A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-workman appears as party in person and has filed this petition challenging the legality and validity of the order passed by the Industrial Court in Appeal (IC) No. 102/91 dated 27/03/1992 by which the Industrial Court set aside the order passed by the Labour Court as regards the payment of backwages and the payment of cost of Rs. 500. 00. The period for which the backwages denied are between November 15 198 8/02/1993 and even according to the respondent-Mill Company the total amount payable to the workman would come to Rs. 91 816. 91 ps. (Ninety-one thousand eight hundred sixteen and paise ninety-one only ). (This figure has been submitted by the learned Counsel for the respondent-Mill Company at the time of hearing of the petition. According to the workman the amount would be more and it would be exceeding Rs. one lac. In short the figure is not admitted by the petitioner workman.) ( 2 ) THE petitioner-workman joined the services of the respondent-Mill Company as doffer in the year 1972. He was promoted as reliever in the year 1975 and since then he was working in Ring frame department as permanent workman in second shift of the Mill Company. He was a member of the Joint Management Council and was union representative of the Textile Labour Association. In this capacity he used to represent the cases of workmen before the management. According to the workman on account of such activities the management had developed prejudice against him and often tried to victimize him. That he had filed complaint in relation to the alleged false birth date of Head Time-keeper Shri Jethabhai Mehta and his continuation in service and the complaint was sent by the criminal Court for police investigation. That from 3/11/1988 to Novem 6/11/1988 he was suspended and thereafter a show of inquiry was made against him and on 15/11/1988 his services have been terminated. Therefore he filed T. Application No. 10/89 under Section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 before the Labour Court praying that he be reinstated in service with full backwages. That from 3/11/1988 to Novem 6/11/1988 he was suspended and thereafter a show of inquiry was made against him and on 15/11/1988 his services have been terminated. Therefore he filed T. Application No. 10/89 under Section 78 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 before the Labour Court praying that he be reinstated in service with full backwages. ( 3 ) THE allegation against the workman was that on the date of payment of bonus amount as he inquired about the lesser amount mentioned in the slip of bonus amount payable to him he was told by Shri Jethabhai the Head Time-keeper that he should come on the next day. Thereupon he got excited and abused said Jethabhai and threatened him saying that as and when he comes out he will see him. It is also alleged that at this time he had spoken abusive language. On the aforesaid allegation inquiry was held between 7/11/1988 and Nov 12/11/1988 and ultimately the order of discharge from service dated 15/11/1988 was passed. As indicated hereinabove the workman filed T. Application challenging the legality and validity of the order of dismissal before the Labour Court under Section 78 of the BIR Act. The Labour Court held that there was no procedural irregularity in holding the departmental inquiry but the finding arrived at in the departmental inquiry was perverse. The Labour Court also found that the order of dismissal from service passed against the workman was not just and reasonable and by its judgment and order dated 28/10/1991 directed that the workman be reinstated in service on his original post with full backwages and be also paid Rs. 500. 00 (Rupees five hundred only) as and by way of cost of the application. ( 4 ) THE Mill Company preferred appeal under Section 84 of the Act being appeal No. (IC) 102/91 before the Industrial Court challenging the legality and validity of the order passed by the Labour Court. The Industrial Court as per its judgment and order dated 27/03/1992 confirmed the finding arrived at by the Labour Court but interfered with the order of payment of backwages and directed that the workman be not paid the backwages and be also not paid the amount of Rs. 500 awarded to him as and by way of cost of the application. 500 awarded to him as and by way of cost of the application. ( 5 ) IN this petition it is contended by the petitioner-workman that the main reason why the Industrial Court interfered with the order passed by the Labour Court as regards payment of backwages is that according to the Industrial Court there was contradiction in the observation made by the Labour Court in Para 12 of its judgment and in the immediately following paragraph of operative part of the Judgment. It is contended that the Industrial Court has misread the order passed by the Labour Court when it observed in Para 17 of its judgment that the Labour Court had come to the conclusion that denial of backwages for a period of about 3 to 4 years was adequate punishment. In fact in Para 12 of the judgment delivered by the Labour Court it has not made observations as read by the Industrial Court. The entire Para 12 of the judgment passed by the Labour Court when translated into