JUDGMENT R.B. Mehrotra, J. - Plaintiff-respondent No. 3 Purusharthi Avas Sahkari Samiti, Indrapuri, Tehsil and District Etah (hereinafter referred to as the Samiti) is admittedly the owner of shop No. 17 for which Municipal Board No. 58 has been allotted; situate at Railway Road, Etah. Admittedly the petitioner is a tenant of the aforesaid shop on a monthly rent of Rs. 15. 2. Plaintiff filed a small causes suit being small causes suit No. 43 of 1985 against the present petitioner with the allegation that the plaintiff is a registered Samiti which has got constructed some shops at Railway Road, Etah of which the plaintiff is the owner and landlord. The plaintiff did not give any information of the completion of the shop to Municipal Board, Etah, neither the completion of the aforesaid shop was recorded in the Municipal Board, Etah. On the date of the construction, the shop was outside the limits of Municipal Board, Etah. The first assessment of the shop in dispute was made on 1st of April, 1981 as such as the provisions of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are not attracted for the shop in dispute. The further statement in the plaint was that the aforesaid shop was rented out to the petitioner-tenant at the rate of Rs. 15 per month. The shop was taken for the business purpose but the petitioner without the permission of the landlord has converted the user of the shop from business to residential purposes. It was also claimed in the plaint that the petitioner-tenant has not paid rent from 1-1-1983 to 13-2-85 at the rate of Rs. 15 per month totalling Rs. 381.80. The said amount was not paid by the tenant even after serving the notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The petitioner-tenant is defaulter in payment of rent and as such is liable for ejectment. 3. Petitioner-tenant constested the suit and filed has written-statement. In the written-statement it was admitted by the petitioner-tenant that he was tenant of shop No. 17 at the rate of Rs. The petitioner-tenant is defaulter in payment of rent and as such is liable for ejectment. 3. Petitioner-tenant constested the suit and filed has written-statement. In the written-statement it was admitted by the petitioner-tenant that he was tenant of shop No. 17 at the rate of Rs. 15 per month but contended that the shop was not constructed by the plaintiff and it was stated that the shop was acquired by the respondent-landlord from one Sri Devi Prasad Kapoor some time in the year 1960, as such the provisions of the Act are fully applicable to the shop in dispute. It was also stated in the written-statement that the petitioner-tenant had been regularly paying the rent at the rate of Rs. 15 per month. The notice has been served on the petitioner on false allegations. The entire rent has been paid to the respondent-landlord upto 31st of December, 1984. Subsequent thereto a money-order was sent on 20-3-1985 which has been refused to be accepted by secretary of the respondent-landlord. The rent from 1-1-1985 to 31-8-1986 is due against the petitioner-tenant for which the petitioner had submitted a tender in the Court. It was also stated in the written-statement that the petitioner-tenant is in service and the shop in dispute was taken for purposes of residence from the very beginning. The plaintiff-respondent never objected to such user. The Secretary of the Samiti had never been issuing receipts of rent regularly. No rent is due against the petitioner-tenant. The suit has been filed to harass the petitioner. 4. On the basis of the evidence on record, the trial Court held that the date of completion of the shop is to be determined under Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act. Admittedly there is no record available with regard to any report of the completion of the shop in dispute or with regard to the local authority having recorded the completion of the shop in dispute and the first assessment of the building having been made on 1-4-1981, the shop should be presumed to have been constructed on the said date and the suit having been filed in the year 1985, the shop was not within the purview of the provision of the Act. The trial Court also held that the petitioner-tenant has not paid the rent of the shop from 1-1-1983 to 13-2-1985 nor had deposited the arrears of rent on the first date of hearing of the suit, as such the petitioner tenant is defaulter in payment of rent and is liable to be ejected from the shop in dispute. 5. The trial Court, however, further held that the plaintiff-landlord has failed to prove that the shop was let out for business purposes, as such the petitioner-tenant cannot be held guilty for change in the user of the premises in question. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff respondent for ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from the premises in dispute and also for arrears of rent from 1-1-1983 to 13-2-1985. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioner-tenant preferred a revision. The IIIrd Additional District Judge, Etah dismissed the petitioner's revision, vide his judgment, dated 10-8-1991. 7. In the Judgment of the revisional Court it has been stated that only one point has been raised by the learned Counsel for the revisionist i.e. regarding application of the provisions of the U.P. Act (XIII of 1972) in regard to the disputed property. Endorsing the judgment of the trial Court, the revisional Court held that the Municipal Board, Etah never recorded the completion of the shop nor any information as such was given by the respondent-landlord in relation to completion of the shop in dispute. Therefore, the construction of the disputed shop shall be the date on which the property was assessed for the first time. The first assessment of the shop in dispute was made on 1-4-1981, as such the said date should be deemed to be the date for the construction of the building in dispute. The revisional Court dismissed the petitioner's revision upholding the judgment of the trial Court. 