ORDER : The petitioner's grievance in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is that his plight is made miserable and pitiable. Though he was sent on deputation to work under respondent No. 1 by respondent No. 2, when no longer required by respondent No. 1. He is not accepted by respondent No. 2 either and to top it all, his services have not come to be terminated officially so far. With this unenviable position, he has been driven to approach this Court for redressal of his grievances for not being owned either by respondent No. 1 or by respondent No. 2. 2. The facts giving rise to this petitions move in a narrow compass. Respondent No. 2 needed services of Drivers presumably on casual or stop-gap basis. He therefore requisitioned suitable names from the Employment Exchange by one communication of 22nd August, 1983. Its copy is annexed with the reply affidavit in the instant case. It is accompanied by the duly filled in prescribed form. It appears that the present petitioner's name was sponsored by the Employment) Exchange. It appears that he was interviewed and was given a purely temporary appointment as a Driver. It appears that he was given appointment orders from time to time for certain specific periods as averred by him in paras 6 and 7 of his petition. Though there were artificial breaks in his service by means of several appointment orders, such breaks were only on paper but in reality he continued in his service without any break. It may be mentioned that this specific averment made by him in paras 6 and 7 of his petition has not come to be denied by or on behalf of respondent No. 2 in his reply affidavit. As transpiring from the reply affidavit, he was appointed last for a period from 24th March, 1985 to 18th April, 1985, by one order of 29th March, 1985. He was not engaged further under respondent No. 2. It has been averred thereafter that, upon the express desire of one Minister on 7th April, 1985, the petitioner worked under the said Minister till 26th June, 1985. According to the deponent of the reply affidavit, the petitioner's services stood terminated with effect from 26th June, 1985. He was not engaged further under respondent No. 2. It has been averred thereafter that, upon the express desire of one Minister on 7th April, 1985, the petitioner worked under the said Minister till 26th June, 1985. According to the deponent of the reply affidavit, the petitioner's services stood terminated with effect from 26th June, 1985. It appears that the petitioner's services with one vehicle bearing R.T.O. Registration No. GUF 9923 were placed under the Home Department by one communication of 10th July, 1985 issued from the office of respondent No. 2. Its copy is annexed as Annexure-l with the reply affidavit. It does not specify that the petitioner's services stood terminated with effect from 26th June, 1985. It only states that one Vehicle bearing R.T.O. Registration No. GU F 9923 has been assigned to the Home Department and along with it the services of the petitioner have been placed at the disposal of the Home Department. The Home Department, through its Secretary. is impleaded as respondent No. 1 in this petition. By one order passed on 19th July 1985, the Home Department accepted the services of the petitioner on deputation from respondent No. 2 with effect from 27th June. 1985. Its copy is at Annexure-A to this petition. It has been mentioned therein that, in case his services were no longer required, he would be sent back to respondent No. 2. Its copy appears to have been endorsed to respondent No. 2. It may he mentioned that one post of driver carte to be sanctioned in the Home Department by one Government Resolution of 7th June, 1985 as transpiring from the order at Annexure-A to this petition. It appears that, by some Government Resolution of 16th May, 1986, this post of driver was placed under suspension. It may be mentioned that the driver was not placed under suspension but the post of driver was not required to be filled in view of the said Government Resolution of 16th May, 1986 presumably on account of some economy measures. It appears that the petitioner thereupon became surplus in the Home Department. He was thereupon, by one order passed on 1st May 1986. repatriated to respondent No. 2. Its copy is at Annexure-B to this petition. It may be mentioned at this stage that his services did not come to be terminated under the order at Annexure-B to this petition. It appears that the petitioner thereupon became surplus in the Home Department. He was thereupon, by one order passed on 1st May 1986. repatriated to respondent No. 2. Its copy is at Annexure-B to this petition. It may be mentioned at this stage that his services did not come to be terminated under the order at Annexure-B to this petition. It appears that the petitioner thereupon went to resume his duties under respondent No. 2 but he was not permitted to do so on the ground that there was no vacancy in which he could be absorbed. Respondent No. 2. by one communication of 22nd May 1986 addressed to the concerned authority of the Home Department, informed the latter that the petitioner could not be absorbed as there was no vacancy under respondent No. 2. Its copy is at Annexure-C to this petition. It may be mentioned that respondent No. 2 also did not terminate the services of the petitioner by any order much less by the communication at Annexure-C to this petition. The plight of the petitioner was thus rendered precarious. He was relieved by respondent No. I for resumption of his duties at the office of respondent No. 2 but respondent No. 2 did not accept him under him. That has driven him to approach this Court by means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of his grievances. 