JUDGMENT : S.R. Singh, J. The dispute in the inatant petition pertains to a shop situate in Mohalla Bazar Bagh Bahadurganj known as Bazarganj, Moradabad. The Petitioner being landlord applied for release of the said shop (hereinafter referred to as 'premises in dispute') u/s 21(1)(a) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Building (Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act 1972 (in short the 'Act'). The Petitioner claims himself to be the landlord and sole owner of the shop in question. It is not disouted that Burhan Uddin the own brother of the Petitioner, was the co-owner of the shop in question to the extent of half share. The Petitioner, however, claimed himself to be the sole owner of the shop on the basis of an oral gift allegedly executed in his favour on 18-2-1979 by his brother, Burhan Uddin. The Petitioner being a retired employee of Municipal Board as it then was, wanted to venture upon a business in the shop in dispute, in brass-wares in order to keep his pot boiling after his retirement from service. 2. the release application was contested by the Respondent-tenant inter-alia on the ground that he purchased the half share of Burhan Uddin Ansari which he had in the shop in dispute, by means of a registered sale deed dated 12-4-1988 and thus, he acquired co-ownership of the shop to the extent of half share and accordingly, it was alleged that he was not liable to be evicted in proceedings u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act. It was also alleged by the Respondent-tenant that the need of the Petitioner was not bonafide one. In his rejoinder affidavit, the Petitioner landlord called in question the genuineness of the sale deed dated 12-4-1988 on which credence was being placed by the Respondents-tenant. The Prescribed Authority, on consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, held that it was not possible to traverse upon the question as to whether the Respondent-tenant had become the co-owner of the building, without weighing the validity of the sale deed, the genuineness of which was being disputed by him the landlord which question can be gone into in a properly constituted suit but the Prescribed Authority rejected the application for release by means of the order dated 29-4-1989 on the ground that the Petitioner’s need was not genuine and bonafide. Upon this, the Petitioner went up in appeal impugning the aforesaid judgment and order of the Prescribed Authority. In appeal, the learned Addl. District Judge came to the conclusion that the oral gift sat up by the Petitioner was not genuine and that the sale deed reliance on which was placed by the Respondent-tenant was genuine and valid. Accordingly, the appellate Authority held that the Respondent tenant had become co-owner of the premises in dispute to the extent of half share and as such the release application was not maintainable. Having arrived at this conclusion, the appellate Court played down the necessity to record any categorical finding as the Petitioner’s need being bonafide and genuine and consequently, dismissed the appeal accordingly by means of the judgment and order dated 24-1-1990. 3. I have heard Sri S.A. Shah, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri R.H. Zaidi, learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 3. On being taken through the judgment and order of the lower appellate court I find that on consideration of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, the appellate court has recorded a finding to the effect that the oral gift being relied upon by the Petitioner was a piece of forgery and that it had in fact never materialised. It further recorded the finding that the sale deed dated 12-4-1988, being relied upon by the Respondent-tenant was valid and genuine. The findings recorded on the aforesaid two questions by the appellate court are findings of fact based on assessment of evidence on record and are not liable to be reopened by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. For purposes of proceedings u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act, this Court has to proceed accepting the aforesaid finding on the question of oral gift being relied upon by the Petitioner and the sale deed being placed credence upon by the Respondent-tenant, inasmuch as the findings on the aforesaid two question being findings of fact, based on appraisal of evidence on record including the statement of Burhan Uddin have to be acted upon as hide-bound on this Court. 4. 4. The question however, that requires consideration by this Court is whether the tenancy stood determined by reason of the fact that the tenant acquired co-ownership on the basis of a sale deed executed in his favour by one of the co-owners of the premises in dispute, and whether the release application u/s 21(1)(a) of the Act, was not maintainable as held by the Appellate Court. It finds mention in the judgment of the appellate court that the release application was filed on 3-8-1987 and the sale deed being relied upon by the Respondent-tenant was executed on 12-4-1988. On the date, the release application was presented, Respondent tenant has not acquired co-ownership rights in the premises in dispute. Sub-sequent acquisition of ownership right in the premises in dispute to the extent of half share on the basis of sale deed dated 32-4-1988 executed in. his favour by one of the Co-owners, would not affect the maintainability of the release application inasmuch as it did not result in extinction of the tenancy rights which takes place in the manner prescribed u/s 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. The question of determination of tenancy on exudation of a period of 30 days of an order under Sub-Section (1) or Sub-section (1-A) or Sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act as provided in Sub-section (6) thereof does not arise at this stage. No other provision for determination of tenancy was brought to my notice by the learned Counsel for the parties. 