JUDGMENT In this application three writ petitioners in their personal capacities seek to challenge an office order dated 26th November, 1991 whereby the Steel Authority of India Ltd. cancelled their earlier proposal of disposal of office equipment to the employees from their erstwhile Martin Burn Building. 2. It is on record that by a letter dated 30th September, 1991 the Steel Authority gave notice to M/s. Martin Burn Ltd. that they would be vacating the premises on 1st January, 1992 consequent upon construction of their own office building. 3. By a circular dated 10th October, 1991 the Steel Authority listed certain office furniture for inviting-requirements by any of the departments at Poddar Court and such other bodies as the Steel Club, Ispat Club etc. 4. It is subsequent thereto that notice of 1st November, 1991 was issued whereby the authorities decided to dispose of office furniture to all employees of SAIL as described in the said circular itself, a copy of which is the first annexure to the writ petition. 5. Pursuant to the said circular there was a big response and it is stated in the opposition of SAIL that about 950 employees quoted their various rates in respect of the various items. 6. In sub-paragraphs (d), (e) & (f) in the said opposition under paragraph 5 thereof the various steps regarding attempted completion of the auction to the various employees are set out. It is stated there that on 22nd November, 1991 a final list was published for nine items and that the final list in respect of other categories of items was completed on 25th November, 1991. The intended deliver, dates were also extended upto 1st December, 1991. The final list was published with regard to eligible employees with bid for only one place of each category of item. 7. Until the time aforementioned the authorities were going ahead with the scheme of sale to employees themselves. On 26th November, 1991, the aforesaid cancellation order was published. It is mentioned in Sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 5 of the opposition that the cancellation was made because several errors were pointed out and a rectification of these errors would result in a disturbance of the final list published already. 8. On 26th November, 1991, the aforesaid cancellation order was published. It is mentioned in Sub-paragraph (g) of paragraph 5 of the opposition that the cancellation was made because several errors were pointed out and a rectification of these errors would result in a disturbance of the final list published already. 8. In Sub-paragraph (h) of paragraph 5 of the opposition two old circulars of 1981-82 are mentioned, copies whereof are also annexed to the opposition whereby it was published the for disposal of condemned items the mode of disposal would be by auction either directly by the company or through DGS & D. 9. Mr. Anindya Mitra appearing for the respondents has submitted that the events subsequent to 1st November, 1991 have exposed the decision to auction the items to the employees as a policy mistake. It is upon detection of the said mistake that the cancellation order was issued on 26th November, 1991. 10. There employees and three employees only have filed this instant petition. I do not want to take any extreme technical view of the matter but in case the three employees are not proceeding in representative capacity then and in that event their individual grievances should, according to the strict law, take the shape of three different writs. 11. Be that as it may, I find from the annexures to the writ petition that three money receipts of the three writ petitioners are annexed and all of them are dated 26th November, 1991 being the date of cancellation of the earlier auction programme of sale to the employees only. The respective amounts of Rs. 896/-, Rs. 253.15 and Rs. 450/- have been deposited under those receipts. They are all deposited according to the receipts on account of “BBA Account-(28499002)” as the said endorsements appear to be. 12. On the basis of the aforesaid three receipts the writ petitioners claim to have the cancellation of the auction set aside, and want orders compelling the respondents to proceed with the sale of the employees themselves. The interim order in this matter was passed on the 3rd December, 1991 in terms as follows : “The Court:- Affidavit-in-opposition is to be filed within two weeks from date, affidavit-in-reply one week after the Christmas holidays and the matter to appear in the list two weeks after the Christmas holiday. Interim order already made, to continue until further orders of this Court. Interim order already made, to continue until further orders of this Court. It is clarified that pendency of this writ proceedings however, will not present the respondents Steel Authority of India to remove the furniture, and sittings to another godown without disturbing the nature and character of the concerned furniture. All parties to set on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking.” 13. It has been submitted before me by Mr. Mitra, though the same is not in the Affidavit-in-opposition, that SAIL has, pursuant to its notice vacated the premises as premised on 1st January, 1992. It has further been stated by Mr. Mitra that the items of furniture are now lying in a godown and that a possible public auction would be held in that regard and so far as Mr. Mitra was presently advised there would by no bar to any employees participating in such public auction if and when held. 14. Mr. Mitra also argued that apart from the policy mistake in restricting sales to the employees the respondents would also suffer monetarily if the final list as published on 25th November, 1991, was itself adhered to. The employees themselves pointed out certain discrepancies and mistakes and in that regard two letters both of 26th November, 1991, were referred to appearing respectively at pages 34 & 35 of the annexures to the opposition. 