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1992 DIGILAW 1224 (ALL)

Tajwar jahan v. Munsif North, Lucknow

1992-09-11

S.C.MATHUR

body1992
JUDGMENT S. C. Mathur, J. - The petitioners have approached this Court for quashing the entire proceedings in suit no. 79 of 1991, Laeeq Ahmad v. Smt. Tajwar Jahan and another pending in the Court of Munsif North, Lucknow. The petition has arisen in the circumstance hereinafter indicated. 2. The dispute in the petition pertains to House No. 238/23 Katra Abu Turab Khan, Police Station Chowk, Lucknow. Admittedly petitioner no. 1, Smt. Tajwar Jahan, is the owner of the said House Petitioner No. 2, Mohammad Ali is her husband. Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui was the tenant of the said House. Petitioner No. 1 filed application under section 21 of the U. P. Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (13 of 1972) for short'Act', seeking eviction of Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui. This application was registered as Prescribed Authority Case No. 164 of 1985. The application was allowed by order dated 27th July 1990. Apart from filing application under section 21 petitioner no. 1 also filed suit no. 25 of 1988 in the Court of Judge Small Causes for eviction of Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui from the house in question and for recovery of arrears of rent. This suit was decreed by the trial court on 8th March 1989 for recovery of arrears only. The decree for ejectment was refused only on the ground that Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui was no longer in occupation of the house in question. Against this judgment petitioner no. 1 preferred revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act complaining against rejection of her claim for eviction of Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui. The revision was allowed by judgment and order dated 13121990. When petitioner no. 1 wanted to put the order and decree for eviction in execution opposite party no. 2 Laeeq Ahmad Siddiqui filed suit in question claiming tenancy rights in himself. A copy of the suit is Annexure1. In paragraph3 he dmits the tenancy of Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui. Thereafter he states that the said Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui purchased a house from the Lucknow Development Authority at Aishbagh Colony, Lucknow and shifted there with bag and baggage on 30th April 1985. In paragraph4 it is pleaded that after vacation of the hoiseby Sri Mobd. Yusuf Siddiqui it was occupied by his sister Smt. Karimunnisan and her son Sri Zubair Ahmad. Yusuf Siddiqui purchased a house from the Lucknow Development Authority at Aishbagh Colony, Lucknow and shifted there with bag and baggage on 30th April 1985. In paragraph4 it is pleaded that after vacation of the hoiseby Sri Mobd. Yusuf Siddiqui it was occupied by his sister Smt. Karimunnisan and her son Sri Zubair Ahmad. These two persons tried to obtain tenancy rights from petitioner no. 1 who did not agree to the request. It is claimed that in view of the fact that petitioner no. 1 did not accede to the request of Smt. Karimunnisan and Sri Zubair Ahmad they vacated the house in question in March 1986. After making this assertion opposite party no. 2 claims tenancy rights in his favour by making the following averments in paragraph5 : "That the plaintiff came into the possession of the house in suit in the month of June 1986 in his independent rights and is residing therein alongwith his family and except the plaintiff and his family members including his wife Smt. Shaheen Laiq and daughters Km. Afreen Laiq and Ambreen Laiq, there is no one residing in the house in suit since June 1986." In paragraph6 it is claimed that dispute arose between petitioner no. 1 and opposite party no. 2 in respect of rate of rent, the petitioner no. 1 demanding Rs. 300/ and opposite party no. 2 offering Rs. 100/. Opposite parry no. 2 claims that on account of this dispute petitioner no. 1 now wants to dispossess him from the house in question in the execution of the order and decree obtained by petitioner no. 1. In paragraph 13 it is claimed that on 3rd March 1991, petitioner no. 1 came to the residence of opposite party no. 2 and asked him either to concede to pay Rs. 300/ per month as rent or vacate the house in question. The threat of eviction, opposite party no. 2 claims, caused him anxiety and he started making efforts to know the strength on the basis of which the threat was being extended and then he acquired knowledge of the orders of eviction obtained by petitioner no. 1 against Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui. On these facts opposite party no. The threat of eviction, opposite party no. 2 claims, caused him anxiety and he started making efforts to know the strength on the basis of which the threat was being extended and then he acquired knowledge of the orders of eviction obtained by petitioner no. 1 against Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui. On these facts opposite party no. 2 filed the suit, which has given rise to the present writ petition, claiming a decree for permanent injunction to restrain the petitioners from evicting him from the house in question under the garb of the order dated 27th July 1990 passed in Prescribed Authority Case No. 164 of 1985 and the decree dated 831989 passed in Small Causes Court suit no. 25 of 1988 as modified by the judgment dated 13121990 passed in Small Causes Revision No. 121 of 1989. 