5. Section 111 of the Transfer Property Act being relevant, is quoted below for ready reference. Determination of lease. No other provision for determination of tenancy was brought to my notice by the learned Counsel for the parties. 5. Section 111 of the Transfer Property Act being relevant, is quoted below for ready reference. Determination of lease. A lease of immovable property, determines (a) by efflux of the time limited thereby; (b) where such time is limited conditionally on the happening of some event-by the happening of such event; (c) where the interest of the lessor in the property terminates on, or his power to dispose of the same extends only to, the happening of any event by the happening of such event; (d) in case the interests of the lessee and the lessor in the whole of the property become vested at the same time in one person in the same right; (e) by express surrender; that is to say, in case the lessee yields up his mterest under the lease or the lessor, by mutual agreement between them; (f) by implied surrender; (g) by forfeiture, that is to say, (1) in case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may reenter; or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself; or (3) the lessee is adjudicated an insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may reenter on the happening of such event; and in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease; (h) on the expiration of a notice to determine, the lease or to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other. On the facts found by the appellate Authority, none of the clauses of Section 111 is attracted in the present case and accordingly the Respondent No. 3 continued to be the tenant of the demised shop despite acquisition of co-ownership right therein. Clause (d) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act which deals with extinction of tenancy rights on the basis of merger of interest does not come into play on the facts of the case. In Badri Narain Jha and Others Vs. Clause (d) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act which deals with extinction of tenancy rights on the basis of merger of interest does not come into play on the facts of the case. In Badri Narain Jha and Others Vs. Rameshwar Dayal Singh and Others, AIR 1951 SC 186 , the Supreme Court while considering the doctrine of merger embodied in Clause (d) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act held as under: If the lessor purchases the lessee's interest the lease no doubt is extinguished as the same man cannot at the same time be both landlord and a tenant, but there is no extinction of the lease if one of the several lessees purchases only a part of the lessor's interest. In such a case leasehold and the reversion cannot be said to coincide. 6. In the case of Badri Narain (supra), certain estate was subjected to Lakhraj and Mokarrari interest. It was jointly held by several persons. One of the several joint holders of Mokarrari interest purchased Lakhraj interest in the estate. The Supreme Court field, as above, that mere purchase by one of the several joint holders of Mokarrari interest of a portion of lease or break its integrity inasmuch as Mokarrari interest by purchaser did not merge, in his Lakhraj interest. It was observed by the Supreme Court that Visheshwar Dayal Singh, the purchaser on the basis of the sale deeds, became a joint owner in the entire Lakhraj holding and since he never came to own the entire Lakhraj interest in the estate or the entire Mokarrari interest therein, there was no coalescene of the interest of the lessor and the lessee in the whole of the estate. Which was subjected to Lakhraj and Mokarrari interest and that being so, the Mokarrari interest of Visheshwar Dayal Singh did not merge in his Lakhraj interest. It was accordingly held by the Supreme Court that doctrine of merger of interest as contemplated by Clause (d) of Section 111 of the Transfer of property Act, was not attracted. 7. Relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, a Division Bench of this Court held as under its Sarju Devi v. Prescribed Authority Kanpur 1976 AWC 752 . 7. Relying upon the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, a Division Bench of this Court held as under its Sarju Devi v. Prescribed Authority Kanpur 1976 AWC 752 . Even if it should be established that the tenant had acquired 1/4th share in the suit house, we do not think how the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority would become incompetent. So long as the tenancy is not extinguished by merger of interest of the landlord and that of the tenant in the entire demised premises, the tenant, does not by reason of his purchasing a share of the landlord's interest, ceases to be a tenant. 