JUDGMENT S. P. Srivastava. J. 1. This petition by a defendant tenant arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiff respondent No. 3 praying for a decree of ejectment of the petitioner from the premises in dispute and for the recovery of mesne profits peadente-lite and future at the rate of 125/- per month, which suit had been decreed by the Judge Small Cause Courts, Shahjahanpur and this decree was affirmed in revision by the respondent No 1. 2. According to the plain allegations, the building in question had been newly constructed in the year 1976 and had been let out to the tenant in the same year for being utilised for business purposes at the rent of Rs 125/- per month. It was asserted by the plaintiff that the premises In dispute did not fall within the preview of U. P. Urban Building Regulations of Letting and Eviction Act, 1972 and stood exempted from the operation of the said Act on account of the said building having been constructed in the year 1976. Inspite of the service of the notice, terminating the tenancy, the defendant had not vacated the premises in dispute, hence the suit. The defendant petitioner had contested the suit referred to above, asserting that the building in question was more than 10 years old. It was further asserted that the defendant had paid an amount of Rs. 5,160/- to the plaintiff landlord on 21-9-1976 by way of advance rent under an agreement with a stipulation that the said amount shall be adjusted at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month, The defendant asserted that so long as the aforesaid amount was not adjusted as stipulated in the agreement, the plaintiff could not seek ejectment of the petitioner from the accommodation in dispute and could not be deemed to have any right to sue, 3. The trial Court after carefully considering the evidence and the materials on record accepted the case of the landlord about the building in question being exempt from the operation of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. In this connection, the trial court relied upon the direct evidence about the construction of the building in question in the year 1976, which had been led by the plaintiff landlord. In this connection, the trial court relied upon the direct evidence about the construction of the building in question in the year 1976, which had been led by the plaintiff landlord. The trial court further placed reliance upon the clear cut and categorical admission of the tenant petitioner contained in the rent deed executed by him, wherein it had been clearly and in categorical terms admitted by the defendant that the building in question was a new construction. The trial court also negatived the case of the defendant to the effect that he had paid an amount of Rs. 5,160/- on 21-9-1976 by way of advance rent. In this connection the trial court placed reliance upon the admission of the tenant to the effect that the aforesaid amount had been advanced as a loan. The trial court further referred to the agreement dated 21-9-1976 and found that even in the said document, the nature of the amount of Rs. 5,160/- had been disclosed as a loan. The trial court did not find any defect in the notice terminating the tenancy of the petitioner and on the aforesaid findings, decreed the suit as claimed. 4. The decree passed by the trial court was challenged by the petitioner in revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act before the regional Court The revisional Court in its turn upheld the findings recorded by the trial court and dismissed the revision. I have heard Shri Ajit Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner In support of the writ petition and Shri R. K. lain, learned counsel representing the contesting respondents in opposition to the writ petition. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner has challenged the findings recorded by the court below on the question relating to the year of construction of the building in question. It has been asserted that from the plaintiff's own evidence, it was clear that the premises in dispute formed part of a building which was in existance in the year 1951-52 and that a Baithaka of that building had been concerted into a shop, which bad been let out to the defendant. It has been asserted that from the plaintiff's own evidence, it was clear that the premises in dispute formed part of a building which was in existance in the year 1951-52 and that a Baithaka of that building had been concerted into a shop, which bad been let out to the defendant. It was asserted that this admission itself pointed out in unmistakable terms that the present case was not a case of reconstruction of the whole building but could at the most be renovation of a part of the building and that could not have the effect of exempting the building in question from the operation of the Act as contemplated under section 2 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 6. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is totally misconceived. A bare perusal of the deposition of the plaintiff landlord, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition, shows that he had clearly asserted that the disputed accomodation had been constructed in the year 1976 and it was after the construction was complete that the premises had been let out to the defendant. The suggestion made to him that it was only a renovation of an old shop was specifically denied. It was asserted that it was not so and the shop had been constructed a new In the cross-examination, he had assetted that the old building had fallen down and it was thereafter that the new building had been raised. The learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily relied upon a stray sentence appearing in the cross-examination, wherein it has been stated that prior to letting out of the premises in dispute, it was being utilised as a Baithak and had been so utilised for ten years. In this connection, it may be noticed that long back in its decision in the case of Umar Daraz and others v. Nihal Singh and another (S. A. No. 717 of 1960. decided on 3rd May, 1965), this Court had clarified that a party which proposes to rely on an admission made by other party in cross-examination should be in a position to quote the exact words of the admission, and for this purpose it should ask the trial court to take down the question as well as the answer in cross-examination. decided on 3rd May, 1965), this Court had clarified that a party which proposes to rely on an admission made by other party in cross-examination should be in a position to quote the exact words of the admission, and for this purpose it should ask the trial court to take down the question as well as the answer in cross-examination. It was pointed out that unfortunately in India there is no short hand record of court proceedings, and questions are never recorded by the court and the answers in cross-examination are paraphrased by the trial court in the process of recording. In these circumstances the court should be cautious in assessing the legal effect of an alleged admission made in cross-examination. Moreover, this Court pointed out, that it is common experience that, witnesses under pressure of cross examination get confused and say all kinds of things without realising their significance. The art of "bamboozling" a witness has attained a high degree of perfection. For these reasons no importance should be given to the so- called admission. In the present case the deposition of the plaintiff landlord has to be read as a whole. The trial court had relied upon the aforesaid deposition, which constituted direct evidence about the construction of the premises in dispute, The clear