Judgment R.N.Sahay, J. 1. The appellant was defendant No. 1 in Title Suit No. 231 of 1982 instituted by respondent Gangu Singh. He had instituted the suit with the object of obtaining a decree directing the appellant to execute and register a deed of sale in his favour in respect of the properties described in Schedule of the plaint. 2. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court only on the ground that when the defendant No. 1 refused to execute the sale deed in pursuance of registered agreement for sale of the suit properties before the Sub-Registrar, the plaintiff was entitled to apply before the Sub-Registrar within 30 days of the refusal for compulsory registration of the deed. The plaintiff was entitled to appeal before the Registrar, in the event, the Sub-Registrar had refused to register the deed. Then he could have, if the appeal failed, the plaintiff was entitled to institute a suit under Sec. 77 of the Indian Registration Act. This view of the trial Court obviously was as a result of mis-conception of the relevant provisions as contained in Secs. 71 to 77 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. It is true, where a person executes a document, but refuses to register it, the person in whose favour the document is executed is entitled to establish his right to have the document registered by instituting a suit under Sec. 77 of the Act "for a decree directing the document to be registered". But such a suit, will not lie unless the conditions precedent to its institution are complied with, in other words, unless the various steps prescribed by the Acts are taken. The lesser remedy provided by Sec. 77 of the Act does not take away the larger remedy under the Specific Relief Act. This was a simple suit for Specific Performance of contract and the trial Court was wrong in holding that the suit was barred under the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Act. 3. The trial Court had decided all the issues in favour of the respondent, but the plaintiffs suit failed on the ground of maintainability on the erroneous interpretation of law. 4. 3. The trial Court had decided all the issues in favour of the respondent, but the plaintiffs suit failed on the ground of maintainability on the erroneous interpretation of law. 4. The respondent preferred appeal before the Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, the appeal was heard and disposed of by the 3rd Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi, who decreed the suit by setting aside the finding of the trial Court that the suit was not maintainable. The learned Additional Judicial Commissioner did not permit the appellant who was the respondent in the appeal to challenge the findings of the trial Court on the other issues which were decided against her. The learned Additional Judicial Commissioner by relying on the order as contained in Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Code has held that the appellant was not entitled to challenge the finding decided against her unless he has preferred a cross-objection against the decree. The Additional Judicial Commissioner has not correctly interpreted the provisions as contained in Order XLI, Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Choudhary Sahu V/s. State of Bihar -- . To my mind, the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner has not understood the ratio of this case. As the plaintiffs suit was dismissed, the respondent could not have filed any appeal. No appeal lies merely against an adverse finding. It was not a case where the suit had been partly decreed. The appellant was, therefore, perfectly entitled to canvass before the appellate Court that the finding decided against her by the appellate Court was erroneous and the suit was liable to be dismissed on other grounds also. 5. This appeal has been admitted to decide on the following substantial question of law: Whether the learned Courts below decreed the plaintiff-respondents suit without considering the oral evidences adduced on behalf of the appellants to the effect that she is Lohara by caste and not Lohar by caste which contention is upheld would have been sufficient for dismissal of the plaintiffs suit. 6. 6. The appellants case, in her written statement was that the Deputy Commissioner was a necessary party to the suit in terms of Sec. 3 read with Serial No. 1 of the Schedule of the Bihar Scheduled Areas Regulation Act, 1969 which provides: Provided that in suits for declaration of, or for possession relating to immovable properties of member of the Scheduled Tribes as specified in Part III to the Schedule to the Constitution (Schedule Tribes) Order, 1950 the Deputy Commissioner concerned shall also be joined as a defendant. 7. The appellant after hearing of the suit had commenced applied for amendment of her written statement wherein she wanted to incorporate the fact that she was "Lohara" a member of the Scheduled Tribe. The amendment application was rejected by the trial Court on footing that the appellant was by costs Loharin and not Lohara (Scheduled Tribes). The appellant then, moved this Court in Civil Revision No. 1241/86 (R). The Civil Revision was permitted to be withdrawn with the observation that there was no ground to interfere with the order of the trial Court. It was, however, observed that the trial Court shall consider the effect of assertion in Paragraph 12 of the written statement that the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, was a necessary party. 8. Shri A. K. Sinha, the learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellate Court reversed the finding of the trial Court without considering the oral and documentary evidence. He submitted that there was over-whelming evidence in shape of oral and documentary evidence that the appellant is by caste Lohra, a member of the Scheduled Tribe. The finding of the Courts below that the appellant is by caste Lohar is contrary to evidence, Shri Sinha referred to the oral and documentary evidence in support of his contention. 9. Shri M. M. Banerjee, the learned Counsel for the respondents invited to my attention to Paragraph 5 of the appellate Court judgment and submitted that the question raised by the appellant is barred by principle of res judicata. Shri Banerjee submitted that the appellant had not alleged in her written statement that she was a member of the Lohra community and not Lohar. Shri Banerjee further submitted that since the amendment application was rejected, she cannot be permitted to raise this question. 10. Shri Banerjee submitted that the appellant had not alleged in her written statement that she was a member of the Lohra community and not Lohar. Shri Banerjee further submitted that since the amendment application was rejected, she cannot be permitted to raise this question. 10. It is true that the amendment application was rejected by the trial Court and Civil Revision application was also withdrawn by the appellant, but I find from the order of S. Roy, J., the Civil Revision No. 1241 of 1986 (R) that the appellant was permitted to raise this question in view of her statement in Paragraph 12 of the written statement. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Shri Banerjee that the question whether the appellant is Lohar and not Lohara is barred by the principles of res judicata. 11. The trial Court has held that the appellant was not Lohar by caste and not Lohara on the basis of certain admission made by her, not in evidence, but in the documents in which she was a party. The appellate Court did not permit the appellant to challenge the findings of the trial Court as stated earlier. Nevertheless, the appellate Court examined the evidence superficially. The trial Court also had not examined the evidence with thoroughness as it was required to do. So far the admission made by her in the documents are concerned, Sec. 3 of the Bihar Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969 provides that the Court shall in a suit or proceeding require fact expressly or empliedly admitted by such person to be proved otherwise then by mere admission, and the Deputy Commissioner may also produce evidence in rebuttal." Thus, if it is held that the appellant is a member of the Scheduled Tribe, her admission is of no value and cannot be acted upon unless the fact is proved by the other parties. The trial Court held that the Deputy Commissioner was not a necessary party, since land is a Chhaparbandi land and not raiyati land, therefore, Sec. 46 (3-A) did not apply and so the Deputy Commissioner was not a necessary party. The trial Court was ignorant of the provisions contained in Bihar Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969 which has amended Order 1, Rule 3 of the C. P. C. by adding Proviso which has already been quoted above. The trial Court was ignorant of the provisions contained in Bihar Scheduled Area Regulation, 1969 which has amended Order 1, Rule 3 of the C. P. C. by adding Proviso which has already been quoted above. The Deputy Commissioner, therefore, is a necessary party in all suits whether for declaration of title or for confirmation of possession of immovable property of a member of the Scheduled Tribe. 12. For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the appellate Court is not in accordance with law and must be set-aside. The appeal is accordingly allowed and the matter is remitted to the appellate Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law. There shall be no order as to costs.