JUDGMENT Anshuman Singh, J. 1. Petitioners in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India have challenged the validity of the order dated 18th June, 1992 passed by the Deputy Housing Commissioner/Deputy Registrar Cooperative Societies, Lucknow, copy of which has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. By that order the respondent no. 1 has initiated proceedings for supercession under section 35 (1) of the U. P. Cooperative Societies Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act; and has also passed an order under section 35 (2) suspending the Committee of management during the pendency of the supercession proceedings and for interim management of the society appointed the City Magistrate, Meerut as the Administrator. The impugned order has been challenged mainly on the grounds that no enquiry whatsoever had taken place against the society, the Registrar did not afford any opportunity to the Society, no opportunity was afforded to the Committee of Management before passing of the suspension order and lastly the impugned order has been passed because of the malafide conduct of the respondent no. 4. 2. Counter affidavit has been filed by Amar Nath Yadav. respondent no. 4 on his behalf as well as on behalf of respondent no. 1 Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies. Petitioner has also filed rejoinder-affidavit to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents no 1 to 4. Since in the instant case counter-affidavit and rejoinder-affidavit have been exchanged between the parties and there are no private parties and as provided under the Second proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules of the Court, this petition is being disposed of finally at the admission stage itself. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents no. 1 to 4 facts which necessitated the initiation of 'proceedings under section 35 (1) by the respondent no. 1 have been enumerated, reference of which is necessary to be made for deciding the controversy involved in the case. Petitioner society was registered on 18th March, 1985. It has been alleged in the counter-affidavit that six Directors of the petitioner society namely S/Sri Mukesh Bhargava, K. K, Bhardwaj, D. P. Singh, A. N. Agarwal. 1 have been enumerated, reference of which is necessary to be made for deciding the controversy involved in the case. Petitioner society was registered on 18th March, 1985. It has been alleged in the counter-affidavit that six Directors of the petitioner society namely S/Sri Mukesh Bhargava, K. K, Bhardwaj, D. P. Singh, A. N. Agarwal. P. D. Sharma, and A. R. Chaudhary made complaint on 18-11-1986 to the Government as well as to the Registrar/Housing Commissioner against the society on which an enquiry was ordered and Sahkari Adhikari Sri K. K. Srivastava was appointed as Inquiry Officer, who submitted his report on 24 9-1988, true copies of the same has been annexed as Annexures CA 1 and 2 to the counter-affidavit On 29-3- 1990 the Registrar ordered the Inspection of books and properties of the petitioner society under section 66 of the Act and authorised the respondent no. 4 to perform that job. In pursuance of the order passed by the Registrar, respondent no. 4 made inspection and submitted his report on 8-4-1990, true copies of the order passed by the Registrar dated 29-3-1990 as well as the Inspection report dated 8th April, 1990 has also been filed as Annexures-CA 3 and 4 to the counter-affidavit. It was alleged that on the basis of the aforesaid report, a charge-sheet was issued to the Secretary, petitioner not 2 to which he did not submit any reply inspite of the two reminders sent to him dated 24-8-1991 and 30-9- 1991, true copies of the charge-sheet dated 12-4-1991 as well as the reminders dated 24-8-1991 and 30th September, 1991 has also been filed as Annexures-CA 5, 6 and 7 to the counter affidavit. It has farther alleged that four Directors S/Sri S. D Sharma. Lt. Col R. P. S. Chaudhary, C. P. Singh and R. P Tyagi made two complaints against the petitioner no. 2 retarding embezzlement of lacs of rupees by him in December, 1991 and February. 1992, wherein an enquiry under section 68 (1) of the Act was set up against the petitioner no. 2 and Sri Lal Bahadur Singh, Avas Adhikari Ghaziabad was appointed as Inquiry Officer, photostat copies of the order dated 17-1-1992 directing the enquiry under section 68 (1) has also been filed as Annexure CA 8 to the counter affidavit. 1992, wherein an enquiry under section 68 (1) of the Act was set up against the petitioner no. 2 and Sri Lal Bahadur Singh, Avas Adhikari Ghaziabad was appointed as Inquiry Officer, photostat copies of the order dated 17-1-1992 directing the enquiry under section 68 (1) has also been filed as Annexure CA 8 to the counter affidavit. The Inquiry Officer fixed 28th and 29th February, 1992 for holding the Inquiry but it is alleged that the Secretary did not allow the enquiry to proceed, whereupon the respondent, no. 1 again wrote to the President and Secretary to cooperate in the Inquiry under section 68 (1) but it had no effect, photostat copy of the letter dated 9-4-92 by the respondent no 1, as stated above, has also been filed as Annexure 9 to the counter-affidavit. It is alleged that since the petitioner no 2 did not allow the enquiry under section 68 (1) to proceed the respondent no. 1 had to pass an order under section 38 (i) of the Act directing the Society to remove him and disqualifying him to hold the office of the Society for next five years, true copy of the order passed by the respondent no.1 has also been filed as Annexure-10 to the counter-affidavit The stand of the respondents in the counter-affidavit is that it is because of the facts stated in the preceding paragraphs, the respondent no 1 had no option but to initiate proceedings under section 35 (1) of the Act in the interest of the Society and pending proceedings for supercession, since the registrar was of the opinion that it was in the interest of the Society to suspend the Committee of management, he resorted action under section 35 (2) of the Act and made interim arrangement and appointed the City Magistrate. Meerut as Administrator for the management of the affairs of the Society, till the finalization of the proceedings under section 35 (1) of the Act. 3. We have heard Sri A. K Yog, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri A. Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no 1 and Sri Vrijendra Singh, learned counsel for the respondent no. 4. 4. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since at the time of inspection made by the respondent no. 4, the Society refused to fulfill the illegal demand of paying Rs. 4. 4. The first contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that since at the time of inspection made by the respondent no. 4, the Society refused to fulfill the illegal demand of paying Rs. 40,000/'- to the respondent no 4 a false report was submitted against the Society. It was further contended that since a representation was made to the Chief Minister and the Minister for cooperation and other Higher Authorities against the conduct of the respondent no. 4 and on the aforesaid representation a Vigilence enquiry has been set up, the respondent no. 4 has manipulated the impugned order from the respondent no. 1. We have perused the writ petition and we find that the allegations regarding demand of Rs 40,000/- by the respondent no. 4 at the time of inspection has been made in paragraphs 7 and 11 of the writ petition, The respondent no 4 who has filed his counter-affidavit has denied the averments in paragraphs 26 and 28 of the counter-affidavit. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a Vigilence enquiry has been set up against the respondent no 4, which has been stated in paragraph 12 of the writ petition has also been denied in paragraph 28 of the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent no. 4 A perusal of the alleged representation made by the petitioner no 2 to the higher authorities indicates that the said representation was sent in May, 1991 in which complaints regarding bribery against Sri S. N Tripathi. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Meerut, Sri R. N. Singh, Additional District Magistrate (E), Meerut and Lekhpal Shri Ram Kailash Singh were also made. In this connection it is pertinent to mention here that it has been alleged that Ram Kailash Singh hinted Rs. 5 lakha for the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Meerut and the Additional District Magistrate (E) Meerut in connection with some of the mutation cases pertaining to the society. The allegation of bribery does not end here A perusal of the said representation further indicates that Rs 7 lacks were demanded by Sarvajeet Singh, Land Acquisition Officer the allegations have also been made against officials of the Board of Revenue namely Sri J. P. Mehrotra and Sri S. C Srivastava for conniving Sri Sarvajeet Singh. Apart from the aforesaid fact the other fact which falsifies the case of the petitioner regarding malafides of respondent no. Apart from the aforesaid fact the other fact which falsifies the case of the petitioner regarding malafides of respondent no. 4 is that in paragraph 7 of the writ petition it has been stated that the respondent no. 4 demanded a sum of Rs. 40,000/- from the petitioner no. 2 for submitting a correct report, otherwise a wrong and adverse report to the interest of the Society was threatened but in the alleged representation, Annexure-6 to the writ petition it has been stated as under : 'One Mr. Amar Nath Yadav, the Cooperative officer (Housing), Meerut made an inspection of our Samiti on 8-4-1990 and demanded a huge sum from me as bribe for sending a report allegedly favourable to the Samiti. In the month of August 90 he told me that the Assistant Housing Commissioner wanted to make an Inspection of our society. I told him that he was most welcome. Then he told as to why I am going for brotherations but to spend some money by which he would manage without the inspection. He chased me for about a year and reduced his demand but by bit and finally distended to the tune of Rs. 40,000/-. He also informed me that part of the above said bribe was to be paid to the Assistant Housing Commissioner and other high ups at Lucknow. Neither I could refuse nor I could pay him. He finally called me to his residence some time in the last week of August, 1990 and threatened that the report was going to be submitted Still I could not help meeting his demand." The petitioners have alleged in paragraph 7 of the writ petition that Rs. 40,000/- was demanded by the respondent no 4 on 8-4-1990 itself at the time of inspection, whereas in the representation it has been stated that at the time of inspection i.e. on 8-4-90 a huge sum was demanded which was subsequently reduced to Rs. 40.000/- and as such it is. abundantly clear that the facts stated in the writ [petition and the representation are quite contradictory which falsifies the case of the petitioners regarding demand of bribe. From the facts stated above, we are of the opinion that the petitioners have failed to prove malafides as alleged in the writ petition and the allegations levelled against respondent no. 4 are wholly false and mischievious. From the facts stated above, we are of the opinion that the petitioners have failed to prove malafides as alleged in the writ petition and the allegations levelled against respondent no. 4 are wholly false and mischievious. Apart from this, the representation is alleged to have been made against respondent no. 4 in May,, 1991 whereas the impugned order has been passed by the respondent no. 1 in June, 1992 i.e. after about 13 months and as such the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed because of the representation made against respondent no, 4 appears to be wholly falicious and does not appeal to reason. Moreover, the impugned order has not been passed by the respondent no 4 but by the respondent no. 1. It also appears to be rediculous that the respondent no 4 who is merely a Cooperative Officer in the office of Avas and Vikas Parishad would exercise so much influence over the respondent no 1 that he would pass the impugned order against the petitioners. 