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1992 DIGILAW 126 (GAU)

Md. Siddique Ali and Ors. v. Md, Ali and Ors.

1992-08-26

D.N.BARUAH, R.K.MANISANA SINGH

body1992
D. N. Banian, J.— This criminal revision has been referred by the learned Single Judge to decide the following questions :- "Whether an order passed under section 146(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code attaching the land in dispute can be treated as an interlocutory order or not ?" 2. This has been referred in view of different views expressed in two decisions in Indrapuri Primary Co-operative Housing Society Ltd & another vs. Bhabani Gogoi reported in 1990 GHC 583 [1990 (2) GLJ 398] and Uriki-mbam Kala Singh vs. Takhel Lambam Juginder Singh & others reported in 1982 GHC 59. In Urikhioitaam Kmla Singh (supra) Hansaria, J. held that an order of attachment under section 146 (1) cannot be treated as interlocutory order and therefore revision would lie. On the other hand the recent decision reported in 1990 GHC 538 [1990 (2) GLJ 398] one of us (Manisana, J.) held that the order under section 146 (1) is an interlocutory order and no revision lies under section 397 (2) of the CrPC. In this revision, we are therefore required to answer the reference. We have heard Mr. SN Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. BP Bora learned counsel for the opposite party. 3. Section 146 is a part of section 145 under which a Magistrate declares possession of a party who is found to be in actual possession or entitled to be in possession. This section deals with Magistrate's power to attach the subject of the dispute. The section further empowers the Magistrate to appoint receiver in a proceeding, in an appropriate case, under section 145 CrPC The pow«r under section 146 can be exercised namely at anytime after making the preliminary order under section 145 - (1) in case if the Magistrate considers the case to be one of emergency in order to prevent the danger of breach of peace and (2) after the enquiry under section 145(4) when the Magistrate due to paucity or unreliability of evidence is unable to decide who among the parties was in actual possession as referred to in section 145 or decides that none of the parties was in such actual possession. This situation is envisaged under section 145 (4) where the Magistrate is directed to come to a decision as to possession, if possible. 4. This situation is envisaged under section 145 (4) where the Magistrate is directed to come to a decision as to possession, if possible. 4. From the reading of the section 146, it is abundantly clear that there can be no order under section 146 without a proceeding under section 145 CrPC. Besides, order of attachment under section 146 (1) is permissible only when the Magistrate considers the case to be one of emergency or is unable to decide question of possession after enquiry as prescribed under section 145 CrPC. The attachment to continue until a competent Court determines the rights of parties thereto. 5. Under the old Code two kinds of attachment, namely attachment in case of emergency before the enquiry under section 145(4) and attachment after the said enquiry in case of doubt as to which of the party was in possession or decision that none of the parties was in such possession were separately provided for in two separate provisions; the first one under proviso 3 to old section 145 (4) and second one in section 146. The first kind of attachment in case of emergency and a qualifying clause pending his own decision in the case, meaning only that this should remain in force till Magistrates own decision in the enquiry. However, in the present Code both the said two kinds of attachments have been incorporated in section 146. In the result the matter consequential to attachment such as appoinment of receiver which were provided for in case of attachment under section 146 after enquiry under the old Code and which were absent in case of emergency are now provided for in case of emergency attachment. Because of new section 146 also contained a clause "until a competent court has determined the tights of the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the possession thereof " has led to divergent views of different High Courts. 6. In Urikhimbam Kala Singh, this Court relying on a decision of Malam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan held that an order of attachment under section 146 (1) is a final order and amenable to a revision. Again in Indrapnri Primary Co-operative Society Ltd. (supra) this Court after discussing various case laws and the provisions of section 397 (2) CrPC held that an order under section 146 (1) is an interlocutory order and therefore no revision ties. 7. Again in Indrapnri Primary Co-operative Society Ltd. (supra) this Court after discussing various case laws and the provisions of section 397 (2) CrPC held that an order under section 146 (1) is an interlocutory order and therefore no revision ties. 7. On the above premises, we are now to see whether an order passed under section 146 (1) CrPC is an interlocutory order or not and whether against such order revision lies. Section 145 and 146 of the CrPC together coustitute a scheme for resolution of a situation where there is likelihood of breach of peace, because of a dispute concerning any lan once an order of attachment is made in any of the situations mentioned in the section, the dispute can be resolved by a competent Court and not by the Magistrate effecting the judgment. But, section 146 cannot be separated from section 145 CrPC inasmuch as section 146 is only a corrollary to section 145 Cr PC and therefore the said section 146 can only be read along with section 145. 