JUDGMENT : B.L. Hansaria, C.J. - The petitioner was a confirmed teacher of Black Diamond Public School. This school came to be taken over by the D.A.V. College Trust and Management Society. The Regional Director of the Trust advertised to fill up the posts of teacher in the school, newly named as "D. A. V. Black Diamond Public School." The petitioner and other teachers were taken aback and approached opp. party No. 2 (Chairman, Managing Committee of the Black Diamond Public School), who assured that their services would not be affected in any way and said that they should appear before the Selection Committee for a formal interview. The petitioner along with other teaching staff accordingly appeared on 10-10-1991 and 11-10-1991. She was, however, not selected. On 12-10-1991, opp. party No. t issued a letter to the petitioner that as the Managing Committee of the, school did not exist after the handing over of the school to the D. A. V. College Managing Committee, it was decided to dissolve the Managing Committee of the Black Diamond Public School as a result of which her services shall stand terminated with effect from 11-11-1991. The petitioner assailed this termination order in O. J. C. No. 5263 of 1991 filed on 30-10-1991 in which an order was passed on 4-11-1991 in Misc. Case No. 5342 of 1991 that Annexure 5 (which was the impugned termination order) shall not be given effect to till 15-11-1991. The case of the petitioner is that after a certified copy of the order was obtained, she approached opp. party No. 2 on 8-11-1991 and presented the same along with a forwarding letter, who 'directed the petitioner to give the same to his Personal Assistant who issued a receipt. Further, on seeing the order, opp. party No. 2 "got wild and told the petitioner that he would stick to the order vide Annexute 5 and does not care for the Court's order. He was categorical that the petitioner would not be allowed to continue beyond 11-11-1991." Till 11-11-1991, she was regularly going to the School but when she presented herself on 12-11-1991, she was not allowed to enter the school and was told by the School-in-charge that her service had stood terminated and that she would not be allowed to continue in her job. 2. 2. It may be stated that when the case came up for further orders on 15-11-1991, the interim order was allowed to continue until further orders. 3. As the petitioner was not allowed to attend the school after 11-11-1991, she filed the present application on 3-2-1992 and notice was ordered to be issued on 11-2-1992 pursuant to which opp. party No. 2 appeared on 25-3-1992 by filing the show cause. We heard what opp. party No. 2 had to say regarding the allegations made against him and Shri Mohanty also adressed us on his behalf. 4. The violation of this Court's order passed on 4-11-1991 is writ large on the face of it inasmuch as it is not even averred by opp. party No. 2 in his show cause that the order of termination was kept in abeyance till 15-11-1991 which was the direction of this Court. The submission of Shri Mohanty is that as the Management of the Black Diamond Public School had been transferred to the D. A. V. College Managing Committee and' according to the agreement that Managing Committee was to recruit fresh staff and the petitioner had appeared in an interview meant for this purpose on 10/11-10-1991, opp. party No. 2 had no hand in extending the service of the petitioner beyond 11-11- 1991. It is for this reason that this opposite party is not contesting the writ petition in which counter has been filed by the Regional Director, D. A. V. Institutions. 5. It may be that opp. party He. 2 has no hand in the working of the D. A. V. Black Diamond .Public School and as such could not have done anything to get the petitioner employed in the school, but this has no bearing at all on the allegation of contempt. The order of termination having been admittedly issued by opp. party No. 2 and that too on 12- 10-1991, after the Black Diamond Public School had lost its identity since 6-10-1991, that the service of the petitioner shall stand terminated with effect from 11-11-1991, and this Court having ordered not to give effect to that order till 15-11-1991, opp, party No. 2 had no alternative but to keep the order of termination in abeyance till 15-11-1991 which has admittedly not been done. No reason for the same has also been given in the show-cause. If opp. No reason for the same has also been given in the show-cause. If opp. party No. 2 could retain the petitioner in service till 11-11-1991 after the school in question had lost its identity by 6-10-1991. we do not find any reason at all as to why the service could not have been extended by mere 4 days upto 15-11-1991, as was the order of this Court. The violation is, therefore, apparently wilful. 6. We may now deal with the contention of opp. party No. 2 that the petitioner had not met him at all on 8-11-1991 and that he had not stated to her as alleged in the contempt petition, According to opp. party No. 2, the order of this Court had been handed over to his Personal Assistant and from the show-cause filed by him, it would rather appear that he was not aware at this Court's order dated 4-11-1991. We have said so because of the averments made in paragraphs 4 and 11 of the show-cause. But then, not being satisfied that a Personal Assistant having received a copy of this Court's order meant for oppo. party No. 2 would not show it to the concerned person, we called upon opp. party No. 2 to produce before us the letter of the petitioner which was given to the Personal Assistant. On this being done, we noticed that on the body of the letter of the petitioner dated 8-11-1991, the osposite party had himself put an endorsement in the name of P. O. asking him to "PI. speak." When this fact came to our notice, we asked Shri Mohanty as to why opp. party No. 2 had suppressed this fact in his show-cause. We did not get any convincing reply. 