5. The other submission made by the counsel for the petitioner is that the order appointing administrator has been passed by the District Magistrate, Meerut and not by the respondent no. 1. In support of the said contention he has placed reliance on the letter dated 19th June, 1992 sent to the President of the Society and the petitioner no 2 by the City Magistrate. Meerut, who has been appointed administrator pending proceedings for supercession It is true that no order appointing administrator could have been passed by the District; Magistrate, Meerut and could be passed only by the respondent no. 1. Since the letter dated 19th June, 1992 refers to some letter dated 17th June, 1992 of the District Magistrate. Meerut, counsel for the respondents was directed to produce the letter dated 17th tune, 1992. if any mentioned in Annexure-2 to the writ petition. Consequently, a supplementary counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent no 4 along with which the copy of the confidential letter dated 17th June, 1992 mentioned In the letter of the City Magistrate dated 19th June, 1992 has been filed as Annexure-2: to the supplementary counter affidavit It appears that the respondent no. Consequently, a supplementary counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent no 4 along with which the copy of the confidential letter dated 17th June, 1992 mentioned In the letter of the City Magistrate dated 19th June, 1992 has been filed as Annexure-2: to the supplementary counter affidavit It appears that the respondent no. 1 by a confidential letter dated 10th June, 1992 informed the District Magistrate that since the proceedings under section 35 of the Act for supersession of the petitioner society was under consideration and in case of suspension some person was to be appointed administrator, he was requested to suggest the name of some gazetted Officer who could be appointed administrator. In reply to the said confidential letter the District Magistrate, Meerut sent a letter dated 17th June, 1992 to the respondent no 1 Learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to make capital out of the words used in the letter dated 17th June, 1992 sent by the District Magistrate to the respondent no 1 and on the basis of the language used therein he contents that in fact of the order appointed administrator has been passed by the Distinct Magistrate, Meerut and not by the respondent no 1. The said contention also appears to be superfluous inasmuch as, the impugned order dated 18-6-1992 has been passed by the respondent no. 1 which has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition and the petitioners in the prayer have specifically prayed for the quashing of the impugned order Annexutre-1 passed by the respondent no. 1. 6. Counsel for the petitioners also made efforts to perusade us to hold that in fact the order appointed the administrator was passed on the dictate of the District Magistrate, Meerut, but he could not succeed in view of the fact that it has been specifically stated in paragraph 6 of the supplementary counter-affidavit that the impugned order dated 18th June. 1992 was passed by the respondent no 1 on 18th June, 1992 and the same was served on the City Magistrate, Meerut by the respondent no. 4 on 19th June, 1992. A supplementary rejoinder-affidavit has also been filed but a perusal of the same indicates that the .contents contained in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the supplementary counter affidavit have not been denied by the petitioners. 4 on 19th June, 1992. A supplementary rejoinder-affidavit has also been filed but a perusal of the same indicates that the .contents contained in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the supplementary counter affidavit have not been denied by the petitioners. Moreover, the petitioners have specifically prayed under relief (a) for quashing of the order dated 18th June, 1992 passed by the respondent no. 1. Annexure-1 to the writ petition and under relief (b) the petitioners have sough for issue of writ of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the impugned order dated 18th June 1992 and as such there is no manner of doubt that the impugned order has been passed by the respondent no. 1 and not by the District Magistrate, Meerut which has been impeached by the petitioners in the present writ petition. There is also no material available on record which may suggest that the impugned order was passed by the respondent no. 1 under the dictate of the district Magistrate, Meerut. Before deciding the real controversy involved in the instant case and in order to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners it appears desirable to refer to the provisions of section 35 of the Statute namely the U. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1965, which is under: "35. Supersession or suspension of committee of management.