Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. - This application is directed against an order dated 26-7-1988 passed by the Additional Munsif, 2nd Court at Aurangabad in title Suit No.16 of 1986 whereby and whereunder the said learned court rejected an application filed on behalf of the petitioner purported to be under Sections 4 (B) and 4 (C) of the Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to the said Act ). 2. The fact of the matter lies in very narrow compass. 3. The plaintiff filed Title Suit No.16 of 1986 for a declaration that a deed of gift executed in favour of defendant-petitioner No.1 was a sham and void documents. According to the plaintiff-opposite party, he is the owner of said property. The defendant-petitioner No.2 was the legally wedded wife of his son Naimuddin and defendant-petitioner no.1 was his grandson. 4. It is further the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant-petitioner No.2 and her father with the help of their friends got a deed of gift dated 16-2-1984 drawn up in favour of petitioner No.1 showing him to be under the guardianship of the petitioner of No.2. It was further alleged that on the aforementioned deed of thumb impression of the opposite party was purported to have been put which was really a forged one. According to the plaintiff some person had impersonated him. 5. The plaintiff further stated that he is still in possession of the lands in question and the deed of gift being a forged document, the same does not affect his right title and interest in the lands in question. 6. The petitioners filed a written statement alleging intet alia therein that the deed of gift was a genuine document wich was executed in presence of various witnesses. 7. The petitioners filed an application on 13-7-1988 which is contained in annexure-1 to the Civil Revision Application wherein inter alia it was contended that upon coming into force of the said Act, the suit has abated. 8. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder to the said application on 15-7-1988 (Annexure-2 ). 7. The petitioners filed an application on 13-7-1988 which is contained in annexure-1 to the Civil Revision Application wherein inter alia it was contended that upon coming into force of the said Act, the suit has abated. 8. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder to the said application on 15-7-1988 (Annexure-2 ). By reason of the impugned order the learned court below held that as the parties are required to lead evidence with regard to the issue as to whether the document in question is a genuine one or not the suit cannot be said to have abated in terms of Sec.4 (C) of the said Act. 9. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that from the reliefs claimed by the plaintiff it would appear that the decree has been prayed for a declaration that the aforementioned deed of gift dated 16-2-1984 is a forged document, and thus it must be held that in the event, the plaintiff succeeds, the same will have to be declared to be a void document and in that view of the matter the Consolidation Authorities will have jurisdiction to decide the said issue and in that view of the matter the suit must be held to have abated. 10. The learned counsel further submitted that the impugned order is vitiated in law inasmuch as the learned court below has merely rejected the prayer of the petitioner on the ground that both the parties would have to adduce evidence on the aforementioned issue. 11. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party, on the other hand, submitted that as in view of the pleadings of the parties;-it is evident, that the issue which requires consideration at the hands of the learned court below it with regard to the genuineness of the document and as such the suit filed by the plaintiff cannot be said to have abated. 12. Learned counsel in this connection has placed strong reliance upon decision of this court in Chhote Gope V/s. Kail Gope, 1983 BBCJ 124 . 13. In Chhote Gapes case (supra) a learned Single Judge of this court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nathv. 12. Learned counsel in this connection has placed strong reliance upon decision of this court in Chhote Gope V/s. Kail Gope, 1983 BBCJ 124 . 13. In Chhote Gapes case (supra) a learned Single Judge of this court relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Gorakh Nathv. Hari Narain Singh, AIR 1973 SC 2451 wherein it has been held as follows : "there is distinction between cases where a document is wholly or partially invalid so that it can be disregarded by any court or authority and one where it has to be actually set aside before it can cease to have legal effect. An alienation made in excess of power to transfer would be the extent of the excess of power, invalid. An adjudication on the effect of such purported alienation would be necessarily implied in the decision of a dispute involving conflicting claims to rights of interests in land which are the subject-matter or consolidation proceedings. But where there is a document the legal effect of which can only be taken away by setting it aside or its cancellation, it can be said that the consolidation authorities have no power to cancel the deed and therefore it must be held to be binding on them so long as it is not cancelled by a court having the power to cancel it. " 14. A suit for cancellation of a document comes within the purview of Sec.31 of the Specific Reliefs Act. It is now well settled that if a document is void, the suit would abates but if the same is voidable, the suit would not abate. 