JUDGMENT Sudhir Narain, J. 1. This special appeal has been filed against the decision of the learned Judge dismissing the writ petition of the appellant by which he prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding the District Judge, Basti, to appoint him as Class III employee. In the year 1983, the then District Judge, Basti held a regular selection for the post of Class III cadre of Basti Judgeship the result of the selection was declared in June 1983 The appellant was selected and he was placed at serial number 35. The vacancy to the post was to be filled up in accordance with the seniority and the vacancy had to be filled up within a period of one year. The selection list was to continue for one year. In the year 1984, one Durga Prasad Gupta took leave for five days. The appellant was appointed on his leave vacancy and the appellant worked on (the said leave vacancy from 22-4-1984 to 26-4-1984, Sri Durga Prasad Gupta resumed his duties on 27-4-1984. The appellant claims that he was appointed within a period of one year and therefore he was entitled to continue in the service. He placed reliance upon Rule 14 of the Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947 which reads as under :- "Registration of selected candidates :- (1) The names of the candidates recruited in accordance with rule 12 shall be entered in order of merit in a bound register in Form (B) prescribed in Appendix I and each entry shall be initialled and dated by the District Judge after he has inspected the original of attested copies of certificates. An entry shall be made in the remark column against the name of a candidate who has qualified himself as a stenographer under rule 11. Note-An official working in the regular line shall be deemed to have qualified himself as a Stenographer if fit any examination held under rule 10 he is certified to possess a speed of 100 words per minute in shorthand and 35 words per minute in type-writing. (2) The name of any candidate entered under sub-rule (1) may be removed for inefficiency or misconduct. (2) The name of any candidate entered under sub-rule (1) may be removed for inefficiency or misconduct. (3) If any such candidate has not been given an appointment (offered in strict order of seniority according to the list in the bound register prescribed under sub-rule (1) within one year from the date of his recruitment, his name shall be automatically removed from the register of recruited candidates he must then take bis chance with others for recruitment again in a subsequent year." 2. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that if the appellant has worked even for a single day in whatever capacity, he shall be deemed to have been absorbed in the service. Rule 14 (3) of the Rules contemplates a regular appointment on the basis of (the selection but if any candidate has been appointed on a leave vacancy his appointment shall not be taken as a regular appointment on the basis of the selection. He is not being appointed on a vacant post. He works on a leave vacancy of an employee who is already holding that post. The selection list which was prepared in the year 1983 exhausted itself after the expiry of one year and the appellant was not entitled to get any appointment after the expiry of one year under sub-Rule 3 of Rule 14 of the Rules. In the counter affidavit it has been further stated that the appellant was placed at serial number 35 and other selected candidates who were above the appellant, were entitled to be appointed on leave vacancy, but the appellant was given chance out of turn. This fact has not been controverted by the appellant in the rejoinder affidavit filed in the writ petition. In these circumstances the appellant was not entitled to any benefit of the selection which had taken place in the year 1983 in which he was placed at serial number 35. Ali the vacancies were filled up on the basis of the selection which had taken place in the year 2983 for the post of Class III cadre. 3. In the year 1985, there was some vacancy in the police paper Copying Section of Basti Judgeship but the post were not sanctioned by the Government. The District Judge Basti appointed seven persons as police paper Copyists on daily wages the appellant was also appointed on daily wages on 10th September 1985. 3. In the year 1985, there was some vacancy in the police paper Copying Section of Basti Judgeship but the post were not sanctioned by the Government. The District Judge Basti appointed seven persons as police paper Copyists on daily wages the appellant was also appointed on daily wages on 10th September 1985. In the appointment letter it was clearly mentioned- "Keeping in view the heavy pendency in the police paper Copying Section, the following persons are engaged to work as police paper Copyists on dally wages, on the terms and conditions laid down in the G.O. No. 4269/VII A.N.-12/74, dated July 29, 1985 w.e.f. 10-9-85 These persons shall have no claim for their regular appointment in the civil court which is meant for selected candidates of this Judgeship. Their engagement is liabe to be terminated at any times without giving any reason, they shall have no lien in the employment nor this employment shall in any way weigh in the future recruitments if any this Judgeship. Their employment may be ceased any day without any notice." 4. The appellant continued to work on daily wages. The Government sanctioned the post of 7 paper Copyists. The appellant appeared in the said selection but he was not selected. Those candidates who were selected were given appointments but as the appellant was not selected in the selection which was held in the year 1985 he was not given any further Job of the copyist. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that he was entitled to be absorbed in the service as he was working on daily wages basis as a copyist. He placed reliance upon Jacob M Puthuparambil v. Kerala Water Authority. 1991 (1) SCC 28 In this case the Supreme Court on interpretation of Section 9 (a) (1) of the Kerala Water Supply and Severage Act, 1986 held that those Employees who were in long continuous service of the Authority their services should be regularised by the Authority. The Supreme Court Itself distinguished the case of P. K. Narayani v State of Kerala, 1984 (Supp.) SCC 212, where the employees who were working for past few years challenged the action of the employer in terminating their services to make room for the candidates selected by the Kerala Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court Itself distinguished the case of P. K. Narayani v State of Kerala, 1984 (Supp.) SCC 212, where the employees who were working for past few years challenged the action of the employer in terminating their services to make room for the candidates selected by the Kerala Public Service Commission. The Supreme Court directed that those petitioners and all other employees similarly placed should be allowed to appear in the next examination when the Public Service Commission may hold, without raising the age bar and till then the petitioners and others may continue in the service provided there are vacancies. In the present case, the appellant was given an opportunity but as he was not a selected candidate of the year 1984, he was not given appointment and regularly selected candidates were given appointment. The appellant cannot claim any right on the basis that he had worked on daily wages. Again in the year 1988, there were certain posts of paid apprentice in the Court of Munsif Khalilabad at Basti. The District Judge, Basti, on 11-1-1988 appointed the appellant on temporary basis on the said post. As the Court of Vth Additional Judge, Basti was shifted from Basti Judgeship to Barabanki Judgeship and in order to adjust the permanent staff of that Court, services of three temporary junior most officials were terminated w.e.f. 1st June, 1988. The appellant was one of them. Obviously, the said post was temporary and the permanent staff was to be accommodated on shifting of the Court of Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge, Basti to Barabanki Judgeship. The appellant has not stated any where that be was not junior most and he was illegally discriminated. 