Judgment : ARUNACHALAM, J. ( 1 ) ALL these petitions are disposed of together by a common order, since the respondent is the same and the contentions raised are identical. Further, the petitioner in Cr1. M. P. No. 9727 of 1988, is the husband of the petitioner in Cr1. M. P. No. 9730 of 1988, and the father of petitioners in Cr1. MP. Nos. 9733, 9736, 9739 and 9742 of 1988. All these petitions have been preferred under section 482, Cr. P. C. to call for the records and quash the pending prosecutions in C. C. Nos. 92 to 97 of 1988 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kanyakumari at Nagercoil, as not maintainable and an abuse of process of court. ( 2 ) ALL the petitioners are facing a charge under section 14 of the Foreigners Act, 1946. The petitioners are stated to be foreigners, namely, citizens of Republic of Sri Lanka, holding passports of that country. All of them arrived in India on 11/3/1986 and were permitted to stay in this country until 12/8/1986, as per residential permits issued. Without obtaining extension permits, they continued to remain in India and hence are liable for punishment under section 14 of the Foreigners Act read with para 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948. ( 3 ) MR. R. Shanmughasundram, learned counsel appearing on behalf of all the petitioners, contended that the petitioners in each of these petitions, was not a foreigner and a Foreigners Act did not apply to them. The petitioners in Cri. M. P. Nos. 9727 of 1988 and 9730 of 1988 are citizen of India by birth, and they had not voluntarily acquired citizenship of Sri Lanka. The passports obtained by them, did not terminate their Indian Citizenship since they had not voluntarily acquired Sri Lanka Citizenship. In such cases where the question of citizenship is disputed, the Courts have no jurisdiction to decide the question of citizenship or termination of Indian Citizenship, for the only authority who could decide the question is the Central Government, under Section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act read with Rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules. The petitioners, as citizens of India, were not bound-to apply for stay permits in this country. The petitioners, as citizens of India, were not bound-to apply for stay permits in this country. These prosecutions cannot be proceeded with, at this premature stage, unless and until a decision was taken by the competent authority under section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act, As far as the petitions in Cr1. M. Ps. Nos. 9733, 9736, 9739 and 9742 of 1988 are concerned. Mr. Shanmughasundaram submitted that though they were born outside India, they shall be deemed citizens of India by descent, as their father (Petitioner in Cr1. M. P. No. 9727 of 1988) was a citizen of India at the time of his birth. ( 4 ) ON these contentions, I have heard Mr. S. Shanmughavelayutham, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. He contended that Rajeswari (petitioner in Cri. M. P. No. 9730 of 1988) was not an Indian citizen by birth and placed for my scrutiny her passport, which shows the place of her birth, as Jaffna, Sri Lanka, and the date of her birth as 11/10/1989. ( 5 ) I have carefully considered the divergent contentions urged by the opposing counsel. I had occasion to consider this very question in Hajee M. Mohamed Kassim and others v. S. I. of Police. Kattur1 and I have held therein, as follows: T1section 14 of the Foreigners Act imposes penalties on person, who contravenes the provisions of the Act or any order made there under of any direction given in pursuance of the Act or such order. Para, 7 of the Foreigners Order, 1948 takes in its fold obtaining of permits by foreigners, to remain in India. A foreigners has been defined under the Foreigners Act, to mean a person who is not a citizen of India. Section 9 of the Citizenship Act relates to termination of citizenship. Sub-section (2) of section 9 contemplates determination as to when and how any person had acquired the citizenship of another country, by an authority contemplated therein in such a manner and having regard to such rules and evidence as may be prescribed. Schedule III, under Rule 32 of the Citizenship Rules, under clause (3) states that the fact that a citizen of India has obtained any different passport from the Government of any other country, shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily acquired citizenship of that country before that date. Schedule III, under Rule 32 of the Citizenship Rules, under clause (3) states that the