English reads as follows:"thus as indicated hereinabove this is not a case in which the applicant- workman should be imposed with a serious punishment due to which he may have to lose his service. In this case viewed from this angle the punishment imposed upon the workman is grossly disproportionate to the misconduct alleged against him. Ordinarily if a workman is forced to sit idle without wages for a period of about 3 to 4 years that itself should be considered sufficient to teach him a lesson. In this case it should be considered that the workman has already undergone this punishment and therefore he should be ordered to be reinstated in service. In this circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons in this case following order is passed". Thus it is evident that the Labour Court has not observed that denial of backwages would be adequate punishment. What is stated by the Labour Court is that for a period of 3 to 4 years when a workman remains unemployed and undergoes the sufferings of passing the days without any income whatsoever that itself should be considered sufficient punishment. The Labour Court has nowhere observed that denial of backwages of 3 to 4 years would be the sufficient punishment. The Labour Court has nowhere observed that denial of backwages of 3 to 4 years would be the sufficient punishment. Be it noted that these observations have been made by the Labour Court in Para 12 of the judgment and immediately thereafter the operative part of the judgment follows. The expression if a workman is forced to sit aside without wages for a period of about 3 to 4 years should have been read in the context in which it occurs. Neither the language nor the context in which the expression is used can be interpreted to mean that Labour Court held that denial of backwages was the proper punishment. It can never be believed that the Labour Court would pass such contradictory order in the next breath only. The reasonable reading of the judgment and order is that the Labour Court considered the sufferings undergone by the workman on account of remaining idle and without any income of wages for a period of about 3 to 4 years as sufficient punishment. The Labour Court never observed that the workman should be denied the wages for the period in question". ( 6 ) IN this connection it should also be noted that after a period of about 3 to 4 years the workman gets the eroded value of the rupee. In these days of continuous inflation eroded value of the rupee would be half the value of the amount which otherwise he would have received before a period of 3 to 4 years. Moreover during this period of 3 to 4 years to keep his body and soul together he would have incurred debts or would have eaten into his past savings. In either case he would be put to loss. On account of the fact that his only source of income (i. e. wages) remained dried up the education of his children would have suffered. He would not have been able to look after elementary health and medical facilities of his family. He and is entire family would have passed through tremendous mental and physical agony. These sufferings can never be compensated even by payment of full backwages and that too without interest after a period of three to four years. Remaining without income for 3 to 4 years itself would be a crushing blow to the person like workman. Loss of interest would be considerable. These sufferings can never be compensated even by payment of full backwages and that too without interest after a period of three to four years. Remaining without income for 3 to 4 years itself would be a crushing blow to the person like workman. Loss of interest would be considerable. As far as lowly paid workman like the petitioner is concerned he would have incurred debts or may have sold his property to maintain himself and his family. This is what is considered as sufficient punishment by the Labour Court. Thus it is evident that the Industrial Court has completely misread the observations made by the Labour Court in Para 12 of its judgment. Therefore the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court is required to be interfered with in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 7 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the respondent-Mill Company submitted that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Yonus v. Mohd. Mustaqim reported in AIR 1984 SC page 38 this Court should not exercise power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and should not interfere with the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court. In the aforesaid case before the Supreme Court the petitioner had moved the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution against the decision of the learned subordinate Judge in execution proceedings. It was an undisputed position that against the impugned order (under-Order XXI Rule 92 of C. P. Code) an appeal was maintainable and the question fell within the purview of Section 47 of the C. P. Code. Therefore the orders were appealable or at any rate revision was maintainable before the High Court. In this background the Supreme Court made observations that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227. In the instant case it is not a case of mere wrong