JUDGMENT 1. - As per the facts mentioned in the memo of writ petition, the petitioner joined the services of the New Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as the 'Bank') on 5.1.1977 as a Clerk. He was promoted as an Accountant in Junior Management Grade Scale-I on 1-9-1983. The petitioner had been an active trade union worker right from 1978 and held several offices of the union and therefore, some times he had to come in conflict with the management of the Bank and incurred displeasure of high officials. On 31.5.1985, the General Secretary and Dy. General Secretary of All India New Bank Staff Association were terminated which orders were set aside by the Supreme Court on 22-7-1986. The termination of the two leaders aforesaid was protested against by the employees all over the country & the petitioner was also one of the several members of the deputation which was led on 8.6.85 before the Regional Manager at Jaipur, demanding the revocation of the orders of the aforesaid two Leaders. An F.I.R. was lodged on 11.6.1985 by the bank management with regard to the alleged incident on 8.6.1985, though the petitioner was not named in the report. But he was placed under suspension on 14.6.1985 along with two other employees namely S/Shri Arun Sharma and Mohan-Lal Sharma. The petitioner was thereafter subject to charge-sheets on various counts-(i) charged-sheet dated 4.10.1985 with regard to the alleged incident dated 8.6.1985, and (ii) charge-sheet dated 11.12.85 with regard to the alleged incident dated 3.6.1985. The petitioner had submitted reply to both the charge-sheets and an enquiry officer was appointed on 3.3.1986 without intimation to the petitioner. Before the Enquiry Officer could proceed, two more charge-sheets were issued on 19.4.1986 and 7.5.1986 to the petitioner. The enquiry commenced on 30.4.1986. An intimation about the said enquiry was sent vide letter dated 25.4.1986 which was received by the petitioner on 1.5.1986. On the next date of enquiry i. e. 9.5.1986, the petitioner demanded the copies of the rules and regulations relating to procedure of enquiry but they were not made available to the petitioner. The petitioner thereafter submitted an application on 28.5.1986 giving list of documents which should be made available to him for his defence. The petitioner again reiterated his grievance with regard to non-supply and non production of certain documents and objected to the procedure of enquiry. The petitioner thereafter submitted an application on 28.5.1986 giving list of documents which should be made available to him for his defence. The petitioner again reiterated his grievance with regard to non-supply and non production of certain documents and objected to the procedure of enquiry. On 15.7.1986, the Enquiry Officer himself cross-examined witness MW-1 and therefore, the petitioner along with representative walked out of the room of the Enquiry Officer. On the next date i. e. 16.7.1986, the petitioner submitted an application in detail that proper opportunity to cross-examine MW-1 should be provided. On the next date also, the Enquiry Officer wanted to cross-examine MW-1 which was objected to by the petitioner & since he started cross-examining, the petitioner did not further participate in the enquiry & the enquiry was held exparte. The petitioner sent a registered letter to the disciplinary authority on 17.6.1986 apprising him of the partisan attitude and unfair treatment on the part of the Enquiry Officer during the course of enquiry and requested for chance of the enquiring authority. On 29.7.1986, the petitioner informed the Enquiry Officer that he was running under temperature and his representative could not come from Delhi because of riots, law and order problem in Delhi. Yet, enquiry proceedings w held exparte on 29.7.86 also and MW-2 was also cross-examined by the enquiring authority himself. A bare perusal of the cross examination would show that the witnesses were cross-examined by the Enquiry Officer and in cross-examination, they deposed what they had not deposed in the examination-in chief. Proceedings were again held on 11.8.1986 and an application along with the doctor's prescription was sent by the petitioner that he was sick. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report with regard to the first and second charge on 29.8.1986 and with regard to the third and the fourth charge-sheet on 10.9.1986. On the basis of the enquiry reports, the General Manager (Personnel) purporting to be the petitioner's disciplinary authority passed an order on 6.11.1986 whereby the penalty of dismissal was awarded to the petitioner. It was further ordered that the petitioner shall not be entitled for any benefit for the suspension period. A telegraphic intimation about this order was sent to the petitioner. The telegram as will as the order dated 6.11.1986 had been served on the petitioner on 10.11.1986. It was further ordered that the petitioner shall not be entitled for any benefit for the suspension period. A telegraphic intimation about this order was sent to the petitioner. The telegram as will as the order dated 6.11.1986 had been served on the petitioner on 10.11.1986. The petitioner preferred an appeal under Regulation 17 b-fore the Chairman-cam-Managing Director which was rejected on 23.5.1987. It is against these orders dated 6.11.1985 and 23.5.1987 that the present writ petition was filed in this Court on 24.7.1987. The petitioner also placed on record copy of the statements recorded during the course of enquiry. 