JUDGMENT B. L. Yadva, J. 1. Whether Upper Zila Adhlkari has jurisdiction to decide revision under section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 (for short the Act), and which out of two provisos added to a statutory provision shall prevail are short question that fall for determination in these three analogous writ petitions hereinafter referred to as 1st, IInd and IIIrd petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking relief for issuance of a writ of Certiorari quashing the order dated 18-6-92 Annexure 7, and order dated 15-12-88 Annexure 2 in the first petition, and the order dated 18-12-88 Annexure 2 in the second writ petition, and the order of the same date i.e. 18-6-92 Annexue 4 of the third petition. 2. The factual matrix of the oase is that the petitioner Kailash Shanker in the first writ petition is chak holder No. 89 village Ata, Pergana Kalpi, District Jalaun. Assistant Consolidation Officer at the time of preparation of provisional Consolidation Scheme under section 19-A of the Act, proposed two Chaks to the petitioner. The petitioner filed an objection under section 20 of the Act before the Consolidation Officer, Kalpi raising grievances that his first chak be corrected and the second chak may be allotted at the land 'Mar' in respect of Kaver. The Consolidation Officer made changes in the first chak but not in the second chak. A copy of the order contained in C. H. form 23, has been filed as Annexure 9. Petitioner's appeal under section 21 (2) of the Act, was dismissed by the order dated 15-12-88 (Annexure 2 to the petition) A revision under section 48 of the Act was filed before District Deputy Director of Consolidation, who is District Magistrate and has power to hear the revision, but the District Magistrate by the order dated 27-6-91 transferred the revision to the court of Upper Zila Adhikari (Finance and Revenue) who was also having the power of Deputy Director of Consolidation for disposal of the revision. Revision was dismissed on 18-6-82, Annexure 5 of the Writ petition. The application for staying change of possession consequent upon that order, was also dismissed on the same date i e. 18-6-92 Annexue 7. In the second petition other fact was same. Revision was dismissed on the same day i. e. 18-6-92 Annexure 6. 3. Revision was dismissed on 18-6-82, Annexure 5 of the Writ petition. The application for staying change of possession consequent upon that order, was also dismissed on the same date i e. 18-6-92 Annexue 7. In the second petition other fact was same. Revision was dismissed on the same day i. e. 18-6-92 Annexure 6. 3. In the third petition revision was dismissed by the similar order dated 18-6-92 Annexure 4. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the petitioners in these petitions must have been given chak on the largest part of their holdings as contemplated by section 19 (1) (e) of the Act, and four chaks were allotted to the petitioner. It appears that the Deputy Director of Consolidation did not apply his mind to that aspect nor he granted approval by Specific order and the first proviso to section 19 (1) (e) would prevail and not the second proviso, and that the revision could be heard only by the District Deputy Director of Consolidation i.e. Zila Adhikari and the Upper Zila Adhlkari (Finance and Revenue) has no power to hear revision under section 48 of the Act. In the second petition Is on an additional ground that Smt. Jayoti respondent No. 6 was not made a party in the appeal, hence the revision without impleading her in appeal was not competent and the revision was dismissed. Learned Counsel urged that even if there was any defect in the revision same could have been decided on merit as revisional jurisdictional was couched in such a language which had very wide sweep. It may be clarified that by non impleadment of Smt. Jayoti in appeal, revision was not dismissed but an observation was made in the last but one sentence immediately before the order. Otherwise substantially revision was dismissed on merit. Reliance was placed on Chandra Pal Singh v. Prem Dutta Rai, 1980 RD 123. Rama Kant Singh v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, AIR 1975 Alld. 126. 5. Sri G. N. Verma and SRI S. K. Singh learned counsel for the respondents have filed the counter affidavits on behalf of the contesting respondents in these three petitions. Rejoinder affidavit has also been filed. Learned counsel for the parties suggested that these petitions may be decided on merit. Consequently, I proceed to decide these petitions on merit, 6. 