decision. In this case misreading of the judgment and order passed by the Labour Court amounts to failure to exercise of jurisdiction by the Industrial Court which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. Therefore this Court can certainly exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. In the instant case it is not a case of mere wrong decision. In this case misreading of the judgment and order passed by the Labour Court amounts to failure to exercise of jurisdiction by the Industrial Court which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. Therefore this Court can certainly exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent-Mill Company relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Manechowk and Ahmedabad Mfg. Co. v. I. C. reported in 1967 (1) LLJ page 463 It was a case wherein a question arose as regards the extent of power of the Industrial Court under Section 84 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act 1946 In this case no such question arises. In the case of Manekchowk and Ahmedabad Mfg. Co. (supra) a clerk was found sleeping with his legs stretched on the gadi at about 11. 40 a. m. while on duty. He was charged for gross misconduct subversive of discipline. At the conclusion of the inquiry the misconduct having been held proved he was ordered to be dismissed from service. The Labour Court rejected the application filed under Section 78 (1)A of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. The Industrial Court set aside the order of Labour Court and ordered the reinstatement of the clerk with six months backwages. The High Court held that the Industrial Court had exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the order passed in the domestic tribunal. This decision is of no help to the respondent. ( 9 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent relied upon a Division Bench decision of this High Court in the case of Ahmedabad New Textile Mills v. Textile Labour Association reported in 29 (2) GLR page 1324 in support of his contention that this High Court should not exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The relevant observations are in Para 16 of the reported decision which reads as follows:"the power of superintendence conferred on this Court is of an extraordinary nature to ensure that Courts and Tribunals function within the bounds of their authority and cannot be invoked to correct errors of fact and even law unless it has resulted in gross miscarriage of justice. True it is that the language of Article 227 of our Constitution does not use words of limitation while conferring power on the High Courts but that does not mean that it would be justified in interfering with the order of the Lower Court or Tribunal if it feels that it would have exercised the discretion differently. The power that is conferred is of superintendence and not that of an Appellate Court and hence it must be used in exceptional cases to avoid miscarriage of justice". In the instant case as indicated hereinabove the Industrial Court has completely misread the judgment of the Labour Court and has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. It can also be said that the Industrial Court has acted in excess of its jurisdiction by misreading the judgment and thereby interfering with the order passed by the Labour Court. This misreading has resulted into miscarriage of justice. It may be noted that even according to the calculations made by the respondent-Mill Company the amount of backwages would be around Rs. 92 0 (Rupees ninety-two thousand only ). For the misconduct of being little agitated as he was refused payment of bonus on the same day he cannot be deprived of about Rs. 92 0 This is shockingly disproportionate and it would certainly result into gross miscarriage of justice. ( 10 ) THE decision in the case of Ahmedabad New Textiles Mills (supra) lays down the principle that the Labour Court has the power to examine and decide as to whether the punishment awarded by the domestic tribunal is legal and proper and as also the power to examine as to whether it is just and reasonable or not. In the instant case the Labour Court has found that the punishment of dismissal imposed has found that the punishment of dismissal imposed upon the workman was not just and reasonable. This conclusion arrived at by the Labour Court. But the Industrial Court failed to read Para 12 of the judgment of the Labour Court correctly. This decision of the Division Bench of this Court helps the workman to the extent that it lays down the principle that the Labour Court could examine the justness and reasonableness of the punishment imposed by the domestic tribunal. But the Industrial Court failed to read Para 12 of the judgment of the Labour Court correctly. This decision of the Division Bench of this Court helps the workman to the extent that it lays down the principle that the Labour Court could examine the justness and reasonableness of the punishment imposed by the domestic tribunal. ( 11 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the Mill Company had filed Special Civil Application No. 4583 of 1992 challenging the legality and validity of the judgment and orders passed by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court. The