- (1) Where, in the opinion of the Registrar, the committee of management of any cooperative society persistently makes default or is negligent in the performance of the duties imposed on it by this Act or the rules or the bye-laws of the Society or commits any act which is prejudicial to the interest of the Society or its member, or is otherwise not functioning properly, the Registrar after affording the committee of management a reasonable opportunity of being heard and obtaining the opinion of the general body of the society in a general meeting called for the purpose in the manner prescribed may, by order in writing, supersede the committee of management; Provided where under the prescribed circumstances it is not feasible to convene a general meeting of the general body of the society, the Registrar may dispense with the requirement of obtaining the opinion of the general body of the society. (2) Where the Registrar, while proceeding to take action under subsection (1) is of opinion that suspension of the committee of management during the period of proceeding is necessary in the interest of the society, he may suspend the committee of management which shall thereupon cease to function, and make such arrangement as he thinks proper for the management of the affairs of the society till the proceedings are completed: Provided that if the committee of management so suspended is not superseded it shall be reinstead and the period during which it has remainded suspended shall count towards its terms." 7. From the perusal of sub-section (1) of section 35, it is absolutely clear that the Registrar has power under section 35 (1) of the Act to supersede the committee of management. 8. Section 35 (2) of the Act further empowers the registrar to suspend the committee of management during the pendency of the proceedings for supersession and has also empower to make arrangement for the proper management of the society till the proceedings for supersession are completed. In the instant case, only a notice under section 35 (1) has been issued for supersession and also the suspension order has been passed for interim period. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner's society before passing the suspension order has no legs to stand, as there is no such obligation cast on the Registrar under the provisions of the Statutute for affording any opportunity of hearing before passing any order under section 35 (2) of the Act and as such the said contention, is wholly devoid of merits and is rejected. The next submission made on behalf of the petitioner is that the Fegistrar before passing as order under section 35 (1) of the Act did not afford any opportunity to the Society, nor obtained its opinion. This contention too cannot be accepted as no final order under section 35 (1) of the Act has been passed. Only proceedings for supersession of the Society has been initiated and a perusal of the language used in section 35 (1). there is no room for doubt that the respondent no. 1 was not required to afford any opportunity or obtain opinion of the petitioners' society initiating proceedings for supersession under section 35 (1). Only proceedings for supersession of the Society has been initiated and a perusal of the language used in section 35 (1). there is no room for doubt that the respondent no. 1 was not required to afford any opportunity or obtain opinion of the petitioners' society initiating proceedings for supersession under section 35 (1). The only act which has been performed regarding supersession of (the society by the respondent no 1 is that notice his been issued. The requirement of opportunity or obtaining the opinion of the society would be relevant before passing final order under section 35 (1) of the Act. 9. No other argument has been advanced by the counsel for the petitioners 10. On the other hand Mr. A. Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents has refused the contention raised on behalf of the petitioners. He contended that the impugned order passed by the respondent no. 1 is just, valid and does not suffer from any error of law. He invited our attention to the provisions of Section 35 (1) and (2) of the Act and submitted that on the basis of the material on record, the Registrar has passed order under section 35 (1) of the Act for supersession and pending supersession proceedings, the respondent no. 1 has also exercised powers vested in him under sub-clause (2) of section 35 of the Act. He further contended that the order of supension passed under sub-clause (2) of Section 35 is based on subjective satisfaction of the respondent no. 1, who thought it proper to suspend the committee of management pending completion of supersession proceedings and to manage the affairs of the Society during the interim period the respondent no 1 has appointed City Magistrate, Meerut as the Administrator. He also urged that the impugned order has been passed by the respondent no 1 and no malafide has been alleged against him and as such the impugned order deserves to be sustained. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision consisting of five Judes of the Supreme Court in the case of Veerpal Singh v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, U. P., AIR 1973 SC 1249 . In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on a Full Bench decision consisting of five Judes of the Supreme Court in the case of Veerpal Singh v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, U. P., AIR 1973 SC 1249 . In the aforesaid case two questions cropped up for determination before the Supreme Court firstly,, whether the Deputy Registrar, under the Co operative Societies Act, 1965 could suspend the President and the committee of management and secondly, whether the Deputy Registrar could temporarily appoint an administrator. Both the questions have been answered by the Supreme Court in the affirmative and it was held that the Registrar could suspend the committee