JUDGMENT M.K. Mukherjee, C.J. - Responding to an advertisement issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh Ram Singar Yadav, the Appellant before us, applied for the job of a Sub-Inspector of Police. As his name did not find place in the list of successful candidates, he filed a writ petition before a learned Judge of this Court averring that he was a member of the backward class and, even though amongst the candidates of his class he had secured the highest marks, he had been illegally and unjustly denied appointment. 2. In contesting the writ petition the Respondents contended that the question whether the Appellant belonged to backward class or not did not arise as he himself had in his application seeking employment specifically stated that he would appear as a candidate of the general category and that he had penned through the column in the application form, which was ear-marked to indicate whether the candidate was of backward class and intended to appear as such. In other words, according to the Respondents, the Appellant did not apply for the job claiming himself to be a member of the backward class. Consequently, it was submitted, the appellant's case was considered along with the candidates of the general category and as he was unsuccessful he was not given employment. 3. After hearing the parties, the learned Judge rejected the writ petition on a finding that as the Appellant had applied for the job as a candidate of the general category, and not as a candidate of the reserved category belonging to backward class, he could not claim appointment even if his contention that he obtained highest marks amongst the candidates of backward category was true. Hence this special appeal at his instance. 4. Mr. Yadav, the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant, did not deny the fact that the Appellant had applied for the post as a candidate of the general category. But he contended that as along with the application the Appellant had filed a certificate to indicate that he was a member of the backward class, the Respondent were duty bound to treat him as a candidate of that class, notwithstanding that the fact that he had waived such a right, and offer him the job as he had secured the highest marks amongst the candidates of that class. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Basheshar Nath Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi and Rajasthan and Another, AIR 1959 SC 149 , Mr. Yadav urged that the fundamental rights incorporated in Part III of the Constitution of India could not be awaived by a citizen and therefore the Respondents ought to have recognised the right of the Appellant, as a citizen of the backward class, more particularly when it was within their knowledge. 5. It is of course true that in the above judgment it has been held that it is not open to a citizen to waive his fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, but then Mr. Vadav's reliance upon the above judgment is wholly misplaced for a citizen has no fundamental right to claim public appointment on the ground that he belongs to a backward class. 6. Clause (i) of Article 16 of the Constitution, which is relevant for our present purposes, declares that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Clause (2) thereof prohibits discrimination and assures effective enforcement of the fundamental right of equality of opportunity guaranteed by clause (1). Clause (3) entities the Parliament to make law in regard to certain class or classes of employment as mentioned therein and clause (4) entitles the State to make a provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. From a plain reading of clause (4) it is clear that it is only an exception to the equality guaranteed under clauses (1) and (2) and is not an independent provision. It is only an enabling provision which confers a discretionary power upon the State for making a provision for reservation of appointments in favour of backward class of citizens which, in its opinion, are not adequately represented in the services of the State. Conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that Article 16(4) of the Constitution does not confer any fundamental right upon a citizen of backward class to claim public employment. Consequently the question of waiver of such a supposed right and obligation of the State to provide employment in spite of such waiver do not arise. 7. Conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that Article 16(4) of the Constitution does not confer any fundamental right upon a citizen of backward class to claim public employment. Consequently the question of waiver of such a supposed right and obligation of the State to provide employment in spite of such waiver do not arise. 7. It was next contended by Mr. Yadav that denial of appointment to the Appellant was unreasonable and discriminatory as candidates of backward class who had obtained lesser marks than him got appointment. This contention has to be stated only to be rejected. As has already been noticed, the Appellant applied for the job not only claiming himself to be a member of the general category but also waiving his claim, if any, as a member of the backward class by striking out the relevant column in his application form. This was obviously done by the Appellant as the number of vacancies in the general category were much larger than the reserved quota for the backward class. In that context the Respondents were obligated to treat -- and in fact treated -- the Appellant as a candidate of the general category, for the purposes of recruitment, along with other candidates of that category vis-a-vis the candidates of backward class. Consequently successful candidates of the two categories comprised two separate and distinct groups and were treated accordingly by the Respondents. It cannot therefore be said that the Respondents adopted any unreasonable or discriminatory attitude in the case of the Appellant. 8. For the foreging discussion we dismiss the appeal, but without any order as to costs.