8. The very purpose and object of section 145 is to maintain public peace and to prevent likelihood of breach of peace. Under the said section, Magistrate on being satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of peace concerning land and water or their boundaries may make a preliminary order. The said preliminary order is the basis of entire proceeding under section 145 and any time after such preliminary order if the Magistrate considers that the situation is so emergent an attachment of the property is necessary, the Magistarate may pass such order of attachment under section 146 CrPC. 9. A proceeding under section 145 commences with a preliminary order passed by the Magistrate and the proceeding shall continue wherein Magistrate shall make enquiry as envisaged under the said sections and the proceeding comes to an end in one of three ways mentioned in the said section. There is no half way through. There is also no question of stopping the case in the middle of the proceeding asking the parties to go to a civil Court. The proceeding can however be stopped if during the pendency of the proceeding, the Magistrate is satisfied that the likelihood of breach of peace 'ceased to exist. There is no half way through. There is also no question of stopping the case in the middle of the proceeding asking the parties to go to a civil Court. The proceeding can however be stopped if during the pendency of the proceeding, the Magistrate is satisfied that the likelihood of breach of peace 'ceased to exist. Section 146 (1) empowers a Magistrate to attach a property, but however section 146 does not indicate that with the passing of an order under the said section the jurisdiction of the Magistrate who initiated procecee-ding under section 145 comes to an end. rar from it, the obligation of the Magistrate to continue its enquiry and to pass order under section 145 (4) of the CrPC. Therefore, if the Magistrate is required to stop any enquiry after the order passed under section 146 the very object and purpose of section 145 will be futile. An emergency is the basis of an attachment under section 146 (1) and it cannot be said that in the event of emergency the dispute regarding the property ceased to exist. This is the view expressed by ' Supreme Court in Mathuralal vs. Bhanwarlal, AIR 1980 SC 242 . In the said decision the Supreme Court observed : "...... the provisions of section 145 and 146 of the 1973 Code aresubstantially same as the corresponding provisions before 1955 Amendment. The only noticeable change is that the second proviso to section 145 (4) has now been transposed to section 146 but without the words "pending his decision under this section" and with the words "at any time after making the order under section 145 (1)" super-added. The change, clearly is in the interest of convenient drafjtmanship. All situations in which an attachment may be made are now mentioned together in section 146. The words "pending his decision under this section" have apparently been omitted as unnecessary since section 145 provides how the proceeding initiated by a preliminary order must proceed and therefore an attachment made "at any time after making the order under section 145 (1) can only continue until the termination of the proceeding. The words "pending his decision under this section" have apparently been omitted as unnecessary since section 145 provides how the proceeding initiated by a preliminary order must proceed and therefore an attachment made "at any time after making the order under section 145 (1) can only continue until the termination of the proceeding. At th.e termination of the proceedings, if he finds one of the parties was in possession stipulated, the Magistrate must make an order as provided in section 145 (6) and withdraw the attachment as provided in section 146 (1) since there can be no dispute likely to cause a breach of peace once an order in terms of section 145 (6) is made." 10. In the said decision their Lordship concluded as follows: "In our view, it is wrong to hold that the Magistrate jurisdiction ends as soon as attachment is made on the ground of emergency." 11. A Division Bench decision of this Court also in Khetra Mohan Sarkar vs. Purna Chandra Mandal reported in 1978 Crl LJ 936 held that along with the order of attachment under section 146(1) of the Code, the proceeding under section 145 does not come to an end. In Urikhindam Kala Singh's case (supra) Hansaria, J. relying on decision 1977 Crl LJ held that the order of attachment under section 146 is not an interlocutory order. However, the later decision of the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Bhanwarilal (supra) has specifically held that the order of attachment under section 146 does not bring to an end to the section 145 proceeding even after the order, the proceeding continues and such proceeding comes to- an end in the various modes prescribed under section 145 CrPC. 12. In Indrapuri Primary Co-operative Society Ltd. one of us Manisana.J. held : "The order under section 146 (1) is a step in the procedure. The order can be revoked at any (time as provided under the proviso to section 146 (1), In that view of the matter, the order passed under section 146 (1) is an interlocutory within the purview of section 397 (2) CrPC." 13. As held by the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Bhanwarilal (supra) and also in the Division Bench of this Court in Khetra Mohan Sarkar (supra) the proceeding under section 145 does not come to an end along with the order passed under section 146 (1). As held by the Supreme Court in Mohanlal Bhanwarilal (supra) and also in the Division Bench of this Court in Khetra Mohan Sarkar (supra) the proceeding under section 145 does not come to an end along with the order passed under section 146 (1). Magistrate's jurisdiction to complete the proceeding under section 145 continues. The order under section 146 (1) is only a step in aid for proper disposal of the proceeding under section 145. Such order is passed in an emergent situation only to prevent breach of peace and to do further justice. Such order does not affect any persons right and in view of the above, the order passed under section 146 (1) cannot be said as a final order. It is only an interlocutory order. 14. We, therefore, accordingly answer the reference as follows : (a) An order under section 146 (1) CrPC passed by a Magistrate is an interlocutory order and not a final order. 15. We send back the case to the Hon'ble Single Judge for disposal of the case.