MER RAMDE VEJANANDBHAI v. HARSHADBHAI PARBATBHAI — 1992 DIGILAW 122 (GUJ)

S. D. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) DOES the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 restrict/limit the power of the Claims Tribunal to condone the delay caused in filing application for compensation to a period of 12 months from the date of occurrence of accident ? Does the proviso exclude expressly or otherwise the application of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or principle underlying said Sec. 5 to an application for condonation of delay caused in filing the application for compensation ? These are the twin questions posed for consideration in these petitions under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 2 ) THESE two petitions under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India are directed against the judgment and order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, porbandar, dated 18/07/1991 passed in Motor Accident Claim Petition nos. 57 and 60 of 1991 respectively. By the said impugned judgment and order the Tribunal has rejected the applications of the petitioner in each case on the ground that such petition is filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and since it is filed beyond six months after expiry of prescribed period of six months, the Tribunal has no authority in law to condone the delay. In Special Civil Application No. 5806 of 1991 the accident in question took place on 8/02/1990 and the petitioner (original claimant) sustained injuries. The Motor Accident Claim Petition is filed on 1-4-1991. Since the petition for compensation was filed beyond prescribed period of limitation and the same was not numbered and application of condonation of delay was numbered as Miscellaneous Claim Petition No. 561 of 1991. ( 3 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5807 of 1991 the accident in question took place on 8-2-1990 and the Motor Accident Claim Petition came to be filed on 9-4-1991. Since the petition was filed beyond period of one year application for condonation of delay was registered as Miscellaneous Claim petition No. 560 of 1991. ( 3 ) IN Special Civil Application No. 5807 of 1991 the accident in question took place on 8-2-1990 and the Motor Accident Claim Petition came to be filed on 9-4-1991. Since the petition was filed beyond period of one year application for condonation of delay was registered as Miscellaneous Claim petition No. 560 of 1991. ( 4 ) IN view of the fact that any decision on the aforesaid question was likely to affect a large number of claimants, whose claim petitions were filed beyond the period of 12 months from the date of occurrence of the accident after coming into force of the new Act, and in view of the fact that the insurance Companies would like to contend that proviso to Sec. 166 (3) should be strictly construed so as to leave no scope for condonation of delay beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident, this Court invited the members of the Bar to address the Court at length on the effect of change in the language used in proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the New Act. ( 5 ) MR. C. D. Kakkad, Mr. T. S. Nanavaty, Mr. C. J. Vin and Mr. Mohit s. Shah have addressed the Court at length to contend that even after enactment of the New Act and despite enactment of proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 it should be held that the Claims Tribunal has power to condone delay beyond a period of six months by resort to Sec. 5 of Limitation Act because provisions of the Limitation Act are not expressly excluded by Motor Vehicles act, 1988. They have further submitted that Sec. 166 of the New Act is not a complete Code providing the entire procedure for making an application for condonation of delay. They have further submitted that there is no express prohibition enacted either under Sec. 166 or under any other provisions of the New Act prohibiting a Claims Tribunal from entertaining an application filed beyond the period of 12 months nor is there any provision which expressly excluded the application of the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 to the proceedings before a Claims Tribunal. The learned Counsels have referred to Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Section 29 (2) reads as under :"sec. 29 (2 ). The learned Counsels have referred to Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act. Section 29 (2) reads as under :"sec. 29 (2 ). Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the schedule, the provisions of Sec. 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sees. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. " ( 6 ) BY reference to the aforesaid provision, it is contended that the Motor vehicles Act, 1988 is a Special Law which prescribed a period of limitation for making an application for compensation. Such period is prescribed by Sec. 166 (3) and the period of limitation is six months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. It is the submission that the limitation prescribed by sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 is different from the limitation prescribed by the Limitation act, 1963. They submitted that under Fatal Accident Act, the prescribed period of limitation is two years under Art. 82 of the Limitation Act or for any other application for compensation for injury, the Residuary Art. 113 of the limitation Act would apply which prescribed a period of three years. Therefore, they submitted that the limitation prescribed by Sec. 166 (3) for making an application for compensation is different from the limitation prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act and, therefore, unless the provisions contained in Sees. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act are expressly excluded by the said law, the principle underlying the said provisions of sees. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply to an application for compensation filed before the Claims Tribunal. They further submitted that there is no exclusion of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the court could apply the provisions of Sees. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act would apply to an application for compensation filed before the Claims Tribunal. They further submitted that there is no exclusion of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, the court could apply the provisions of Sees. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act to a proceeding before the Claims Tribunal so as to empower a Claims Tribunal to condone delay caused in filing the application for compensation even beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. ( 7 ) ON the other hand, in response to the notice, Mr. Rajni H. Mehta, mr. P. F. Makwana, Mr. Darshan Parikh and Mr. R. P. Waghela have appeared on behalf of different Insurance Companies and they have submitted that the sec. 166 of the said Act is a complete Code and legislature has purposively taken away the uncontrolled and unlimited power to condone delay which was hitherto conferred on a Claims Tribunal under Sec. 110 (A) of the old act. Such deliberate purposive exercise undertaken by the legislature should not be rendered meaningless or otiose by reference to Sec. 29 (2) of the limitation Act so as to make applicable underlying principle of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act to a claim petition which is filed beyond the prescribed period of Limitation. In the alternative, they have submitted that by confining the power of Tribunal to condone delay upto a period of 12 months only from the date of the occurrence of the accident the legislature has expressly excluded applicability of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to a claim petition or the legislature has made applicable the provisions of Sec. 5 in its limited application for a period of 12 months only from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The provisions to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166, therefore, should be read as a provision expressly excluding the unlimited scope of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and, therefore, in their submission the Court should not once again extend the power of the Tribunal to condone delay beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the accident which is sought to be taken away deliberately and purposefully by the legislature. In their submission to accept the argument of the petitioners would amount to making the legislature exercise futile and meaningless and Court should accept that interpretation which would harmoniously construe the statute so as not to render the statute ineffective and inoperative. ( 8 ) MR. Rajni