15. Bikash Bhattacharyya appearing for the writ petitioners relied upon the case of (1) Steel Crakers reported in AIR 1992 Calcutta 86 and placed before me paragraph, 16 & 17 from the judgment. In those two paragraphs, as I respectfully read the judgment delivered in that case. Justice Banerjee has recognised and applied the well established principle of State authorities being bound to act fairly in all circumstances. In the facts of that case his Lordship came to the conclusion that a second auction was unfair and the reason for cancellation of the first auction was in reality the putting of pressure upon the first successful party for railing its bid. 16. Whether the State authorities are guilty of unfair action has to be judged in each case on the different facts applicable to the case in hand. No unfairness is manifest from the cancellation of the restricted auction to the employees in the case before me. 16. Whether the State authorities are guilty of unfair action has to be judged in each case on the different facts applicable to the case in hand. No unfairness is manifest from the cancellation of the restricted auction to the employees in the case before me. From the records of the case, it does not appear that any of the 950 employees deposited any money, but the deposits came from three writ petitioners themselves, and that too on the date of cancellation of the auction itself. 17. None of the other 950 employees is apparently aggrieved by the cancellation of the list, as in that event, they would have come forward either by their own writs or would have indicated their disapproval of the cancellation to any of the three instant writ petitioners and would have joined in this writ petition itself, even though that might not have been strictly in accordance with the law as to joinder of causes of action. 18. In my opinion the cancellation of the restricted auction took place on grounds which are cogent and bona fide. Apart from the policy change of holding public sales instead of restricted sales, these grounds were that the mistakes regarding sales of certain items were pointed out by the employees themselves. Such mistakes may have been un-business –like and inefficient but these do not lead to any inference of unreasonableness of high handedness would call for interference from the judiciary. 19. When all is said and done executive word must be left to be done by the executive in the manner they are best able to discharge the same. The judiciary interferes only in cases of manifest unreasonableness which are so important and glaring as to amount to a breach of the mandate of-Article 14 itself. Not every bungling and not every mistake of the executive should result in an interference by the judiciary and taking up of the executive work upon its own shoulders. 20. The Second reason for cancellation of the auction programme was for prevention of possible loss of revenue to the respondents. This is also not an unreasonable ground. Normally a disposal of office furniture need not necessarily be restricted to the employees as the same might cause far less money to be brought in as a result of the auction than could otherwise be had if the auction were held publicly. This is also not an unreasonable ground. Normally a disposal of office furniture need not necessarily be restricted to the employees as the same might cause far less money to be brought in as a result of the auction than could otherwise be had if the auction were held publicly. The second ground for cancellation of the agreement, in my opinion, also stands scrutiny, and is not in any manner mala fide or unreasonable or irrelevant to the issues at hand. 21. Apart from the above, the question remains as to whether even an unfair action is necessarily at all times to be rectified by issuance of a high prerogative writ, even where the unfairness is rectifiable by payment of money only. Certain instances of unfairness are not rectified in the writ jurisdiction at all because the same involve serious disputed question of facts. The law of writs does not claim to be a panacea for all unreasonableness on the part of all State authorities in respect of each and every action of theirs. Thus, even if the three employees before me have failed to drive good bargains pursuant to their deposit, which I assume were made bona fide for specified items, (which specified items are not manifest on the receipts themselves), even then, all that the writ petitioners have lost is money and money alone. 22. Under these circumstances in the ordinary courts of law neither would an application for injunction lie nor would a suit for specified performance be maintainable, Can it be that in spite thereof, a high prerogative writ should be issued and the respondents authorities should be bound to deliver furniture to the three writ petitioners in accordance with the three receipts of money mentioned above ? In my opinion, issuance of such a writ would be putting more emphasis upon abstract legal principles than upon the ordinary realities of the situation. 23. Under these circumstances the writ petition is dismissed and the rule, if any issued, is discharged; the interim order dated 3rd December, 1991 is vacated. 24. There will be no order as to costs. The copy petition handed upto Court shall be countersigned by the Court Officer and kept on record.