2. This writ petition was admitted on 16.9.87 and notices were issued to the respondents. Reply on behalf of the respondent Bank was filed on 30 11.1987 to which a rejoinder was also filed on behalf of the petitioner on 11th March, 1991. Arguments have been heard. Record of the case has also been perused. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has very vehemently argued that a bare perusal of the statements recorded by the Enquiry Officer shows that the Enquiry Officer had put several questions in cross-examination and the witnesses have deposed many things which they did not depose in their examination-in-chief. This by itself is denial of principles of natural justice. The petitioner was not afforded a reasonable opportunity of appearing and participating in the enquiry and cross-examining the witnesses which also does not fulfil the fundamental principle of affording reasonable opportunity to the petitioner before he is condemned. In spite of the specific request by the petitioner that the Enquiry Officer should be changed on the ground of bias, it was not acceded to and he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that the disciplinary authority should pass a speaking order in case the disciplinary authority itself is not the Enquiry Officer. The disciplinary authority should apply its mind and thereafter, record specific findings on each charge. Order of punishment without mentioning reasons is vitiated. In this connection, he has placed reliance on a division bench decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Amolak Chand Sanghi, 1983 R.L.R. 246 . He has also placed reliance on Union of India v. Mohd. Order of punishment without mentioning reasons is vitiated. In this connection, he has placed reliance on a division bench decision of this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Amolak Chand Sanghi, 1983 R.L.R. 246 . He has also placed reliance on Union of India v. Mohd. Ramjan Khan, AIR 1991 SC 471 wherein the Supreme Court has held that the petitioner is entitled to copy of the enquiry report when the disciplinary authority itself is not the enquiry officer and he has a right to submit as to why the enquiry report should not be accepted and relied before passing an order agreeing with the enquiry report. He has further submitted that this court in numerous cases including the following three cases has followed the latest view of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra), and has set aside the order passed by the disciplinary authority on-this court, S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4191/1989 M. K. Soni v. State of Rajasthan, decided on 4.12.1990 , S. B. Civil Writ Pet. No. 1285/1985 Tejkaran Jain v. State of Rajasthan decided on 8.2.1991 and S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 969/1987 Hemendra Kumar v. State of Rajasthan and ors. decided on 27.6.1991 . 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has also very vehemently submitted that the petitioner did not co-operate with the enquiry. He did not participate in the enquiry and was interested in delaying the same and also interested in creating grounds for the purpose of filing the writ petition. There is nothing wrong if the enquiry officer had put certain questions to the witnesses to elucidate the points deposed by them. No prejudice, whatsoever, has been shown or even alleged by the petitioner by cross-examination of these witnesses. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the petitioner is not a Government servant and Article 311 of the Constitution is not attracted and therefore, the observations of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) are not applicable to the case of the petitioner. Moreover, he has submitted that Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case is only to apply prospectively and not retrospectively, meaning thereby that the delinquent officer should be furnished with a copy of the enquiry report in future after the judgment in Mohd. Ramjan. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) are not applicable to the case of the petitioner. Moreover, he has submitted that Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case is only to apply prospectively and not retrospectively, meaning thereby that the delinquent officer should be furnished with a copy of the enquiry report in future after the judgment in Mohd. Ramjan. Khan's case but in cases where orders have already been passed by the disciplinary authority even without making report of the enquiry officer available to the delinquent those cases will not be disturbed. In view of the specific observations of the Supreme Court the ratio decidendi in that case has to be applied only prospectively for the cases to be dealt with in future. He has brought to my notice, the following decisions of the Supreme Court 6. Management of M/s. Modern Electro and Trading Co. v. Baldev Lal and R.C. Sharma v. Union of India, AIR 1976 SC 2037 wherein it has been observed that the question whether a civil servant in a departmental enquiry against him was given a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence and to be heard or not is largely a question of fact. It is only when opportunity denied is of such a nature that the denial contravenes a mandatory provision of law or a rule of natural justice that it could vitiate the whole departmental trial. Prejudice to the Government servant resulting from an alleged violation of a rule must be proved. 