3. Whatever be the nature of the petitioner's appointment prior to the order at Annexure-A, under the said order at Annexure-A he came to be absorbed in service as a temporary employee against a clear vacancy. It is true that the said vacancy was placed under a cloud presumably on account of some economy measures. But then he could not be thrown to streets once the order at Annexure- A was issued to him. Even at the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that, under the order at Annexure-A to this petition, the petitioner was accepted by respondent No. I as on deputation from respondent No. 2. The petitioner was thus given to understand that he was absorbed in regular service as on deputation from respondent No. 2. As pointed out hereinabove, a copy of the order at Annexure-A to this petition was endorsed to respondent No. 2. The petitioner was thus given to understand that he was absorbed in regular service as on deputation from respondent No. 2. As pointed out hereinabove, a copy of the order at Annexure-A to this petition was endorsed to respondent No. 2. It is not the case of respondent No. 2 that he never received the copy of the order at Annexure-A to this petition. If the petitioner's services were no longer required by respondent No. 2 or if the petitioner was not to be treated as on deputation in the office of respondent No. 1 from respondent No. 2, it was the duty of respondent No. 2 to have pointed out to respondent No. 1 in response to the order at Annexure-A that the petitioner's services were no longer required in the office of respondent No. 2. It was too late in the day for respondent No. 2 to have come out with the case, in the communication at Annexure-C, that the petitioner was not serving under respondent No. 1 as on deputation from respondent No. 2. 4. Again, respondent No. 2 has not chosen to place on record office copies of the appointment orders issued to the petitioner from time to time. According to the deponent of the reply affidavit, the petitioner's services were availed of by one Minister from 7th April 1985 up to 26th June 1985. It appears that there was no break in his service during that period from 7th April 1985 to 26th June 1985. It does not become clear from the reply affidavit whether or not any appointment order in that regard was issued. It is not the case of respondent No. 2 in the reply affidavit that the petitioner's services came to be terminated in any manner with effect from 26th June 1985. In that view of the matter, it is not possible to gulp down the case set up by and on behalf of respondent No. 2 in the reply affidavit that the petitioner's services stood terminated with effect from 26th June 1985. As pointed out hereinabove, if that was so, respondent No. 2 would have immediately stirred to action in response to receipt of the copy of the order at Annexure-A to this petition as endorsed to him. 5. Besides, respondent No. 2 has also not come to this Court with all full particulars. As pointed out hereinabove, if that was so, respondent No. 2 would have immediately stirred to action in response to receipt of the copy of the order at Annexure-A to this petition as endorsed to him. 5. Besides, respondent No. 2 has also not come to this Court with all full particulars. The communication at Annexure-C to this petition only recites that on that day there were in all 32 posts of driver under him and all the 32 posts were filled up. Whether any post of driver was filled in after the order at Annexure-A was passed is not on record. If any such post of driver was filled by respondent No. 2 under him after the order at Annexure-A was passed, respondent No. 2 ought to have given regular appointment to the petitioner instead of giving appointment to someone else. In absence of any such particulars, it would be difficult to visualise what was what at the relevant time when the communication at Annexure-C was issued. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner's services did not come to be terminated at any point of time. At least there is nothing on record to show that his services came to be terminated at a particular point of time. When his services are not terminated, he cannot be just left in the lurch. He ought toy have been taken back on service and, if his services were no longer required, they could have been terminated. There cannot be any termination of service without any express) action in that regard. 6. There is no substance in the submission urged before me by Shri Poojari for the respondents to the effect that the petitioner's appointment was not in accordance with the Driver-cum-Mechanic Recruitment Rules, 1970 (Rules for brief). In the first place, no such contention in that regard has been taken in the reply affidavit. Secondly, it has not been shown in what way the petitioner did not answer the requirements mentioned in the Rules. It is difficult to accept the submission that the direct selection contemplated in Rule 2 of the Rules would mean such direct selection only through public advertisement. The direct selection contemplated therein would be in contradistinction with selection by promotion. The petitioner was never in any employment under respondent No. 2 in any capacity. It is difficult to accept the submission that the direct selection contemplated in Rule 2 of the Rules would mean such direct selection only through public advertisement. The direct selection contemplated therein would be in contradistinction with selection by promotion. The petitioner was never in any employment under respondent No. 2 in any capacity. He came to be accepted as a driver in whatever capacity on forwarding of his name by the Employment Exchange. It is not in dispute that he was interviewed before selection. In that case he could be said to have been recruited by direct selection. He was admittedly not promoted to the post of driver from any lower position. 