H. Mehta and Mr. C. J. Vin also referred to Maxwell on interpretation and pleaded that as per Golden Rule of construction when two interpretations of statute are permissible, narrow interpretation should be avoided and interpretation which is nearer to the objective sought to be achieved by the statute should be accepted. Mr. Rajni H. Mehta has also invited attention of this Court to various other statutes, an identical provision contained in such statutes where power to condone delay beyond a specified time is taken away from the Tribunal or quasi-judicial authority and by process of reasoning by analogy he has submitted that since the legislature has in the New Act specifically taken away the power of the Claims Tribunal to condone delay in making application for compensation beyond a period of 12 months of the occurrence of the accident, the Court should not rasort to any other provision so as to make the amendment made by the legislature ineffective or meaningless. ( 9 ) IN order to appreciate and properly answer the questions raised in these petitions, it will be necessary to refer to old Sec. 110a of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939 in juxtaposition with new provision in the Motor Vehicles act, 1988, viz. Sec. 166 in a tabular form : sec. 110a of the Old Act Application for Compensation : 1 (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 110 may be made - (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (aa) by the owner of the property; or (b) Whether death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all. (1) of Sec. 110 may be made - (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (aa) by the owner of the property; or (b) Whether death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (c) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all. or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be : provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every application under sub sec. (1) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed. Provided that where any claim for compensation under Sec. 92-A is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant. (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident; sec 166 of the New Act Application for Compensation : 2 (1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 165 may be made - (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) Whether death has resulted from the accident by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be : provided that where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and the legal representatives who have not so joined shall be impleaded as respondents to the application. (2) Every appplication under sub-sec, (i) shall be made to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, and shall be in such form and shall contain such particulars as may be prescribed: provided that where any claim for compensation, under Sec, 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant. (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident: 1 2 provided that the Claims Tribunal may Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is of the said period of six months but not satisfied that the applicant was prevented later than twelve months if it is satisfied by sufficient cause from making the that the applicant was prevented by application in time. sufficient cause from making the application in time. ( 10 ) THE fundamental change brought about by the Act of 1988 is to be noticed in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 as compared to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 110a. Under the old provision of Sec. 110a (3) no application for compensation shall be entertained unless it was made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The said provision is retained in subsec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the New Act. However, proviso to sub-sec. (3) to Sec. 166 is materially different from proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 110a. Under the old proviso to Sec. 110a (3)the Claims Tribunal was empowered to entertain the application for compensation after the expiry of the period of six months if it was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Having provided a substantive period of limitation of six months for making the application for compensation from the date of occurrence of the accident the legislature left very wide power to the Claims Tribunal to entertain even application filed beyond the period of six months provided the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. It was a very wide power to condone delay caused in filing application within the prescribed time. It was a very wide power to condone delay caused in filing application within the prescribed time. Such power to condone delay caused in filing application within the prescribed time. Such power to condone delay on establishment of sufficient cause which prevented the applicant from making an application for compensation was to be exercised by the Tribunal on application of well established principle of law for condonation of delay. The principles are analogus to those which are applied by the Court while condoning delay on sufficient cause being shown under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It was the exercise of the judicial discretion by application of factors relevant to condonation of delay under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act that the Claims Tribunal was expected to exercise the power of entertaining application for compensation which were preferred beyond the prescribed period of limitation. ( 11 ) HOWEVER, to the said position of law which was very much present before the Parliament when it enacted Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and more particularly Sec. 166 of the said Act, it enacted a different proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166. Under the new proviso, Claims Tribunal is empowered to entertain the application after the expiry of the prescribed period of six months on it being satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time subject to one further restriction or limitation and that limitation is introduced by the words but not later than 12 months. By introducing said words the Parliament has substantially limited the power of the Claims Tribunal to condone delay. A Claims Tribunal entertaining an application for compensation after Motor vehicles Act, 1988 has come into force shall have to act under amended proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 and by such proviso it can condone delay in making an application for compensation filed beyond the prescribed period of six months but upto a period of 12 months only. Therefore, it can in substance condone delay in preferring an application for compensation upto a period of 12 months only from the date of the occurrence of the accident. In other words, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to condone delay between the first day of seventh month and last day of 12th month. Therefore, it can in substance condone delay in preferring an application for compensation upto a period of 12 months only from the date of the occurrence of the accident. In other words, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to condone delay between the first day of seventh month and last day of 12th month. The duration of delay which could be condoned by the Tribunal in making an application for compensation is thus additional period of six months only. From the date of occurrence of the accident application for compensation shall have to be filed within six months and if there is delay in filing application for compensation, it cannot be entertained under any circumstances beyond 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. In order to bring out the desired curtailment on the power of condoning delay and in order to see that the Tribunal does not entertain the application for compensation filed beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident the legislature has used negative phraseology by using following words "but not later than 12 months". The Parliament has before it the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 110a, the Parliament has not thought it fit to retain very proviso by enacting Sec. 166 (3 ). The substantive provision prescribing limitation is retained by enacting sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 which is identical to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 110a of the old Act. The Parliament has, however, deliberately amended the proviso and as against very wide power to condone delay in making an application for compensation which was hitherto conferred on Claims Tribunal under unamended proviso to Sec. 110a (3), the parliament has now by purposefully amending proviso, substantially restricted the said power of Claims Tribunal to condone delay only upto a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. Beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. Claims tribunal shall have no power to condone delay. Beyond 12 months from the date of the occurence of the accident, Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to condone delay. The proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 thus curtails hitherto wide power of condonition of delay beyond a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. Beyond 12 months from the date of the occurence of the accident, Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to condone delay. The proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 thus curtails hitherto wide power of condonition of delay beyond a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. ( 12 ) VERY recently in the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance co. Ltd. , reported in 1991 (4) SCC 333 , the Supreme Court as called upon to dacide the effect of proviso to Sec. 166 (3) on the power of the Claims Tribunal. Before the Supreme Court, the appellant was injured in a road accident which took place on 22/01/1989. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was repealed by Sec. 217 (1) of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The New Act came into force on 1/07/1989. Thus the accident took place on a date on which the Old Act, the motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was in force. However, when the petition for compensation came to be filed, the New Act had come into force. The claim petition was filed on 15/03/1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay. The period of limitation for filing the claim petition both under the Old Act and the New Act was six months. The said period, therefore, expired on 22/07/1989 and by that time on 1/07/1989 the New act came into force. Therefore, on the date on which the petition was filed, it was the New Act which was in force. The question before the court was as to which provision would apply to such claim petition and secondly as to whether it was competent for the Claims Tribunal to condone delay caused in filing the application for compensation. While examining the aforesaid questions, the Supreme Court noticed that the period of limitation for filing the claim petition both under the Old Act and the new Act is six months from the date of accident. The difference in the two Acts is in regard to the provisions relating to the condonation of delay. In view of proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the New Act, the maximum period of delay which can be condoned by a Claims Tribunal is six months. The difference in the two Acts is in regard to the provisions relating to the condonation of delay. In view of proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the New Act, the maximum period of delay which can be condoned by a Claims Tribunal is six months. Therefore, if the New Act was held to be applicable the petition for compensation preferred by the claimant in March, 1990 was one which was required to be dismissed because the Claims Tribunal had no power or authority to condone delay beyond the period of six months. However, under the Old Act no restriction was placed on the power of the Tribunal to condone delay and under proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 110a unconfined and unlimited power was given to a Claims Tribunal to condone delay on sufficient cause being shown. While negativing the contention that the Old Act would apply since the accident has occurred on 22/01/1989, date on which the Old Act was applicable, the supreme Court held that the appellant before it has not been deprived of an accrued right or privilege to claim the compensation which the claimant was entitled to, by reason of the accident and it was certainly enforceable as a right. The Court thereafter observed as under :"so far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act subject to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceedings so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy. "after undertaking an exhaustive analysis of various decisions dealing with period of limitation and curtailment thereof by a subsequent statute, the Court held as under :"there is a vital difference between an application claiming compensation and a prayer to condone the delay in filing such an application. Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege. Liberty to apply for a right is not in itself an accrued right or privilege. " ( 13 ) THE Court found that in the case before it, the period of limitation for condoning the delay under the Old Act as well as the New Act was of six months which expired three weeks after coming into force of the new Act. It was therefore, open to the claimant to file his claim within the said period or even latest by 22/07/1989 with a prayer to condone delay. The right of the claimant to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act for another. Since the period of limitation remaining the same, there was no question of the claimant being taken by surprise. So far as the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change on the position under the New act. The Court found that the proceedings were actually initiated when the old Act covered the filed. A claimant could say that his right being accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away. However, in the case on hand, the Court found that the right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expection of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its effect. The Court, therefore, ruled that benefit of the repealed law could not be available to the appellant because the question for the first time arose only after the repeal of the old law and therefore benefit of the repealed law was not available. The Court, therefore, ruled that the question of condonation of delay must be governed by the new law and since the application for condonation of delay was filed beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident, such delay could not be condoned. The Court thus virtually accepted the effect of the new proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166. The Court also accepted that under the New Act there is no power in the Claims Tribunal to condone delay for the period beyond 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The Court thus virtually accepted the effect of the new proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166. The Court also accepted that under the New Act there is no power in the Claims Tribunal to condone delay for the period beyond 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. ( 14 ) IN view of clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the amended proviso, there was very little scope to contend that the Claims Tribunal acting under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 can still condone delay caused in filing the application for compensation beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident as it used to do under the Old Act. ( 15 ) EFFECT of Sec. 29 (2) : The provision of Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation act, 1963 are set out hereinabove. The said section embodied the general principle initiated in the wellknown Maxim - generalia specialibus nonderogant. The said Maxim means that general words do not derogate from the special. From the language of Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, it becomes clear that in order that Sec. 29 (2) may apply firstly a period of limitation has to be prescribed for any suit, appeal or application under a special or local law and secondly the said period of limitation must be different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act. It is only if both these conditions are satisfied that the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Limitation Act will apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the said Schedule. It is only then that for the purpose of determining the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the special or local law, the provisions of Sees. 4 to 24 (inclusive) will be made applicable insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. ( 16 ) IN Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh, reported in AIR 1964 SC 260 while dealing with sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court found that in enacting sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29, the intention of the legislature was not to enlarge the scope of any provision of the Limitation Act which has been made applicable