5. Sri G. N. Verma and SRI S. K. Singh learned counsel for the respondents have filed the counter affidavits on behalf of the contesting respondents in these three petitions. Rejoinder affidavit has also been filed. Learned counsel for the parties suggested that these petitions may be decided on merit. Consequently, I proceed to decide these petitions on merit, 6. Learned counsel for the respondents urged that Kallash Shanker, Chak holder 89 petitioner in the petition has been allotted two chaks both of them are on original holding and petitioner and respondent Nos. 5 and 6 were real brothers, hence considering their convenances chaks have been allotted to the respondents also. In the second petition not only petitioner, in view of the first proviso to section 19 (1) (e) of the Act was given four chaks, but these four chaks have been allotted mostly on the original holdings. The petitioner, in fact, wanted some more land of plot No. 1528 etc. but in case he was given chak over this place in that event he shall have five chaks. Similarly, the contesting respondent have also been given four chaks on their original holdings and in case any alteration was made for chaks on plot No. 1528 etc. to the petitioner, changes have also to be made in the chak of contesting respondents and they shall also have five chaks, which was not permissible under the provision of section 19 of the Act, and even though no specific order for allotment of four chaks. was mentioned in the impugned order, but as Deputy Director of Consolidation exercising jurisdiction as Director of consolidation himself has decided the revision and was conscious about the allottment of four chaks to the petitioner, hence it shall be persumed that the Deputy Director of Consolidation granted approval. It was urged in the alternative that in case section 19 (1) (e) of the Act there were to provisos and it is second proviso which shall prevail and not the first one. By the first proviso no tenure holder was to be allotted more chak than three except with the approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, whereas, proviso 2 was the last enactment of the legislature and was to the effect that no consolidation made shall be invalidated for the reason merely that a number of chaks allotted to a tenure holder exceed three. In view of the second proviso even if tenure holder has been allotted four chaks, but that itself would not invalidate the consolidation proceedings. 7. In reply to the petitioners' submission that Upper Zila Adhikari, has no jurisdiction to decide the revision under section 48 of the Act, It was submitted that as the High Court has passed the order on 20-5-1992- Annexure 4 in the first petition, Annexure 5 in the second petition and Annexure 2 in the 3rd petition, that only District Deputy Director of Consolidation must decide application hence petitioner may inform the District Deputy Director of Consolidation that his application may be decided by a competent Deputy Director of Consolidation, Consequently, District Deputy Director of Consolidation (Collector/D M.) transferred the revision filed by these three petitioners by a specific order pasted on 10-6-1991 directing the Upper Zila Adhikari (Finance and Revenue) to decide these revisions allegation have been made in para 18 of counter affidavit in the first petition and Annexure 3 to 6 have been filed. C.A-3 was a notification G.O. No. 113/74 Revenue 8 (868) Revenue-8 dated 21-11-74 by which all the Additional District Magistrates were conferred jurisdiction as Deputy Director of Consolidation to decide the revision under section 48 of the Act. They were competent to decide the revision, whereas G.O. Annexure 5 No. C-1/G-618/ 91/92 dated 2 January 1992, in respect of the disposal of the revision under section 48 of the Act. Every Additional District Magistrate/District Magistrate was to decide atleast 10 revisions every moth and if interest is taken, 15 revisions can be decided. Similarly G.O. No. 1-3-85 (9C)/Revenue 8 dated 5 June 1985 was to be implemented strictly. It was thus urged that in view of these G.Os. similar other G Os. Additional District Magistrate have been conferred jurisdiction as Deputy Director of Consolidation to decide the revisions on merit, filed under section 48 of the Act. There was accordingly no defect, if the revision has been decided by Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue). 8. It was thus urged that in view of these G.Os. similar other G Os. Additional District Magistrate have been conferred jurisdiction as Deputy Director of Consolidation to decide the revisions on merit, filed under section 48 of the Act. There was accordingly no defect, if the revision has been decided by Additional District Magistrate (Finance and Revenue). 