with a Male Constable. The order had stated that on an overall assessment, the Superintendent of Police, Hoshiarpur had come to the conclusion that the petitioner in that case was not likely to become an efficient Police Officer. So she was discharged in accordance with the conditions of service. 12. The impugned order in the case in hand says that in accordance with the rules the petitioner is given notice that his services are not required now. The order, though innocuous, is a camouflage for an order of discharge from service passed by way of punishment. That is fully established from reading of the pleadings of the parties as also the reply filed by the respondents before the respondent No.1. The order of termination of services, therefore, could not be passed without affording opportunity to the petitioner of being heard and of filing explanation. Any deficiency or short coming found in the petitioner during the period of his probation was to be brought to his notice and he was to be given an opportunity to file an explanation. That has not been done. 13. The termination of the petitioner's services is bad because he is rendered unfit for police service for all time to come. That is revealed by the counter-affidavit filed by the respondents in reply to the writ petition. He is removed on the ground of being unfit for police force and in public interest. Therefore, the order of termination is order of discharge by way of punishment. It could be done only after holding such enquiry as was required to be held under the rules. He is removed on the ground of being unfit for police force and in public interest. Therefore, the order of termination is order of discharge by way of punishment. It could be done only after holding such enquiry as was required to be held under the rules. In this view of the matter, the petitioner's contention that guarantees contained in Article 14 of the Constitution have been violated is to be upheld. I do not wish to say anything with regard to the petitioner's contention about the retention of his juniors in service by the respondents. Such juniors are not before the Court nor is it proper to comment on this aspect of the case because the petitioner's termination from service is held to be bad on other grounds. 14. The Tribunal has fallen in great error by holding that the order of termination was termination simpliciter which did not attract the provision of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. It has not considered even indirectly the reply given by the respondents in paras 9 and 3 of their written statement before the Tribunal. The omission of the Tribunal to consider the reply of the respondents has resulted in miscarriage of justice. The Tribunal has ignored the relevant considerations and based its findings on irrelevant considerations. Every case is to be decided on its own merits and on facts which it unfolds. 15. As a result of the aforesaid discussion I am convinced that the petitioner has made out a case for issuance of a writ of certiorari and for appropriate directions to the respondents Nos. 2 and 3. 16. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 21.1.1985 terminating the petitioner's services as also the order dated 31.12.1987 passed by the respondent No. 1 rejecting the claim of the petitioner are quashed by a writ or certiorari as being unconstitutional, invalid and bad in law. By a writ of mandamus the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 are direr d to reinstate the petitioner on the post of constable and given him all consequential benefits admissible to him under law. There will be no order as to costs.