7. The State of Haryana and others v. Shri Ram Chander, 1976 (2) SI R 690 , wherein after relaying on State of Madras V.A.R. Srinivasan ( AIR 1966 SC 1827 ) the full bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court observed that where an enquiry officer submits a detailed report giving his findings and the reasons for the findings and where the disciplinary authority agrees with the findings of the enquiry officer, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the disciplinary authority is bound to record reasons in every case. There is no need for the disciplinary authority to reiterate findings and reasons given by the enquiry officer when he has agreed with them. 8. There is no need for the disciplinary authority to reiterate findings and reasons given by the enquiry officer when he has agreed with them. 8. Associated Cement Companies Ltd., v. T.C. Shrivastava and others, AIR 1984 SC 1227 wherein it has been held that neither under the ordinary law of the land nor under industrial law, a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary. 9. Felix Anthony Lawyarance v. The Union of India and others, 1986 Lab. I.C. 127 wherein a division bench of the Bombay High Court has held that if copy of the enquiry report is not furnished to the railway servant and no demand for report is made, no grievance about non-supply of report in appeal made, and the rules do not make it obligatory on punishing authority to furnish copy of report, principles of natural justice are not violated. 10. Bharath Electronics Ltd. v. K. Kasi, 1987 (2) LLJ 203 wherein the learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court held that it is not necessary that presenting officer should be appointed and merely because no presetting officer was appointed, enquiry cannot be decided. It has further been observed that the enquiring authority is entitled to put questions to the witnesses for clarification here ever it becomes necessary and so long as the delinquent employee is permitted to cross-examine the witness after the enquiring authority questions the witnesses proceedings cannot be impeached t.s unfair and the final order could not be quashed on the ground that the enquiry officer played the role of the Presenting Dicer unless it was shown that the questions put were not by way of seeking clarification. 11. Railash Chander Asthana v. State of Y.J.P. and others, AIR 1988 SC 1338 wherein it ,has been observed as under:-- "Mr. Garg next contended that a copy of the report of the Administrative Tribunal was not made available to the petitioner and this must be held to have vitiated the subsequent proceeding including the impugned order of punishment. A reference was made to the Explanation to sub-rule (3) of R.9 of the Rules, stating that a copy of the recommendation of the Tribunal as to the penalty should be furnished to the charged Government servant. A reference was made to the Explanation to sub-rule (3) of R.9 of the Rules, stating that a copy of the recommendation of the Tribunal as to the penalty should be furnished to the charged Government servant. It has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents that after the amendment of Article 311 of the Constitution by the 42nd amendment the Explanation was dropped. The question of service of copy of the report arose on account of a right of a second show cause notice to the Government servant before the 42nd amendment and since present disciplinary proceeding was held later, the petitioner can not legitimately demand a second opportunity. That being the position, non-service of a copy of the report is immaterial." 12. He has further submitted that in the present case, Regulations did -tot provide that the disciplinary authority should also pass a speaking order riving his findings on every charge specially when he is in agreement with the indings of the Enquiry Officer. The dismissal order is in accordance with the Regulations. Reliance in this connection has been placed on 1987 (55) EER488. 13. In rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to S. L. Soni v. R.S.M.D.C., 1985 RLR 857 wherein after considering several authorities, it has been observed that the scope of public employment is not on fined to employment on Government posts only and the concept of public employment covers employment with a statutory corporation constituted under a statute as well as Government companies registered under the provisions of the Companies Act and the principles of natural justice are equally applicable if the .services of an employee are sought to be terminated by way of punitive action on account of misconduct. He must be afforded a reasonable opportunity before such on action is taken. 14. 