15. Reference in this connection may be made to a Full Bench decision of this court in Sheoratan Chamar V/s. Ram Murat Singh; 1985 PLJR 86 . 16. In Sheoratan Chamars case (supra) the Full Bench held as follows : - "now applying the ratio of Gorakhnath Dubeys case to the case where the issue rests solely or primarily on the challenge to a particular document or deed, the resultant consequence is that if the said document is void ab initio then necessarily the proceeding will jjabate and the matter would come squarely within the jurisdiction of the consolidation authorities. However, if such a document is only voidable in nature and is sought to be voided by one of the parties on any ground, then the court has to adjudicate upon the same and set it aside, and, therefore, no abatement of such a proceeding would follow and the forum, including jurisdiction to deal with the same. Mr. Jagdish Pandey, learned counsel for the appellants somewhat tenuously and vainly had attempted to distinguish the observations in Gorakhnath Dubeys case. However, the argument was one of desperation and nothing meaningful could be pointed out which could possible take the present case out of the sweep and ambit of those observations. Equally vainly, learned counsel relied on a single Judge decision of this court in Tarkeshwar upadhyaya V/s. Mahesh and others, 1982 BBCJ 114 : 1982 pljr 155. A close perusal of the same would indicate that after reference to Gorakhnath Dubeys case, the learned Single judge expressly held in Paragraph 8 of the report that the document in the said case having been executed by a person of unsound mind was plainly void and inevitably the proceeding in the Civil Court would, therefore, abate and fall within the jurisdiction of the Consolidation authorities. Reference was also made by learned counsel to Bijali Thakur V/s. Rameshwar thakur, 1977 BBCJ 701 s 1977 PLJR 410 and Bansi Bhagat V/s. Kishun Bhagat, 1977 Pat 304 : 1980 PLJR 539, which equally are of no relevance. As has been noticed above, the ratio in Gortkhnath dubeys case (supra) is attracted only in a case founded entirely on a transfer document. It would appear that no such situation or issue arose in any one of the above cases, far, from the same being considered or adjudicated upon. To concluse, following the ratio in Gorakhnath Dubeys case (supra), it is held that under Sec.4 (C) of the Act, all cases where the lis is rested wholly on a document or transfer deed, the proceeding would abate, if such document is void, but no such abatement would result, if the same is Avoidable and has to be set aside by the court after adjudication. " 17. The Full Bench considered the difficulty in deciding a void and voidable documents and observed that in a marginal case, if may not be easy to draw the line. 18. " 17. The Full Bench considered the difficulty in deciding a void and voidable documents and observed that in a marginal case, if may not be easy to draw the line. 18. It is the case of the plaintiff that the document is void ab inttio as the genuineness of the forged document is in question. 19. In this case, the plaintiff has categorically stated the he did not execute any document, and thus, his title in relation to the {lands in suit has not passed to the defendants as the same contains of a forged signature made by somebody upon impersonating him. This being the situation, if the petitioner-plaintiffs allegations are correct, the document would be void ab initio, inasmuch as, if he is not an executant in relation to the instrument in question, his interest could not have passed to the transferee by reason thereof. In the case of Sheo Ratan Chamars case (supra), the Full Bench categorically held that in a case the plaintiff takes the pleaithat he was not the executant of the document in question the matter would be different but in the facts of that case the question of validity of the document was raised on the grounds which would make the same a voidable transaction and not a void one. 20. As in this case, the plaintiff categorically alleged that he is not the executant of the document in question, the document, would be a void one if the allegations made in the plaint are proved. 21. In that view of the matter in my opinion, the learned court below has committed jurisdictional error in not directing that the suit has abated in terms of Sec.4 (C) of the said Act. 22. In the result, this application is allowed and the impugned order dated 26-7-1988 is set a side. 23. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, there will be no order as to costs application allowed.