3. In the aforesaid suit opposite party no. 2 filed application for interim injunction also. The petitioners opposed the injunction application but their objection failed and the trial court passed interim injunction restraining the petitioners from dispossessing opposite party no. 2 otherwise than in due course of law. 4. On the face of it the order of the court below appears to be innocuous inasmuch as it requires the petitioners to take recourse to court of law for evicting opposite party no. 2 but the context in which the order has been passed makes it apparent that opposite party no 2 cannot be evicted in execution of the orders obtained by petitioner no. 1 in the proceedings under section 21 and in the suit for eviction. 5. Before the trial court and before this court it was pressed on behalf of the petitioners that the suit filed by opposite party no. 2 is a clear abuse of the process of court and the same has been filed in order to protect possession of those who have entered into occupation of the house surreptitiously and not in accordance with law. In this context it is pointed out that opposite party no. 2 is noneelse but the real brother of Zubair Ahmad Siddiqui who alongwith his mother earlier tried to assert tenancy rights in respect of the accommodation in question which assertion was not accepted by this Court in writ petition no. 5739 of 1990 filed by them. In this context it is pointed out that opposite party no. 2 is noneelse but the real brother of Zubair Ahmad Siddiqui who alongwith his mother earlier tried to assert tenancy rights in respect of the accommodation in question which assertion was not accepted by this Court in writ petition no. 5739 of 1990 filed by them. On this ground it is pressed that not only the interim injunction passed by the court below in favour of opposite party no. 2 is liable to be vacated but the entire proceedings in the suit are liable to be quashed. 6. It is not disputed that opposite party no. 2 Laeeq Ahmad Siddiqui is the real brother of Zubair Ahmad Siddiqui. Writ Petition no. 5739 of 1990 was tiled by Zubair Ahmad Siddiqui, brother of opposite party no. 2 and his mother. A copy of the judgment dated 6th March 1991 passed in the said writ petition is on record as enclosure to petitioners' objection filed before the court below. From a perusal of this judgment it is abundantly clear that opposite party no. 2's brother and mother earlier claimed terancy rights in respect of this very accommodation; their plea in the said writ petition was that they had been residing with Mohd Yusuf Siddiqui from the very inception of tenancy and they acquired tenancy rights under section 14 of the Act when Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui vacated the house in 1985. This writ petition was fiied in the year 1990 and it was dismissed on 631991. All along, the claim of opposite party no. 2's brother and mother continued to be that they have acquired tenancy rights under Section 14 of the Act. It was nowhere their case that there was fresh agreement of tenancy between petitioner no. 1 and them. In the present suit also no such assertion has been made by defendant no. 2. In paragraph1 of the plaint he has stated that he is in occupation as tenant at the rate of Rs. 100/ since June 1986. In paragraph5, which has been reproduced hereinabove, he has only stated that he came into the possession of the house in the month of June 1986 in his independent rights. There is no indication of the manner in which this independent right came into existence in favour of opposite party no. 2. Admittedly the house in question is governed by the Act. There is no indication of the manner in which this independent right came into existence in favour of opposite party no. 2. Admittedly the house in question is governed by the Act. Section 11 of the Act lays down that no person shall let any building except in pursuance of an allotment order issued under Section 16, Opposite patty no. 2 does not indicate as to how he obtained pos session of the accommodation without allotment order under Section 16 from the District Magistrate or his delegate. There is no rent receipt also which may indicate creation of tenancy in favour of defendant no. 2. Although defendant no. 2 states in paragraph5 of the plaint that he came in possession of the house in the month of June 1986 he does not assert that the possession was given to him by either of the two petitioners in pursuance of any contract of tenancy entered into between him and the petitioners. Even though there is no assertion of any contract of tenancy preceding the alleged delivery of possession in June 1986, opposite party no. 2 in paragraph6 of the plaint refers to dispute regarding enhancement of rent from Rs. 100/ to Rs. 300/. The time when this dispute allegedly arose has also not been mentioned anywhere. Opposite party no. 2 is related not only to the petitioner of writ petition no. 5739 of 1990, he is related to also Sri Mohd Yusuf Siddiqii who was admittedly the tenant of the accommodation in question, Sri Mohd. Yusuf Siddique is the brother of defendant No. 2's mother. 