of management during the pendency of the proceedings of supersession and also has power under section 35 (2) of the Act to make temporary arrangement for the management of the Society till the proceedings under section 35 (1) are completed. In our opinion, the entire controversy involved in the present case has been finally set at rest by Supreme Court In the case of Veerpal Singh (supra). The observations made in the case of Veerpal Singh (supra) in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 of the judgment is exhaustive and settles, the scope of power of the Registrar under section 35 (1) and (2) of the Act which we would like to refer in extenso : "13. These provisions indicate the circumstances under which the Registrar has power to supersede or suspend the committee of management and to appoint an administrator. Section 35 (2) of the Act confers power on the Registrar to suspend the Committee of management during the period of proceedings for supersession. The Registrar has also power under section 35 (2) of the Act to make arrangement as ho thinks proper for the management of the society till the proceedings are completed. The power to suspend the committee of management during the period of proceedings is exercisable when proceedings for supersession have commened. Section 35(1) of the Act shows that when the Registrar is of opinion that the committee of a co-operative society makes default or is negligent in the performance of duties or is otherwise not functioning [properly the Registrar may supersede the committee of management and has to give an opportunity to the society to be heard in that behalf. The Registrar has also to obtain the opinion of the general body of the society. The Registrar has also to obtain the opinion of the general body of the society. Therefore, the opinion of the Registrar is to be followed by some definite act which will commence the proceedings for supersession. The provisions in the Act indicate that some definite steps like the issue of a notice must be taken under the provisions of Section 35 (1) of the Act with a view to show that proceedings for supersession of the Committee are set in motion. 14. It is, therefore, manifest that power exercisable under section 35 (2) of the Act is confined to the time during the period of supersession proceedings. Unless the proceedings have started as indicated earlier the Registrar cannot call in aid the power exercisable under section 35 (2) of the Act. 15. The second question which has to be decided is whether the Registrar could appoint on administrator in the present case. The Registrar could not appoint an administrator. The reasons are these. The proceedings for supersession of the committee of management have not commenced the proceedings can commence only when the necessary step is taken. The interim suspension of the committee of management under section 35 (2) of the Act is made when in the opinion of the Registrar the suspension of the Committee of management during the period of proceedings is necessary in the interest of the society. As no proceedings have been set in motion in accordance with the provisions of the statute, the interim suspension of the committee of management is bad- An appointment of administrator is specifically dealt with in sub-sections (3), (4), (5), and (6) of Section 35 of the Act. The appointment of administrator is normally after the supersession of the committee of management. It is true that there is no specific provision for an appointment of administrator during the interim period. But section 35 (2) of the Act states that the Registrar may make such arrangement as he thinks proper for the management of the affairs of the society till the proceedings are completed. It is true that there is no specific provision for an appointment of administrator during the interim period. But section 35 (2) of the Act states that the Registrar may make such arrangement as he thinks proper for the management of the affairs of the society till the proceedings are completed. An appointment of administrator during the interim period is therefore, not ruled out of the provisions of section 35 (2) of the Act, but the pre-requisite condition to the appointment of the interim administrator has not been fulfilled in the present case, because no proceedings for the supersession of thee committee of management of the society have commenced." In the case of Veerpal Singh (Supra) since no proceedings for the supersession of the committee of management were initiated, the order under section 35 (2) of the Act appointing the (administrator was quashed but in the present case the requirement of appointment of administrator under section 35 (2) of the Act has been fully complied with, In as much as, the proceedings for supersession has already been initiated and a notice to that effect has been issued and since the proceedings for initiation has been set in motion the order under section 35 (2) of the Act passed by the Registrar is wholly justified. 11. After hearing learned counsel for the patties and after perusal of materials on record and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Veerpal Singh (supra), we are of the opinion that the writ petition is wholly devoid of merits ami deserves to be dismissed. 12. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. The impugned order passed by the respondent no. 1 is sustained. The interim order dated 2nd July, 1992 is here by discharged. However, if the petitioners cooperate in the proceedings for supersession under section 35 (1) of the Act, the respondents are directed to complete the same within a period of three months from the date of presentation of the certified copy of the order of this Court. The parties shall bear their own costs. Petition dismissed.