7. In view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the respondents, more particularly respondent No. 2, cannot refuse the petitioner from joining services under respondent No. 2 on his being relieved by they order at Annexure-B to this petition. 8. Since the action of the respondents more particularly of respondent No. 2, of not providing any employment to the petitioner cannot be sustained in law, he will have to be ordered to be reinstated in service with continuity in service. The question would arise as to what back wages should be made payable to the petitioner on his reinstatement in service. The principle of ‘no work no pay' cannot be made applicable in this case for the simple reason that the petitioner did not refuse to work. He was not allowed to work by the respondents, more particularly by respondent No. 2. The principle of 'no work no pay' would be applicable when the person refuses to work out of his own volition. 9. The reliance placed by Shri Poojari on the unreported ruling of this Court in Special Civil Appln. No. 4728 of 1984 decided on 14th October 1991 (reported in (1992)2 Guj LR 1216), in support of his submission that the petitioner should be awarded no back wages is misconceived. In the first place, the petitioner in that case was found to have become ineligible for holding the post on account of his having failed at the departmental examination, the clearance of which would entitle him to retain his post. In the first place, the petitioner in that case was found to have become ineligible for holding the post on account of his having failed at the departmental examination, the clearance of which would entitle him to retain his post. In the second place, the aforesaid unreported ruling of this Court has not taken into consideration the Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of Sub-Divisional v. M.M. Saiyed, reported in 1990(1) Guj LR 495. In that case the services of one Government employee was terminated without complying with Rule 33(I)(b) of the Bombay Civil Services Rules, 1959 (the ‘B.C.S. Rules' for brief). No due notice was given nor was the salary for the notice period paid before effecting the termination in that case. It has been held that such termination gets voided and the employee must be reinstated. With respect, the attention of the learned single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 4728 of 1984 decided on 11th/14th October, 199I was not invited to the aforesaid Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of M.M. Saiyed (supra). In absence of this notice, the learned single Judge, after observing that the termination was not in accordance with law in that case, did not order reinstatement in service and instead ordered payment of only one month's pay in lieu of the notice period. In view of the aforesaid binding Division Bench ruling of this Court in the case of M.M. Saiyed (supra), I am unable to persuade myself to follow the aforesaid unreported ruling of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 4728 of 1984 decided on 11th/14th October, 1991. 10. Reverting to the question of back- wages, one thing is certain that the petitioner was appointed as a driver. He was relieved by respondent No. 1 by the order at Annexure-B way back on 22nd May 1986. He was not allowed to resume his service under respondent No. 2. It is difficult to believe that he would have remained jobless during the intervening period. It is possible that he might not have earned so much salary as he would have earned in Government service. Ordinarily, an enquiry could have been ordered to find out what he earned during the intervening period. It is difficult to believe that he would have remained jobless during the intervening period. It is possible that he might not have earned so much salary as he would have earned in Government service. Ordinarily, an enquiry could have been ordered to find out what he earned during the intervening period. Institution of such enquiry might add to his agonies which he has suffered on account of his having been thrown on the streets because of inaction on the part of respondent No. 2. I am therefore of the opinion that, instead of ordering any enquiry as to his earning during the intervening period, the ends of justice will fully be met if payment of half back wages for the intervening period is ordered. 11. In the result, this petition is accepted. The respondents are, more particularly respondent No. 2 is directed forthwith to reinstate the petitioner in service. The respondents are, more particularly respondent No. 2 is, further directed to pay to the petitioner half of the back wages from the day next from the date of his release pursuant to the order at Annexure-B to this petition, that is, from 17th May, 1986, till his reinstatement in service. The respondents are directed to comply with this direction within four weeks from the receipt of the writ from this Court or from production of a certified copy of the judgment in this case by or on behalf of the petitioner. Rule is accordingly made absolute however with no order as to costs on the facts and in the circumstances of the case. The Registry is directed to send the writ in this case as expeditiously as possible, preferably by 20th April, 1992. Order accordingly.