fact that a citizen of India has obtained any different passport from the Government of any other country, shall be conclusive proof of his having voluntarily acquired citizenship of that country before that date. A prosecution could be launched against these petitioners only after a determination as contemplated under section 9 (2) of the Citizenship Act read with Rule 30 of the Citizenship Rules, 1986. Even if a decision were to be taken subsequently by the Central Government, holding the petitioners to be foreign nationals, as enunciated in State of U. P. v. Rahmathulla (A. I. R. 1971 S. C. 1382), such determination rendering a penal offence an act which was not so at the time of its alleged commission. If that be so, none of these prosecutions can be maintained and allowed to survive any further. The State would be left free to prosecute petitioners if and when a decision is obtained against them from the appropriate authority in accordance with law. As further observed therein, the authority will, no doubt, consider all relevant facts including the total period of the stay of the petitioners in this country as compared with the period of their stay in other countries, from where, they had obtained foreign passports. It will, of course, be open to the Central Government after a decision is rendered by the competent authority and in the event of it being against the petitioners, to take such suitable action against them under the Foreigners Act or under any other provision of law which may be applicable to them for the purpose of either deporting them or otherwise dealing with them as may be thought fit. As far as the petitioners in Cri. M. Ps. Nos. 9727 of 1988, 9733 of 1988,9736 of 1988, 9739 of 1988 and 9742 of 1988 are concerned, their cases present no difficulty, as the law laid down by me in the case afore stated, will squarely apply to them. This petition is conceded by Mr. Shanmughavelayutham, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. It is quite so since the petitioner in Cri. 9727 of 1988, 9733 of 1988,9736 of 1988, 9739 of 1988 and 9742 of 1988 are concerned, their cases present no difficulty, as the law laid down by me in the case afore stated, will squarely apply to them. This petition is conceded by Mr. Shanmughavelayutham, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor. It is quite so since the petitioner in Cri. M. P. No. 9727 of 1988 is an Indian by birth and his children, the petitioners in the other petitions, though born in Sri Lanka, would be citizens of India by descent, as contemplated under section 4 of the Citizenship Act, since their father was citizen of India at the time of his birth. On the same parity of reasoning in Hajee Mohamed Kassims case (supra), I quash all further proceedings in C. C. Nos. 92 of 1988, 94 of 1988, 95 of 1988, 96 of 1988 and 97 of 1988. In other words, Cri. M. Ps. 9727, 9733, 9736, 9739, and 9742 of 1988 are allowed. My observations in Hajee Mohamed Kassims case (supra) extracted earlier about the option of the State to prosecute the petitioners in the event of obtaining further material would of course, equally apply to the case of these petitioners. ( 6 ) AS far as the petitioner in Cri. M. P. No. 9730 of 1988 (Rajeswari) is concerned, the prosecution against her cannot be quashed at this stage. Though Mr. Shanmughasundaram claims, that she is also an Indian citizen by birth, prima facie the passport produced by the prosecution indicates, that her birth place is Jaffna and she is a citizen of Sri Lanka by birth. If it is the defence of the petitioner, that she is a born Indian, sufficient evidence ought to be placed before the trial Magistrate to displace the basic foundation laid by the prosecution by means of passport, that she is a foreigner. No ground has been made out to quash the pending prosecution as far as she is concerned. Criminal M. P. 9730 of 1988 shall stand dismissed. The Trial Magistrate shall expeditiously dispose of C. C. No. 93 of 1988 after affording sufficient opportunity to both parties to place their respective contentions. ( 7 ) THE net result is all other petitions except Cr1. M. P. No. 9730 of 1988 shall stand allowed while Cri. M. P. No. 9730 of 1988 shall stand dismissed. The Trial Magistrate shall expeditiously dispose of C. C. No. 93 of 1988 after affording sufficient opportunity to both parties to place their respective contentions. ( 7 ) THE net result is all other petitions except Cr1. M. P. No. 9730 of 1988 shall stand allowed while Cri. M. P. No. 9730 of 1988 shall stand dismissed. Petitions, except No. 9730, allowed.