by virtue of that subsection. (2) of Sec. 29 of the Limitation Act, the Supreme Court found that in enacting sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 29, the intention of the legislature was not to enlarge the scope of any provision of the Limitation Act which has been made applicable by virtue of that subsection. This sub-section is supplemental in its character insofar as it provides in the application of Sec. 3 to such cases as would not come within its purview for this provision. For the purposes of determining any period of limitation prescribed by any special or local law, it is made provision of the Limitation Act, viz; Sees. 4 to 24 (inclusive) applicable to such cases to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. However, the decision of the Supreme Court in Kaushalya runis case (supra) was considered once again in the case of Manguram v. Delhi municipality, reported in AIR 1976 SC 105 , the Supreme Court held that the ratio of the decision in Kaushalya Ranis case (supra) can : "have no application in cases governed by the Limitation Act, 1963, since that decision proceeded on the hypothesis that the applicability of Sec. 5 was excluded by reason of Sec. 29 (2) (. b) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908. Since under the Limitation act, 1963, Sec. 5 is specifically made applicable by Sec. 29, sub-sec. (2), it can be availed of for the purpose of extending the period of limitation prescribed by a special or local law if the applicant can show that he had sufficient cause for not presenting the application within the period of limitation. It is only if the special or local law expressly excludes the applicability of Sec. 5, that it would stand displaced. Here, as pointed out by this Court in Kaushalya Ranis case, AIR 1964 SC 260 : (J 964 (1) Cr. LJ 152} the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of Sec. 5. It is true that the language of sub-sec. LJ 152} the time limit of sixty days laid down in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 417 is a special law of limitation and we do not find anything in this special law which expressly excludes the applicability of Sec. 5. It is true that the language of sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 417 is a mandatory and compulsive, in that it provides in no uncertain terms that no application for grant of special leave from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High court after the expiry of sixty days from the date of that order of acquittal. But that would be the language of every provision prescribing a period of limitation. It is because a bar against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation is created by a special or local law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of See. 5 in order that the application may be emertained despite such bar. Mere provision of a period of limitation in howsoever peremptory or imperative language is not sufficient to displace the applicability of Sec. 5. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistable that in a case where an application for special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is filed after the coming into force of the Limitation Act, 1963, Sec. 5 would be available to the applicant and if he can show that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the application within the time limit of sixty days prescribed in sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 417, the application would not be barred and despite the expiration of the time limit of sixty days, the High Court would have the power to entertain it. " ( 17 ) APPLYING the aforesaid ratio it shall have to be stated that Sec. 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is a special law which prescribes a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of the accident as a period within which petition for compensation is to be filed before a Claims Tribunal. This special law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The question, however, is as to whether Sees. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to such claim petition filed under Sec. 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This special law prescribes a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. The question, however, is as to whether Sees. 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the limitation Act, 1963 shall apply to such claim petition filed under Sec. 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. To be precise the question is as to whether sec. 5 of the Limitation Aci, 1963 snail apply to a Claims Tribunal acting under Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The immediate question which shall have to be met by this Court is as to whether Sec. 5 of the limitation Act, 1963 is expressly excluded by such special law, viz. Motor vehicles Act, 1988. It shall have to be stated that Sec. 166 (3) prescribes a period of limitation within which an application for compensation can be filed before a Claims Tribunal being a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. This provision of special law like any other provision prescribing a period of limitation in no uncertain tarms provide that no application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The said provision creates a bar or prohibits against entertainment of an application beyond the period of limitation. However, it is because of this bar or prohibition created by special law that it becomes necessary to invoke the aid of Sec. 5 of the limitation Act, 1963. The question is as to whether the epplicabiliiy of Sec. 5 is in any way displaced or is in any way restricted. Proviso to Sec. 166 (3) restricts the power of the Claims Tribunal to entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than 12 months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. Section 5 of the Limitation Act enables the court to hear any appeal or application after the prescribed period of limitation if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making an application within the said period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act enables the court to hear any appeal or application after the prescribed period of limitation if the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making an application within the said period. More or less identical phraseology is employed by the legislature while enacting proviso to Sec. 166 (3) and the Claims Tribunal is empowered to entertain a claim petition which is filed beyond the prescribed period of six months but not later than 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident if it is shown by the applicant that he was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. It is thus clear that underlying spirit of Sec. 5 in its limited application for a period of 12 months only from the date of the occurrence of the accident is made applicable by the legislature to a claim petition. Thus, in my opinion, not only Sec. 5 is expressly excluded by special law, i. e. . Sec. 166 (3) proviso to Motor Vehicles Act. 1988 but by the said provision Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has its limited application as contemplated by proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166. The power to condone delay when sufficient cause is shown in not making an application for compensation within the prescribed period of limitation is conferred to the Claims Tribunal, but such power is not unlimited power which a Claims Tribunal hitherto possessed prior to coming into force of the New Act, but it is a limited power of condonation of delay between six months to 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident provided sufficient cause is shown by the applicant which prevented himfrom making an application for compensation. ( 18 ) IT will not be out of place to mention that the expression "the provision contained in Sees. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special law or local law" used in Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 did come up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in the case of Manguram reported in AIR 1976 SC 105 . 