7. From the facts hereinabove stated it is apparent that the near relations of Mohd. Yusuf Siddiqui against whom eviction order has been passed are trying to grab the property and to put off the execution of the said orders by involving the petitioners in various litigations. This clearly amounts to abuse of the process of the court. Accordingly the proceedings in the suit pending in the court below are liable to be quashed. 8. Apart from the above, an order of interim injunction is to ttf issued only when the plaintiff succeeds in establishing prima facie case. In the present case even if the requirement of allotment order under section 16 is ignored the plaintiff of the suit did not make out a case of creation of tenancy. 8. Apart from the above, an order of interim injunction is to ttf issued only when the plaintiff succeeds in establishing prima facie case. In the present case even if the requirement of allotment order under section 16 is ignored the plaintiff of the suit did not make out a case of creation of tenancy. As already indicated hereinabove paragraph5 which is the only paragraph in the plaint relating to creation of tenancy does not plead any settlement between opposite party no. 2 and either of the two petitioners. Mere coming into possession is not enough to create tenancy. Under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 tenancy may be created by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. This delivery of possession must be by the landlord or landlady. It cannot be by any oneelse. If defendant no. 2 has obtained possession from Mohd, Yusuf Siddiqui or from his mother Smt. Khairunnisa or his brother Zubair Ahmad that will not be sufficient for creating tenancy under Section 107 of T. P. Act. 9. In support of the proposition that when there is abuse of the process of court the proceedings can be quashed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the karned counsel for the petitioners has cited (1) 1986 ALJ 1200, Prem Shanker Tripathi v. 1st Additional District Judge, Allahabad and others ; (2) 1987(1) ARC 406, Smt. Mahadevi and others v. Civil Judge,Farrukhabad and others (3) 1988( 1) ARC 335, Gulab Chand v. Munsif West, Allahabad and others ; and (4) 1992(10) LCD 90, Mohd. Qadeer v. Munsif North, Lucknow and others. These authorities fully apply to the facts of the present ease. In all these eases execution of the decree for eviction was sought to be thwarted by filing suit for injunction. This court did not approve of the attempt. The last authority is particularly apposite. 10. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 strenuously submitted that the petitioners have the alternative remedy of contesting the suit and therefore, there is no occasion for them to approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. He has further submitted that the interim order of the learned Munsif is appealable before the learned District Judge and the petitioners having failed to avail of that alternative remedy, they cannot seek to nullify its effect through the instant petition. He has further submitted that the interim order of the learned Munsif is appealable before the learned District Judge and the petitioners having failed to avail of that alternative remedy, they cannot seek to nullify its effect through the instant petition. In support of his proposition that Article 226 cannot be utilised to supersede the reliefs available under the Code of Civil Procedure the learned counsel has cited (1) 1990 (1) ARC 250, Qammddinv. Rasul Baksh and another ; and (2) 1992 Current Civil Rulings 3, Ordinarily this court indeed does not entertain writ petitions when remedy is available before another forum. However, that principle cannot be applied in the present case as it is a case of abuse of the process of Court. 11. In the writ petition filed by opposite party no. 2's mother and brother Rs. 300/ were awarded as costs. That amount has not been a sufficient deterrent for opposite party no. 2 to file the present frivolous suit. The amount of costs, therefore, deserves to be enhanced in the present case. 12. In view of the above the petition is allowed and the proceedings pending before Munsif North, Lucknow in Suit No. 79 of 1991, Laeeq Ahmad Siddiqui v. Smt. Tajwar Jahan and another are hereby quashed. The petitioners will be entitled to receive from opposite party no. 2 a sum of Rs. 1000/ by way of compensatory costs.