1 have carefully gone through the voluminous record of the case acid have also considered various submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, at the bit and have perused the various authorities cited by them. 15. He must be afforded a reasonable opportunity before such on action is taken. 14. 1 have carefully gone through the voluminous record of the case acid have also considered various submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, at the bit and have perused the various authorities cited by them. 15. I would like to first examine the fundamental objection raised by the :earned counsel for the petitioner that the copy of the report of the enquiry officer was not furnished to the petitioner before the disciplinary authority accepted the same and agreed with the findings given by the enquiry officer and whether supplying a copy of the preliminary enquiry is a must and whether if these formalities have not been complied with, the order punishing an officer is vitiated. Supreme Court in its latest decision of Mohd. Ramjan Khan (supra) has considered its several decisions given on this point and thereafter observed as under "Deletion of the second opportunity from the scheme of Article 311 (2) of the Constitution has nothing to do with providing of a copy of the report to the delinquent in the matter of making his representation. Even though the second stage of the inquiry in Article 31((2) has been abolished by amendment, the delinquent is still entitled to represent against the conclusion of the Inquiry Officer holding that the charges or some of the charges are established and holding the delinquent guilty of such charges. For doing away with the effect of the enquiry report or to meet the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer in the matter of imposition of punishment, furnishing a copy of the report becomes necessary & to have the proceeding completed by using some material behind the back of the delinquent is a position not countenanced by fair procedure. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done by the 42nd amendment which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the applicability of the rules of natural justice to such an inquiry is not affected by the 42nd amendment. While by law application of natural justice could be totally ruled out or truncated, nothing has been done by the 42nd amendment which could be taken as keeping natural justice out of the proceedings and the applicability of the rules of natural justice to such an inquiry is not affected by the 42nd amendment. We therefore, come to the conclusion that supply of a copy of the inquiry report along with recommendations, if any, in the matter of proposed punishment to be inflicted would be within the rules of natural justice and the delinquent would, therefore, be entitled to the supply of a copy thereof." 16. In view of this latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the petitioner was not entitled to a copy of the enquiry report. The delinquent is entitled to make representation to the disciplinary authority as to why the findings of the enquiry officer should not be accepted. It is only when copy of the enquiry report is supplied to the delinquent officer that he gets an opportunity of defending himself because it is not the enquiry officer who has to come to the conclusion as to whether the delinquent is guilty of the charges made against him. It is for the disciplinary authority to come to the conclusion objectively as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of the charges or not and no evidence or document can be used by such authority without supplying a copy of the same to the delinquent officer. Report of the enquiry office is a very valuable and important document on which the disciplinary authority makes up its mind as to whether the delinquent officer has a right to make a representation and sets his part of the case as to whether the enquiry officer has gone wrong and why his report should not be accepted by the disciplinary authority. Obviously, the principles of natural justice would be violated if the delinquent officer is not afforded an opportunity to defend himself and to have his say before the report of the enquiry officer is acted upon, relied upon or taken assistance of, by the disciplinary authority. The earlier view of the Supreme Court that in view of the 42nd Amendment in the Constitution, this requirement is not necessary, has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Mohd. The earlier view of the Supreme Court that in view of the 42nd Amendment in the Constitution, this requirement is not necessary, has been rejected by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) and needs no elaboration anymore because the observations of the Supreme Court are binding throughout the country under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 17. Now coming to the question as to whether the interpretation of law propounded by the Supreme Court is to be held to be prospective or retrospective. Supreme Court in its decision in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) itself was conscious of the fact that earlier Supreme Court and several High Courts had taken a different view in this regard and therefore, in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case, it