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special law or local law" used in Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 did come up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in the case of Manguram reported in AIR 1976 SC 105 . In the said decision the Supreme Court took the view that the expression "expressly excluded" would mean exclusion by express words, i. e. , by express reference to the section of the Limitation Act and not exclusion as a result of logical process of reasoning. Justice J. M. Panchal of this Court while following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manguram (supra) taken the same view in the case of Gunvantlal Manekchand v. M/s. Atulkumar and Co. , reported in 1991 (2) GLR 1000 and has held that unless there is an express exclusion of any of the provisions of Sees. 4 to 24 of the Limitation act by special reference to the said provision in the special or local law, the said provision of the Limitation Act would apply by virtue of Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. ( 19 ) IN the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra, reported in AIR 1974 SC 480 Supreme Court was called upon to decide the question as to whether provision of the Limitation Act more particularly Sees. 4 and 5 of the limitation Act would apply to an Election Petition filed under Representation of the People Act, 1951. Answer to the said question obviously depended upon Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act and more particularly as. to what meaning the Court would give to the expression expressly excluded by such special or local law. In that connection, the Supreme Court obseived as under :"it is contended, before us that the words expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. In that connection, the Supreme Court obseived as under :"it is contended, before us that the words expressly excluded" would mean that there must be an express reference made in the special or local law to the specific provisions of the Limitation Act of which the operation is to be excluded. As usual the meaning given in the dictionary has been relied upon, but what we have to see is whether the scheme of the special law, that is, in this case, the Act, and the nature of the remedy provided therein are such that the legislature intended it to be a complete code by itself which alone should govern the several matters provided by it. If on an examination of the relevant provisions it is clear that the provisions of the Limitation Act are necessarily excluded then the benefits conferred therein cannot be called in aid to supplement the provisions of the Act. In our view, even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provision of Sees. 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude thsir operation. " (Emphasis supplied) the Court further observed as under :"it was sought to be contended that only those provisions of the Limitation Act which are applicable to the nature of the proceedings under the Act, unless expressly excluded, would be attracted. But this is not what Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation act says, because it provides that Sees. 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. If none of them are excluded, all of them would become applicable. Whether those sections are applicable is not determined the terms of those sections, but by their applicability to inapplicability of the proceedings under the special or local law. A person who is a minor or is insane or is an idiot cannot file an election petition to challenge an election, nor is there any provision in the Act for legal representation of an election petitioner or respondent in that petition who dies, in order to make Sec. 16 of the Limitation Act applicable. A person who is a minor or is insane or is an idiot cannot file an election petition to challenge an election, nor is there any provision in the Act for legal representation of an election petitioner or respondent in that petition who dies, in order to make Sec. 16 of the Limitation Act applicable. The applicability of these provisions has, therefore, to be judged not from the terms of the Limitation Act but by the provisions of the Act relating to the filing of election petitions and their trial to ascertain whether it is a complete Code in itself which does not admit of the application of the provisions of the Limitation act mentioned in Sec. 29 (2) of the Act. "from the aforesaid observation it becomes clear that if the scheme of special law, i. e. . Sec. 166 (3) of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the nature of the remedy provided therein viz. proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 amount to a complete code in itself, it alone is intended to apply which the legislature provided in the special law by enacting new proviso to Sec. 166 (3) and hence the provision of the Limitation Act must be held to be necessarily excluded. I am of the opinion by proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 negative phraseology is employed by the legislature by use of the words but not later than 12 months which leaves no room for doubt that the legislature intended the Claims Tribunal to entertain an application for condonation of delay only upto 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The legislature intended principle of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act to apply, but it wanted to restrict such application of Sec. 5 to a period of 12 months only from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The legislature, therefore, wanted to exclude applicability of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act beyond the period of 12 months from the date of occurrence of the accident. Therefore, in my opinion, the provision of Sec. 166 and more particularly proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 now no longer permits a Claims Tribunal to entertain a petition for compensation beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. Therefore, in my opinion, the provision of Sec. 166 and more particularly proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 now no longer permits a Claims Tribunal to entertain a petition for compensation beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. There is exclusion of the provision of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and I am fully fortified in my conclusion by the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. ( 20 ) WHILE dealing with closely identical provision to the proviso to Sec. 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-member Bench of the Supreme court of India in the case of the Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Mis. Parson tools and Plants, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1039 has taken the view which fully fortifies the conclusions reached by me. In the aforesaid case. Sec. 10 of U. P. Sales Tax Act prescribed a period of limitation within which revision can be filed. Section 10 (3) reads as under :" (3-B) The application under sub-sec. (3) shall be made within one year from the date of service of the order complained of, but the Revising Authority may on proof of sufficient cause entertain an application within a further period six months. "under sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 10 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 revision petition before the Revising Authority would have been filed but the same were filed more than 18 months afcer the dismissal of the appeals. The revisions were thus time barred. The revisions were accompanied by two applications in which the assessee prayed for exclusion of time spent by him in prosecuting the application, proceedings under Rule 68 (6) for setting aside the dismissal of his appeal, the Revising Authority excluded the said time spent in those proceedings by applying Sec. 14 of the Limitation Act. However, on the motion of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, two references were made to the High Court and the question was as to whether time spent in prosecuting the application for setting aside the order of dismissal of appeals in default can be excluded for computing the period of limitation in filing the revision by applying the principle underlying Sec. 14 (2) of the Limitation Act. The high Court of Allahabad answered the question in affirmative. The high Court of Allahabad answered the question in affirmative. In appeal the supreme Court found that three features of the scheme of Sec. 10 of U. P. Sales Tax Act were noteworthy. The first was that no limitation was prescribed for the suo motu exercise of its jurisdiction by the Revising Authority. The second was the period of one year was prescribed as limitation for filing an application for revision by the aggrieved party and that was usually long period. The third was that the revising authority has no discretion to extend that period beyond a further period of six months even on sufficient cause shown. The revising authority could have at the most on sufficient cause being shown extended the period for filing revision application for a further period of six months only. The Court, thereafter observed as under :"the three stark features of the scheme and language of the above provision, unmistakably show that the legislature has deliberately excluded the application of the principles underlying Sees. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, except to the extent and in the truncated form embodied in sub-sec. (3-B) of Sec. 10 of the sales Tax Act. Delay in disposal of revenue matters adversely affect the steady inflow of revenues and the financial stability of the State. Section 10 is therefore designed to ensure speedy and final determination of fiscal matters within a reasonably certain time scheduled. It cannot be said that by excluding the unrestricted application of the principle of Sees. 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act, the Legislature has made the provisions of Sec. 10, unduly oppressive. In most cases, the discretion to extend limitation, on sufficient cause being shown for a further period of six months only given by sub-sub-sec (3-B) would be enough to afford relief. "the observations made by the Supreme Court in paras 11, 12, 17 and 18 of the said report are more pertinent to be reproduced insofar as they are relevant in appreciating the ratio decidendi of the said case :"11. Be that as it may, from the scheme and language of Sec. 10, the intention of the legislature to exclude the unrestricted application of the principles of Sees. 5 and 10 of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear. Be that as it may, from the scheme and language of Sec. 10, the intention of the legislature to exclude the unrestricted application of the principles of Sees. 5 and 10 of the Limitation Act is manifestly clear. These provisions of the Limitation act which the legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the sales Tax Act, cannot be imported into it by analogy. An enactment being the will of the legislature, the paramount rule of interpretation, which overrides all others, is that a statute is to be expounded "according to the intent of them that made it". "the will of the legislature is the Supreme Law of the land, and demands perfect obedience" * "judicial power is never exercised", said Marshall, C. J. of the United states, "for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judges; always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature, or in other words, to the will of the law" (*see Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, llth Edn. , pp. 1, 2 and 251 ). "12. If the legislature wilfully omits to incorporate something of an analogous law in a subsequent statute, or even if there is a casus omissus in a statute, the language of which is otherwise plain and unambiguous, the Court is not competent to supply the omission by engrafting on it or introducing in it, under the guise of interpretation by analogy of implication, something what it thinks to be a general principle of justice and equality. "to do so" (at p 65 in Prem Nath L. Ganesh v. Prem naih L. Ramnath) "would be entrenching upon the preserves of legislature",the primary function of a Court of law being /us dicere and not jus dare. 11"17. Thus the principle that emerges is that if the legislature in a special statute prescribes a certain period of limitation for filing a particular application thereunder and provides in clear terms that such period on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only upto a specified time-limit and no further, then the Tribunal concerned has no jurisdiction to treat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time-limit specified in the statute, by excluding the time spent in prosecuting in good faith and due diligence any prior proceeding on the analogy of See. l4 (2) of the Limitation Act. l4 (2) of the Limitation Act. ""18. We have said enough and we may say it again that where the legislature clearly declares its intent in the scheme and language of a statute, it is the duty of the Court to give full effect to the same without scanning its wisdom or policy, and without engrafting, adding or implying anything which is not congenial to or consistent with such expressed intent of the law-giver, more so if the statue is a taxing statute. " . ( 21 ) FROM the aforesaid very emphatic observations of the Supreme Court it becomes abundantly clear that while drafting Sec. 166 (3) and more particularly its proviso the legislature, in my opinion, intented to exclude the unrestricted application of the principles of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. These provisions of Limitation Act which the legislature did not, after due application of mind, incorporate in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be imported into by analogy. Section 166 (3) is a special law prescribing a period of six months from the date of the occurrence of accident as a period of limitation for filing the claim petition before a Claims Tribunal. The proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 in no unclear terms provides that such period of six months, on sufficient cause being shown, may be extended, in the maximum, only upto a period of 12 months and no further, from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to teat within limitation, an application filed before it beyond such maximum time limit of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. ( 22 ) ONCE again, while dealing with another analogous provision contained in Sec. 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in the case of Mohammad ashfaq v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, reported in AIR 1976 SC 2161 , two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court speaking through P. N. Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) considered the effect of Sec 29 (2) and Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The main question posed for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the time-limit prescribed by the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 58 apply in case of an application for renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-sec. (ID) of Sec. 68f. The proviso to subsec. The main question posed for consideration before the Supreme Court was as to whether the time-limit prescribed by the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 58 apply in case of an application for renewal of a permit under the proviso to sub-sec. (ID) of Sec. 68f. The proviso to subsec. (2) required that an application for renewal of a permit should be made not less than 120 days from the date of expiry of the permit. However, sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 58 vested a discretion in the Regional Transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal of a permit even if it is beyond the time but in that case the delays should not be of more than 15 days. The word used in sub-sec. (3) of Sea. 58 was may and not shall. The Regional Transport Authority was thus given a discretion to entertain an application for renewal of a permit even where it was beyond the time, though not more than 15 days. It can thus condone delay depending on the circumstances of each case and can condone delay for a period of 15 days only. It was contended before the Supreme court that by virtue of Sec. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provision of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act would become applicable in the case of an application for renewal of a permit. In this context Honourable Justice P. N. Bhagwati of the Supreme Court made following most pertinent obseivations :"it is, therefore, clear that sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 58 confers a discretion on the Regional transport Authority to entertain an application for renewal when it is made beyond the time limit specified in the proviso to sub-sec. (2), but not more than 15 days late and the discretion is to be exercised in favour of entertaining the application for renewal when it is shown that there was sufficient cause for not making it in time. Now the question which arises is : Does Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply so as to empower the Regional Transport Authority, for sufficient cause to enertain an application for renewal even where it is delayed by more than 15 days ? Section 29, sub-sec. Now the question which arises is : Does Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply so as to empower the Regional Transport Authority, for sufficient cause to enertain an application for renewal even where it is delayed by more than 15 days ? Section 29, sub-sec. (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes Sec. 5 applicable in the case of an application for renewal unless its applicability can be said to ve expressly excluded by any provision of the Act. The only provision for the Act sught to be pressed into service for the purpose was sub-sec. (3 ). Does sub-sec. (3) expressly exclude further extension of time under Sec. 5 ? If it does, then Sec. 5 cannot be availed of by the appellant for condonation of the delay. Sub-sec. (3) in so many terms says that the regional Transport Authority may condone the de,ay in making of an application for renewal and entertain it on merits provided the delay is of nor more than 15 days. This clearly means that if the application for renewal is beyond time by more than 15 days, the Regional Transport Authority shall not be entitled to entertain it, or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delaty. There is thus, an express provision in sub-sec. (3) that delay in making an application for renewal shall be condonable only if it is not more than 15 days and that expressly excludes the applicability of Sec. 5 in cases where an application for renewal is delayed by more than 15 days. This provsion may Seem harsh, but it has been deliberately and advisedly made because the question of renewal of a permits must obviously be decided before the expiration of the period of the permit and in view of the elaborate procedure set out in Sec. 57 for dealing with an application for renewal, a certain minimum period before the expiration of the period of the permit must be provided which this procedure can be completed so that the renewal can, if at all, granted well in time before the permit expires. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 23 ) FROM the aforesaid observation, it becomes clear that Sec. 5 of the limitation Act cannot be availed of by the petitioners for condonation of the delay. Proviso to sub-sec. " (Emphasis supplied) ( 23 ) FROM the aforesaid observation, it becomes clear that Sec. 5 of the limitation Act cannot be availed of by the petitioners for condonation of the delay. Proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles act, 1988 in so many terms says that the Claims Tribunals may entertain the application after the expiry of the prescribed period of six months but not later than 12 months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. This would clearly mean that if the application for compensation is filed beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident, the Claims Tribunal shall have no power to entertain it, or in other words, it shall have no power to codone delay. There is thus express provision in proviso to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 166 that delay in making an application for compensation shall be condonable not later than 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident and that expressly excludes the applicability of Sec. 5 of Limitation act in cases where an application for compensation is delayed by more than 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The submission that such a provision is harsh or may adversely affect large number of claimants cannot find favour with the Court. It shall have to be noted that the legislature has by enacting new legislation, i. e. , the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and while retaining provision analogous the Sec. 110a of the Motor Vehicles act, 1939 by enacting Sec. 166 and also while retaining the period of limitation for filing an application for compensation has deliberately and purposively enacted proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 so as to limit the powers of a Claims Tribunal to condone delay only upto a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. The aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court thus fully supports my conclusion. ( 24 ) IT will not be out of place to mention that in Sec. 20 of the Coal mines (Nationalization) Act, 1973, Sec. 23 of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972, in Sec. 16 (3) of Plantation Labour Act, 1981, sec. 10f of Companies Act, 1956, Sec. 7 (7) of Payment of Gratuity Act, sec. ( 24 ) IT will not be out of place to mention that in Sec. 20 of the Coal mines (Nationalization) Act, 1973, Sec. 23 of the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalization) Act, 1972, in Sec. 16 (3) of Plantation Labour Act, 1981, sec. 10f of Companies Act, 1956, Sec. 7 (7) of Payment of Gratuity Act, sec. 35 of Central Excise Act, 1944, Sec. 6 (7) of qua Remuneration act, 1976 and in Sec. 5 (C) of Cinematograph Act, 1952 provision identical to or analogous to Sec. 166 (3) proviso of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are enacted. By reference to the said provisions and various decisions dealing with such provisions it was contended by the Counsels appeared for the insurance Companies that Sec. 166 (3) proviso enacts a complete Code for making an application for compensation by enacting proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Ssc. 166, the Legislature has made its intention manifest that beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident there will be no power in the Tribunal to condone delay. ( 25 ) MR. Mohit Shah has strenuously urged before me that Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is not a self-contained Code of limitation nor does it expressly exclude the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation act to a petition for compensation filed before a Claim Tribunal. He further submits that Sec. 166 of the Act finds it place in Chapter XII. The caption of the said Chapter is "claims Tribunal". He submits that unlike sec. 144 which finds its place in Chapter X, the Legislature has not given any overriding effect to the provisions of Sec. 166. He submits that when the Legislature wanted to give overriding effect, it has by Sec. 144 of the Act enacted that the provisions of Chapter X shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of the said Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Such a povision giving overriding effect to Chapter xii or any of its provisions is not to be found in Chapter XII of the said Act. He, therefore, submits that Legislature never wanted to restrict the power of Claims Tribunal to condone delay caused in filing petition for compensation. Such a povision giving overriding effect to Chapter xii or any of its provisions is not to be found in Chapter XII of the said Act. He, therefore, submits that Legislature never wanted to restrict the power of Claims Tribunal to condone delay caused in filing petition for compensation. In my opinion, the argument is misconceived and shall have to be rejected on the ground that Chapter X of the said Act deals with liability without fault in certain cases. Ordinarily, liability to pay compensation is at common law based on negligence. Since the Legislature wanted to give effect to the observation of Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. Ramanabhai Prahlanbhai, AIR 1987 SC 1690 : [1987 (2) GLR 1104 (SC)], to the effect that in view of vast increased volume of traffic, the motor vehicles upon the roads may be regarded to some extent as coming within the principle of hiability defined in Raylands v. Fletcher as roads of the country from the pedestnars point of view have been rendered highly dengerous. In order to meet to some extent the responsibility of the society to the death and injuries caused in road accidents, there has been a continuous agitation throughout the world to make the liability for damages arising out of motor vehicles as a liability without fauit. In order to meet the above social demand on the recommendation of the Indian Law Commission, this Chapter X was introduced in the New act. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner of the motor vehicles in order to make the said provision more efftctive, Sec. 144 is enacted. In my opinion, the said provision cannot be pressed into service to construe the Chapter which deals with the Claims tribunal. The very purpose of Chapter XII of the said Act is to prescribe the machinery of making an application for compensation before the Claims tribunal and the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal. Chapter xii of the said Act contains a self-contained Code and more particularly sec. 166 deals exhaustively with filing of an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal and jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to deal with such application for compensation. Chapter xii of the said Act contains a self-contained Code and more particularly sec. 166 deals exhaustively with filing of an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal and jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal to deal with such application for compensation. It is to be noted that period of limitation for filing an application for compensation which was prescribed by Sec. 110a (3) has retained by Sec. 