JUDGMENT S.P. Srivastava 1. Feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the appellate authority in the proceedings under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, negativing the claim of the tenant petitioner regarding the non maintainability of the release application filed by the respondent landlord for want of notice contemplated under the Ist proviso to section 21 (1) of the Act, the tenant petitioner has approached this Court seeking the quashing of the order passed by the appellate authority. 2. The undisputed facts which emerge from the evidence and the materials on record are that the landlord had purchased the building of which the disputed premises forms part on 26-10-1976. A notice dated 1/4-10-1982 was issued by the landlord wherein the tenant petitioner was required to vacate the premises in question. The aforesaid notice was duly served on the respondent. Initially a suit for ejectment of the tenant was filed in the Small Cause court on the basis of aforesaid notice, in which even though the tenant was found to be a defaulter, he was relieved of the decree of ejectment as he had satisfied the requirements envisaged under section 20 (4) of the said Act. It was thereafter that an application for release was filed by the petitioner under section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 for the same accommodation and in support of its maintainability reliance was placed on the same notice on the basis where of the suit to which a reference has been made above had been filed. Initially the Prescribed authority dismissed the release application on the ground of its non- maintainability for want of notice. The appellate authority however, has found the same notice to which a reference has been made above to be a valid notice and reversed the finding of the prescribed authority about the non maintainability of the release application for want of notice and has remanded the case for decision in accordance with the law. I have heard Shri K. M. Mishra learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Tarun Verma, learned Counsel representing the respondents. 3. I have heard Shri K. M. Mishra learned Counsel for the petitioner and Shri Tarun Verma, learned Counsel representing the respondents. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the notice relied upon by the landlord could not be deemed to be a notice as envisaged under the first proviso of section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, in as much as, it did not specify that the premises should be vacated within six months and further did not contain an averment that the release application will be filed after expiry of the aforesaid period. It was further contended that in any case, the aforesaid notice had to be treated as having become non-est on account of the filing of the suit on the basis thereof and as exhausted on that account. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the notice but Iived its purpose which was the filing of the suit and in this view of the matter, it was necessary for the landlord to give a fresh notice in case, he wanted to initiate proceedings under section 21 (1) (a) of U P. Act No. 13 of 1912. This having not been done, it is asserted, the release application could not be entertained and was liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. 4. Learned counsel for the respondents however, has urged that the notice in the present case, was a composite/combined notice and satisfied the requirements envisaged under the provisions contained under section 20 (2) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 as well as the requirements contemplated under the 1st proviso to section 21 (1) (a) of the aforesaid Act. It was further contended that the notice in question, could not, under the law be either treated as exhausted or non-est with the filing of the suit for ejectment find in the circumstances of the case could very well be availed of even for maintaining the release application. It was further contended that the notice in question, could not, under the law be either treated as exhausted or non-est with the filing of the suit for ejectment find in the circumstances of the case could very well be availed of even for maintaining the release application. I have given my anxious thought to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record, A perusal of the aforesaid notice, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure-4 to the writ petition shows that it is a combined/composite notice purporting to be a notice contemplated under section 20 (2) of the aforesaid Act as well as a notice envisaged under the 1st proviso to section 21 (1) (a) of the aforesaid Act. The aforesaid section along with the proviso is to the following effect x "21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant ?- (1) The prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely- (a) that the building is bonafide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family or any person for whose benefit it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purposes of any profession, trade or calling, or where the landlord is the trustee of a public charitable trust, for the objects of the trust; (b) that the building is in a dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new construction; Provided that where the building was in the occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in Clause (a) unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years.........." 5. In the notice in question, the landlord has clearly asserted that they urgently required the accomodation in dispute for their personal residence and had also required the tenant to hand over vacant possession of the demised premises. 6. It is however, true that in the notice it has not been mentioned that the tenant should vacate the premises within six months and it has also not been indicated that a release application will be filed after the expiry of six months. In the circumstances, the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the notice referred to above, indicating that the accommodation was required by the landlord for their personal use for residential purposes and demanding the tenant to handover vacant possession thereof could be deemed to be sufficient compliance of the requirement as envisaged under the 1st .proviso to section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. 7. The proviso referred to above prohibits the entertainment of the application for release contemplated, (hereunder on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) unless the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before moving such application. The section 21 (1) (a) of the said Act provides that the application for release may be entertained on the ground that the building is bonafide required either in its existing form or after demolition and new construction by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family, or any person for whose benefit, it is held by him, either for residential purposes or for purpose of any profession, trade or calling or where the landlord is a trustee of public charitable trust for the object of the trust. 