8. In view of the above decisions" of the Supreme Court and. this, Court, the view taken by the learned Addl. District Judge that the release application was not maintainable is not sustainable being patently incorrect and illegal besides amounting to refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law. It may be stated that in the aforesaid case of Sarju Devi (supra) the Division Bench of this Court held as an alternative proposition that even if it was established that tenant bad purchased 1/4th share in the suit house subsequent to the filing of release application and had become a co-owner, the proceedings before the Prescribed Authority would not come to an end inasmuch as the Prescribed Authority had the jurisdiction to make an order for eviction from a specified portion of the suit house by metes and bounds. The order parsed by the Prescribed Authority consigning the landlady's release application to the reaords was quashed by the High Court and it was directed to decide the same on merits. The learned Addl. District Judge Moradabad in the instant case seems to have examined the alternative proposition laid by the Division Bench in the above case of Sarju Devi (supra) and held that the shop whose width is about seven feet, cannot be partly released in favour of the landlord. It was further held by the learned Addl. District Judge that if the half specified portion of the shop is released in favour of the landlord, the shop in question will become useless both for landlord and the tenant, because no business can be transacted in a shop which is 3, 1/2 feet in width. Accordingly it was held that the above authority of this Court was of no avail to the Petitioner. Accordingly it was held that the above authority of this Court was of no avail to the Petitioner. 9. Having bestowed my anxious considerations, on the question involved in the instant case, I am of the opinion that the maintainability of the release application u/s 21(1)(a) remained unaffected even if the Respondent tenant acquired co-ownership right in the demised shop during the pendency of the application before the Prescribed Authority. The jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the Petitioner and the third Respondent still holds good. The application was also not liable to rejection, as held by the Appellate Authority, on the ground that it was not practicable to divide the shop and release half of it in favour of the Petitioner without in fact destroying the, utility of the demised premises as a shop. The application must succeed or fail on proof or otherwise of bonafide need and balance of hardship as contemplated by Section 21(1)(a) of the Act read with Rule 16 of the Rules. 10. It would not be out of place to point out that in a case like the one in hand it tray not be possible for the Petitioner to evict the Respondent no 3 and obtain possession of the disputed shop except on the basis of decree u/s 20(2) or on the basis of release order u/s 21 of the Act. A partition by metes and bounds of the demised shop 'would necessarily involve eviction of the tenant (Respondent No. 3) at least from that coition which may fall in the share of the Petitioner, but this may not be possible in view of the bar created by Section 20(1) of the Act. The institution of the suit at the behest of the Petitioner would be barred notwithstanding the determination of tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a nonce to quit or in any other manner. The institution of the suit at the behest of the Petitioner would be barred notwithstanding the determination of tenancy by efflux of time or on the expiration of a nonce to quit or in any other manner. Further the co-owner tenant may not at all give an occasion for a suit u/s 20(2) of the Act and even if he gives and the landlord Petitioner obtains possession of the demised shop, he may not be able to occupy the same in view of the prohibition imposed by Section 13 and if the view taken by the Appellate Authority is accepted, the co-owner tenant would enjoy the property in its entirety for ever howsoever may be the pressing and genuine need of the Petitioner at least for his share of the property. I am of the opinion that if the view taken by. the Appellate Authority is accepted it would lead to unjust result On the other hand, if the shop is released the bar would cease to be operative on expiration of 30 days from the date of the release order as provided in Section 21(6) of the Act and in that event the Respondent No. 3 shall have the right to claim partition by way of a suit being the Co-owner of the shop in question without there being any risk of deemed vacancy u/s 12 of the Act. This aspect of the matter too, ought to have been examined by the Appellate Authority. 11. Accordingly, in view of the above discussion, the petition succeeds and is allowed in part. The Appellate Authority's order dated 24-1-90 is quashed. The Appellate Authority shall decide the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the body of this judgment. 12. Parties to bear their respective costs.