8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments and orders, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. In the writ petition, two points have been urged. The revisional Court dismissed the petitioner's revision upholding the judgment of the trial Court. 8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgments and orders, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 9. In the writ petition, two points have been urged. Firstly, it was urged that the plaintiff having specifically admitted in his statement that the shop in dispute was constructed prior to 1972 and defendant is tenant in the shop since 1974 and in view of the fact that the date on which the shop was constructed it was not within the municipal limits of any local authority, the provisions of explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act were not attracted and the completion of the shop should have been determined on the basis of the admission of the plaintiff landlord himself. The second submission made on behalf of the petitioner-tenant is that it was specifically argued before the revisional Court that the petitioner had not defaulted in payment of rent and was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of the Act but the revisional Court failed to consider the said argument and wrongly observed in the judgment that the only point argued was in respect of the applicability of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. 10. The petitioner has filed and affidavit of his Counsel who argued the petitioner's revision before the revisional Court. In the aforesaid affidavit the Counsel has stated that he specifically argued that the respondent had admitted the date of construction of the disputed premises to be the year 1964 as such the provisions of the Act were applicable to the shop in dispute. The affidavit further states that it was also specifically argued that the petitioner had not defaulted in payment of rent and was entitled to the said arguments. 11. Admittedly, in the present case, the respondent-landlord in his statement had admitted that the defendant is the tenant in the shop in dispute since 1974 and the shops were constructed prior to 1972 when the shops were brought within the municipal limits. 11. Admittedly, in the present case, the respondent-landlord in his statement had admitted that the defendant is the tenant in the shop in dispute since 1974 and the shops were constructed prior to 1972 when the shops were brought within the municipal limits. The exact words of the statement made are quoted below for convenience sake :- "........Prativadi eis kukan main san 1974 sey kirayedar hai Kiraya 4-5 maheeney ka ekkaththa honey par bar bar mangney par diya kartey they ....." " Ean Dukano ka nirman chungi mein san 1972 main aney say pahley ka nirman hai. Yah mujhey nahin pata ki kiteny pahley ka hai........................" 12. It is admitted case of the plaintiff-respondent that on the date the shops were constructed, the shops were not within the municipal limits of Municipal Board, Etah. 13. The revisional Court also went stray in observing that "it cannot be said that the construction of the shop was completed as the occupant of the shop in dispute prior to that date might be living in the capacity of a supervisor or in the capacity of a watchman'. This was nobody's case that the petitioner-tenant was living as a supervisor or watchman. On the other hand there was a categorical admission of the respondent-landlord saying that the premises in dispute was let out to the petitioner-tenant in the year 1974 and the building was completed prior to 1972. 14. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Hirday Narain Singh and another v. Maloo Mal Srivastava, reported in 1986(1) ARC 74, wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court took a view that in a case where the landlord states specific date of construction of the building was made later on. The learned Single Judge while considering the scope of Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act, held that in a case where the date of actual construction is known and stated by the plaintiff, then irrespective of the fact that completion of the building was not reported to the local authority, the premises should be treated to have been completed on the date the actual construction was completed. The learned Single Judge held :- "The actual date of completion which is known to and is averred by the plaintiff will not cease to be the date of completion simple because it was not reported to the local authority. The dominant purpose of the 1972 Act is to protect the interest of the tenants and the whole Act is to be interpreted bearing this purpose in mind........................................In the situation of a kind that has arisan in this case, if the fiction is given an overriding effect over the actual date of completion as averred by the plaintiff then the tenants will be deprived of the protection which the Legislature sought to give to them. In my view the words "is reported to" occurring in clause (a) of Explanation I to sub-section (2) of Section 2 deserve a liberal consistent which is consisted to the object of Act. If the words "is reported to" are construed libe rally, then in my view these words may be read meanining as "is reported to or averred by the owner of a building"." 15. Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of Act does not take into consideration a situation where admittedly the premises was constructed on a date when the premises was not within the purview of any local authority and after its construction the shop had been brought within the purview of the local authority. In such a situation there is no occasion for reporting or otherwise recording the completing of such premises by the local authority having jurisdiction, as on the relevant date, there was no local authority having jurisdiction over the constructed premises. Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act will not be attracted in such a situation and merely on the bases that after completion of the premises, the premises came within the local jurisdiction of the local authority and subsequent thereto it was subjected to first assessment the deeming clause of Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 should not be attracted. In Ram Saroop Rai v. Smt. Lilavati, reported in AIR 1982 Supreme Court 945 : 1980 ARC 406 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the trial Court for re-considering the entire evidence and recording a finding as to when the building was actually completed. In Ram Saroop Rai v. Smt. Lilavati, reported in AIR 1982 Supreme Court 945 : 1980 ARC 406 (SC) the Hon'ble Supreme Court remanded the matter back to the trial Court for re-considering the entire evidence and recording a finding as to when the building was actually completed. In the aforesaid decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court took a view that since it was not possible for the landlord-respondent or the tenant-appellant to give direct testimony about the time of construction or the nature of construction, the best testimony is the municipal record about the completion of the building and the verification by the municipal authorities as to whether a new construction has come into being or an old construction has been re-modelled when exactly the construction took effect. 16. In Smt. Samundari Devi v. Nand Kishori Marwah and others, reported in 1986(2) ARC 428, a learned Single Judge of this Court has taken a view that in a case where a building is neither assessed nor its construction is noted by the local authority but the building was first let out on 1st of October, 1976, the date i.e. 1st of October, 1978 will be the date of construction for purpose of the applicability of the Act. Mere admission by the landlady in the plaint that it was constructed in the year 1976 will not be decisive. 17. In the present case, the plaintiff-landlord in his statement has clearly admitted that the defendant is the tenant in the premises since 1974. It has also been admitted by plaintiff-respondent that on the date the shop was constructed it was outside the limits of Municipal Board, Etah. It was brought within the limit of Municipal Board in the year 1972. 18. In Aziz Admad, Bareilly v. Additional District Judge, Bareilly and others, reported in 1983 ALJ 184 : 1982(2) ARC 16, a learned Single Judge of this Court held : "In the present case no assessment existed on the date of the suit. There is no evidence that the completion of the building was reported to be recorded by the local authority at any time. It is also not the case of any party that the suit was filed in respect of a building which was to be completed in nature. Consequently, it cannot be said that suit was filed in respect of a building which was incomplete. It is also not the case of any party that the suit was filed in respect of a building which was to be completed in nature. Consequently, it cannot be said that suit was filed in respect of a building which was incomplete. In such a case the date of the building would be the date of occupation according to the underlined portion of the explanation reproduced above...............................................". 19. In the aforesaid background the question for consideration is as to whether Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act will also be attracted in a case where initially on the date of completion of the building, the building is not within the jurisdiction of any local authority and later on the building has been brought in the jurisdiction of the local authority. In such a situation, should the deeming clause be given effect to ? In the decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff a stress has been laid on the point that where a building is within the jurisdiction of a local authority Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 should be given effect to and the building should be deemed to be completed on the basis of the municipal records, but in a case where at the time of construction of the building the building was not within the purview of any local authority, and such building has been brought within the jurisdiction of local authority subsequent to the construction of the building the position will be different. I am clearly of the view that in a situation where the building was admittedly constructed on a date when it was not within the purview of local authority before which the completion of the building is required to be recorded or reported, Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 will have no application and the actual date of construction will have to be determined on the basis of the evidence of the parties. The Courts below have misapplied the provisions of Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act for determining the date of construction and thereby erred in decreeing the suit on the basis of applying the provisions of the said Explanation. 20. All these aspects require a fresh look in the matter. The Courts below have misapplied the provisions of Explanation I(a) to sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Act for determining the date of construction and thereby erred in decreeing the suit on the basis of applying the provisions of the said Explanation. 20. All these aspects require a fresh look in the matter. The judgment of the revisional Court deserves to be set aside and the matter deserves to be remanded back to the revisional Court for determining the question as to when the building was actually let out to the petitioner-tenant and whether U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 will be applicable to the premises in dispute on the basis of actual letting out of the premises to the petitioner. since the revisional Court has decided the revision on this point alone it is being made clear that if any other point is urged on behalf of the parties the same will also be considered and decided. 21. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. The judgment and order of the IIIrd Addl. District Judge, Etah dated August 20, 1999 is set aside. The matter is remanded back for a fresh decision in accordance with the observations made in this judgment. Parties will bear their own costs.