5. The appellant made a representation to the High Court. He claimed that be was selected in the year 1983 and on that basis he was entitled to be regularised in the service. The representation was considered by the learned Administrative judge and he passed the following order on 18-11-1989. "After having perused the comment of the District Judge and the office report it is obvious that the applicant cannot be treated to be a candidate of approved list of 1983. He may however apply for fresh selection in future at Basti and question of his age can be considered by taking a judicial lenient view." 6. "After having perused the comment of the District Judge and the office report it is obvious that the applicant cannot be treated to be a candidate of approved list of 1983. He may however apply for fresh selection in future at Basti and question of his age can be considered by taking a judicial lenient view." 6. The appellant made further representation which was rejected by the then Honourable Chief Justice on 2nd May 1990. The appellant made a third representation which was rejected by the learned Administrative Judge on 28th August 1990. The learned counsel for the appellant urged that the appellant was entitled to be regularised in the service on the principle of promissory estoppel. He placed reliance upon the decision of the State of Maharashtra v.. Jagannath, 1989 (Supp) SCC (1) 393 and Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Union of India (1988) 1 SCC 86 In this case, the Supreme Court held that the principle of promissory estoppel is applicable where- (1) The party asserting the estoppel must have acted upon the assurance given to him or must have relied upon the representation made to him and thereby the party has changed or altered the position by relying upon the assurance or the representation. (2) The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the public bodies or the Government to carry out the representation or promise which is contrary to law or which its outside their authority or power. (3) The doctrine cannot be invoked if it is found to be inequitable or unjust in its enforcement. Applying these aforesaid principles it is clear that none of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court are applicable In the case of the appellant. There were three posts and on the three posts as mentioned above, the appellant was given opportunity. The appellant had appeared in the selection of Class HI cadre of Basti Judgeship in the year 1983, and be was placed at serial number 35. The vacancy was filled up and the petitioner was only on the waiting list. The list exhausted itself after the expiry of one year in accordance with the Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947. The appellant could not take advantage of such selection for any future appointment in Class HI cadre. The vacancy was filled up and the petitioner was only on the waiting list. The list exhausted itself after the expiry of one year in accordance with the Subordinate Civil Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1947. The appellant could not take advantage of such selection for any future appointment in Class HI cadre. The posts of police paper Copyists were filled up in the year 1986 by those candidates who were duly selected in the] year 1985. The appellant had participated in the selection which was held in the year 1985 but he failed. Those candidates who were selected in the year 1985 were recruited in the service. The mere fact that the appellant worked on daily wages did not entitle him to claim any right against those candidates who were duly selected. When a post is to be filled up by selection but on account of exigency a person is permitted to work on daily wages or works on ad-hoc appointment before selection to the post, he cannot lay any claim to such post, after the selection has taken place. In Sardara Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1991 SC 2248 , the Supreme Court did not accept the prayer for age relaxation and observed- "Admittedly, the appellants have taken the chance for selection and they were not selected on the basis of comparative merits. Therefore, merely because appellants are carrying on the litigation, there cannot be any justification to give direction to the Government to consider their cases by relaxing the age qualification for appointment as patwari. It is not in dispute that hundreds of candidates who could not be selected would In that event seek similar relief Under these circumstances we do not find any cause to add to the selection and appointment of the candidates as Patwari.' 7. In case of the appellant, the learned Administrative Judge took lenient view and permitted the appellant to appear in selection again relaxing age bar. The appellant,, however,, never availed that opportunity. He cannot now turn and claim any right to selection posts because for sometime he worked on daily wages. 8. The learned Judge has rightly held that the appellant was guilty of laches. He made a representation which was rejected by the learned Administrative fudge and his decision was communicated. There was no reason to make a second or third representation. 8. The learned Judge has rightly held that the appellant was guilty of laches. He made a representation which was rejected by the learned Administrative fudge and his decision was communicated. There was no reason to make a second or third representation. In case a representation is rejected the appellant cannot take advantage of the time taken by making a second and third representation. The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon Arun Kumar v. South Eastern Railway, AIR 1985 SC 482 . In this case, the Supreme Court held that if the representation is made and is not decided the party may approach to the Court and his petition cannot be thrown on the ground of laches. In this case, the order was passed on the representation submitted by the appellant there was no justification for agitating on the same matter by filing second or third representation. In the result, the special appeal is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.