8. If, was next urged that the substantial justice has been done by the impugned order as petitioners were allotted chaks mostly on their original holdings and there would be no justification for Interference, Having heard learned counsel for the parties, as regards the first point, that the provision of section 19 (1) (e) of the Act was violated in as much as petitioner were not allotted compact area at the place where they hold largest part of their holding. In support of that submission reliance was placed on Chander Pal Singh v. Prem Dutta Rai, 1980 RD 123 (supra) but that was the case where the allotment of compact area was not made to the tenure holder where he holds largest part of their holding, nor he was given area, where he has private source of irrigation, but in the present case a perusal of the order of Deputy Director of Consolidation in revision would make it manifest that the petitioner In these three revisions have been given chak over the largest part of their holding Consequently, neither the case relied upon is applicable nor submission of learned counsel for the petitioner has any substance. 9. Reverting to the next submission as to whether Addl. District Magistrates (Revenue and Finance) Have got jurisdiction to decide the revision under section 48 of the Act. Suffice it to say that Director and Deputy Director of Consolidation are defined terms under section 3 (4) of the Act. Director of Consolidation means a person appointed as such by the State Government, who exercises the power, perform the duty as Director of Consolidation and would include Addl. Director of Consolidation/Joint Director of Consolidation. 10. Deputy Director of Consolidation is also defined under section 4 (4) A of the Act. It means person appointed as such by the State Government, who exercise such powers, perform such duties as Director of Consolidation as may be delegated to him by the State Government and shall include District DEPUTY Director of Consolidation, Director of Consolidation. 10. Deputy Director of Consolidation is also defined under section 4 (4) A of the Act. It means person appointed as such by the State Government, who exercise such powers, perform such duties as Director of Consolidation as may be delegated to him by the State Government and shall include District DEPUTY Director of Consolidation, Director of Consolidation. The District DEPUTY Director of Consolidation is also a defined term under section 4-B which means a person for the time being collector of the District. The revisions were filed before the collector of the District. The petitioners earlier filed a writ petition in this court on 2tst of May 1992 (Annexure 4 In the first petition Annexure 5 in the second petition, Annexure 2 in the 3rd petition) and this court directed that the District Deputy Director of Consolidation would pass appropriate order so that revisions are decided by a competent authority as directed by this court specific order was passed on 10-6-91 by the collector of the District i.e. the District Deputy Director of Consolidation as envisaged by section 3 (4) (b) of the Act. As a consequence of it the Revisions were transferred to the court of Upper Zila Adhikari (Finance and Revenue) who was authorised to decide the Revision. There is. accordingly no irregularity if the revisions were decided by the Upper Zila Adhikari as Deputy Director of Consolidation. The power to decide the revisions under section 48 was conferred on the Addl. District Magistrate in view of G.O. No. 113/74--Revenue-8 (868)- Rev-8 dated 21-11-1974 and other relevant G. Os. referred to above. There is, therefore, substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. Reverting to the next question as to which out of the two provisos, which were in conflict, would prevail,, 12. Section 19- A (e) of the Act, was to the effect that as far as possible tenure holder shall be allotted compact area at the place where he holds largest part of his holding This provision was hedged by two provisos. The first was that no tenure holder may be allotted more than three chaks except with the approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The second proviso was to the effect that no consolidation made shall be invalid simply because the nature of chak allotted to a tenure holder exceeds three. The first was that no tenure holder may be allotted more than three chaks except with the approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The second proviso was to the effect that no consolidation made shall be invalid simply because the nature of chak allotted to a tenure holder exceeds three. To put it differently if more than three chaks were to be allotted to a tenure bolder, approval in writing of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was to be obtained first; whereas second Proviso was to the effect that any consolidation would not be invalid simply by the fact that more than three chaks were allotted to a tenure holder first proviso would hold the field. Certain cardinal cannon of interpretation pertaining to the Proviso may be noticed, normal function of the proviso is to say something different or qualify something enacted therein. Otherwise proviso would be within the perview of the enactment. To pur. it differently, but for the proviso every part of the section would have included the subject matter. The proviso has qualification to the preceding expression in terms of general rule in common paralance. The Proviso is in one sense a part of the section itself. But it is added either to explain the main provision and to create an exception. Some times the section itself starts with the proviso in that event it has to be ascertained as to what are the preceding sections to which the section commencing with the Proviso has been added Sunder Pellai v. Pratabi Ram, AIR 1985 SC 882, Moti Ram Ghela Bhai v. Jaggannath, AIR 1985 SC 709 . There would be slightly difference in interpretation, when there are two provisos and it shall however, be difficult to reconcile them and to ascertain their extent of operation. 