cut statement of the plaintiff landlord about the building in question having been constructed in the year 1976 after the old building had fallen down is amply corroborated by the dear cut and categorical admission of the defendant tenant contained in the rent died, the due execution whereof was admitted to the defendant petitioner. As a matter of fact, the trial Court has also considered the effect of the so-called admission strongly relied upon by the petitioner and has rightly found that the so-called admission did not lead to any such inference that the building in dispute had not been constructed in the year 1976. The finding recorded by the trial court on the question indicated above, was based on appreciation of evidence and was a finding of fact which was rightly affirmed by the revisional Court 7. The finding recorded by the trial court on the question indicated above, was based on appreciation of evidence and was a finding of fact which was rightly affirmed by the revisional Court 7. Taking into consideration the ratio of the decision of this Court in the case of Jagdish Prasad v. District judge, Ghaziabad, 1980 ALJ 229, there can be no manner of doubt that even if the old Baithka had been used to carve out the shop in dispute, it would not bring it within the preview of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, in as much as the word "substantial addition" as used in clause (c) of explanation (1) to section 2 (2) of the U. P. Act No 13 of 1972 will take within its ambit not merely the addition of wholly new construction increasing the area of the building but also the alteration of the existing building into a new accommodation by remodelling it, which may include the use of some parts of the old structure. 8. According to the plaintiff landlord in the present case, no portion of the old house was utilised in the new construction in question. The altered structure therefore could not, in the present case, be deemed to contain any part of any old construction. In the circumstances, therefore, the findings recorded by the court below to the effect that the building in dispute stood exempted from the operation of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 does not call for any Interference of this Court. 9. It was next contended by the: learned counsel for the petitioner that the court below have completely misunderstood the agreement dated 21-9-1976 which according to the petitioner clearly indicates that so long as the amount of Rs. 5,160/- was not adjusted as against the rent at the rate of Rs- 50/- per month, the tenancy of the petitioner qua the accomodation in dispute could not be terminated and the suit was therefore, premature in as much as, on the own saying of the landlord respondent, an amount of Rs. 1150/- out of Rs. 5160/- referred to above still remained to be adjusted by the date of the suit Reliance in this connection was placed on the deposition of the plaintiff landlord wherein he admitted that at the time when the suit had been filed, an amount of Rs. 1150/- out of Rs. 5160/- referred to above still remained to be adjusted by the date of the suit Reliance in this connection was placed on the deposition of the plaintiff landlord wherein he admitted that at the time when the suit had been filed, an amount of Rs. 1150/- remained to be adjusted and the total amount of Rs. 5,160/- had not been paid up. 10. The aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner has also no substance. I have perused the copy of the agreement dated 21-9-1976. This agreement clearly shows that the amount of Rs 5,160/- had been advanced by the petitioner to the respondent No. 3 as loan without Interest. This agreement which has not been registered, contained a repayment schedule for the liquidation of the amount of loan. Under this repayment schedule, the tenant petitioner had become entitled to recover the amount of loan at the rate of Rs, 50/- per month and as against this recovery, he could take that amount from the monthly rent in respect of the premises in dispute, which had been fixed at the rate of Rs. 125/- per month. The agreement stipulated that so long as the amount of loan was not repaid by adjustment of an amount of Rs. 50/- per month, the rent in respect of the accommodation in dispute would continue to remain Rs. 125/- per month and on the repayment of the entire amount of loan, the rent will be increased to Rs. 150/- per month. There is nothing 'in the agreement, which debarred the plaintiff landlord to repay the amount of loan at once or debarred him from repaying the amount at once or whenever he liked. The landlord had every right to repay the loan either in lump sum or in larger instalments, and this repayment schedule of the amount of loan provided for in the agreement dated 21-9-1976 could not by any stretch of imagination be deemed to be an agreement for continuing the tenancy for the period till the amount of loan was not repaid by adjustment of the instalments at the rate of Rs. 50/- per month. 50/- per month. In this connection it may also be noticed that if the agreement dated 21 -9-1976 is interpreted in such a manner as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner, then it will lead to a situation where the aforesaid agreement will become the foundation for a lease of a duration of more than eight years The lease for such a period wis compulsorily registrable. The defendant petitioner could not be permitted to do indirectly, which he could not do directly. 11. It may be noticed that if the parties entered into an agreement of lease through a document in writing and the document is cot registered, the said document could not be looked into for establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The petitioner tenant can not take any advantage of the document dated 21-9-1976 for claiming the duration of a tenancy to be for a period of over eight years on the strength of the terms of the agreement stipulated in the said document in this view of the matter also. 12. Since the premises in dispute did not fall within the preview of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 and the suit filed by the respondent landlord was not a suit filed on the ground of default as contemplated under section 20 of the said Act, the question of adjustment of loan amount against the rent which had accrued to cover any claim of arrears of rent did not arise. The decision of the Apex Court in case of Mr. Shravan Kumar Onkar Nath v. Subhash Kumar Agarwalla, 1988 (1) ARC 259, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner has no bearing on the controversy involved in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the defendant 'petitioner can not derive any advantage out of the same. During the hearing of this writ petition, Shri R. K. Jain, learned counsel for the respondent landlord has made a statement on behalf of the contesting respondent that the respondent landlord is ready to pay the amount of Rs. 1150/- which according to the plaintiff remained unpaid out of the amount of loan of Rs. 5,160/- advanced by the defendant petitioner on 21-9-1976. 13. 1150/- which according to the plaintiff remained unpaid out of the amount of loan of Rs. 5,160/- advanced by the defendant petitioner on 21-9-1976. 13. In the circumstances, I think: it to be expedient in the interest of justice to direct the executing court to proceed with the execution of the decree under challenge only after the amount of Rs. 1150/- is deposited by the landlord-respondent for payment to the tenant petitioner. 14. In the result this writ petition is dismissed with the direction referred to above in the preceding paragraph. There shall be no order as to cost. Petition dismissed.