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. However, proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 110a of the Act of 1939 is substantially amended by substitution of a new proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of Motor vehicles Act, 1988. By enacting the new proviso, the unrestricted power to condone delay which was given to the Claims Tribunal by the provision of the Old Act is substantially curtailed and it is now restricted to a period not beyond 12 months from the date of the occrurence of the accident. Such a provision, as inteipretcd by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases has the effect of expressly and/or by necessary implication excluding the applicability of Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. I am not called upon to decide in this case as to whether other provisions of the Limitation Act are excluded. However, exclusion of Sec. 5 of the Limitation act beyond the period of delay of six months, in my opinion, is very specific and express and, therefore, I do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. Mohit S. Shah. ( 26 ) MR. C. J. Vin and Mr. Mohit Shah have also referred to sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 166. The said provision reads as under :"166 (4) Where a Police Officer has filed a copy of the report regarding an accident to a Claims Tribunal under this Act, the Claims Tribunal may, if it thinks necessary so to do, treat the report as if it were an application for compensation under this act. "by the said sub-section, a Claims Tribunal is empowered in its suo motu jurisdiction to treat a report from the Police Officer regaiding an accident as an application for compensation. Such a piovision was not there in Sec. 110a. By enacting such a piuvision, the legislature has permitted a Claims tribunal to treat the repoit received hem the Police as an application for compensation. Such a piovision was not there in Sec. 110a. By enacting such a piuvision, the legislature has permitted a Claims tribunal to treat the repoit received hem the Police as an application for compensation. For filing such a report before a Claims Tribunal no time limit is prescribed under the provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. As and when the repoit is made by the Police about the occurrence of a Motor Accident, a Claims Tribunal is empowered to treat such a report as an application for compensation. Based on this provision, they submitted that a person who has failed to file an application for compensation within the prescribed period of hmnation may get the report filed through Police before the Claims Tribunal and the Claims Tribunal may thereupon treat the said upon an application for compensation and such a party may thereby avoid the prescribed period of limitation and may get his application for compensation entertained. It is further submitted that something that cannot be done directly can thus be got done indirectly by getting the report of Police submitted to the Claims Tribunal. It is undoubtedly true that power given to the Claims Tribunal to sub-sec. (4) of Sec. 166 is very widely weided and the report received from the Police can be entertained by the Claims Tribunal as an application for compensation. However, I am of the opinion that the provision of Sec. 166 (4) does not militate against the interpretation which I have given to Sec. 166 (3) and its proviso. Section 166 (4) is merely enabling provision. It simply enables the tribunal to treat the report of the Police as an application for conpensation. In harsh cases when there is no one to make application for compensation and where the victim of the accident has either died or has received serious injuries and when no one has made an application for compensation, the Tribunal is enabled to treat the report of the Police as an application for compensation. This, however, does not in any way militate against the interpretation of Sec. 166 (3) and its proviso given by me hereinabove. I, therefore, do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. C. J. Vin. ( 27 ) NO other submissions were made. This, however, does not in any way militate against the interpretation of Sec. 166 (3) and its proviso given by me hereinabove. I, therefore, do not find any substance in this submission of Mr. C. J. Vin. ( 27 ) NO other submissions were made. ( 28 ) FROM the aforesaid discussion the following clear principles emerge: (1) Section 166 (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 prescribes the same period of limitation for making an application for compensation to claims Tribunal which was prescribed by Sec. 110a of the Motor vehicles Act, 1939. (2) The proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 restricts the power of the Claims Tribunal to condone delay inmaking application for compensation on sufficient CAUSE BEING SHOWN TO a period not above 12 months from the date of the OCCURRENCE OF the ACCIDENT. IN OTHER Words, a Claims Tribunal can condone delay in making an application for compensation upto a period o f 12 months only from the date of the occurrence of accident. This is quite in contrast to the power given by the proviso to Sec. 110a (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 which did not in any way restrict thepower of the Claims Tribunal to condone delay in making an applicationfor compensation on sufficient cause being shown. (3) The legislature while enacting the New Act, i. e. , the Motor Vehicles act, 1988 has deliberately and purposively introduced a new proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 while otherwise retaining the substantive provision by enacting Sec. 166 (1), (2) and (3) which are verbatim the same as Sec. 110a (1), (2) and (3 ). (4) Consistent with the principle enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Parson Tools and Plants (supra) it shall have to be held that the provision of Sec. 166 (3) and its proviso unmistakably show that the legislature has deliberately excluded the application of the principle underlying Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 except to the extent of its operation for a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. (5) Since the legislature has wilfully committed to incorporate the provision identical to Sec. 110a (3) proviso of the Act 1939 and since the legislature has instead enacted the proviso to sub-sec. (5) Since the legislature has wilfully committed to incorporate the provision identical to Sec. 110a (3) proviso of the Act 1939 and since the legislature has instead enacted the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 which is plain and unambiguous, it is not open to the Court to supply the omission by engrafting in it or introducing in it, under the guise of introduction by analogy or implication, something what the Court thinks to be a general principle of justice and equity. (6) Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 makes Sec. 5 of the said act applicable in the case of an application for compensation filed before a Claims Tribunal to a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident. Proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 in so many terms provided that of a Claims tribunal can entertain an application for compensation not above the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident provided sufficient cause is shown. This clearly means that if an application for compensation is filed beyond a period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident, the Claims Tribunal shall not be entitled to entertain it, or in other words, it shall have no power to condone the delay. There is thus an express provision in proviso to sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 166 that delay in making an application for compensation shall be condonable only if it is not beyond 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident and that provision expressly excludes the applicability of Sec. 5 in cases where an application for compensation is delayed by more than 12 months from the date of the occurrence of the accident [see Supreme Court decision in Mohammad Ashfaq (supra)]. (7) Though not expressly by necessary implication, the Supreme Court of India has in its recent decision in the case of Vinod Gurudas Raikar (supra) supported the view that the Claims Tribunal acting under the act of 1988 has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond the period of 12 months from the date of the occurrence of accident and such an application for compensation is liable to be dismissed. ( 29 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, the petitions are bound to fail and the same are, therefore, dismissed. ( 29 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussion, the petitions are bound to fail and the same are, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged in both the petitions. There shall be no order as to costs. .