7. From the submission of Shri Mohanty, we also understand that of the three opposite parties arrayed in the writ petition, only opp. party No. 2 was available on the spot, and as the order of termination had been issued by him, the petitioner must have approached him. Having approached this Court on 30-10-1991 feeling aggrieved at the termination order issued by opp, party No. 2 on 12-10-1991 and having obtained a stay order on 4-11-1991, xerox copy of which was obtained on 6-11-1991, any reasonable human being would have rushed with the order to apprise the concerned person about it as the last date was 11-11-1991. Opp. Having approached this Court on 30-10-1991 feeling aggrieved at the termination order issued by opp, party No. 2 on 12-10-1991 and having obtained a stay order on 4-11-1991, xerox copy of which was obtained on 6-11-1991, any reasonable human being would have rushed with the order to apprise the concerned person about it as the last date was 11-11-1991. Opp. party No. 2 being the Chairman of the Managing Committee of the School, of which the petitioner is a teacher, no protocol or obstacle would have stood in her way to meet the author of the termination order, more so, when he was the only one among the opposite parties available at the spot. The school having student strength of about 300 and teachers being not too many, it stands to reason to believe that opp. party No. 2 was accessible to the petitioner. 8. If opp. party No. 2 would not have said to the petitioner that she would not be allowed to continue beyond 11-11-1991, this opposite party would have taken step after receipt of this Court's order to extend the service of the petitioner at least till 15-11-1991. This was definitely within the power of this opposite party inasmuch as though the school had been taken over by the D. A. V. College Managing Committea on 6-10-1991 (the decision relating to which had been taken by the end of July 91, as would appear from the counter filed by opp. party No. 3 in the writ petition) despite which the petitioner was continuing in the school till 11-11-1991 by force of the order dated 12-10-1991 passed by opp. party No. 2. If he had any regard to this Court's order about which he did become aware, he would have definitely taken steps to extend the period of service till 15-11-1991 (mere 4 days), which admittedly had not been done. So, we accept the case of the petitioner that on 3-11-1991 itself she was told by opp. party No. 2 that she would not be allowed to continue in the school beyond 11-11-1991. 9. This being the position, we find opp. party No. 2 guilty of contempt. The sentence to be awarded for any offence is to commensurate with the gravity of the same. In contempt matters one may be justified in thinking that unless the contempt is serious in nature, unconditional apology should be accepted. 9. This being the position, we find opp. party No. 2 guilty of contempt. The sentence to be awarded for any offence is to commensurate with the gravity of the same. In contempt matters one may be justified in thinking that unless the contempt is serious in nature, unconditional apology should be accepted. We have noted that in the present case the contemner has offered his unconditional apology also "for any action which deems/amounts to violate the orders of this Hon'ble Court". as is stated in paragraph 15 of the show-cause. As to when apology should be accepted had come up for consideration of the apex Court in the recent decision in M.B. Sanghi, Adv. Vs. High Court of Punjab and Haryana and others. It was observed in paragraph 12 that it is well settled that an apology is not a weapon of defence to purge the guilty of their offence ; nor is it intended to operate as a universal panacea, but is intended to be evidence of real contriteness. It was stated in paragraph 2 that if the apology is hollow, there is no remorse, no regret, and only a device to escape the rigour of the law, it does not deserve to be accepted. 10. In the present case, we do not find any such repentance on the part of the contemner. He has instead taken up a false plea that the petitioner had not met him on 8-11-1991 after the order of 4-11- 1991 was passed; indeed, according to the contemner. the petitioner had never met him after the passing of the aforesaid order. We have, however, held that this stand of the contemner is far from truth. Not only this, the defiant attitude taken by the contemner when the petitioner had met him on 8-11-1991 has aggravated the seriousness of the offence. What is more, by the order of 4-11-1991 this Court had merely desired not to give effect to the impugned order of termination till 15-11-1991, as against its expiry on 11-11-1991. When a person in authority does not carry out lawful order even though he is required to postpone an event by a few days, serious view of the matter has to be taken. When a person in authority does not carry out lawful order even though he is required to postpone an event by a few days, serious view of the matter has to be taken. The stand taken by the contemner in his show-cause, which gave the impression that he had not even seen the application filed by the petitioner on 8-11-1991 enclosing therewith a copy of this Court's order gets belied because of the endorsement of the contemner on the body of the application. This is an aggravating circumstance. 11. The aforesaid special facts of this case, read with the growing general tendency of violating the orders of this Court, amply borne out by a spate of contempt petitions being filed, compel us to take a strict view of the matter. According to us even imposition of fine, in the facts and circumstances of the case, viewed in the background of the prevailing situation, would not meet the ends of justice ; and a sentence of imprisonment is called for. However, a long period of incarceration is not demanded by the present case, and the ends of justice would be met if the contemner is sentenced to civil imprisonment for seven days. 12. In so far as opp. party No. 3 is concerned, who has also appeared by filing his show-cause, we do not, on the averments made in the present case, find him guilty of contempt; but we would direct him to abide by this Court's order passed on 4-11-1991, which was subsequently allowed to continue until further orders as appears from the order dated 15-11-1991 passed in the O. J. C. and the connected Misc. Case, the effect of which is that the petitioner has to be accepted as a teacher in the D. A. V. Black Diamond Public School till the order of 15-11- 1991 subsists. Opp. party No. 3 would, therefore, issue necessary direction to the concerned authorities to allow the petitioner to function as a teacher in the aforesaid school on her reporting for this purpose, till the order of 15-11-1991 passed in the O.J.C. holds the field. 13. The petition is disposed of accordingly. K.C. Jagadeb Roy, J. 14. I agree.