has been observed as under : 'There have been several decisions in different High Courts which, following the Forty Second Amendment, have taken the view that it is no longer necessary to furnish a copy of the inquiry report to delinquent officers. Even on some occasions this Court has taken that view. Since we have reached a different conclusion, the judgments in the different High Courts taking the contrary view mast be taken to be no longer laying down good law. We have not been shown any decision of a coordinate or a larger Bench of this court caking this view. Therefore, the conclusion to the contrary reached by any two Judge Bench in this Court will also no longer be taken to be laying down good law, but this shall have prospective application and no punishment impose) shall be open to challenge on this ground. 18. The principle enunciated in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) has been applied by this Court in the cases of M. K. Soni, Tej Karan Jain and Hemendra Kurnar (supra) which have been relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In those cases, punishment had been inflicted and the order, inflicting punishment was under challenge before the High Court in writ petitions and this principle shall apply in all those cases which were pending before the Court. There are several other cases also wherein the principles enunciated in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) have been applied by this Court. I have myself applied these principles in several cases and set aside the order of punishment on this count alone. 19. There are several other cases also wherein the principles enunciated in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) have been applied by this Court. I have myself applied these principles in several cases and set aside the order of punishment on this count alone. 19. The point regarding the interpretation of the phrase "this shalt have prospective application and no punishment imposed shall be open to challenge on this ground" came up before this Court in M. K. Soni's case (supra). Therein, this court came to the conclusion that it will be reasonable to apply this principle against all those orders of punishment which have not attained finality. It has further been mentioned that had the intention of the Supreme Court been to cover all those punishment orders which have been imposed prior to the date of the judgment, the Supreme Court would not have interfered with the order passed in the case which was there before the Supreme Court itself and therefore, it will cover only those in which the punishment orders have already become final and have already with-stood the challenge before the court of law and therefore, this phrase means to cover only those cases which have already become final and which are not facing any challenge before any authority or any pending case at any stage before the court. I am also of the same view and I see no reason as to why I should differ with the view expressed by my learned brother Justice M.R. Calla in M.K. Soni's case (supra). Another learned Single Judge of this Court (Justice G.S.Singhvi) has also placed reliance on M.K. Soni's case (supra) in Tej Karan Jain's case (supra) and expressed his agreement. Therefore, in my opinion, the principle laid down in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) is applicable in all those cases which are pending before the Court where the order of punishment has been challenged, but the orders of punishment which have become final either by afflux of time or by the fact that it h-As been upheld in a court of law, will not be allowed to be re-opened on this ground. Since in the present case, the writ petition had been filed challenging the order of punishment, the principle enunciated in Mohd. Since in the present case, the writ petition had been filed challenging the order of punishment, the principle enunciated in Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) applies and since the petitioner was not supplied a copy of the enquiry report before the disciplinary authority considered it and agreed with the same and came to the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of charges, relying on that report, the petitioner's case has been prejudiced and this clearly amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice. Since the principle mentioned in the case of Mohd. Ramjan Khan's case (supra) has been applied by this Court itself, the petitioner should not be discriminated at least by this Court. In view of this, it is not necessary for me to go into other questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 20. In the result, this writ petition is allowed, the order of punishment dated 23.5.1987 (Ex. 29) is quashed and the petitioner will continue to remain in service till any further orders are passed. He will also be entitled to all consequential benefits. However, it will be open to the non petitioners to furnish a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner and thereafter consider his representation if he so chooses to make;and the disciplinary authority is directed to decide the matter afresh in the light of the representation made by the petitioner. No order as to costs.Writ Petition Allowed. *******