said petition filed by the Mill Company has been rejected by this Court by order dated 19/08/1992 (Coram: S. B. Majmudar J as he then was and S. D. Shah J. ). In this connection it may be noted that the workman initially filed this petition against the respondent-Mill Company as well as against one Shri Ajit D. Padiwal Advocate who appeared on his behalf in Special Civil Application No. 4583 of 1992. In Para 12 of this petition he has alleged that the said Advocate Shri Padiwal had colluded with Advocate Shri B. R. Gupta who represented the Mill Company in that petition. It is alleged that he was handed over the papers of Appeal (IC)No. 102/91 for challenging the judgment of the Industrial Court before this High Court but on account of collusion said Advocate Shri Padiwal filed caveat application and application for Contempt of Court and did not file petition. He has further alleged that he did not know about the decision dated 19/08/1992 rendered by this court in Special Civil Application No. 4583/92. It is further averred that he had even filed Misc. Civil Application No. 1033/92 for taking actions for contempt against the Mill Company. But even in that application said Advocate Shri Padiwal did not remain present and therefore he has been relieved on 1/09/1992 On these and other allegations made in the petition it was prayed that said Advocate Shri Padiwal had colluded with the Advocate of the other side and was guilty of professional misconduct and therefore appropriate action be taken against him. However when the petition was moved before this Court it was pointed out to him that for the alleged professional misconduct this Court may not be in a position to take any action against the Advocate. However when the petition was moved before this Court it was pointed out to him that for the alleged professional misconduct this Court may not be in a position to take any action against the Advocate. He ultimately deleted the said Advocate as respondent and also deleted the prayer made against him. As averred in the petition it is in this circumstances that he has filed this petition little late i. e. On 18/01/1993 ( 12 ) SIMPLY because the petition filed by the Mill Company has been rejected by this Court the petitioner - workman does not lose his right to challenge the legality and validity of the order of punishment imposed upon him by the Industrial Court. It is not correct to say that while rejecting the petition filed by the Mill Company this Court has confirmed the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court. It may be noted that the petition has been rejected summarily. All that can be said is that this Court has refused to interfere with the order passed by the Industrial Court. This Court did not call upon the workman to show cause as to whether he felt aggrieved by the judgment rendered by the Industrial Court and as to whether he was desirous to challenge the legality and validity of the same. When this Court refused to exercise its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in the petition filed by the Mill Company as per order dated 19/08/1992 this Court did not in any way adversely affect the right of the workman to challenge the legality and validity of the order passed by the Industrial Court. Even if the Mill Company has preferred Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court against the order passed by this Court in the Special Civil Application filed by it that circumstance also does not take away the right of the workman to challenge the legality and validity of the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court. ( 13 ) REFERENCE may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Scooter India Limited v. Labour Court Lucknow reporteed in AIR 1589 SC page 149. In that case on the charges of major misconduct held proved the services of the workman were terminated. The said decision was challenged before the Labour Court by the workman. In that case on the charges of major misconduct held proved the services of the workman were terminated. The said decision was challenged before the Labour Court by the workman. The Labour Court found that the inquiry was fair and lawful but justice was required to be tempered with mercy and therefore interfered with the order of termination and directed that the workman be reinstated in service with 75% backwages. In Para 7 of the reported decision the Supreme Court has inter alia observed that merely because the Labour Court had found the enquiry to be fair and lawful and the findings is not to be vitiated by any manner it cannot be said that it could not have interfered with the order of termination of service passed against the workman. As observed by the Supreme Court the Labour Court could exercise its powers under Section 6 (2a) of the Act. [section 6 (2a) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is analogous to Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Thus it is evident that the Labour Court could have exercised powers under Section 11-A of the Act even when it might have found that the enquiry was just and fair. It may be noted that in view of the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of A. N. T. Mills v. Textile Labour Association reported in 29 (2) GLR page 