13. In the present case, both the provisos were apparently inconsistent in as much as the first proviso enacts that if any tenure holder is to be allotted more than three chaks, approval in writing of Deputy Director of Consolidation may be obtained. Whereas Second proviso enacts that simply on the ground that tenure holder is allotted more than three chaks would not invalidate the consolidation proceeding. In such a situation statute should be construed to avoid any repugnancy or absurdity. Normally a proviso is to be construed harmoniously keeping in view the intention of the legislature. 14. Whereas Second proviso enacts that simply on the ground that tenure holder is allotted more than three chaks would not invalidate the consolidation proceeding. In such a situation statute should be construed to avoid any repugnancy or absurdity. Normally a proviso is to be construed harmoniously keeping in view the intention of the legislature. 14. In the present case it appeals that the legislature was conscious that written approval of the Deputy Director of Consolidation was to be obtained before allotting four chaks to tenure holder may entail insurmountable difficulties Consequently, second proviso seems to have been added to the effect that simply on the ground that tenure holder was allotted more than three chaks that would not invalidate the consolidation proceedings. The Second Proviso is the last will of the legislature. It has been deliberately added, otherwise the first Proviso would have served the purpose. In State of Orissa v. Debki Devi, AIR 1964 SC 1413 it was held J "that the Second Proviso to section 12 (b) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act 1947, Is really an independent legislative provision of the Act, and though it has been inserted by the draftsmen in the form of proviso but it is in substance not a real proviso to the main provision". 15. In King v. Dominion Engineering Co. Ltd., AIR 1947 PC 94, it was held by Lord Macmillan that if there are two Provisos which is repugnant, in any way to proviso one, ill must prevail for it stands last in the enactment. 16. In Institute patent Agent v. Lockwood, 1894 AC 347 (HL 360, as follows: "You have to try and reconcile them as best as you may, if you can not, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision and which must give way to other." In Maxwell on the Interpretation of the Statute page 190 if a proviso can not reasonably be construed otherwise than by contradicting the main enactment then the proviso will prevail over the principle". The Second Proviso speaks the last intention of the maker. 17. In view of these cardinal principle applicable, in my opinion that the second proviso is obviously in conflict with the first proviso. The Second Proviso speaks the last intention of the maker. 17. In view of these cardinal principle applicable, in my opinion that the second proviso is obviously in conflict with the first proviso. Consequently, it has to be reconciled, but as the Second proviso is totally inconsistent with the first one, hence it appears sheer impossibility to reconcile the second proviso with the first one. I am constrained to say and I have no option but to hold that the second proviso is to prevail and is more effective than first proviso as second proviso speaks the last intention of the maker. Even if Deputy Director of Consolidation was conscious that he was allotting four chaks to the petitioner, similarly four chaks to the respondent were allotted, but it shall be assumed that he has granted approval for creation of fourth chak in favour of the petitioners and the respondents. In the alternative, I have already held that second proviso, is effective and not first one. Simply, because four chaks have been allotted to the petitioner and to the respondent, that would not invalidate the consolidation proceeding and there can be no illegality. I do not find any merit in the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner. 18. In view of the premises aforesaid, and applying Aristotalian and Baconian reasoning these petitions are devoid of merit and are dismissed. There shall be no order as to cost. Interim Stay dated 25th of June, 1992 extended from time to time is vacated. Petition dismissed.