8. In the present case, the landlords had clearly indicated in the notice that the building in question was required by them for their personal use for residential purpose and also requested the tenant to vacate the same. There is no dispute that the application for release was filed much after the expiry of the period of six months. The proviso in question does not cast any duty on the landlord to specify in the notice that the tenant should vacate the premises within six months. There is no dispute that the application for release was filed much after the expiry of the period of six months. The proviso in question does not cast any duty on the landlord to specify in the notice that the tenant should vacate the premises within six months. On the other hand the proviso prohibits entertainment of the release application before the expiry of the period of six months from the date of the service of the notice. The term 'entertain' as occurring in the proviso in question, appears to have been used to prohibit the prescribed authority to adjudicate upon or to consider on merits the application for release unless the period of six months had expired calculated from the date of service of the notice on the tenant. In this connection, it may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Punnu Sahu, AIR 1970 SC 1384 , had reiterated its earlier decision in the case of Laxmi Ratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner Sales Tax. kanpur, AIR 1968 SC 488 , wherein the expression 'entertain' was 'interpreted as meaning 'adjudicate upon' or 'proceed to consider on merits'. The further requirement of the proviso is that the tenant must be apprised of the ground for seeking the vacation of the premises. In the present case, the landlord had clearly informed the tenant about the ground for release, which was that the building in question was required for personal residence of the landlord. It may be observed that the notice contemplated under the proviso referred to above is not a notice for (terminating the tenancy. The object of the notice is to furnish information to the tenant about the requirement of the landlord in order to enable the tenant to search for an alternative accomodation after receiving the notice. The legislature appears to have thought the period of six months to (be sufficient period for this purpose, and it is with this end in view that the competent authority stands prohibited from entertaining the application for release for a period of six months to be counted from the date of the service of the notice, as indicated above. It is therefore, obvious that the non-mentioning of the period of six months in the notice itself could not invalidate the notice. It is therefore, obvious that the non-mentioning of the period of six months in the notice itself could not invalidate the notice. The release application based on such notice, in case, it is filed after the expiry of six months calculated from the date of the service of the same on the tenant, can not be dismissed as non-maintainable. In this connection, I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the decision to the case of Muslim Parwez v. Mohammad Jalil, 1985 (2) ARC 377. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision in the case of Sita Ram Agarwal v. Ilnd Additional District Judge, 1977 ARC 296, in support of his contention that the notice in question stood exhausted on the filing of the suit. I have perused the above decision. It is of no assistance to the petitioner. What has been held in this case is that in case, a suit is filed on the basis of the notice terminating the tenancy and the suit is dismissed, the relationship of landlord and tenant does not come to an end and the old relationship of land lord and tenant continues to exist. The aforesaid decision has to be read talcing into consideration the law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court in its decision In the case of Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 796 , where under it has been clearly held that the effect of the notice under section 106 Transfer of Property Act terminating the tenancy is that it results in the snapping of the contractual relationship of landlord and tenant but the protection afforded under the Rent Act continues the said relationship as inspite of the contractual tenancy having been terminating the tenant continues to retains the character of statutory tenant with the same rights and liabilities, which he enjoyed before the termination of the contractual tenancy. It cannot be over-looked as observed by the Apex Court that in 'view of the provisions contained in the Rent Act, a contractual tenant on the termination of the contractual tenancy is by virtue of the provisions of tie Rent Act not liable to be evicted, as matter of course under the ordinary law of the land and he is entitled to remain in possession even after determination of the contractual tenancy and no order or decree for eviction can be passed against such a tenant unless any ground, which entitles the landlord to get an order or decree for possession specified under the Act is established. 10. It may however, be further observed that the notice envisaged under the proviso in question should contain a formal demand in writing insisting on vacant possession of the demised premises. The notice in question should also specify the nature of the requirement as well. The provisions contained under section 20 and 21 of the U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 contemplate proceedings before different forms, on different considerations and with different consequences. The purpose of the eviction of the tenant from the premises in question, however, is common in both of these proceedings. The aforesaid provisions, it is therefore, obvious, provide for two remedies for the same purpose to the extent as indicated above. There is nothing in the scheme of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, which may prohibit the prosecution of these two remedies simultaneously,. In the aforesaid circumstances, I am clearly of the view that under the scheme of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972, there is no such requirement, which may contemplate issuing of separate notices before instituting proceedings as envisaged under section SO or 21 of the said Act. A combined/ composite notice can not therefore, be deemed to be prohibited. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice in question stood exhausted or became non-est or out lived its purpose, with the filing of the suit is totally misconceived and baseless. A combined/ composite notice can not therefore, be deemed to be prohibited. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice in question stood exhausted or became non-est or out lived its purpose, with the filing of the suit is totally misconceived and baseless. The notice, in view of what has been pointed out above, can not be deemed to have exhausted itself or become non-est or out lived its purpose so long as the object of eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute is not achieved or the notice itself is waived by conduct or otherwise or it is statutorily nullified. In this connection. it may be further observed that document purporting to have a legal effect may fail to achieve that effect only if it lacks something but it can not be said to fail to achieve that effect just because it contains a superfluous matter unless the law makes it devoid of the effect on account of its containing the superfluous matter. 11. In the present case, therefore, the notice in question could not be held to. be invalid because it .purported to contain those assertions also which are relevant for the purposes of section 20 (2) of the Act, 12. For the conclusions indicated hereinbefore, I do not find any error much less manifest error of law in the impugned order, which may justify any interference in the exercise of the jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is devoid of merits and is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to cost. Petition dismissed.