1324 the Labour Court is empowered to decide a dispute regarding the propriety and legality of the order passed by an employer. While deciding this dispute the Labour Court has to examine both the legality and propriety of the order. If the order is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act or the Rules or the Standing Orders or is violative of the principles of natural justice and fair play it can be interfered with by the Labour Court as being illegal. Even if the order is legal it can still be questioned on the ground that the same lacks propriety. This Court has held that the Labour Court when called upon to decide a dispute regarding the propriety of the order passed by an employer it is open to the Labour Court to decide whether the said order is proper fit appropriate suitable and in conformity with rightness correctness justness and accuracy. This Court has held that the Labour Court when called upon to decide a dispute regarding the propriety of the order passed by an employer it is open to the Labour Court to decide whether the said order is proper fit appropriate suitable and in conformity with rightness correctness justness and accuracy. The Labour Court can also examine the question as regards the punishment imposed by the employer under the impugned order and find out whether it is just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers are analogous to the powers under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Moreover in the instant case the Labour Court has found that the finding arrived at in the domestic enquiry was perverse. Therefore it cannot be said that the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order of punishment imposed upon the workman. ( 14 ) IN the case of Rama Kant Misra v. State of U. P. reported in (1982) 3 SCC page 346 the Supeme Court has observed that the Labour Court and Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction and power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act to substitute its measure of punishment in place of that awarded by the employer. In that case the workman was an office-bearer of the workers union. He was in service for about 14 years. One day he got enraged due to some deductions made from his wages. He used some indiscreet indecent or threatening language to his superior officer. On the ground of this misconduct departmental enquiry was held and at the conclusion of the departmental enquiry he was ordered to be dismissed from service. The Labour Court dismissed the reference. The High Court also did not interfere with the order passed by the Labour Court. The Supreme Court in a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution in Para 6 of the judgment observed that the punishment must be for misconduct. To some extent misconduct is a civil crime which is visited with civil and pecuniary consequences. In order to avoid the charge of vindictiveness justice equity and fair play demand that punishment must always be commensurate with the gravity of the offence charged. Many times Court found that while the misconduct is proved the punishment was disproportionately heavy. To some extent misconduct is a civil crime which is visited with civil and pecuniary consequences. In order to avoid the charge of vindictiveness justice equity and fair play demand that punishment must always be commensurate with the gravity of the offence charged. Many times Court found that while the misconduct is proved the punishment was disproportionately heavy. Prior to enactment of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act the Court remained powerless and had to be passive sufferers incapable of curing the injustice. Hence Section 11 was enacted by the Parliament. After making reference to the provisions of Section 11-A of the I. D. Act the Supreme Court in Para 7 of the decision has observed that the Labour Court has jurisdiction and power to substitute its measure of punishment in place of the managerial wisdom once it is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the instant case the Labour Court has found that the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate heavy or excessive and also observed that the forced idleness for a period of about 3 to 4 years and remaining unemployed without wages for this period was enough punishment to teach a lesson to the workman. There was no reason whatsoever for the Industrial Court to substitute this finding. As indicated hereinabove the Industrial Court has misread the judgment and order passed by the Court and thereby exceeded in exercise of its jurisdiction which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. ( 15 ) NO other contention is raised. ( 16 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court to the extent that it set aside the order passed by the Labour Court as regards the payment of backwages and the payment of cost of Rs. 500. 00 (Rupees five hundred only) to the petitioner-workman is quashed and set aside and the judgment and orders of the Labour Court is restored. The amount of backwages payable to the petitioner workman shall be paid to the workman by the respondent-Mill Company latest by 15/05/1993 In case the amount is not paid by 15/05/1993 it shall carry interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of this judgment till the amount is paid. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. Rule made absolute accordingly with no order as to costs. ( 17 ) AT this stage the learned Counsel for the respondent-Mill Company requests that the aforesaid judgment and order be stayed for a period of twelve weeks so as to enable the Mill Company to approach the Supreme Court and obtain appropriate order. The workman who is present in Court states that the. Mill Company has still not complied with the direction as regards reinstatement. Learned Counsel Mr. B. R. Gupta appearing for the respondent-Mill Company states that the said direction has not been complied with because the Mill Company has approached the Supreme Court and the order of reinstatement has not been stayed. ( 18 ) THE request made by the learned Counsel Mr. B. R. Gupta appearing for the respondent-Mill Company regarding stay of the judgment and operation of the aforesaid direction will be considered on 19/04/1993 The Factory Manager of the respondent-Mill Company is directed to remain personally present in Court on 19-4-1993. ( 19 ) THE Factory Manager is not present. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. K. G. Vakharia is also not present. However Mr. B. R. Gupta appearing for the respondent-Mill Company states that the Factory Manager is on leave and Mr. K. G. Vakharia is at present not in the Court. S. O. to 20-4-1993 at 4. 45 p. m. in Chamber. Parties are directed to remain personally present in Court. Respondent shall remain present through the General Manager. 19-4-1993 At the report of the parties S. O. to 22-4- 1993 at 4. 45 p. m. Order: (23-3-1993) today when the petition is called out petitioner-workman is present but no one on behalf of the respondent-N. T. C. is present. In the facts of the case it would not be proper to grant the request for staying the aforesaid judgment and order of this Court made on behalf of the Mill Company. It may be noted that after this Court (Coram: S. B. Majmudar J as he then was and S. D. Shah J.) rejected the petition i. e. Special Civil Application No. 4583/92 the workman was obliged to file Misc. Civil Application No. 1033 of 1992 praying that action for contempt be taken against the Mill Company for non-compliance of the order passed by the Court. On 21/09/1992 in that proceedings learned Counsel Mr. Civil Application No. 1033 of 1992 praying that action for contempt be taken against the Mill Company for non-compliance of the order passed by the Court. On 21/09/1992 in that proceedings learned Counsel Mr. B. R. Gupta appearing for the Mill Company inter alia stated before the Court as follows:"mr. Gupta further states that he shall move the Honble Supreme Court of India and obtain necessary order of stay by 21-11-1992 failing which he undertakes to reinstate the petitioner in service with all consequential benefits". It is an undisputed position that by 21/11/1992 no order staying the judgment and order passed by the Labour Court and the judgment and order passed by this Court has been obtained. It is also an undisputed position that the learned Advocate has not fulfilled the undertaking given to this Court. The petitioner-workman was then obliged to review the contempt petition. It is unfortunate that when this petition was heard learned Counsel for the respondent-Mill Company did not bring this fact to the notice of this Court. It may also be noted that the contempt petition i. e. M. C. A. No. 1033 of 1992 which was pending before another Division Bench (Coram: K. R. Vyas and A. N. Divecha JJ.) was called out on 19/04/1993 and on that day without informing the Bench about the judgment and order passed by this Court on 17/04/1993 in this Special Civil Application No. 329 of 1993 certain orders have been obtained in that contempt petition and the contempt petition has been adjourned to 14/06/1993 It is unfortunate that the respondent-N. T. C. which runs the Mill in question and which is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India has not fulfilled the undertaking given to this Court and has not placed all the facts before this Court and before the Court taking-up contempt matters. Having regard to the overall facts and circumstances of the case it appears that the respondent-Mill Company is not justified in not complying with the orders passed by this Court. If the request for stay is refused no injury whatsoever will be caused to the respondent-Mill Company while on the other hand the petitioner-workman who is out of job since 15/11/1988 and who has remained unemployed and without wages till today will suffer prangs of starvation and will have to undergo other untold miseries. If the request for stay is refused no injury whatsoever will be caused to the respondent-Mill Company while on the other hand the petitioner-workman who is out of job since 15/11/1988 and who has remained unemployed and without wages till today will suffer prangs of starvation and will have to undergo other untold miseries. We hope that the respondent-N. T. C. will adopt reasonable approach and will at least see that the undertaking given to this Court through its Advocate on 21/09/1992 is complied with immediately. For the aforesaid reasons request for stay is refused. (NSS) Order accordingly. .